Polish Presidential Flight Crash Thread
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the atmosphere in the pilots' cabin was quite cheerful and relaxed, talks on private matters and on general matters, until the last seconds of the flight when the hell so to say suddenly broke out.
Did they ever hear of "sterile cockpit"?
Alice, could you confirm the rumour, from the other forums,
that a retired pilot, who was one of the first on the scene
after the accident reported fifth body in the cockpit?
It would fit with the information about at least two persons
visiting the cockpit.
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Does the TAWS command indicate they were not planning to land the plane? Would TAWS warnings be inhibited if the aircraft was configured for landing?
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From the description, it appears that nobody was watching the pressure altitude for the aircraft to get 115 meters below the established decision height. Even if they were solely focused on the RA, the valley was only 40 meters in depth, so they were still 75 meters or so below decision height. Either that, or they never set a clear decision height in their landing briefing. Did they even have a briefing?
So they are below what should have been decision height, they knew the visibility was only about 200m, or far below what should have been acceptable, ATC is telling them to level off, GPWS is telling them to "pull up", and they still didn't react until they actually saw the ground. Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.
So they are below what should have been decision height, they knew the visibility was only about 200m, or far below what should have been acceptable, ATC is telling them to level off, GPWS is telling them to "pull up", and they still didn't react until they actually saw the ground. Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.
Last edited by ST27; 20th May 2010 at 15:21.
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Continuing Alice025 translation
Group 7 Execution of flight from the moment of entering aerodrome Smolensk "North" controlled zone to the beginning of the descent on the glide path
a. At their request the crew was carrying out a "trial" approach to the decision height (100 meters).
b. Upon granting the crew a permission to execute the third turn, the controller advised the crew to be ready to go around from 100 meters.
Group 7 Execution of flight from the moment of entering aerodrome Smolensk "North" controlled zone to the beginning of the descent on the glide path
a. At their request the crew was carrying out a "trial" approach to the decision height (100 meters).
b. Upon granting the crew a permission to execute the third turn, the controller advised the crew to be ready to go around from 100 meters.
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Group 8 Final approach and a descent on the glide slope
a. Descent on the glide path was performed with AP controlling both pitch and bank with AT engaged. Turning off the AP in the longitudinal channel and AT occurred while trying to go around 5 and 4 seconds, respectively, before the collision with an obstacle (tree), which led to the beginning of the destruction of the airframe. Disengagement of AP in the lateral channel occurred at the time of the third collision with obstacles, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the aircraft structure.
b. The first TAWS warning “PULL UP” was 18 seconds before the collision with an obstacle, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the aircraft structure. Before this, a message TERRAIN AHEAD sounded twice.
c. The first collision of the plane with an obstacle occurred at a distance of about 1100 meters from the runway threshold and about 40 meters left from the runway centerline. Taking into account the terrain (ravine) and the tree height, aircraft was 15 meters below the runway threshold level.
d. The third collision of the left wing, which led to the destruction of the aircraft structure, with a birch trunk diameter of 30-40 cm occurred at a distance of 260 meters from the point of the first contact 80 m to the left of the extended runway centerline.
e. Time elapsed from the beginning of the aircraft destruction to the complete destruction of the aircraft fuselage structures due to collision with the ground in inverted position was about 5-6 seconds. The final destruction of the aircraft occurred at 10 o'clock 41 minutes 06 seconds.
f. Medical studies have shown that at the time of the aircraft destruction in an inverted position the passengers were subjected to overloads of 100 g. Survival in this incident was not possible.
a. Descent on the glide path was performed with AP controlling both pitch and bank with AT engaged. Turning off the AP in the longitudinal channel and AT occurred while trying to go around 5 and 4 seconds, respectively, before the collision with an obstacle (tree), which led to the beginning of the destruction of the airframe. Disengagement of AP in the lateral channel occurred at the time of the third collision with obstacles, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the aircraft structure.
b. The first TAWS warning “PULL UP” was 18 seconds before the collision with an obstacle, which led to the beginning of the destruction of the aircraft structure. Before this, a message TERRAIN AHEAD sounded twice.
c. The first collision of the plane with an obstacle occurred at a distance of about 1100 meters from the runway threshold and about 40 meters left from the runway centerline. Taking into account the terrain (ravine) and the tree height, aircraft was 15 meters below the runway threshold level.
d. The third collision of the left wing, which led to the destruction of the aircraft structure, with a birch trunk diameter of 30-40 cm occurred at a distance of 260 meters from the point of the first contact 80 m to the left of the extended runway centerline.
e. Time elapsed from the beginning of the aircraft destruction to the complete destruction of the aircraft fuselage structures due to collision with the ground in inverted position was about 5-6 seconds. The final destruction of the aircraft occurred at 10 o'clock 41 minutes 06 seconds.
f. Medical studies have shown that at the time of the aircraft destruction in an inverted position the passengers were subjected to overloads of 100 g. Survival in this incident was not possible.
