|
Originally Posted by AerocatS2A
(Post 10140364)
It wouldn't be a big deal. Those jets on the ground would stay there, and those in the air would land in an orderly fashion. There are places where passenger jets operate in and out of airports that don't have any controllers at all. Despite what they might like you to think, we don't really need them ;).
On the night in question, there was a long queue of flights lined up for landing. If everything went smoothly, flights may indeed have landed in 'an orderly fashion'. But things don't always go smoothly. Assume that the single controller had, say, become unconscious. It one flight had failed to clear the runway in time (perhaps not knowing which exit to take, lacking tower instructions), or a vehicle encroached on the runway, there would be no way for the following flight to know that and execute a go-around. How long would it take for the 'spare' controller to become aware of his/her colleague's absence? How long to run upstairs and assimilate the situation? The single-controller situation seems to me to be a risk. That might be acceptable in a small, remote airport with few flights. But in SFO? With ground and airport full of a/c and vehicles? A major international airport should not be allowed to take that kind of risk. |
Ok, so they can't produce a picture of what it looked like out the window, so we can't know how red the X was or how runway like the taxiway seemed (wasn't it a smaller runway for a few years?)
But single controller was a factor, just not for the obvious reasons. There's no way you can expect him to spot the misalignment in time, given the angle he has on the 28s. But, for a relatively calm part of the day, what were all those a/c doing on the taxiway? The lead A/C had been waiting at the bar for thirty minutes. When the ATCOs made the determination to go to a single controller, they did so based on the number of strips they had.I wonder if they took into account the evening closure of 28R? So, with one controller on ground and tower, Line Up And Wait goes into the break room. With all arrivals on 28R, the heavies have very few gaps to get out in, and no-LUAW means those gaps need to be bigger. So the heavies pile up on the taxiway, because the controllers didn't fully account for the impact of construction, as the AC bus lines up on them, for similar reasons. ATC has changed their procedures since. |
Originally Posted by PaxBritannica
(Post 10140612)
In non-ATC airports, pilots are aware and operate accordingly. This is quite different from a major international airport where flight crew know that there are many a/c in the same airspace and expect a highly-managed environment.
On the night in question, there was a long queue of flights lined up for landing. If everything went smoothly, flights may indeed have landed in 'an orderly fashion'. But things don't always go smoothly. Assume that the single controller had, say, become unconscious. It one flight had failed to clear the runway in time (perhaps not knowing which exit to take, lacking tower instructions), or a vehicle encroached on the runway, there would be no way for the following flight to know that and execute a go-around. How long would it take for the 'spare' controller to become aware of his/her colleague's absence? How long to run upstairs and assimilate the situation? The single-controller situation seems to me to be a risk. That might be acceptable in a small, remote airport with few flights. But in SFO? With ground and airport full of a/c and vehicles? A major international airport should not be allowed to take that kind of risk. |
Originally Posted by AerocatS2A
(Post 10140727)
Well, it happens all the time. The tower controller doesn’t have a lot to do when it comes to landing aircraft, just clear them to land, they’ve already been sequenced by approach. Remember the controller is busy because he’s dealing with ground vehicles, aircraft wanting an airways clearance, aircraft wanting to taxi and the aircraft on final, if he dies the only aircraft that can’t just wait around are the couple on final. As for vacating the runway, you think we land without briefing an expected exit? We just get off by the most efficient exit, we don’t need someone to hold our hand every step of the way. Is operating somewhere like SFO with no controller a good idea? Of course not, but if there is one controller and he has a heart attack, the aircraft on finals will land with no problem, and once they realize no ones talking to them they’ll be letting approach know pretty quick. If the preceding aircraft is still on the runway then the following just goes around, same with vehicles on the runway. This incident notwithstanding, it is normally easy enough to see if the runway is a, a runway, and b, clear. b) And you can see everything with absolute clarity at night? The whole point of aviation safety measures is to minimise the possibility of system failure. Belt and braces and belt and braces. There's a line where there's no real safety gain for extra safety measures. It probably wouldn't increase safety much to have ten controllers in the tower at 23.30. It's probably pointless to have five. But one controller? To go with a single point of failure on the basis that the chances of failure are low and only a few a/c would be affected? This is not how aviation safety is supposed to work. Is it just SFO? What other safety measures are shaved to the bone for reasons of cost-cutting, hubris or machismo, that this trusting, fare-paying passenger doesn't know about? |
