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Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation

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Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation

Old 3rd Feb 2011, 17:49
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MB is puzzled about the use of Bayesian techniques in the evaluation of (supposedly-) ultrareliable systems.
I'm not puzzled by that at all. I understand it quite well.

What does puzzle me is your own contradictions. You say one thing in a post. Then the exact opposite in a following post. It's that reality that makes me wonder if you are being argumentative.

If that's what you want to discuss, fine.
You remind me of a younger sibling who once proudly proclaimed to me that "you have to play by the definitions in my dictionary." To me your posts amount to the claim that the letter A is equal to the letter B in their graphical design. I don't know how to have that discourse on that basis.

What I get is an constant appeal to your authority as an expert. One of the main reasons I chose to remain anonymous on these boards is precisely because I would rather discusses matters free from such appeals. Rational men are able to see the light of truth where ever it may shine, in the gutter no less than the academy.
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Old 3rd Feb 2011, 18:13
  #142 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by MB
I'm not puzzled by that at all. I understand it quite well.
That is not the impression I am getting. The impression I am getting is that you don't know this material at all well.

Originally Posted by MB
What does puzzle me is your own contradictions. You say one thing in a post. Then the exact opposite in a following post.
That old humbug again. So, quote a contradiction that you claim I have proposed.

Originally Posted by MB
What I get is an constant appeal to your authority as an expert.
Sorry if that style grates on you. It's a career-related illness, I fear. But I don't think you'll find me claiming expertise where I don't have it.

So, is my appeal to return to the subject matter of the thread falling on stony ground? Do you feel, like BOAC, unable to get anything more out of a technical discussion?

PBL
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Old 3rd Feb 2011, 18:30
  #143 (permalink)  
 
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So, is my appeal to return to the subject matter of the thread falling on stony ground? Do you feel, like BOAC, unable to get anything more out of a technical discussion?
It's amazing what a little bit of knowledge and a whole lot of arrogance can produce.

Just like my younger sibling: "Bow to my expertise or I will kill the discussion." Hopefully, you'll grow out of this mentality one day.

If anyone actually wants to discuss, as opposed to sneer, computers and aviation I will still check this thread from time to time.
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Old 3rd Feb 2011, 19:13
  #144 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by MB
It's amazing what a little bit of knowledge and a whole lot of arrogance can produce.
MB, I find it a shame that many PPRuNe contributions are vastly more eloquent with insults than they are with technical material.

I think we may live in different worlds. I correspond on a regular basis with the people who actually did the work to which I was referring, and there is (as there usually is in these circles) mutual respect for each other's capabilities and interests. No one would ever say or write something like the above.

Which doesn't mean to say no one is arrogant. Just that personality characteristics is an uninteresting topic of conversation. We are much more interested in Bayesian methods and CCFDs.

However, accusing someone of not knowing (thoroughly) what they are talking about is a serious one in our circles, and usually requires proof.

Which is how I know you don't live there: the fact that you don't feel the need to establish, with proof, your suggestion that I may have contradicted myself is a firm indication. Let me suggest that my world is far preferable to live in than one in which discussion differences are resolved through throwing insults.

But I am still curious, of course. Where exactly is that contradiction that you think I offered?

I doubt you'll answer. But if you were living in my world, that would get you thrown out.

PBL

Last edited by PBL; 3rd Feb 2011 at 19:50. Reason: Maybe a little more background is needed
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Old 3rd Feb 2011, 21:00
  #145 (permalink)  
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If anyone actually wants to discuss, as opposed to sneer, computers and aviation I will still check this thread from time to time
- thanks MB - that is why I started it.

