You’re confusing two different things: a visual approach is still an IFR approach in the UK. An IFR approach which requires standard IFR separation. And, even if they did misspeak to begin with before later clarifying, it has been well established within this thread that DLH are not banned from doing visual approaches, it’s the standard controller-provided IFR separation that was the issue, whether they did an ILS or a visual approach. 3nm/1000ft/proper wake gap ahead.

Another clarification, if you reuest a visual approach and follow traffic you are responsible maintaining visual separation with preceding, in Europe. Common in places like Rhodos.

Haven’t checked the Greek docs, but to supply the UK reference: CAP 493

S3 Ch1 12 (Visual Approach) .3: “Within controlled airspace, standard separation shall be effected between such aircraft and other IFR and/or Special VFR aircraft.”

edit: you (theoretically at least) cannot force an IFR pilot to apply their own separation, but as long as they’re agreeable it is a perfectly valid procedure. In the US AIM it states the pilots responsibility is to inform ATC promptly (and prompt isn’t defined anywhere) if they are unable for any reason to apply visual separation. I’d tend to argue that 14,000ft before you’ve even been asked to apply it is fairly prompt notice.

I believe there's a few significant misconceptions being made about how these particular parallel Charted Visual Procedures are handled at SFO that need clearing up.

First, SFO ATC doesn't pass responsibility for wake avoidance spacing to the pilot with the clearance for the approaches or the "maintain visual separation" instructions. That would be insane, especially if one was taking into account only the aircraft directly ahead and not with regards to the parallel ahead and abeam one's own. Leaving it up to each pilot eyeballing in-trail during the most critical phase (on final) of these extra-close, vertically staggered parallels would result in aircraft splashing in the Bay with great regularity and the objective....keeping the aircraft pairs paired until touchdown to create clean gaps through with to launch departures...would be a mostly-unrealized fantasy or matter of luck rather than what's routinely accomplished.

For example, on the night in question the wind was 290 @12, off 10 degrees right of the inbound course for both runways. The 28L glide path is set lower than the glide path on 28R. Can you imagine some guy in his Gulfstream on 28L closing to 3 miles behind a 737 directly ahead (no problem there) but a few hundred feet off that 737's right wing there's a paired, half-clean LH A350 on a higher glide path laying down some nice, leftward & downward drifting wake vortices for the hapless 28L Gulfstream to fly through? (Enormous problem, if they should be so clueless and blind).

So, rather than leaving it to luck or pilots' varying degrees of depth perception, what actually happens is the same thing as if they weren't conducting closely-spaced Visuals; SFO ATC retains responsibility for spacing by issuing speed assignments after the approach clearance and "maintain" instruction, usually 180 until 5 miles plus, for the aircraft they've positioned slightly behind the other in each pair, to "not overtake" the aircraft it has positioned just slightly ahead on the parallel. The latter instruction holds until it's necessary to stabilize at one's Final Approach speed where, of course, not all aircraft are exactly equal but by that point there's not enough difference to screw up the gaps. It's still Class B airspace, and ATC can and does issue any speed it wants at any time to adjust spacing issues it sees and these must be complied-with throughout the approach unless it's beyond the aircraft's capability.

When sequencing inbounds and during these approaches, SFO ATC provides through vectors and speed control at least the standard Wake Category in-trail spacing. I have no idea where you're coming up with 3 miles. Behind LH's Heavy A350 those minimums are; 4 miles for another Heavy/Super, 5 for a Medium, and 6 for a Light. The vast majority of aircraft using SFO are Mediums and Heavies.

When conducting the simultaneous, parallel Visuals with aircraft in pairs rather than being staggered, because the runways are so closely spaced, ATC applies the most conservative wake avoidance minimum to each pair as if they were 1 aircraft. Examples. (lead pair) M/M...3 miles....M/M (following pair). H/M.....5 mile...M/M. H/M.....5 miles.....H/M, H/M....4 miles....H/H, etc.

Because the required spacing for LH is also a function-of and must be applied-to the diagonal aircraft on the parallel, in order to maintain the side-by-side pairing gaps, the size of the gap required for LH's A350 Heavy to be sequenced into 28L's stream must take into account the S/H/M/L wake cat makeup of 28R's parallel stream. Even for an ILS with no aircraft on a visual beside him. Because LH also needs to be spaced as required in-trail of both aircraft in the pair ahead, the minimum gap ATC would need to create would be 7 miles (M/M...3...LH...4...H/H), 8 miles (M/H....4....LH..4...H/H or M/M...3...LH....5....H/M or M/M), 9 miles (M/H....4.....LH...5....H/M, M/H, M/M), or 10 miles (M/H...4....LH....6....?/L).