Originally Posted by Ambient Sheep
(Post 10140370)
You may therefore have missed the following:
May I thus venture to suggest that the actual situation as seen through the cockpit window on that particular night may not have tallied with the "sim program screencap" -- 28L not dark, and red-X drowned out by construction floodlights perhaps? The closed runway was the subject of a NOTAM and was mentioned in the ATIS broadcast. In spite of this, the crew made no mention of that fact during the approach briefing. While some look for reasons to exonerate the crew from blame, it seems to me they ignored several opportunities to recognize the approach required a bit more attention than they gave it. |
wingview
"SFO should have better equipment and more staff on duty. This was almost a disaster but everybody seems to forget Asiana which would have been prevented with the right radar. To have a blanc spot on very very short final is not acceptable for an airport like SFO with runways used for parallel landings and take off." The AC crew were the only ones to get "confused" that night, it was severe clear weather. The Asiana crew totally screwed up, blaming SFO for not having the "right radar" is totally pointing at the wrong problem. And it is "blank", blanc is French for white.... maybe you are trying to "white-wash" the poor performance of those 2 crews... f |
Originally Posted by PaxBritannica
(Post 10140752)
a) Well, apparently not.
b) And you can see everything with absolute clarity at night? The whole point of aviation safety measures is to minimise the possibility of system failure. Belt and braces and belt and braces. There's a line where there's no real safety gain for extra safety measures. It probably wouldn't increase safety much to have ten controllers in the tower at 23.30. It's probably pointless to have five. But one controller? To go with a single point of failure on the basis that the chances of failure are low and only a few a/c would be affected? This is not how aviation safety is supposed to work. Is it just SFO? What other safety measures are shaved to the bone for reasons of cost-cutting, hubris or machismo, that this trusting, fare-paying passenger doesn't know about? |
Originally Posted by ThreeThreeMike
(Post 10140802)
I made the assumption that during the previous five months the runway was closed, the situation must not have created undue problems for the thousands of flights that had landed without mistaking the taxiway for the runway.
Oh indeed, but it seems to me that over those five months the nature of the construction and the number of lights used and/or their position and/or direction may well have changed, possibly rendering that assumption invalid. And we do have the evidence of the previous flight who said that on that particular night they had found the construction lights far too bright and as a result had found locating the runway difficult.
Originally Posted by ThreeThreeMike
(Post 10140802)
The closed runway was the subject of a NOTAM and was mentioned in the ATIS broadcast. In spite of this, the crew made no mention of that fact during the approach briefing.
I'll freely confess that -- just as you haven't had time to read the newest part of this thread -- I haven't had time to go through the whole docket yet, but according to this recent post, they DID read the NOTAM:
Originally Posted by pattern_is_full
(Post 10139528)
I can feel for the crew. They tried to do everything right (saw the NOTAM, noted the risks of an oh-dark-thirty arrival on their own human performance) - but in the end, they still "lost the picture" in a critical phase of the flight, were slow to respond to their own growing doubts, and nearly produced a major catastrophe.
(EDIT: I've just realised that there's a difference between seeing the NOTAM at the start of the flight, and (not) mentioning it during the approach briefing. Apologies if this applies.)
Originally Posted by ThreeThreeMike
(Post 10140802)
While some look for reasons to exonerate the crew from blame, it seems to me they ignored several opportunities to recognize the approach required a bit more attention than they gave it.