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Aha. Group 7 translated, now
Group 8. Exit onto the landing straight line and lowering along the glissade.
(sorry keep forgetting how "glissade" is in English)
a. Landing along the glissade was taking place with the switched-on auto-pilot in the ? "along" and side channels, also with the swithed-on pull?tug? automate.
Switch off of the auto-pilot in its "along" channel and in its side channel happened at the attempt to go for the 2nd circle, at 5 and 4 seconds, respectively, before the clash with an obstacle (a tree). Which led to beginning of dismantling of the plane.
The auto-pilot switch off by the side channel took place at the moment of the third clash with obstacles, which were leading to the beginning of dismantling of the plane.
b. First TAWS warning type PULL UP was issued 18 seconds before the clash with the obstacle (leading to the beginning of the dismantling of the plane). Before that, there were twice TAWS messages type TERRAIN AHEAD.
(doesn't say was it 18 sec away from the first tree or from the third tree)
simply, "an obstacle"
c. First plane clash with an obstacle took place 1,100 metres away off from the runway, 40 meters to the left from the correct course of landing.
Taking into account the landscape eh? pecularities (a ravine) and the tree height - the plane height during the clash was 15 meters lower than the runway level.
d. Third clash, by the left wing, leading to the beginning of the dismantling of the plane, with a birch-tree, of ? leg? diameter 30-40cm, took place at 260 metres off away from the spot of the first touch/clash, at that - 80 metres to the left from the straight line continuation, the runway axis, that would have left to the runway.
e. Time passed between the beginning of the dismantling of the plane (trees clash - me) - and the total destruction of the plane caused by hitting the ground in upside down position - is about 5-6 seconds.
:o(
Total destruction of the construction of the plane took place at 10 hrs 41 minutes 06 seconds - at 10:41:06.
f. Medical- trasse ? research showed, that at the moment of the plane costruction destruction, in the upside down position, over-loads of value of about 100 g were influencing the passangers. To survive in this very accident was impossible.
Group 9 Alarm trouble and Saving work
a. In 13 minutes from the crash time approx. the area of the plane fall was "fenced" by means of Smolensk own police and by means of Federal security (two types of men - me), in the radius of 500 metres around the crash site, 180 men and 16 units of technical means (cars-trucks?)
b. The happened insignificant fire was liquidated by the fire brigades arrived to the scene - in 18 minutes after their arrival. (doesn't say when they arrived)
(but yes, all say there wasn't much fire, here and there, small bits. Not much to extinguish)
Group 10. Results of investigation of the aviation technics.
a. Results of work of the engineering-technical Sub-Commission state that there were no denials in the work of the airplane, its engines and its systems.
Dismantling of the plane in air, before the clash of the air vessels with the obstacles - took place not.
Group 11. Main future work of the Commission on investigating the accident.
a. Complete analysis of the TAWS and FMS data; when completed, and if there will arise the necessity - correct the actual flight route of the plane.
b. Research results of the court-medical tests of the members of the flying crew.
c. Attract independent flying experts and all together analyse the whole framework of the actions of the crew, specialists of the Service of Flights Managament (aerodrome) and model te possible flight, taing into account the real meteo-conditions and data from the control flights conducted over tghe aerodrome radio-technical means.
(they plan to do flight modelling hopping together all they know)
d. Prepare the draft of the Final Report
Technical Commission MAK worked out Operative Recommdendations and, in accordance with the point 6.8 of the Attachment 13 of the Chicago Convention - passed them over to the Appointed Representative of the Republic of Poland.
(that's the main thing that MAC normally does - says to plane owners what to correct in practices or in the technical equipment in order not to fall again)
Group 8. Exit onto the landing straight line and lowering along the glissade.
(sorry keep forgetting how "glissade" is in English)
a. Landing along the glissade was taking place with the switched-on auto-pilot in the ? "along" and side channels, also with the swithed-on pull?tug? automate.
Switch off of the auto-pilot in its "along" channel and in its side channel happened at the attempt to go for the 2nd circle, at 5 and 4 seconds, respectively, before the clash with an obstacle (a tree). Which led to beginning of dismantling of the plane.