I take it there is still a 'slide rules at dawn' battle in progress, but it is beautifully peaceful here
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Old 6th Feb 2011, 14:20
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The latest from Flight Global: Industry sounds warnings on airline pilot skills
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Old 7th Feb 2011, 08:46
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I don’t think the good old days were that good. I can still remember the sheer bloody effort spend learning about the errors and limitations of instruments. Just like a politician, not one of the wretched things ever told the truth and with the slightest provocation they told huge great porkies. That was if you could actually read the buggers. The “three pointer altimeter,” monochromatic dials, pointers the same colour as the displacement indicators and so on. They were difficult to read during day time. Reading them at dusk was virtually impossible as the instrument lighting was not bright enough. At night it wasn’t much better. I still remember my fingers being burnt by post lights when you had to swap them about during an approach at night in an F27. And then there’s the fuel trim indicators – a gauge with an arc length of something like 2.5 inches where you were expected to set something like 78.9%. And this little gauge was there to help you control up to 30% on the engine’s fuel flow. As for backup, you had to remember which engine the standby horizon was connected to. From what I can understand, this aircraft was typical for the period.

Then there’s the last generation of steam instruments, the ones fitted to jet transport aircraft just before the world went glass. I’m talking here about aircraft manufactured up to about 25 years ago. The legibility of these instruments was excellent as was their reliability if you compared them with previous generations. But they suffered from being incredibly complicated, very expensive and by modern standards inaccurate. First generation “glass” left these things for dust in the reliability stakes. Unfortunately, this stuff was fitted without the background knowledge we had with old fashioned steam instruments. We were told that these thing were accurate – even when the system knew it self that it wasn’t. The “magenta” line was always (and still is) a few pixels wide when these systems know that they may have an error of up to two miles. We weren’t taught how these things could be miss-programmed, could suffer from interference or in many cases even where the data came from. Surprisingly the data often came from the same “black boxes” that supplied the previous generation of steam instruments. And I remember being told that I didn’t have enough experience to fly an “all glass aircraft.” There were even more idiots around in training during this period.

Virtually all modern FBW digital aircraft now have solid-state transducers and a high degree of redundancy. They are reliable. But the worst case scenarios are not practiced with enough regularity. My own aircraft, one of the cheapest jets money can buy, still leaves you with a flight path vector if all ADC data are removed. If the screens capable of supplying that information go blank, I still have a battery driven attitude indicator. The engine data is capable of being displayed on three screens. Overall, I’d suggest that following a catastrophic instrumentation failure, you still have a flyable aircraft – but only if you were trained to use it. And I tell you what, we are. It is included in our type training and elements are practiced during bi-annual recurrent training.

Regarding modern flight decks, we face two big problems. Firstly is “mode awareness” – I have lost count of the amount of times I personally have been caught by my aircraft doing something I didn’t want it to do. Either I trap by error by noticing the untoward behaviour or my ever vigilant, normally thirty years younger colleague spots it. This is only possible in system where both seats respect each other as equals when it comes to flying. The fact that most F/O’s can fly better than me is not significant. The second is receiving training that exposes you mode and system failure at critical times and how this physically interacts with the aircraft. This has to be planned by imaginative trainers and be very type specific. I don’t think every airline does this nor are they aware of some of the nasty little surprises hidden inside the aircraft they every day. A crew of a 737 at BOH a few years ago received several nasty shocks as did the poor sods at AMS.

Solution? A free flow of information and training so that we can a) Recognise the early onset of source data supply problems, if any and b) Have a rapidly executable plan that will always allow an immediate escape using data that is reliable.

PM

Last edited by Piltdown Man; 8th Feb 2011 at 16:48.
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Old 26th May 2011, 14:47
  #148 (permalink)  
 
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Typing during flight

I have so often seen complaints about pilots typing in data before a landing. I have the following suggestion.
Today we have memory sticks with capacities above 64 GBytes which could easily store all available information about all runways known e.g. to Jeppesen.
Then a small program could take the current position (altitude and heading) from the on-board system. Then wind conditions could added by hand using a touch screen to compute a nearly optimal descent. - A minimum of typing.
The result could be reviewed and - if accepted - transferred to the on-board system. Voila!
But maybe I am too far into the future?

Regards from an old real-time-system designer.
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Old 23rd Jun 2011, 07:36
  #149 (permalink)  
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Time to awake an old friend (post #1 here) and check whether any others now agree? Take a moment also to read Sciolistes' link from February, and note with some irony perhaps that the Air France "corporate safety manager Bertrand de Courville dealt with the art of safe go-arounds." during the 'presentations' - an interesting focus perhaps in the light of what we now think.