Let's assume ATC needed a wake cat-driven, 8 mile gap for LH.

On the night in question, LH was arriving from the NW, not on one of the established streams inbound from the E or SE landing to the west. LH was to be vectored on right downwind and base turns and plugged into an already-established 8 mile gap in 28Rs stream created by ATC for him to do so. Yes, LH crossed BDEGA @ 13K and descending to 11K (mandatory)/250 at CORKK where the downwind turn was to have occurred had he continued to 28R. He would've been about 30 - 35 miles from touchdown at that point, but the stream of aircraft sequenced for 28R extended far beyond that from the direction the vast majority of SFO traffic is arriving from. I've flown the same Arrival into SFO many times trans-Pacific routing using a different transition, but the point LH received the instructions to turn 100 at CORKK is routing common to all arriving from northerly directions.

LH's requirement for the ILS scrubbed the 28R plan and so he wasn't broken off for the downwind north of the airport. He was instead sent over the airport to the south and hold away from everyone and await sequencing into another already-existing stream for 28L where, unlike for 28R, no place at the table had already been set for him. Everyone on 28R is flying the QB Visual, which is offset for noise and is the preferred/expected Approach at SFO when VMC prevails in that East quadrant over the Bay. Also, the reason ATC asked LH if he could "maintain visual separation" even after LH said he needed an ILS was NOT (as explained) to relinquish responsibility for spacing to LH.

The reason was for ATC to know how radically he'd need to alter the spacing/sequence of the stream parallel to LH on final. SFO allows for (at least used to) an aircraft on an ILS to be paired side-by-side with an aircraft on the parallel Visual Procedure as long as both aircraft in the pair confirm the traffic is in sight and will maintain visual separation. This is essentially what an aircraft flying the Tip Toe Visual to 28L does anyway tracking the Loc inbound. LH saying that they could not "maintain vis separation" affects how many and how much the Controller needs to shuffle over on 28R for LH to be able to conduct his ILS on 28L.

LH not accepting the "maintain" instruction means that no aircraft can be paired side-by-side with him. This compounds the problem for ATC on that night because the long, existing streams extending to the E and SE for both Runways were already metered/sequenced/built for pairs of aircraft on the parallel Final Approaches since the Visuals were in use to create the gaps between the pairs for departures. It was peak hours and aircraft were already holding, waiting to be plugged in, and mostly likely were able to accept the "maintain" instruction.

Because no pairing was possible with LH's refusal of the "maintain", in addition to ATC needing to;

1) Create an 8-mile, wake cat-driven gap in 28L's already-existing stream where there was none before.
2) Create another 8-mile, Wake Cat-driven gap in 28R's already-existing stream where there also was none before, that mirrors 28L in order to preserve the gaps between arrival pairings to allow departures.

ATC must also:

3). Somehow, completely eliminate one aircraft from 28R's sequence....the one that would have flown the Visual approach to 28R side-by-side with LH flying his ILS on 28L if LH had been able to accept the "maintain" instruction. If LH could have accepted, ATC could plan for this 6-aircraft pairing and space pattern on final for the parallels (where "B" represents Medium 737s)

B....3 miles....B.......5 miles.........B
B....3 miles....LH.....5 miles.........B

However, since LH couldn't accept, the Controller had to "remove" an aircraft and plan for this 5-aircraft pattern.

B.................8 miles....................B
B....3 miles.....LH.....5 miles.......B

So on a night were they're saturated and with other aircraft already holding before LH arrived, how is that a simple task? One thing for sure, no airlines up there are holding with excessive amounts of fuel above what's required. The fact that LH was long-haul doesn't make him unique in that respect. So when the requirement to "remove" an aircraft from the other runway comes into play it's affecting others in a hold on top of already doing so to create the 2 additional 8-mile gaps to slot him in.