Oh I have no wish to exonerate the crew. From my humble position it seems clear to me that they screwed up pretty badly as mentioned above, not least leaving it far too late to go-around. However it does now seem that they were not entirely to blame due to various issues at SFO, and it seems to me best that those are understood by all concerned. |
Originally Posted by Ambient Sheep
(Post 10141256)
Oh indeed, but it seems to me that over those five months the nature of the construction and the number of lights used and/or their position and/or direction may well have changed, possibly rendering that assumption invalid.
And we do have the evidence of the previous flight who said that on that particular night they had found the construction lights far too bright and as a result had found locating the runway difficult. I'll freely confess that -- just as you haven't had time to read the newest part of this thread -- I haven't had time to go through the whole docket yet, but according to this recent post, they DID read the NOTAM: Oh I have no wish to exonerate the crew. From my humble position it seems clear to me that they screwed up pretty badly as mentioned above, not least leaving it far too late to go-around. However it does now seem that they were not entirely to blame due to various issues at SFO, and it's best that those are understood by all concerned. |
Originally Posted by Ambient Sheep
(Post 10141256)
Oh I have no wish to exonerate the crew. From my humble position it seems clear to me that they screwed up pretty badly as mentioned above, not least leaving it far too late to go-around. However it does now seem that they were not entirely to blame due to various issues at SFO, and it seems to me best that those are understood by all concerned. |
Originally Posted by voyageur9
(Post 10141609)
Given the sometimes very nasty denunciation of pax (perhaps selfish, perhaps panicked) who endanger the lives of others by dallying to get luggage during an emergency evacuation -- a subject dear to the hearts of some pilots on pprune who sometimes suggest prison or lifetime flying bans for those miscreants -- why is the no similar outcry (in the interests of safety) for the pilots who fail to secure the CVR after a screw-up.
|
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10141658)
There was no statutory requirement for the Air Canada crew to preserve the CVR tape.
|
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
(Post 10141658)
There was no statutory requirement for the Air Canada crew to preserve the CVR tape.
|
Originally Posted by aterpster
(Post 10142169)
I understand that. But, I am appalled that neither Canada nor Air Canada doesn't have such a requirement.
There are no Canadian rules that stipulate that a CVR or DFDR must be saved after an event like this. There are no company (Air Canada) rules that stipulate that a CVR or DFDR must be saved after an event like this. Let us not forget that this was simply a missed approach followed by a normal landing by those two pilots (in their minds) regardless of what we now know to be the truth in how close to a disaster this could have been. |
Originally Posted by Jet Jockey A4
(Post 10142249)
Let us not forget that this was simply a missed approach followed by a normal landing by those two pilots (in their minds) regardless of what we now know to be the truth in how close to a disaster this could have been. When ACA759 was about one-tenth of a mile on final, the airplane looked “extremely strange,” regarding its proximity to the aircraft on taxiway C, and the taxiway itself. It was then Mr. Delucchi made the decision to send ACA759 around. There was no indication that ACA759 was in the wrong place until the aircraft was on short final. About that time, he heard a second transmission on the frequency, which he assumed was from one of the three United Airlines pilots holding short of runway 28R on taxiway C, state “he’s lined up on the taxiway.” Mr. Delucchi assumed it was a United Airlines pilot because three of the four aircraft holding short of runway 28R were United Airlines, and one was Philippine Airlines. The pilot making the transmission did not have a foreign accent. After the second transmission, “he’s lined up on the taxiway,” he directed ACA759 to go around, assigned a runway heading, and instructed the pilot to contact NCT. He noted the callsign, type aircraft, and time for documentation purposes and directed ACA759 to contact NCT. He took a minute to relax and then started departing aircraft from runway 28R. ACA759 landed shortly thereafter without incident. After ACA759 landed, the pilot asked for and was provided the telephone number for the tower’s unrecorded line. Mr. Delucchi was going to give him the number for the tower anyway. The pilot called a bit later and was concerned about the possible seriousness of the go around, and he sounded “shaken up. During the telephone conversation he was primarily attempting to calm the pilot down. They discussed the process of what happened. It was not a lengthy conversation, because he was still working ground traffic. Mr. Delucchi had calmed down between the time of the incident and the phone call with the pilot; he had not realized how close the aircraft had gotten to each other. Mr. Delucchi was slightly more concerned with how the pilot was taking it and did not want to “freak the guy out” since he seemed shaken. |