Ladies and gentlemen - there have been many calls for a significant shift in focus in 'training' - I again add mine. Time for the remaining few 'old' pilots with any clout in the system to take a stand against the accountants and managers who are dazzled in the headlights of an imperfect technology and training system and ensure all pilots simply have BASIC flying skills and the BASIC tools with which to use them.
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Old 23rd Jun 2011, 19:06
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Well, I think a sense of perspective about "the art of safe go arounds" is in order here. Even in the 20 years I've been flying, things have developed in this regard. For the first few years of doing an instrument rating, I was incredibly adept at doing a single-engine go-around at ILS Cat I minima - and this was what we had legally to be able to demonstrate. The only thing that ever changed was which engine was shut down.

Over the last 20 years, it has been pointed out that life is rarely that simple. And so go-around techniques (and everything else) have been finessed to cover a wide variety of other options. A go-around from the runway. A go-around and level-off at 1000'. A safe go-around at Cat III minima. An engine failure on short final followed by a go-around. A go-around with jammed flaps. Windshear go-arounds. A go-around with an obstacle clearance procedure. Doubtless there were some good ol' boys who regardless of what you threw at them would have the skills to do the right thing intuitively. Perhaps. It was also discovered that there were about 80% of the people who might well be thrown by the unexpected. Not every pilot is as brilliant as those good ol' boys. And no airline could count on having a good ol' boy in the left hand seat on the day when it all went to pot.

So go-around techniques continued (and continue) to be a matter of debate. The appropriate level of automation continued to be discussed and developed.

There are some things which, in my opinion, are absolutely brilliant about how the Airbus is set up. Like when doing a CFIT manoeuvre, you can just firewall the throttles and pull the stick back as far as it will go and hold it there. You don't have to worry about overstressing anything or whether you could pull harder - the aeroplane will simply give you everything it is capable of. And not worrying about that, try and work out why the heck you have granite in front of you and how you can get away from it.

Except that you have predictive GPWS, so may well have avoided that in the first place.

And here's the rub. All these computers are there to improve safety. GPWS, EGPWS, Weather Radar, Windshear, Predictive windshear, TCAS, GPS, FMC, Autopilot ... all have been added because, all else being equal, they add safety margin. "Good" pilots have had a share in a significant number of the most famous air accidents - I'm not going to enumerate them, but I'm sure you won't have to think hard - and in some cases, they were not using systems that aircraft manufacturers had made available to protect them.

You can talk about this being an erosion of professionalism if you like. I don't think so. What it means is that a different skill set is required. The same happens in every job. If you go back to the 50s and 60s, there were airliner crashes most months, it seems (I had to do a quiz, and working through the headlines of those years was startling). If aviation were as dangerous now as it was then, we would be seeing hull losses daily.
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Old 23rd Jun 2011, 20:40
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Reminds of debates about ethics and morality...

I think when the airlines want to have a serious discussion about safety practices, then hiring practices will be first on the agenda, not whether we need TCAS I or II, or third FMS on board.

When all the lights go out, we either have pilots that can dead reckon and hand fly or we do not. Let's start there.

It's laughable to discuss SOPS and safety strategies when the airlines continue to hire personality over experience.
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Old 23rd Jun 2011, 22:24
  #152 (permalink)  
 
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If you are going to give management a problem, have a solution beforehand

BOAC (#149), hopefully avoiding previous debates; we the ‘older’ generation, should also take care not to be “dazzled in the headlights of an imperfect technology and training system”.
What may have been 'basic' to us may not represent current views of training requirements – the minimum skill set to conduct flight operations safely. I stress ‘minimum’ and ‘safe’, used as in airmanship terms which requires additional and progressive acquisition of skills with operational experience – training on the job.
In the view above, I assume that the industry has deliberately changed the required level of training with the advent of advanced technology – automation. If so, then either this training does not match the requirements of the new generation of pilots, perhaps dependant on automation, or it does not match the expectation of the older captains in modern operational situations, of whom most have the relevant experience and skills.
The former leaves new pilots ill-equipped to conduct operations without additional support; the latter places greater workload and responsibility on captains, and in reality, probably both.