I obviously can't vouch for the video-maker's bona fides as a Controller, but I do know in this thread there's a ton of misconceptions bout how these particular approaches are conducted, what ATC actually does provide during these Approaches, or how easy it would have been to slot LH in on a peak hour night with extended streams and aircraft already in the hold. It's a lot more complicated than just sliding a couple aircraft a couple miles to work him in any place onto 1 runway as if nothing else needs to be taken into account.

Have those ATCOs worked SFO, know the airspace, airports, airspace constraints, noise constraints, the congestion/saturation level of that night? Any other things going on that we don't know about?

How does one fit a Heavy into 2 or 3 miles of extra spacing when there is no space for them in the first place? They were outside the minimally-spaced flow. To plug them in they'd need to create 7-10 miles (depending on relative wake categories) for not 1 but 2 streams, their own and the parallel, plus 1 aircraft abeam on the parallel removed completely from the equation.

The reason for these routine Visual Procedures and the reason for the "maintain visual separation" instruction in conjunction with those visual procedures is not a mystery nor a whim of that particular controller. The reason/necessity for it (due to the proximity of the aircraft established abeam on the parallel visua...not for self-positioning or in-trail spacingl) has been explained on this thread numerous times.


When IMC prevails with lots of arrivals, SFO uses Dependent Parallel ILS Approaches with authorisation for a reduced diagonal/adjacent separation of 1.0 mile (instead of 1.5) for the staggering with standard minimums for direct in-trails. Otherwise, depending on the inbounds and outbounds they use other parallel runway modes. In this way, they're pretty much like any other airport with parallel runways close enough to warrant specified minimums for adjacent aircraft on a parallel.

San Francisco isn't a fair weather city, which is why for awhile they had PRM approach capability. PRM allowed side-by-side pairing of aircraft in IMC at airports where the runways are too close to allow Simultaneous Independent parallel approaches. Since it's not functioning now, SFO reverted to Dependent Parallel approaches.

I don’t have time to respond to your entire manifesto right now, but since it starts so glaringly incorrectly…

I hate to be the one to break this to you… .65 reference

2-1-9 b) “The separation minima must continue to touchdown for all IFR aircraft not making a visual approach or maintaining visual separation.”

Every time you accept a visual approach in the US, you are absolving ATC of responsibility for wake to touchdown, their only responsibility is to say “caution wake turbulence” (see 2-1-20 after), and it’s on you.

What you have described as insane is the responsibility that you yourself have been taking on - albeit unwittingly - every time you accept a visual approach.

edit: 99% sure RECAT wake is in use at SFO. That puts a 3nm wake gap between two “Upper Heavys” and a 4nm for a B737-700+ behind one.

MarcK, you are riding the wrong horse once more.

Of course you can't ask for something that is out of service. But that was not the case. The ILS was functioning. If it was switched off (which is not the same as out of service), it can be put on air within 2 minutes. A controller has to do that if an aircraft on Mayday asks for it. He can't say I have 10 other aircraft to bring in - these aircraft have to step back, unless one of them is also on Mayday.

Anyways, the discussion of this aspect is also missing the point, since Lufthansa did not ask for an ILS, but asked for separation by the controller. These are two orthogonal issues, separation and type of approach.

A bit harsh, we tend not to sack people for mistakes, but of course it would be highly unprofessional. The Lufthansa PIC was obviously a pro so did the right thing in reaction to the bad show of the controller.

I think what megan was alluding to was to actively provoke a Mayday to force the unwilling controller to do his job. I agree with that, that would be unprofessional.

It's a complete different thing than running out of fuel due to sudden, unanticipated airport closure, sudden extreme weather changes or just unexpected problems at your alternate you just diverted to. Longtime professionals working at airlines with good safety departments will have read about such incidents. They are rare, but sometimes things just line up in a very bad way that could catch most pros out.

Check Airman, really?

A visual approach and maintaining own visual separation are two orthogonal concepts.

If you are on a visual approach, it is still up to the controller to assure separation in class B airspace.
If that is not the case in the US, I am happy to learn, but please with proper sources and without your usual chest beating.

Lufthansas issue was not the visual approach. It was that the controller wanted to put the responsibility for separation on the crew, which Lufthansa does not allow at night - at least that is what Lufthansa said on the radio.

Rhodos is not a class B airspace.

I am not argueing what SFO controllers try to achieve. Still they had 40 min's to make that gap. They did not, for whatever reason. They did not even give an EAT.