Let us not forget that this was simply a missed approach followed by a normal landing
Would that also be the case if the GA was due to a microburst GA; or a misjudged/cowboy approach that need up at 500' & 30kts too fast and only half flap; or an attempt to land at the wrong airfield...or...? Are you saying that all GA's are just normal manoeuvres and the reason has no significance? About this specific approach I have always been curious what they were using for vertical guidance. PF had gone manual flight some miles out. One would normally do this, especially at night, when one was good confident visual with the landing runway. From photos the only PAPI's were those associated with 28R. One is used to the PAPI's being closely adjacent to the runway and touchdown lights. The PAPI's for the correct 28R were displaced a significant distance from the centreline. If they were following those PAPI's the picture should have looked very iffy from a long way out. Only the crew will know. |
Originally Posted by aterpster
(Post 10142268)
You need to read the NTSB interview with the tower controller. Here's an excerpt:
(emphasis added) The controller told AC to go around after the crew had already initiated the procedure so it is irrelevant. It doesn’t matter how bad the approach was flown or how close they came to other aircrafts on the taxiway in so far as the CVR and DFDR are concerned. My two points here are not about the Go Around itself but a reply about why some of you think the CVR and DFDR should have been preserved. #1 - Again, there is no Canadian rule of law or Air Canada directive that state that the CVR and DFDR must be preserved after an incident like this. If there were such directives, to preserve both contents everytime there was a GA, wouldn’t you be grounding the aircraft and perhaps crews at every incident until the CVR and DFDR are read and a report concluded? #2 - Whether justified or not, I am convinced those two pilots never thought about the CVR and DFDR because in “their minds” they had just accomplished a GA followed by a normal landing even though they might have known it was a close call. |
SLF here - since GA can occur for all sorts of reasons , is it not normal or even required to describe the cause of the GA? As mentioned it could be something outside the crew's control such as weather....in this case it was a mis-alignment resulting in near-miss. So GA could be fairly benign vs not so. Is there no reqmt to describe the cause? The docket seems to say AC took this very seriously indeed once they got the details. |
Originally Posted by Smott999
(Post 10142566)
SLF here - since GA can occur for all sorts of reasons , is it not normal or even required to describe the cause of the GA? As mentioned it could be something outside the crew's control such as weather....in this case it was a mis-alignment resulting in near-miss. Good question. In years past many carriers would require a report to be submitted to the airline if a go-around was done. As a result, some folks would go to extremes trying to salvage a bad approach in part to avoid some paperwork. Old-timers here on PPRuNe would sometimes brag that they never had to do a go-around not ordered by the tower. It was realized that the failure to go-around in an attempt to 'get it on the ground' no matter what had caused avoidable accidents. The no-fault go-around became policy whereby no paperwork or explanation was required for the missed approach. Even if no report is required (I don't know if that is the case at Air Canada), the tower will usually ask the reason for the go-around. 'We didn't meet our stable approach criteria' is normally a good answer. If you say you encountered windshear on final, you'd better make sure you filed the required w/s report. I know all this sounds like CYA but it is the reality of the modern closely monitored cockpit work environment. Now, about that missing CVR... ;) As I speculated earlier on this thread:
Originally Posted by Airbubba
(Post 9830972)
The AC crew probably has a policy to pull the Cockpit Voice Recorder circuit breaker and make a logbook entry for maintenance to remove the CVR after a 'reportable' incident. Did they? I wouldn't be surprised if they 'forgot' to do this based on some other incidents of this type.
