I was thinking about that automated yaw assistance enthusiastically mentioned before.

Designing your aircraft capabilities down to what a particular customer wants is disastrous for an aircraft manufacturer.

Always remember the HS Trident which was designed down to the limited imagination and scope of the Chairman of BEA and therefore had limited sales prospects to other customers.

And why is Boeing in such trouble today? Because they kept warming-over their 1960s design to suit one customer, instead of building a good aircraft for the 21st century.

So still a long way to go.... Wouldn't be surprised that certification of this 'first', slides the planning well into 2026.

Less Hair, Capn Bloggs #19, 20

Both posts Irrelevant and Incorrect; Disrespectful.

Take off performance is limited by the engine failure case.

A point for discussion is how automation - auto rotate, will improve the certificated performance.

Mishandled Rotation is discussed by D.P Davies @ https://www.pprune.org/accidents-clo...l#post11698267 #55

eeek! :E

Interesting comment but being physically attached to a centerline for a two-second event with no rejected takeoff options in an aircraft where high risk operations are considered as acceptable is a slightly different scenario.

It's not assistance on take-off the E2 needs, it's help getting the damn thing back on the ground.

They come down eventually, given enough time.

Depends what they mean by "operational". It's quite conceivable that they have an operational test aircraft in 2025 but we don't see it certified for decades.

MD-11 needed more pitch up to fly V2+10 than Douglas though acceptable for passenger comfort. The FD pitch command was limited, I think, to command no more than 23 degrees. The presentation slides for this auto takeoff mode show pitch attitude closer to 45 degrees. Ok, I assume that is some marketing and artist "freedom" in the presentation material but what pitch limit, if any, would this system actually use?

Obviously. :cool:

This not some wonder feature that will suddenly make the aeroplane go like a Saturn 5. If the 350nm is correct, then, as I said before, that equates to around 1750kg extra RTOW. For a ~50 tonne aeroplane, it's not much in relation to how the jet will perform during the takeoff. It appears to be nothing more than a reduction in/elimination of the pilot-induced delays/handling foibles, so allowing a bit more TO weight.

That’s the benefit of reading those f**%^ books you see…

This is a load more electronics/ circuitry and diodes and chips between you and the aircraft.
These manufacturers can't wait to get us out of the cockpit for their customer's company accountants.
How many times does it have to go wrong?
Human Factors? - how about Aircraft Factors?

Broadly speaking the reason we have human factors is cos it’s what’s left after (largely) fixing the aircraft factors.

They actually did, but thought they could get away with busting the weight limit as long as they stayed within the seat limit. They, however, underestimated the resolve of US pilot unions. And thus died the 170/175.

That is undeniably true. After over a decade of using this case to underpin a few Vmca slides, I was somewhat surprised to learn the PIC routine for that doomed day.

2x 4 hrs SIM session with pilots and then a VVIP event for customers. Finish that, and off to perform the flight test.

Things we have done before … but haven't
 

Also, Bloggs, et al, re #20 #24 - inaccurate views of the accident.

Whereas:-
Human mistakes, identified via unexpected aircraft motion; human intervention.
Flight test in limiting conditions, modified software in SRS (speed related), AP mode and unexpected reversion hidden by declutter function (the electronics/ circuitry and diodes and chips between you and the aircraft.)

the facts - specialist safety briefing to the manufacturing industry.

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/1omlh...hpqs1pkr6&dl=0

I flew in a 175 last Friday, American Airlines. (Technically, their 'regional jet' subordinate airline: Operated by Envoy Air as American Eagle).

Not now. But in 20 years or so I will feel more comfortable getting in a pilotless aircraft than one with pilots.

Automated aircraft will still have accidents. However that will be much less than pilot error.

There will be no statistics to support that claim until there have been millions of pilot-less flights made. As the reliability of current two-man crews is less that one hull loss per million flights.