I read with interest what you write, but it does not convince me. I still have the feeling the controller wanted to punish Lufthansa for not playing along as the controller deemed necessary. But that would be overstepping by the controller.

I also do not understand your thing of "own visual separation" still means the controller does assume separation. Obviously something is different compared to a crew not accepting "own visual separation", otherwise Lufthansa would have been in the sequence and we would not be discussing. No need to complicate very basic things, KISS principle applies.

Nowhere in FAAO 7110.65AA or the AIM is there a restriction prohibiting visual separation, once the pilot accepts. The controller is required to provide IFR separation until the pilot accepts responsibility for separation. Visual approaches are common in Class B airspace at both the primary and non-primary airports. If there were one, they wouldn’t be using visual approaches.

The pilot did not accept responsibility because, in those circumstances (night), his company did not permit him to do so. Therefore it was up to the controller to continue to provide IFR separation.

Having some familiarity with SFO I find the initial issue somewhat surprising.

Regarding the "close parallel" or "side-by-side" approaches, sure I've seen them, but not that often. A little look at websites since this thread started shows that at any time of the USA day they happen, but are still not that common, maybe just one or two. And when in the usual single approach manner, they still normally use alternate runways for landing.

For those unfamiliar with the SFO runway layout, they have these two closely parallel, broadly east-west runways, commonly used for arrivals, and also two comparably close runways, broadly north-south, commonly used for departures, with the two pairs crossing at their midpoints. The approaches are not often at minimums with the aircraft ahead, because of the need to allow departures to pass between the arrivals. It does seem from observation that departures, lined up, are not given clearance until the landers have passed the intersection (this seems obvious but is relevant to the consideration). Some departures are likewise done "closely parallel", two together, with one slightly trailing the other, and fanning apart immediately after liftoff. So the concept of a constant succession of arrivals at minimum spacing doesn't seem to happen, or even be practical, as nothing could depart.

Maybe I'm missing something.

As I was addressing how visual separation works in Class B; I am making no reference to the DLH flight. If he was prohibited by company policy not to fly night visuals, then he can’t do so,

1201alarm
The following is from section 5-4 of the FAA Airman Information Manual (AIM)

https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...section_4.html

(As an aside, you can also be cleared for a visual approach with only the preceding aircraft, but not the airport in sight.)

For the people who insist that an IFR aircraft should always be afforded an IAP, please note what I've highlighted in bold.

Check Airman

For balance it seems worth adding the next paragraph as well (5-4-4b):

“The purpose of this information is to aid the pilot in planning arrival actions; however, it is not an ATC clearance or commitment and is subject to change. Pilots should bear in mind that fluctuating weather, shifting winds, blocked runway, etc., are conditions which may result in changes to approach information previously received. It is important that pilots advise ATC immediately they are unable to execute the approach ATC advised will be used, or if they prefer another type of approach.”

I also thank you for including the AIM reference to pilot wake responsibility on a visual. While we disagree, I respect that you at least know what you’re talking about. On which note…

That’s a statement by a pilot with an ATPL (apparently). Is that the level of understanding you’d expect to come across on a line check? Not trying to be snarky, but I’ve no idea if it’s common knowledge among pilots or not.

Thanks, Check Airman. This confirms my understanding.

"Own visual separation" is an add-on to a visual approach. A crew can't be expected to accept "own visual separation", so the controller needs to continue providing separation, even on a visual approach.

This has become a contest about who is right so my contribution as follows :8;
PANS-ATM section 6.5.3. A framework for air traffic management procedures, which I pressume may be applied somewhat differently across the world:

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....4c6a5482cd.png

Rhodos is class D, IFR is separated from IFR, no different from class B. If you get cleared for a visual approach the maneuvering is up to the pilot. Don't request it unless you can see and follow preceding traffic. Never have I been pushed into a visual approach in Europe (many airports prohibit them due noise).

6.5.3.1: the crew has to agree to it

6.5.3.4: as in class B, visual approach means ATC responsible for separation, which is where visual separation comes in - entirely separate to the visual approach itself

6.5.3.5: … however pilot takes responsibility for wake separation regardless, if additional spacing required, pilot to tell ATC

That is all consistent with what is published in the .65 and the AIM. There’s nothing in the published AIP that seems to contradict it.

PukinDog, thanks for your response.