These thoughts were developed in the adjacent thread - http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ver-pilot.html (#19)

Many of the problems stem from ‘change’ and how changes have been identified and managed; ‘change’ was also an issue earlier in this thread - http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post5041334 (#20)

Perhaps what the industry is concerned about (link @ #146) identifies with the relatively recent changes in ‘imperfect technology and training system’, and thus are reactions to first contact with the enemy – no plan survives contact with the enemy. Conversely, is the industry over-reacting to a few surprising ‘automation’ accidents (salience), in what is a very safe mode of transport, but one which always expects improvement?

I agree that the industry needs to review (change) the current situation, but not necessarily ‘back to (the old) basics’ – you cannot turn the clock back.
What has changed? Man, machine, or situational context – the big system – human, technical, social aspects.
What is inadequate about the existing technology and training – remember that nothing is perfect. The man / machine only need to be adequate for the task and context (not perfect safety). Is the current (changed) context too complex for the present man / machine combination?

Thus what needs to be improved? Basics are important, but what are the ‘basic’ skills and tools for today’s context? Will these be adequate for the foreseeable future involving the ‘new’ man /machine and operational situations?
How and when are improvements to be achieved? Perhaps the latter (timing) is the pressing issue.
IMHO the discussion should focus on the changes, not just on taking a stand. If you are going to take a problem to management, have a workable solution beforehand – and one in your favour, safety.
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Old 24th Jun 2011, 07:27
  #153 (permalink)  
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I do not have a solution, alf - that is for more qualified folk than me. Nor is it wrong to try to ensure that this very 'management' or whatever is driving the situation is thinking about the issue. No, I do not wish to revert to flying ILS on Turn and Slip, or inclinometers or wing-warping, but you must admit that whatever 'bells and whistles' (make that now 'Ecam and alerts'?) a system provides, IF(when?) it goes tits up, providing a pilot has basic control of the a/c and basic reliable (even if crude) information, he/she should be capable of recovering to a more safe environment. I'm sure, as one of the older generation like me, you treasured the ability to disconnect the autopilot from the automatic vertical/lateral navigation system and, knowing where you were and where you wanted to go were then able to use basic piloting skills to actually FLY the aircraft while the 'what's it doing now' mist burnt off?

My fear is that this concept is no longer built into the mindset of the 'modern' pilot. My fear is that in the 447 case (since that is where I began this thread) they were 'expecting' something magic to happen' rather than ensuring that it did. That primarily is my concern.

I said many moons ago, that once the 'spamcan' in the PPL syllabus has some form of LNAV as a standard (which is probably not far away) the concept of 'where am I' may completely disappear too. I saw that very mindset 5 years ago when there was an LNAV issue in my company and one particular pilot was COMPLETELY lost without the HSI Nav display - no concept of PLOG/time/tuning a beacon or even looking out of the window - just a disbelieving fixed stare at a useless EHSI. The problem is with us - let's address it. The call is for input from greater minds than mine, alf, particularly those with influence. After all, the little boy shouting that the king was actually naked probably did not have a complete set of clothes in a holdall for the king, but simply and genuinely felt someone should be aware.

Your opening para is indeed valid, alf, but who, then is to tell the king?
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Old 25th Jun 2011, 07:50
  #154 (permalink)  
 
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What it means is that a different skill set is required.
I agree.

I said many moons ago, that once the 'spamcan' in the PPL syllabus has some form of LNAV as a standard (which is probably not far away) the concept of 'where am I' may completely disappear too.
I think there is a cogent argument to be made that 'where am I' as a concept should go away. At least, it should go away as a matter of first priority. One's position is no longer determined by peering through the glass of your bi-plane and following the dirt road to the landing strip. Where one is, in the first instance, a function of what flight system or what instrument one chooses to give attention. It's based upon what mental model one has constructed of events as feed to you by those instruments. What goes under the term 'loss of situational awareness' is really the result of data overload, or mode confusion, or wrong priorities. The amount of accidents where the GPWS is going off on the flight deck while the crew blithely plows the plane into the ground is astonishing.

