Questioning Flight Crew SOP's

[jetset lady]

During the joy that is SEP, for the past couple of years, we have had a section that involves some sort of incident. The flight crew will sit down the front of the mock up with a laptop, which will give them the incident, then various options they can take all the way through. Cabin crew will either "play" the cabin crew or pax. Generally, it works very well as it's entirely dependent on the decisions made by the flight crew, so has different outcomes on each run through. It also gives us a chance to see why things are done, whether they work and in the past, has resulted in various procedures being looked at and if neccessary, changed.

This year, the incident resulted in an evacuation, with a hazard on the left side. Obviously, in normal circumstances, you would hopefully be able to see the hazard, before opening the door, but it's not a guarantee, especially on some of the 737's. (The door windows steam up so badly, you can't see anything out of them!) The flight crew made the PA, as per company SOP's, ordering the evacuation and stating "Left hand side, hazard". The problem is, the minute people hear "evacuate", they tend to jump into action, meaning the hazard message is lost in the melee. Even if we pause, in reality, the passengers won't. In this particular case, the few that did hear the second part, only heard "left". That's fine for us as we know that that would mean there was a hazard on the left, but a passenger, just hearing evacuate and left, would probably instinctively go to the left. While on the larger aircraft, the crew should be able to redirect, it could be a problem on those aircraft with self help exits. As Cabin Crew, we are told never to give negative commands, as people may not hear the full message. So why does this not carry through to the front?

My question is, should I raise this issue as a mere member of cabin crew and if so, how do I do it without risking the wrath of the instructors? I did mention it during the following discussion but was told, pretty sharply, by the flight crew instructor, that that is the SOP!

Thanks

Jsl

[PA38-Pilot]

Our SOP's are to indicate the side for which we are going to evacuate. In your case, it would be "Evacuate, right side only"

[Cpt_Schmerzfrei]

Do you have a Safety Manager / Officer? He should love to hear about your (absolutely valid) concerns. You can also ask him or her to keep your concerns confidential. BTW, SOPs are there to make flying safer, not just for their own sake. If they are not enhancing flight safety, they should be changed.

[jetset lady]

PA38,

That is exactly what I suggested during the discussion, but was told that was not the way we do things! I got the impression that the instructor felt that I was criticising the flight crews performance, despite my assurances to the opposite, along with a slight disbelief that a member of cabin crew could possibly question the SOP's. That's why I have been slightly reluctant to bring it up again. However, I shall now take Cpt_Schmerzfrei's advice and seek out the relevant person to speak to.

Thanks to both of you for your replies. It is much appreciated!

Jsl

[BOAC]

Good on you for speaking up and bad on 'them' for apparently smacking you down. You do, after all, have to handle the melee we cause

[turbocharged]

JSL,

Safety is all about reducing the risk of exposure to hazard. You have identified a probably risk factor that could expose pax to hazard through 'weak' SOPs. If I were you I would submit a report to the Safety Manager. If you subsequently incur the wrath etc, the submit a second report on how company culture impedes effective hazard analysis and subsequent risk management - a fundamental aspect of SMS.

It is amazing how little attention is paid to cabin crew views when designing SOPs.

TC

[mesh]

We never instruct on sides, only give the evacuation. You guys are stood at the doors, you and only you can see any hazards at point of exit and therefore its your decision.

[turbocharged]

Mesh,

It seems that JSL's company DO say which side to go. And her point is that on some types the cabin crew are not in a position to make that judgement.

And how many times have pilots called for an evacuation with other information, leaving the cabin in no position to make a judgement.

I was running a CRM class recently and one CA was telling me of an experience she had. Pax had not boarded so empty aircraft when suddenly the captain called 'evacuate'. She put her head through the door and asked what was going on and all he did was shout at her to get off the aircraft. So she left. But there was no sign of the pilots following her. So she reboarded ... only for the Captain to start shouting at her. She was concerned that maybe they were incapacitated. 20 minutes later the pilots emerged. They'd had a smoke detector go off in the cargo compartment and had decided to stay on board to guide the fire trucks to the aircraft.

I mean, what's a girl to do!?

[mesh]

Turbo, usually the crew would know what the problem was via a NITS or similar tool. If the pilots are giving other info with evacuation command then you are going to have trouble. When the doors are open the cc will have a much clearer idea of hazards than the flight deck.