You reference minimum separation/wake spacing but SFO don’t operate to minimum spacing, they provide gaps for departures from the crossing runways. Look at the landing rate, it’s 30 per hour which equates to about 5.5 mile average spacing.
A gap of 8/9/10 miles would easily accommodate 3 mile separation for the DLH (although you’d only need a 6 mile gap). All they had to do was add 3-5 miles to an existing gap.

SFO had 40 minutes to organise an extra 3-5 miles.

I'm well-aware of who has responsibility for what when accepting a Visual Approach and what my own is under FAA rules. Instrument flying 101. Thanks though :ok:, I've been aware of them for about 40 years or so. Not sure if this this is your first foray into them because...,

I hate to break it to you, but I'm not incorrect, let alone glaringly, because (from your own source) https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...section_7.html.

The generic Visual approach rule you referenced assumes the Visual approach clearance is received with no accompanying or further speed restriction issued by ATC. Speed-control restrictions are, as already mentioned, commonly re-stated/issued at SFO at the time Clearance for these 28 Visuals are issued. This restatement of a restriction is no different than for any Instrument approach when ATC desires or needs to retain positive control of spacing since issuance of any approach Clearance, Instrument or Visual, automatically cancels any previously assigned speed restriction.

Ignoring the effect that restating the speed restriction has on the Visual approach clearance when issued is not unlike ignoring that there is such a thing as a conditional clearance. For the purpose of clearing up your misunderstanding, it's not an unimportant detail.

Because details matter, ATC can and does restate/issue a speed assignment with the Visual approach clearance and it essentially becomes part of that Visual approach clearance, so the generic rule you reference does not invalidate the restated/issued speed restriction (as it does a previously-assigned one). And, for the same reason ATC restates a speed restriction for an Instrument approach Clearance when they want to retain positive control for spacing, ATC does the same when issuing a Visual approach clearance; to retain positive control of spacing.

The only difference between a Visual and Instrument approach as far as Speed control and wake is what happens within 5 miles of the runway. But the subject is creating space to plug LH into the stream and the gap ATC needs to create for wake, not something that happens within 5 miles on any approach.

But, since you keep making your assumptions and hate my Manifestos, I'll assume you enjoy your own sources, so here's an excerpt from yours in the link above. Note, especially, points #9 and #10..

Quote:

---

Section 7. Speed Adjustment

---

So yes, ATC does require one to fly a speed so restates the restriction when issuing the Clearance in order to retain positive control for required or desired spacing. SFO does it, as per the reasons in bold, and they are not alone in doing so. They also restate speed restrictions during Visual approaches at JFK, DCA, LGA...pretty much anywhere Charted Visual approaches are conducted and for the same reason. This shouldn't come as a shock to anyone except those who refuse to believe it's not a highly unsafe, free-for-all up there with pilots jockeying for position all over the sky just because "Visual" appeared in the Approach Procedure. No, it's pretty organised, controlled, and happens hundreds of time every day where Charted Visual Procedure are in use.

On the issue of "maintain visual separation" again, excerpts from your source... https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...section_4.html

The "maintain visual separation" instruction for pilot-applied visual separation is necessary if ATC wants to have aircraft positioned 750' apart side-by-side in pairs tracking the charted Visual inbound courses. While tracking those Visual inbound courses the aircraft targets on Controller's display with touch/merge, so pilot-applied visual separation becomes necessary in order to conduct them in that manner.

If ATC decides to alternately stagger aircraft with sufficient in-trail spacing during the Visuals (which does happen during off-peak hours), there is no need for the pilots to accept and confirm they will "maintain visual separation" when positive speed control is retained and ATC provides the approved separation.

The "maintain visual separation" instruction has nothing to do with the pilot jockeying his own speed to manage the in-trail spacing between himself and the aircraft miles ahead already spaced for wake turbulence by ATC. The Controller, by restating a speed restriction issued in conjunction with the Visual Clearance, is already providing-for and maintaining the wake turbulence spacing under positive control for as long as the positive speed control is valid, That's how they do it at SFO during the paired Visuals. Please don't keep repeating how something theoretically works, or can't work, until you've done sone ride-alongs in the cockpit to see how they work the Procedures.