The way I see it is that in modern FBW aircraft before you even get to the 'where am I' question the pilot has a credibility problem. Is that GPWS warning accurate or is it malfunctioning. Is that altimeter that's dropping 10,000 meters/minute on AF 447 accurate or the computer run amok. It's rare that the pilot loses situational awareness; it's more often the case that he's simply wrong about the situation in the first instance. And that's usually the result of the fact that he's chosen to believe his eyes (his biological system) over the instruments in the plane, or because he's chosen to believe what the instruments are telling him in terms of raw data rather than filtering that through the logic of the automation, or some other type of mode confusion.

The point that I'm driving at is developing new skills are not enough. To the extant that a pilot in a modern FBW aircraft is a computer jockey, he just doesn't need to do things differently he needs to think about flying differently. He needs new conceptual tools and different training. I don't think that retreating to paeans about 'basic airmanship' is healthy. All that will do is create a type of dual-consciousness that will exacerbate mode confusion rather than resolve it.
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Old 25th Jun 2011, 11:49
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It's rare that the pilot loses situational awareness;
In the simulator we see it all the time. And I don't mean a pilot looking at his MAP and pointing to that VOR symbol over there. During the course of being radar vectored the instructor will cover or fail the MAP mode and freeze the simulator and ask the student to point to the position of the aircraft on the Jepps chart.

You would be dismayed how many pilots have difficulty with this simple task. Sometimes the instructor will take control of the simulator and move the aircraft to several positions within a 50 mile radius and then ask the student to show his position on an en-route chart using RMI indications requiring cross radials or ADF readings coupled with DME readings. Again we see much sucking of teeth especially if the instructor then asks the student the MSA in that sector. This is only part of situational awareness by definition. Sometimes it takes several minutes for the student to work out his present position with much turning of the Jepps chart sideways or upside down. This is basic instrument navigation but reliance on the MAP has meant these navigation skills are lost.
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Old 26th Jun 2011, 19:04
  #156 (permalink)  
 
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BOAC et al, this is an excellent thread, but like that of AF447, the search for meaningful understanding and solutions to a complex problem often leads to repetition and entrenched thinking.
However, by revisiting ‘the two tasks’ in # 1, it may be possible to have a deeper, although more conceptual view of the issues; I offer the following:
  • … the manufacturer/regulators/operators to ensure something usable remains, …
If we remove AF447 and its speculative aspects from the wider view of current safety, then the existing requirements appear to be satisfactory. Where technical issues appear to dominate accidents, regulatory interpretation and/or the operational implementation (human factors) also contribute serious weaknesses, e.g. 737 Rad Alt, A320 Congonhaus, MD80 TOCW.
Other accidents almost exclusively involve the use, the application, of what equipment/knowledge ‘remains’ (or is normally available); LOC, disorientation, overrun.
  • … a change in the philosophy and application of training and recurrent testing.
This task reflects the problems of applying what ‘remains’, what is normal (as above). One solution proposed so far is what I have described as ‘more of the same’ (blame and train), and which other posts have described as specific changes in education, training, checking, and operation. The report in the link @ #146 follows the same theme.

However, with a conceptual view, I suggest that these solutions are only treating the symptoms of a much deeper problem. An obvious candidate is the increasing use technology, but not to discard interrelated aspects of human behaviour and the overall operational ‘system’.

Technology / automation may encourage complacency in operational, organisational, design and regulatory judgement; we are assuming too much, there is technological bias in our risk management.
Not that the human is lazy, but we do like to be efficient; high in trust, and making many (often undisclosed) assumptions.
We depend on automation, and in the extreme may believe that automation can replace the unique human ability to think. We no longer practice ‘old skills’ associated with understanding (situational awareness) because the required level of ‘understanding’ is presented in suitable formats; EFIS, FMS, Autopilot/FD, but most of the modern human-machine interfaces are adequate for basic flying tasks.