In terms of the cc situation, as soon as you are on the aircraft or in the area of the aircraft then you are in a work environment. There are a few instances in our jobs that require no questioning. These situations are practiced outside of the aircraft time and time again so when they actually happen they should be second nature. For pilots it includes aborting the take off, going around etc. You hear those words and react immediately, ask questions later when you are sat in the crew room. To hear the flight deck issue an evacuate and not react immediately is very poor. To go back onto the aircraft afterwords is poor. I'm flight deck, in my view if I say evacuate thats all I haveto say. If there's one person or more in the back I do this so I can carry on with correcting the problem in the knowledge that the back is being cleared. If I go incap then its for my co pilot, fire brigade etc to find me.
To issue an evac with a cargo smoke indication is the FD's decision but if the CPT beleived there to be a fire I'm not surprised he shouted when interupted trying to save his life by someone incorrectly following SOP's that should be burnt into their memories.
I would rather someone shouted 'dont open that' when I was about to open an armed door and blow a slide against my SOPs' and saved my job than let me get on with it.
Just to finish, we had a situation in the cruise on a positioner with cc in the rear. The masks dropped as they were enjoying the film, No.1 walks forward to inform the flight deck, opens the door to find both FD with their O2 masks on. They turned around with looks of complete shock on their faces, the aircraft was depresurising, they were trying to get their O2 on and deal with the problem and then they have the incredible extra pressure of worrying that 20 cc in the back are starting to go into Hypoxia.

We practice these drills for a reason, they save our lifes.

[BOAC]

JSl - one operator I was with taught "Hazard on the .... - Evacuate evacuate" which might help a bit?

Originally Posted by mesh

To issue an evac with a cargo smoke indication is the FD's decision but if the CPT beleived there to be a fire I'm not surprised he shouted when interupted trying to save his life by someone incorrectly following SOP's that should be burnt into their memories.

- I think the point that TC was making was that since there were no pax and there was no immediate danger to the crew (or the pilots would have left!) the crew were in practice just being sensible!

[turbocharged]

Mesh,

The point I was trying to make is that, sometimes, SOPs might contribute to confusion and maybe increase risk.

Moving on to your example:

"Just to finish, we had a situation in the cruise on a positioner with cc in the rear. The masks dropped as they were enjoying the film, No.1 walks forward to inform the flight deck, opens the door to find both FD with their O2 masks on. They turned around with looks of complete shock on their faces, the aircraft was depresurising, they were trying to get their O2 on and deal with the problem and then they have the incredible extra pressure of worrying that 20 cc in the back are starting to go into Hypoxia".

Aren't there some SOP actions missing here?

TC

[mesh]

BOAC 'I think the point that TC was making was that since there were no pax and there was no immediate danger to the crew (or the pilots would have left!) the crew were in practice just being sensible! '

When you hear Evacuate in the back you dont know if there is immediate danger to the crew! for all intense purposes there is and this is why this move is taken...

'or else the pilots would have left'....when a severe emergency arises such as an engine fire etc we dont just jump out of the window, we have a checklist of things to get done to reduce the risk of us all going up. These guys were being careful but as I said they evacuated this one cc member to take her/him out of the equation. To walk back just put another body on the line.
Simple way of stating it...evacuate heard,

case a. cc member gets off A/C walks away to await instructions that he/she i would think will get from the F/D as part of there take control left/rightAll survive, FD walk down stairs, false alarm, de brief correct sop actions and look at anything to learn

case b. cc member doesn't follow sop's, walk towards fd door, interupts flow of FD sop's, gets shouted at, all get off as false alarm

case c. cc member doesn't follow sop's, walk towards fd door, in addition to cabin smoke the fd now get ATC message that fire engulfing underside of A/c, FD jump out of windows , run away from A/C to take charge and cant find CC member, cc member still trying to get into cockpit, Boom!

TC yes the SOP in the back is to put the masks that fall down in front of you on?

[BOAC]

TC yes the SOP in the back is to put the masks that fall down in front of you on?

- and.......?

In your other example it was, I think, patently obvious that that Captain was totally unaware of 'souls on board'. Add the fact that the jetty/stairs were presumably still on and I give that CA a big thumbs up for:-

Initiative
Commonsense

and looking after the flight deck's safety. TC - out of interest, what was the 'verdict' from the class on that one?

She should have taken in tea, though. Oh, and I try NEVER to jump out of a window when the cabin is clear and there is a jetty.

[turbocharged]

BOAC,

She felt humilated and confused. It seems the FD thought it was spurious which is why they weren't acting with any urgency.

Mesh's example actually goes to the heart of the problem. I could be just misreading the comment but Mesh seems to suggest that the CAs should have put their masks on and awaited further information. I'd like to know if this was a rapid decompression. Otherwise, what about 'monitoring systems', cabin altitude warning etc?

I know of a similar situation where the crew were down the back on a ferry flight when the masks dropped. No calls from the FD. The No1 went up to ask. The guys had not noticed that the cabin had climbed above 14.5.

On another occasion masks dropped, Crew were serving drinks but sat down and donned masks. Then the FD start chiming. No calls. The No1 does the monkey swing from mask to mask .. to find the Captain collapsed and the FO in dire need of help.

SOPs bring some order to the operational world. They don't always work as planned. JSL was simply suggesting that if something doesn't seem right in a training situation, what is the chance of it working as planned when needed.

[mesh]

it never takes long before silly little put down start hey BOAC...I use the window as an extreme example, but yes you are absolutely right you can exit via the stairs..well done! I drink coffee by the way!