What ATC is unable to do is see or provide for is lateral separation between the closely-spaced (750') paired aircraft, abeam each other with a slight stagger. If pilots are flying the Charted Visuals correctly, established on the inbound courses, the lateral separation will be there because that's how the Visuals are constructed. One is straight in, the other is Offset. The pilot only need to visually ensure and maintain the separation that flying to procedure establishes. Again, nobody has gets a clearance to eyeball and fly formation with anyone. The clearance is to fly a Charted Visual Procedure that has electronic lateral guidance and fly them at the ATC-assigned speeds until within 5 miles.

The excerpt directs a Controller "Do not permit an aircraft to overtake another aircraft when wake turbulence separation is required". The Controller can only prevent what he/she can clearly determine on the display, and the only way to prevent an aircraft from overtaking is through speed control. The Controller can see and prevent this for the pairs in-trail of other pairs, but the controller cannot see that the slight stagger between the aircraft that make up each pair, where pilot applied visual separation is, is being maintained. If a high-side aircraft in a pair overtakes the other and pulls ahead far enough, wake can become an issue. Therefore, the instruction.

Since this was directed at me and of course not trying to be snarky, I'd expect a Controller (apparently) to know what restating a speed restriction/assignment when issuing an Approach clearance does for the Controller, and why it must be restated. Or do you believe that restating/issuing a speed restriction is not authorized if the approach happens to be a Visual? If it isn't, how come I've frequently received them? Is it because the Controllers also don't know their own rules?

All these years I thought when Controllers did that it was so they could retain control over my speed while on the approach after the Clearance already automatically cancelled whatever restriction I'd been assigned before. Retain control so Controllers could ensure I'd maintain any separation they'd established for me, or establish it if it wasn't yet, or adjust my speed to tweak spacing, that sort of thing. All those years I'd been following those restated speed restrictions on Visual approaches when, apparently, I could've just ignored them and self-positioned to my heart's content as if they'd never happened..

So next time I'm line checking someone and receive a Visual Approach clearance with a restated speed restriction and we're, say 10 miles in-trail of someone, if the pilot maintains or slows to the restriction I'll tell him "No No, speed at your discretion. You're cleared for the Visual so just haul ass until 3 miles in-trail. A UK Controller educated me on the the FAA rules re Visual Approaches, and we've been doing it wrong".

PukinDog, thanks, very interesting insight into the controllers "universe".

To me it seems well thought out what is done in case of "own visual separation". Such knowledge might help Lufthansa to consider their SOP's into SFO.

However doesn't change the requirement to not punish Lufthansa in case they do not "maintain own visual separation" and still bring them in.

It does not matter. If they give you 160/4 (or whatever they give), and what should be a 4nm gap to touchdown becomes a 3.7 when you’re on a visual, that’s on you not them. Sure, they’re not regularly sticking a Citation XL 4nm behind an A380 and going “ah, visual, it’ll be grand” but the speeds they’re giving are not aimed at maintaining wake to touchdown on a visual. That is your job.

Generally speaking in a sequence like that the speed is to make sure you don’t slow early and back the sequence up behind, or to give the tower their requested gaps. It is nothing to do with wake from the aircraft ahead. It is your responsibility to say “UNABLE” if that speed won’t allow you to do what you need to do. You can’t ignore the speed given, but the reason it’s re-stated is the US has a published difference from ICAO where an approach clearance cancels previously iterated speed control (as you correctly stated). Pretty much anywhere else in the world the speed isn’t re-stated because it was never cancelled. The speed is for the sequence, not necessarily for the wake, and definitely not on a visual.

Example 1, normal sequence. You are number 1 for the day (ie, no wake ahead), I have a steady sequence spaced behind you. I clear you for the approach at 12nm and give you no speed. The approach clearance cancels speed, you come back to 140 knots at 10nm (entirely legally) and my sequence behind you is screwed. That’s why speed is re-iterated, nothing to do with wake.

Example 2, LVPs (/LVOs..?). You are number 2, number 1 is on a 3.5nm final. I’m doing 12nm gaps for the tower to get departures away. You’re doing an ILS in this case. I turn you to establish 16nm out and clear you for the ILS. I re-iterate a speed of 160/4 with the clearance because if I hadn’t, you’d have potentially (entirely legally) stayed fast or even sped up and eroded the 12, resulting in tower losing a departure. Speed issued, nothing to do with wake.