Canada is a little behind the times on CVR legislation by their own admission. The CVR has been added to the shutdown checklist at many places in the U.S. after a rash of 'accidental' failures to pull the CB after an incident. The tower controller says that the Air Canada captain was shaken up when he called the tower from the gate. The claim that he didn't know that the incident was serious seems unlikely to me. Anybody from the Great White North know if Air Canada has any guidance in their books about preserving the CVR after a significant event? |
Again, there is no Canadian rule of law or Air Canada directive that state that the CVR and DFDR must be preserved after an incident like this. If there were such directives, to preserve both contents everytime there was a GA, wouldn’t you be grounding the aircraft and perhaps crews at every incident until the CVR and DFDR are read and a report concluded?
I think you are taking things to extremes, where that was never intended. This incident was akin to a very very near armies. This was not a normal GA. It's a damn good thing they made one, but because it was made so late and during hat we believe to be a period of severe doubt, means it was not a normal GA in the accepted sense of the manoeuvre. They were within a whisker of causing 00's of deaths. The root cause of this could very likely go back to the approach briefing, or lack of, and then into possible disquieting utterances during the approach. All useful information into preventing it happening again. This was close to the most major crash and loss of life in an aviation accident in USA ever. It was not 'just an incident'. |
You are missing the point. Whether or not the crew think to pull the CVR or not depends not one little bit on what the incident was, it only depends on what they perceived the incident to be at the time. If they didn’t perceive it to have been a near disaster they may not have considered pulling the CVR. Given they had had so little situational awareness during the incident it doesn’t seem like a stretch to me to think that their lack of situational awareness may have continued until well after landing. |
pie in the sky swiss cheese
Originally Posted by aterpster
(Post 10142268)
It was not a lengthy conversation, because he was still working ground traffic.
Despite my feelings, this feels like pie in the sky swiss cheese. We are hoping the holes line up to succeed. |
in this day of super connectivity and tiny high capacity gadgets it seems a bit antiquated to "pull CBs" to preserve something that documents the near loss of 100s of passengers, and could well prevent a similar accident in the future. Suggestion, why not use a secure wifi connection to automatically dump an encrypted 3 hour CVR to a secure airline server when the plane pulls into the gate. Every trip. Can only be examined by accident investigators etc.
G |
There was a discussion some months ago about FDR/CVR data being transmitted live via satellite and stored on servers back at the home base of operator. This would answer many questions about MH370 and various other accidents. Some said the technology was no problem; it just needed the will to do so.
|
Originally Posted by groundbum
(Post 10143954)
in this day of super connectivity and tiny high capacity gadgets it seems a bit antiquated to "pull CBs" to preserve something that documents the near loss of 100s of passengers, and could well prevent a similar accident in the future. Suggestion, why not use a secure wifi connection to automatically dump an encrypted 3 hour CVR to a secure airline server when the plane pulls into the gate. Every trip. Can only be examined by accident investigators etc.
G |
Suggestion, why not use a secure wifi connection to automatically dump an encrypted 3 hour CVR to a secure airline server when the plane pulls into the gate. Every trip. Can only be examined by accident investigators etc.
Because accident investigators are usually investigating accidents that never reached the gate. |
Originally Posted by RAT 5
(Post 10143975)
There was a discussion some months ago about FDR/CVR data being transmitted live via satellite and stored on servers back at the home base of operator. This would answer many questions about MH370 and various other accidents. Some said the technology was no problem; it just needed the will to do so.
|
Originally Posted by RAT 5
(Post 10143975)
Some said the technology was no problem; it just needed the will to do so.
|
If there is concern over misuse then the information could always be held 'in escrow' by a trusted 3rd party and only released on formal written request from AAIB/NTSB/BEA or equivalents.