At a regulatory level this search for efficiency might result in lower standards (old assumptions), allowing greater complexity in operations - crowded airspace, longer duty time, etc.
At the operator-management level, there is a lower calibre recruiting, reduced training, etc.
And at the sharp end … … what exactly is the problem with automation; not seeing emerging problems, not appreciating ‘change’, or the need to change our thoughts or actions; not being very thorough.

Much of the above comes from ‘The ETTO principle’, Efficiency - Thoroughness Trade-Off (Hollnagel), how we balance getting the job done vs cost, time, and resource. This involves the sharp-end, management, regulators, and designers.
  • AF 447; regulatory assumption that crew can fly pitch / power, delay in retrofitting pitots was acceptable, crew fly close Cbs because of route structure / other traffic – efficiency!
  • 737 Rad Alt, MD 80 TOCW; maintenance, fault reporting and rectification, lower regulatory standards – grandfather rights (assumption), – efficiency!
  • Disorientation; crew rush to engage autopilot, early turns, weak crosschecking, – efficiency!
  • Overrun; press-on-itis, approximate calculations, poor knowledge, – efficiency!
How do we balance our quest for efficiency in normal operations with thoroughness to maintain safety?
We need to “enhance [our] abilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn” - Hollnagel The ETTO Principle.
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Old 26th Jun 2011, 21:13
  #157 (permalink)  
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alf - thanks as always for a thoughtful and comprehensive post. I cannot respond to it all, but would say:

"repetition and entrenched thinking." is where I think we are. Take the 3 year cycle of LPC/OPC 'topics' - how often is a wildie thrown in? Do we just tick the box for UPs, double engine fail, loss of all hydrayulics etc etc without looking at the increasing complexity of the a/c systems, what can go wrong and how we both recognise that and react to it? Hence the secong bullet point you post.

"We depend on automation, and in the extreme may believe that automation can replace the unique human ability to think. We no longer practice ‘old skills’ associated with understanding (situational awareness) because the required level of ‘understanding’ is presented in suitable formats; EFIS, FMS, Autopilot/FD, but most of the modern human-machine interfaces are adequate for basic flying tasks." - yes, to me a very large part of the problem. Indeed I would go further than you and say "all of the modern human-machine interfaces are more than adequate for basic flying tasks". Most are indeed excellent. The AB system included. I have, however, maintained for a long time that these outstanding systems are ahead of human capacity at this time and thereby too complicated. My point is - are we ready when it fails and do we have the necessary human skills to notice and react and the equipment with which to cope.

Tee Emm's post is a case in point - that sort of SA is rarely, if ever, in a pilot's life-time needed now - it was 'bread and butter'. When the wick goes out, however, on the EHSI or whatever, what should be a simple task of sorting things out methodically is vastly complicated by a lack of awareness as to what the magic stuff had been doing for the last x minutes/hours. Get airborne, plug it in, and when we see 1 hour or so to go, start paying attention to things. Seen that before?

Keep it coming folks - something needs to change..
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Old 27th Jun 2011, 13:09
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The Problem with Mishap Based analysis

PBL made some interesting points regarding data that promotes a level of safety to be gained by relying increasingly on the computer/automation. The problem is that the depth of inquiry and investigation over accidents, where the combined man/machine lash up failed, is orders of magnitude deeper than the depth of inquiry into those events where "it nearly went pear shaped" or other system issues arose but the plane landed safely. It is my guess that any number of events of that sort are never captured. There may be "conventional wisdom" or a variety of anecdotal evidence about how poor a given system is, but until failure, or near catastrophe, where is the data that allows one to make a case for change or improvement? Within each organization I suspect that the attention paid to the "not quite right but it didn't kill us this time" varies. That leads to the idea that data for analysis is further skewed, as a certain percentage of this will remain "in house" for a variety of reasons.

In gross terms, the analysis scheme PBL was resting upon in the linked article somewhat resembles "counting the hits and ignoring the misses." As a data collection method on the man/machine system, this seems a step toward a technique that is a No-No of significant severity. You have to account for the hits and the misses to get a sense of what your data is telling you. (An example is the rigor of drug tests in the US that FDA gets all shirty about ... and even then the outcome isn't perfect). I am not convinced that data collection by exception is going to take the industry in the proper direction, since it looks to create a built-in bias.