Vortex Avoidance Procedures (FAA AIM) 7-4-6 a):
“Under certain conditions, airport traffic controllers apply procedures for separating IFR aircraft. If a pilot accepts a clearance to visually follow a preceding aircraft, the pilot accepts responsibility for separation and wake turbulence avoidance. The controllers will also provide to VFR aircraft, with whom they are in communication and which in the tower's opinion may be adversely affected by wake turbulence from a larger aircraft, the position, altitude and direction of flight of larger aircraft followed by the phrase “CAUTION - WAKE TURBULENCE.” After issuing the caution for wake turbulence, the airport traffic controllers generally do not provide additional information to the following aircraft unless the airport traffic controllers know the following aircraft is overtaking the preceding aircraft. WHETHER OR NOT A WARNING OR INFORMATION HAS BEEN GIVEN, HOWEVER, THE PILOT IS EXPECTED TO ADJUST AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND FLIGHT PATH AS NECESSARY TO PRECLUDE SERIOUS WAKE ENCOUNTERS. When any doubt exists about maintaining safe separation distances between aircraft during approaches, pilots should ask the control tower for updates on separation distance and aircraft groundspeed.” (The capitalisation is the FAAs, not mine)

Pilot Responsibility 7-4-8:
a) Research and testing have been conducted, in addition to ongoing wake initiatives, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of wake turbulence. Pilots must exercise vigilance in situations where they are responsible for avoiding wake turbulence.

b) Pilots are reminded that in operations conducted behind all aircraft, acceptance of instructions from ATC in the following situations is an acknowledgment that the pilot will ensure safe takeoff and landing intervals and accepts the responsibility for providing wake turbulence separation.

1. Traffic information.
2. Instructions to follow an aircraft; and
3. The acceptance of a visual approach clearance

I’m not posting the entire thing but it goes on to list the techniques it would expect you to use (if in a lighter aircraft fly above the glide path, land longer than the preceding. If in the preceding heavy do not deviate from the nominal glide path etc).

That is 100% incorrect. Wake separation on a visual approach is pilot responsibility regardless of any assigned speed.

____________________________________________________________ ___________
************************************************************ ***********

edit 12/10/23:

To avoid detailing the main thread again, I’ll add these extra references here for anyone who happens to stumble across this at a later date.

AIM 7-4-5b) note
FAA AIM 5-4-23e) Arrival procedures - Separation responsibilities
AINOnline - The dark side of visual approaches
NASA Callback 524 September ‘23
This one is worth a read as the first example is a Challenger 350 that experienced a wake encounter on final at…SFO.

IFALPA briefing: Visual approach considerations in the USA
This document is superb, including full coverage of separation/speed/wake responsibilities and requirements with references. It is clear and very well written.
​​​​​​​

Well, some one understood the thrust of what I inferred.

Yes, but on aggregate.

Every single one of those passengers wants to arrive infinitely more than they want to arrive at the right place.

Let me try this a different way. Do we want the controller out of their comfort zone?

I hope we can agree that we don’t want that. We don’t actually want a controller finding out on the job where their personal limits are.

So what seems to have happened here is a controller soft pedaling on an important but non-urgent request for LH. One that we would all hope and likely they do to that they could have accommodated, but they clearly felt unable.

What we are left with, in my view, is why is the controller so close to the edge of their envelope that they just cannot countenance accommodating this request more timely. That they will have or care to find a reason not to?

And then by consequence, what would it take to put them back into their comfort zone for when this situation inevitably arises again?

TL;DR what is required to fix it?

Finally. It all comes down to capacity, both of the controller and the airspace. It’s been well established this was a busy rush of scheduled planes so it will have been forecast on whatever traffic monitoring systems exist there.

Assuming Bbtengineer is on the right lines: Why was this controller put in a position where they had no capacity left to handle anything else? Factors that come into it: airspace, controllers personal capacity, training, expectation, staffing, airspace and procedure design. Was the position further splittable? If it was, were there enough staff to actually split it? Was there pressure on to power through and not split? Would the split actually have helped? What would have happened if there was an actual mayday in the middle of that? The NYT article did a good job of highlighting that US ATC are handling relatively, more planes than ever with fewer staff than ever. Is the airspace evolving to assist that, or are they just trying to cram as many planes into an already creaking system as possible?

After near on 400 comments we’ve gone round and round about what happened, without ever getting any closer to why it happened.