Is that not now the case with OFDM data? FDR/CVR would just be an extension of that. Introducing & applying legal constraints that are contractual should not be beyond the whit of man; unions or not. Video would surely require hugely more bandwidth. That's beyond my knowledge. Should any manager be identified as abusing the system they would not only be fired, but end up in court under heavy financial & penal threat. Are FAA/ EASA/Boeing/Airbus even discussing this? Surely an airline could invest in this on its own and take the initiative. It does not need legislation. ACARS was a customer option and look how many have that. When the airlines e.g. Qantas who could see just what their A380 was doing when its engine blew up, decided to invest in that technology you wonder why they don't go further and include FDR/CVR. Mind you that would need cooperation of the manufacturer. But surely the technology to achieve this would be simplistic compared to FBW and all the transmitted systems data, and the manufacturers invested zquillions in that. |
That's been the argument throughout aviation history - right up until there is a big body count, and then "tombstone engineering" figures out that, oh - yes - well, maybe it wasn't as prohibitive as we thought. ;)
"Radar coverage over the entire US??!! That's prohibitive!" "CVRs/FDRs on all commercial airliners??!! That's prohibitive!" etc. |
Interesting .
Some of you want us to be continuously filmed and taped just because a AirCanada crew did not go to SpecSaver. You have to be joking. Donate a GPS to AirCanada, that is money better spent! The day there is a camera in my flight-deck is the the day I resign! |
I am post #111_ on this incident. We all pretty well know what happened. The pilots were qualified on type, high-time hours wise, had flown to KSFO before, and had a varied experience operating in and out of airports globally.
Clearly a new debate on a different topic has evolved, Nothing new is being added on the topic of this thread. Enough already. Perhaps a new thread about mandatory installation of cameras in the cockpit and on the nose cone of airliners? No more visual approaches to complex high traffic airliner-only airports? A mere suggestion. BluSdUp : Many jobs now have cameras monitoring full-time what the employee does. Recently in Canada, a heavy-haul (semi) truck (articulated lorry) allegedly blew through a STOP sign, colliding with a chartered motor coach (bus), killing 16 people, mostly youths. Proof is lacking. No video evidence. Should interior security video cameras and forward facing security video cameras be mandatory on all heavy (10-tonne) trucks and commercial buses (motor coaches)? Remember that even routine telephone calls of an air traffic control staffer are recorded and retained for at least one month unless otherwise specified. It has been such for decades. The driver's compartment (cab) of many school buses are required to be video recorded. Not audio. No forward facing (dash cam) is presently required in most states/provinces. Do you want the cameras on school bus drivers removed? Bank tellers have continuous camera on them. Is the job of an airline pilot less critical to public safety than a school bus driver? Do you want the cameras on bank tellers removed? What about cameras on police officers and their patrol cars? Perhaps these are topics of a new thread. |
Evansb
Read George Orwells 1984. We are heading for a police state. Indeed another thread. Back to the Incident: How this is possible is incredible. And NO, it cant happen to anyone, Tune and fly the ILS inside 4 miles,at night. And AirCanada sounds like they need a reality check and need to review their whole operation! |
Look, I think it's fair to say that there are very few people who would be opposed to cockpit video being provided to accident investigations that do not apportion blame and cannot be cited in a court civil or criminal.
But what if those videos of the last terrifying minutes got made public? What if they were used by court systems in populous countries as evidence in criminal proceedings to railroad foreign pilots? What if they were cited in tort cases for massive civil awards? What if the airline used them to bolster a league table of pro-airline actors on the flight deck, giving bonuses to the most management friendly? These things (at least the first three) have already happened with CVRs. So, would it help here to be useful enough? FWIW, one of the AC mgmt types said that, in a go around from a taxi, they would expect an immediate report and to pull the FDR/CVR. |
I'll say it again,.. Do you want the school bus driver video monitor removed?