As an industry (I recall discussing briefly with PJ2 some FOQA issues a while back) there are disincentives and obstacles to the industry wide sharing of "hey bubba" moments and lesser "it went wrong" incidents that were not fatal. But I also understand that there are programs to do just that.

A few pages back, one of the old hands called for a required debrief session after each leg or trip. Having grown up in military flying, that was part of the event. The sortie was not complete until we'd all sat down, cigarettes and coffee in the old days, coffee and nothing more recently, and walked the mission front to back in about ten to fifteen minutes to see what we did right, wrong, and what to do about any of it. The CRM environment the Navy got very involved with encouraged this in terms of the working the approach to the debrief as a no fault event.

That left the sticky issue of dealing with SOP and Rule breaches. If during a flight, something blatantly wrong was done or commanded, then what? (Oh, by the way, what rule set did the organization overlay on the system? Varies by organization). Sometimes, the PIC would address it formally. Sometimes, it was the PIC who was the culprit. The Navy's Anymouse program was able to bring to light a few of these things, via a non-attribution safety gram entering the flight safety system and "something not right" was aired rather than being buried. I will guess that airlines have similar structures in place. If the culture of the flying professionals in the organization is "I can be a better aviator/crewman/crewmember" each day, the above system worked better than when that attitude was not evident in the organizaiton from top to bottom.

What has this to do with Computers in the Cockpit and aviation safety?

The debriefing and the documentation of any and all, even seemingly minor, hitches and glitches on each and every system ought to be part of every flight. The designers and those who work on system improvement and adjustments need data in order to get get funds for system adjustments or improvements. So too those who keep track of training and proficiency of aircrews.

Are man/machine interface issues handled well enough in your (or any) organization?

Snipped the rest, as I am wandering into areas I don't know enough about.
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Old 27th Jun 2011, 13:23
  #159 (permalink)  
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Snipped the rest, as I am wandering into areas I don't know enough about.
- I would guess that is a shame - Why not float 'ideas' if nothing else on the topic? They can stimulate discussion. If they are 'rubbished', I'm sure as ex Navy you are used to brushing that off......................
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Old 27th Jun 2011, 14:19
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Why not float 'ideas' if nothing else on the topic? They can stimulate discussion.
Back to basics. Firstly - can the aircraft be flown safely by hand? If it cannot then it should never have been certified in the first place. Of course all jet transports are capable of being hand flown.

There is evidence that over-reliance on automation is causing accidents - particularly loss of control in IMC when the automation disconnects for whatever reason. That problem is easily fixed by practice. And not just the last few miles of an ILS either. Pilots should be encouraged to hand fly for the prime purpose of maintaining pure flying skills.

Commonsense dictates the automatics should be used when landing in weather worse than Cat 1 ILS. Nevertheless pilots should maintain the basic skills to fly an ILS by hand. Where airspace navigation is based upon tight tolerances thus requiring automatics, then of course the rules are there.

We see on Pprune pages contributors advocating hand flying only in VMC. That does not fix the problem. Any fool can hand fly by looking at the horizon.

Sharp pilots know that hand flying up to 10,000 ft and during descent below 10,000 ft (arbitrary numbers) is probably the simplest method of keeping current. Switching off the flight directors increases scanning skills which is why hand flying is being carried out in the first place. If in IMC then all the better because hand flying in IMC is no big deal. That said, it is a big deal if you are frightened of hand flying. Time for simulator practice.

If automation dependency has you by the short and curly, then you have only yourself to blame. Of course there are operators that demand full use of automatics for every minute of flight and no leeway apart from take off and the last few seconds of landing approach. But until operators stop paying lip service to the potential dangers of automation dependency and encourage crews to hand fly in appropriate conditions (and that depends on the judgement of the captain) then we simply go around in circles waiting for the next inevitable loss of control in IMC tragedy. Unfortunately, I doubt if things will ever change and we are stuck with automation dependency.
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