Bbtengineer, what you say is fair.

But to arrive at the discussion about the "why", first we needed to establish that the controller should have sorted Lufthansa into the arrival sequence. Already this was disputed by many contributers.

Personally I still have the feeling that is was more a problem of unwillingness by the controllers side and not a problem of unableness. But this is for others to decide, if there even is an investigation.

As we have learned the controller anyways has to variably sequence the arrivals, some need more space, some less. Lufthansa would have just been another one with a bit more spacing.

KSFO have built parallel runways that are too close together, (probably owing to lack of space), to allow ILS approaches when both runways are in use simultaneously.

KSFO have decided to reduce safety margins in order to get more traffic on the ground during busy periods.

LH's safety department - or their insurers - have undertaken a risk-assessment and decreed that night visual-separation approaches at KSFO are not quite safe enough, so have banned them.

This LH crew were - or sounded - cocky and unprofessional, and used a swear word, which (understandably) got ATC's backs' up.

ATC allowed their (understandable) annoyance with LH to influence their handling of the situation.

ATC did not issue an EAT.

USA ATC is apparently a difficult place to work right now, owing to controller shortages ? Don't know, but US controllers at large busy airports often sound stressed-out to me.


Not having a go at any one party here; just as I see it.

You forgot to see the main point: for 40 minutes KSFO ATC did not make any effort to land an IFR flight at KSFO while other aircraft who arrived later were landed.

Agree with 1201alarm, in my view they sounded entirely professional up to that transmission, which itself came after 40 minutes of poorly explained and un-updated delay. It wasn’t like they rocked up on frequency with that attitude to begin with, and the lack of updates on the delay was directly linked to that change in attitude. For the next point, that may or may not have led to a change in how ATC handled them, but it was so busy anyway it could have made no difference. We don’t know for sure.

Excellent summation otherwise.

OK, fair enough - but I have mentioned that in a previous post. Here, I was trying to think of the "WHYs" as you asked about earlier, rather than what did or did not happen. :ok:

However, I did say that ATC did not issue an EAT, which was part of the problem; If ATC could not reconfigure the approaches and calculate an EAT, then why not ?

Uplinker :ok:

Sure, yes, but this is getting lost in the weeds.

The controller failed to provide a published service to LH.

What you are describing is a laundry list of reasons why LH could have accepted that failure on the part of the controller to deliver the published service, and deal with it anyway.

What you are not tackling is why the controller could not provide a service that was published and therefore reasonably expected.

The reason is… traffic. KSFO has an inbound flow of traffic that won’t work unless the pilots accept visual separation. Well, it’ll work with except the delays and holding will go back to SLC Center. Without visual separation, it the acceptance rate less than half. Theres lots of published services that cannot be offered. 01L/R have published approaches, try getting it when the 28s are for landing, 01s departures.

I can see why this thread is going round in circles.

It’s one aircraft. They didn’t request the other runway.

Why is it reasonable for you to extrapolate to all aircraft and halve the acceptance rate?

Why is it reasonable for you to compare it with a runway switch that they didn’t ask for?

In the SFO perspective response video, they said they treat it as though it’s asked for an opposite end approach. Why they’d choose to treat it like that I have absolutely no idea, and is why a lot of this make no sense at all.

And that is indeed the root of the problem : Declared capacity. For economic reasons the acceptance rate into SFO has been increased to such an extend that to make it work you had to bend the normal rules. Now if someone asks for the rules to be applied the numbers can\t be reached , The issue here is that ATC, a safety service provider has been turned into an economic enabler, the numbers being more important than the separation standards . , and with time ,perhaps with the help of their local management, some of the local controllers were led to believe that it was their duty to provide numbers instead of applying the basic safety service they were initially trained for .
The rest are just details.

Why? Maybe a YT thing. Exaggerating things out of proportion.

Just as academic excercise, if someone would be so kind: What a gap would be needed to be created in the 28 inbound stream if LH indeed requested an opposide 10 approach?

ATC, #396; :ok:

Bottle that and put it on the top shelf … no, send it to the FAA via a safety report.

ATC, You are absolutely right, and I speak as one who was involved in the Eurocontrol PRC comparisons of US ATC vv European ATC.

+ 1 ATC Watcher, very good summing up :ok:

This incident has highlighted a practice that is not primarily safety driven.