The auto-pilot switch off by the side channel took place at the moment of the third clash with obstacles, which were leading to the beginning of dismantling of the plane.
b. First TAWS warning type PULL UP was issued 18 seconds before the clash with the obstacle (leading to the beginning of the dismantling of the plane). Before that, there were twice TAWS messages type TERRAIN AHEAD.
(doesn't say was it 18 sec away from the first tree or from the third tree)
simply, "an obstacle"
c. First plane clash with an obstacle took place 1,100 metres away off from the runway, 40 meters to the left from the correct course of landing.
Taking into account the landscape eh? pecularities (a ravine) and the tree height - the plane height during the clash was 15 meters lower than the runway level.
d. Third clash, by the left wing, leading to the beginning of the dismantling of the plane, with a birch-tree, of ? leg? diameter 30-40cm, took place at 260 metres off away from the spot of the first touch/clash, at that - 80 metres to the left from the straight line continuation, the runway axis, that would have left to the runway.
e. Time passed between the beginning of the dismantling of the plane (trees clash - me) - and the total destruction of the plane caused by hitting the ground in upside down position - is about 5-6 seconds.
:o(
Total destruction of the construction of the plane took place at 10 hrs 41 minutes 06 seconds - at 10:41:06.
f. Medical- trasse ? research showed, that at the moment of the plane costruction destruction, in the upside down position, over-loads of value of about 100 g were influencing the passangers. To survive in this very accident was impossible.
Group 9 Alarm trouble and Saving work
a. In 13 minutes from the crash time approx. the area of the plane fall was "fenced" by means of Smolensk own police and by means of Federal security (two types of men - me), in the radius of 500 metres around the crash site, 180 men and 16 units of technical means (cars-trucks?)
b. The happened insignificant fire was liquidated by the fire brigades arrived to the scene - in 18 minutes after their arrival. (doesn't say when they arrived)
(but yes, all say there wasn't much fire, here and there, small bits. Not much to extinguish)
Group 10. Results of investigation of the aviation technics.
a. Results of work of the engineering-technical Sub-Commission state that there were no denials in the work of the airplane, its engines and its systems.
Dismantling of the plane in air, before the clash of the air vessels with the obstacles - took place not.
Group 11. Main future work of the Commission on investigating the accident.
a. Complete analysis of the TAWS and FMS data; when completed, and if there will arise the necessity - correct the actual flight route of the plane.
b. Research results of the court-medical tests of the members of the flying crew.
c. Attract independent flying experts and all together analyse the whole framework of the actions of the crew, specialists of the Service of Flights Managament (aerodrome) and model te possible flight, taing into account the real meteo-conditions and data from the control flights conducted over tghe aerodrome radio-technical means.
(they plan to do flight modelling hopping together all they know)
d. Prepare the draft of the Final Report
Technical Commission MAK worked out Operative Recommdendations and, in accordance with the point 6.8 of the Attachment 13 of the Chicago Convention - passed them over to the Appointed Representative of the Republic of Poland.
(that's the main thing that MAC normally does - says to plane owners what to correct in practices or in the technical equipment in order not to fall again)
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This last one is the most interesting :o) but they won't let it know to the public.
Ptkay, re the additional person in the pilot cabin on the ground discovered - only rumours level on the Russian side as well. There is a dacha owner nearby who saw way too much in that flight cabin REPORTEDLY - but the way rumours went the Smolensk blog thinks it's all over-inflated to enormous degrees.
First he "saw a man", then he "saw 2 men", then he saw even the straps by which they were held in their chairs - and all this "through the cabin window".
While nobody so far saw the cabin itself!
so much it got destroyed.
What most people take for the "cabin" - that's end of the tail, in all the photos.
Ptkay, re the additional person in the pilot cabin on the ground discovered - only rumours level on the Russian side as well. There is a dacha owner nearby who saw way too much in that flight cabin REPORTEDLY - but the way rumours went the Smolensk blog thinks it's all over-inflated to enormous degrees.
First he "saw a man", then he "saw 2 men", then he saw even the straps by which they were held in their chairs - and all this "through the cabin window".
While nobody so far saw the cabin itself!
so much it got destroyed.
What most people take for the "cabin" - that's end of the tail, in all the photos.
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First he "saw a man", then he "saw 2 men", then he saw even the straps by which they were held in their chairs - and all this "through the cabin window".
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Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.
The third-hand reports from Polish media people who have interviewed a Russian, who remains nameless, but who heard the audio of the CVR are that some of the last words out of the crew's mouth (after they saw the trees in front) were "Settings?... Altitude?..."