TC I'm a little confused, if they ordered an evac I would have thought that was an indicator of acting with urgency.

I dont know the exact circumstances but with such indications as you have intimated the FD would check that its not a spurious message,check with the cc in question, ATC, firebrigade etc to try and confirm cargo smoke before evac command. It seems in this case a very quick command to evac.

In my example I would expect masks to be put on and await communications from FD once down to FL100 and level. This was an incipient loss so would have crept up on crew, but masks should have been put on as sop's dictate.

A lot of this stuff does rely on good communications between fd and cc. SOP's are there to provide basic responce to a situation. If the cc in question had followed SOP's then all would have been well. I refer back to my worst case scenario

[BOAC]

TC - was this fed back to the flight deck crew?

Back to the 'mesh' incident - we are pretty close to another Helios here with these 'slack' SOPs -

yes, c/c mask up (and ENSURE any pax do too).

After a SUITABLE time, attempt contact with F/deck - PDQ in fact if no announcement or emergency descent is detected.

Sauntering forward [presumably without a bottle (of oxygen)] is just plain stupid and a bottom needs to be kicked.

[jetset lady]

Well, I tried....

Thanks to all for the advice!

[Firestorm]

JSL you could raise your concern through CHIRP so that it will be put forward to your company without them knowing that it came from you. Alternatively you could raise your concern with the company CAA Flight Ops Inspector. If you call the CAA at Gatwick they can tell you who to write to, or of course CAA cabin safety department.

If you feel that you have a question about safety you must raise it: that is the whole point of CRM!

PM me if you need any help finding who to contact.

[lowcostdolly]

JSL I know we have had our differences of opinion in the past but please can I give you some advice as one colleague to another.....be very careful here.

Of course the advice given to you by Firestorm is correct and the rationale sound but..... please can I tell you about something that happened to a close friend of mine who worked for a major airline (not BA) and did exactly as you are considering doing. The safety culture of any airline is only as good as the receptiveness of the people charged with the responsibility of upholding it.

My friend raised 3 safety concerns with this airline. The first involved CC only. When she raised this CC managers failed to take ownership of this for 3 months. During that time some CC (including my friend) were injured so the issue was raised again. As a result of doing this my friend was suspended and taken off a promotion course by somebody who didn't have the maturity to see the bigger picture and was of the opinion CC should be seen but not heard in relation to safety. The matter was finally resolved with union intervention and my friend re- instated.

My friend had to wait several months for her promotion so lost salary. During this time she was subjected to open hostility from so called managers at her base. Further to that this hostility was tranferred to the company email system when she had input into a second issue which was formally raised by the flight deck via an ASR. The CC Manager who sent the email pressed the wrong button and it landed in my friend's inbox. The behaviour which she had felt from these people was now no longer a perception but a written reality.

The third issue involved flight deck SOP's, a failure of which impacted on my friends SOP's in the cabin. The Captain refused to support a CSR despite admitting he had made a mistake which was plainly felt by all on board apparently! When my friend submitted a written report the manager receiving it failed to submit it onto the company safety database for investigation. It was this dishonesty by this manager that prompted my friend to contact the CAA via their whistleblowing procedure.

This procedure, although guarenteeing anonimity, states you should try and resolve the matter through the company procedures. My friend tried to do this and failed. When she went to the CAA she lost her job due of the vindictiveness of immature people playing at cabin crew management and didn't want their procedures or behaviour under scrutiny. There was a term for this to do with working relationships.....I can't remember what.

If you raise an issue via the CAA which you have already raised in the company and you are the only person to do so the company will probably guess who you are. Be prepared to take the consequences.....

The Public Interest Disclosure Act is supposed to protect people from this behaviour. It doesn't but it will ensure you are compensated when you loose your job and bring a claim to the employment tribunal.

My friend now works for a different airline and is happy. The safety culture of that airline is the same as stated at her previous one but she would always now go through CHIRP or the CAA direct. She would never raise it direct to the company because of previous experience. I would always now do likewise because of what I saw her go through at her airline.

Be careful JSL. If you are happy with the safety culture at BA and the people charged with upholding it then raise your issue to the "relevant person" (your words). If you have not raised it as yet then go through CHIRP or the CAA. I would advise against combining the two.

I wish you luck on whatever you decide to do and I hope BA are different.

[Firestorm]

LCD: you are right that the safety culture is only as good as the integrity of those administering it, and in my experience cabin services managers can be unbelievably corrupt in such matters. I know of instances between flight ops managers and chief pilots being told that cabin services knew better on various matters of operation (as opposed to cabin management). CRM isn't something that happens only on the aeroplane, but should be a part of the company culture, particularly if a member of the operation has a safety concern or query. My advice to JSL assumed a higher level of integrity than might exist, and in the case of a system you can't trust I would agree that you should bypass the company system, and go direct to CHIRP or the CAA. If you have brought it up, and been rebuffed the trail is too obvious, as you correctly state.

JSL I hope you manage to either sort the problem out, or to live with it.