Would a simple video camera aid in the investigation of the recent tragic Canadian truck/bus collision? Certainly. As the crash site is in a somewhat remote location, a vehicle mounted camera is better than a government funded and maintained land-based camera. Make the commercial vehicle camera requirement a tax deduction. I don't want government surveillance of my backyard BBQ. Who does? Note that traumatic crash evidence doesn't have to made public, if only to a jury/public court. Jurisprudence applies. Some court evidence is never made open to the media. State sponsored executions don't have to made public. I will vehemently ( ve·he·ment·ly ˈvēəməntlē/ adverb
Is it just me? Will most airlines video and audio monitor the cabin in the future? You are probably right.. Curiously in post-totalitarianism Russia, nearly every car has a dash cam, although it is not required by the State.. Nearly all dash cams being purchased privately. |
Not to fault the controller, but had a second controller been working would the handling controller not feel as rushed leading to a more lengthy conversion and a preserved CVR? If so, you’re confused as to the role/scope of a controller’s job. |
Originally Posted by fleigle
(Post 10140818)
The AC crew were the only ones to get "confused" that night, it was severe clear weather.
There was a lot of traffic that night and we were vectored off the DYAMD3 arrival and flew past the SFO airport, then given a 180 degree turn to the East, then a turn near TRDOW to intercept the FMS Bridge Visual 28R. The weather was VFR and RWY 28L was under construction and NOTAM’d closed. Aircraft were lined up on taxiway C for takeoff and this caused me to question if I was lining up on the correct runway. The last time I had flown the bridge visual was several months prior and it was in the daytime. I could see what I thought were two sets of parallel runway lights. Aircraft on taxiway C were stopped and had their taxi lights off which helped to create this miss conception that taxiway C was RWY 28R. Had the runway sequenced flashing lights been on it would have defined the landing runway or had we flown the ILS we would have had precision course guidance which would have eliminated the illusion that we were not lined up on 28R. Because we were flying a visual approach and not a precision approach, this also caused me to question if I was lined up on 28R. We confirmed that we were lined up with 28R,cross checking it with the LNAV on final. I was preparing to go-around if I could not confirm which runway I was landing on. It was confirmed prior to crossing the threshold when I saw 28R painted on the runway. Once we turned on final, there was some confusion. We were lined up on a runway, to the left was an obvious construction site and to the right was what appeared to be a taxiway. However, the lighting was different and I did not know until after landing that was because there were aircraft lined up on it waiting to takeoff.
Originally Posted by AerocatS2A
(Post 10138390)
It is interesting that the previous landing also questioned to themselves if they were lined up on the correct runway stating that the construction lights were very bright and made it impossible to see the closed runway, also that the lack of lights on the jets on the taxiway contributed to their confusion. Of course they sorted things out fine, but it certainly suggests that the visual environment was not good.
|
Because we were flying a visual approach and not a precision approach, this also caused me to question
if I was lined up on 28R. We confirmed that we were lined up with 28R,cross checking it with the LNAV on final. I'm surprised by this. From what has been reported it would seem AC & Delta were flying a visual, slightly offset, at night to a runway which had an ILS transmitting, yet neither had the ILS tuned. Why would anyone not avail themselves of all the help they could, especially under these conditions? It's a combination of airmanship & SOP's. In my EU airlines it was SOP to tune all aids even if a visual was expected. Why would you not do so? You may not be flying down the ILS for the whole of finals, but you will for sure end up 'in the slot' below 1000'. Every little helps. |
Do any airlines have SOP's to turn off taxi lights if pointing towards landing aircraft?
My airline doesn't, but most pilots turn them off anyway. Interesting that this common practice may have been one of the holes in the swiss cheese. |
Aterpster, I think I read somewhere that they didn't have GPS. Is the Airbus non-GPS RNAV system so accurate that it would be "perfectly aligned"? Further, I doubt their SOP would have allowed autoflight, in LNAV, down to 100ft, especially at night.
|
| All times are GMT. The time now is 05:29. |
Copyright © 2026 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.