The earlier parts of the recording pretty much matches what is known, that the flight was uneventful and the mood in the cockpit was pretty relaxed. Of course this is not by any means based on a transcript of the CVR, but based on an interview with someone who has heard the CVR recording.
Source:
Ostatnie krzyki pilotów: "Jezu, Jezu!" - Fakty w INTERIA.PL - Prezydent RP Lech Kaczy?ski nie ?yje, katastrofa samolotu w Smole?sku, pogrzeb Prezydenta
Also:
"Jezu, Jezu". Ostatnie s?owa pilotów - Katastrofa w Smole?sku - Dziennik.pl
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"The third-hand reports from Polish media people who have interviewed a Russian, who remains nameless, but who heard the audio of the CVR are that some of the last words out of the crew's mouth (after they saw the trees in front) were "Settings?... Altitude?..."
and by Russian blog gossip the last word was "Height?"
and by Russian blog gossip the last word was "Height?"
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"Mówili?my: uwa?ajcie strasznie. Potem s?ysza?em trzask i huk" - Polska - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 20.05.2010
In short:
Jak-40 crew talks with FO of 101 (Robert Grzywna).
There were lights on the edge of runaway.
Pressure altimeter on Jak-40 which was set according to Smolensk tower, was right +\- zero.
In short:
Jak-40 crew talks with FO of 101 (Robert Grzywna).
There were lights on the edge of runaway.
Pressure altimeter on Jak-40 which was set according to Smolensk tower, was right +\- zero.
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Today's MAK statement
After press conference held at the Interfax May 19 and publishing of preliminary results of the investigation, revealed facts and circumstances of the crash of the Tu-154M № 101 some media published information with reference to the alleged technical commission MAC or some "experts" in a number of publications, distorting the information provided at the press conference.
There was published even pictures of some of the victims with a link - photo IAC.
IAC officially declares:
We affirm the openness of the investigation.
The Technical Commission of IAC carries out its work in full accordance with international standards of ICAO, in which investigations are conducted in order to establish the circumstances and causes of the disaster and is not intended to establish someone's guilt or liability. The papers presented at a press conference, can not and should not be interpreted in this way.
ICAO regulations, which we follow, is not allowed disclosure of persons involved in the accident.
At a press conference on May 19 was not named any specific names, do not distribute photos of the victims, taking into account the principle of moral and ethical standards for the relatives of the victims. Photos of the victims in the MAC available.
IAC was sympathetic to the feelings of the public, but, realizing our full responsibility, believes that no one should affect the integrity and objectivity of the investigation.
Identified during the investigation the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash published on the website of the MAC.
After the press conference on May 19 Correspondent 24 television stations and news agencies attended the MAC lab for processing and interpretation of parametric and audio information onboard and ground-based objective control, familiar with equipment operation and related technologies.
There was published even pictures of some of the victims with a link - photo IAC.
IAC officially declares:
We affirm the openness of the investigation.
The Technical Commission of IAC carries out its work in full accordance with international standards of ICAO, in which investigations are conducted in order to establish the circumstances and causes of the disaster and is not intended to establish someone's guilt or liability. The papers presented at a press conference, can not and should not be interpreted in this way.
ICAO regulations, which we follow, is not allowed disclosure of persons involved in the accident.
At a press conference on May 19 was not named any specific names, do not distribute photos of the victims, taking into account the principle of moral and ethical standards for the relatives of the victims. Photos of the victims in the MAC available.
IAC was sympathetic to the feelings of the public, but, realizing our full responsibility, believes that no one should affect the integrity and objectivity of the investigation.
Identified during the investigation the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash published on the website of the MAC.
After the press conference on May 19 Correspondent 24 television stations and news agencies attended the MAC lab for processing and interpretation of parametric and audio information onboard and ground-based objective control, familiar with equipment operation and related technologies.
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The transcripts of the recording of conversations in the cockpit of the presidential Tupolev (CVR), which crashed near Smolensk on April 10 have been brought to Poland. Mr Edmund Klich, the Polish representative accredited to the MAK in Moscow brought it in on Friday afternoon. On Thursday, transcripts of the recordings from cockpit voice recorder were handed over to Klich by Aleksey Morozov from the MAK.
More here:
Edmund Klich: Mam ju? zapis rozmów w kabinie Tu 154 i wiele pyta?
More here:
Edmund Klich: Mam ju? zapis rozmów w kabinie Tu 154 i wiele pyta?
