Sunamer,
A rather uninformed comment.

If so, this is a good book to start with:
Joe Sutter was the Engineer in charge of this bet the farm project. Not only will you learn about the 747 and Boeing, you will learn about some other interesting things back in the good old days, do you remember the good old days?

There are plenty of books about the creation and history of the Boeing 747 that counters your assertions.

I'll see Joe Sutter's book and raise him another one:

The Sporty Game: The High-Risk Competitive Business of Making and Selling Commercial Airliners
Hardcover – July 12, 1982
by John Newhouse (Author)

Newhouse follows the development in the 60s & 70s of four widebody airliners - their target markets, technical innovations, successes and failures. A really great book IMHO. :ok:

Sunamer,

The requirement back then (for the 747) was to move a lot of people around to a greater distance than the 707. The requirement for the 787 was to have a great fuel efficiency. The difficulties were similar.

Back when the 787 was running in difficulties I firmly believed that Boeing paid for its effort to kill two birds with one stone - new construction materials (and techniques) and bring a number or partners in a new base bearing full responsibility for their final input.

But it is not NORMAL to have to take the fuselage APART again after roll-out and severely damage it in the process - because it was held together with ridiculously large temoprary bolts in the first place. All just to meet some idiotic marketing deadline.

You are correct that was the reason. The Tristar had far more redundancy built into the airframe. It was a lot safer. It also had a higher empty weight with those extras. Payload and revenue generation tops safety every time in the airline business.

Well, I see 6 fatal DC-10 accidents:

NA ABQ 1973
TK Paris 1974
AA O'hare 1979
ANZ Mt. Erebus 1979
WA Mexico City 1979
UA Sioux City 1989

I read the second and last of these as airframe design-related, the others were either engine-, operator-, or maintenance-caused accidents. After the 1979 crashes there was a lot of passenger resistance, but this had died down within a few years. Overall, not a bad safety record.

And the 1011 was awful noisy (hydraulic or other machine noise) in the cabin, and you had to book an extra 10 minutes on the departure stand while you started three 3-spool RB211's.

910 miles is still a long way to walk, nearly half the distance of 2,063 to Seattle

Actually, having built major sections of the B-2 ( body, major wing structure, etc ) of similar composites, plus the A-6 composite rewing program- and using catia and other computer design stuff, followed by major catia useage on 777- BA had the experience and knowledge to do the 787 in reasonable fashion. What was lacking was competent management- having been taken over by MDC mis- management. And to ' save' money they offloaded way to much design and manufacturing issues. So it wasn't so much the technology issues, but major major mis- management. Those who had experience with 777 and B-2 were rapidly shuffled out when they tried to say ...no no dont give away the wing, do not overload or off load the design stuff...

It's an impressive taxi-out. Taxi tests up to 100 knots, lifting the nose gear. Another taxi at 100 knots with full flaps. Then it took it's first flight 5 weeks later.

It also received it's type certificate and entered commercial service less than a year after that.

Roll Out: Jul-23-70
First flight: Aug-29-70
Type Certificate: Jul-29-71
First Commercial Flight: Aug-5-71

These days on a rollout, you'd be lucky to see inside let alone see it moving or doing 100 knots. Then years before certification.