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After his arrival to Poland Mr. Kich gave an interview to the private
TVN24 television.
It was not pressure, but ...
Among other matters, he confirmed that somebody
was still in the cabin 1 minute before impact.
"Klich would not confirm these reports (that it was Blasik), nor whether the person of the recording died in the cockpit - I do not confirm, I do not deny - he said. - I know, but I am not authorized to betray the details. I know, but I can not share it - he concluded"
He didn't want to confirm the identity of this person as Gen, Blasik,
Chief in Command of PAF at that time.
Mr. Klich confirmed, a voice belonging to a non-crew
was recorded 1 min. before accident.
He admits, in contrary to his earlier opinion, that just the
"presence of a person" could have been a "pressure on landing" factor,
although no words to this effect were spoken or registers.
It could also be a distraction to the crew.
He also conformed, although not directly, that the QFE value given to
the crew by the ATC was correct.
Asked directly by the journalist Klich confirmed:
"They knew their barometric altitude."
He kept refusing to give any further details, claiming that the CVR
transcripts were given to him personally as to a member of the
commission, by Mr. Morozov, and he promised to keep them confidential.
Source:
Na minut? przed katastrof? w kabinie by? kto? spoza za?ogi - Polska - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 21.05.2010
Poor translation:
Google T?umacz
TVN24 television.
It was not pressure, but ...
Among other matters, he confirmed that somebody
was still in the cabin 1 minute before impact.
"Klich would not confirm these reports (that it was Blasik), nor whether the person of the recording died in the cockpit - I do not confirm, I do not deny - he said. - I know, but I am not authorized to betray the details. I know, but I can not share it - he concluded"
He didn't want to confirm the identity of this person as Gen, Blasik,
Chief in Command of PAF at that time.
Mr. Klich confirmed, a voice belonging to a non-crew
was recorded 1 min. before accident.
He admits, in contrary to his earlier opinion, that just the
"presence of a person" could have been a "pressure on landing" factor,
although no words to this effect were spoken or registers.
It could also be a distraction to the crew.
He also conformed, although not directly, that the QFE value given to
the crew by the ATC was correct.
Asked directly by the journalist Klich confirmed:
"They knew their barometric altitude."
He kept refusing to give any further details, claiming that the CVR
transcripts were given to him personally as to a member of the
commission, by Mr. Morozov, and he promised to keep them confidential.
Source:
Na minut? przed katastrof? w kabinie by? kto? spoza za?ogi - Polska - Informacje - portal TVN24.pl - 21.05.2010
Poor translation:
Google T?umacz
Last edited by Ptkay; 22nd May 2010 at 18:16.
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Ptkay, takin in account that Blasik will rather defend pilots, than press them (from interview with pilots collegues from SAF 36) and that second person in cabin was probably Chief of Protocol... 2+2 figure it.
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Quote:
Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.
Backing up a bit, I would suggest that a similar flight from another major country, carrying top government officials, wouldn't have even considered making an attempt to land using a NPA, knowing the visibility was well below minimums, and that another aircraft had diverted after making two attempts. They would have diverted without even trying, simply to ensure safety. It almost appears that they made the attempt to be able to say that at least they tried to land.. More political than safety-driven.
What do you suppose the pilot was thinking as he set up the approach? Perhaps that he was going to descend to his MDA, fail to see the ground, bounce off and execute a GA?
So how did he get as low as he did? Was the PA set wrong? (The CVR supposedly recorded ATC giving him the correct altitude, and the Polish YAK already on the ground had the same reading.) When the RA readings became available, did they fail to cross-check the PA? Why did the crew fail to immediately react to ATC telling them they were too low, and the GPWS telling them to "pull up"?
Yes, those are the questions the inquiry will attempt to answer, but I still ask how their procedures even allowed them to make an attempt to land.
Amazing that a high-level government flight could be operated with such lax standards.
Amazing that you think the crew flying IFR in dense fog down to a planned 100m altitude were NOT watching their barometric altimeter!
What do you suppose the pilot was thinking as he set up the approach? Perhaps that he was going to descend to his MDA, fail to see the ground, bounce off and execute a GA?
So how did he get as low as he did? Was the PA set wrong? (The CVR supposedly recorded ATC giving him the correct altitude, and the Polish YAK already on the ground had the same reading.) When the RA readings became available, did they fail to cross-check the PA? Why did the crew fail to immediately react to ATC telling them they were too low, and the GPWS telling them to "pull up"?
Yes, those are the questions the inquiry will attempt to answer, but I still ask how their procedures even allowed them to make an attempt to land.