Lithium batteries (when charged) do not need extra oxygen/oxidizer to burn; they contain it, much like explosives do.

fgr..concur...

they scrapped the Titanium enclosure when they figured out it is the only element that will burn using nitrogen...

fgrieu,

Thanks, I was wondering why and you answered it.:ok:

Quote.

He began by reminding the audience that the problematic batteries are not used in flight !!!

That's ok then.

Quote.

will move really fast” once the Federal Aviation Administration approves the company’s certification plans to modify the Dreamliner’s lithium-ion batteries and systems relating thereto.

Once/if/maybe/maybe-not. Maybe-not is my guess

Why bother, just remove them and save more weight.

Reading between the lines, going A350 plan B batt option for the 787 is no simple option, guess it will require monster change and monster time to do.

Guess it's possible the A350 will be flying with the airlines before the 787 gets sorted out.

galaxy flyer:

The mountains are high and the emperor is far away.

FAA faces obstacles in approving Boeing Dreamliner fix

"The NTSB has questioned the process Boeing and the FAA used to certify the plane."

"Weber speculated that the safety concerns may result in regulators restricting the 787's ability to make long flights over water, a standard known as ETOPS. Such a change would be a severe blow to Boeing and airlines that use the Dreamliner for long-haul direct flights with about 250 passengers, a highly lucrative market that the 787 can serve at 20 percent lower fuel cost than other planes."

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/analys...w_default=true

galaxy flyer
Indeed. When I heard the move did not include the whole production facility - it was clear that it was being done to save money and nothing else. It was also clear that the Board were already entranced by their new hire to agree to such a remarkable thing.

In my current line of work, I visit many different premises that carry out the same function (nothing to do with flying). I see a BIG difference in the way they work: Some of them have the office remote from the operations and some have it 'close coupled'.

In one type of design, the manager is 1,000 yards (or more) down the road in another building. In the other, the manager is so close that, if there is a sudden change in the background noise - they will hear it in their office - and be outside in 15 seconds in among their customers.

In the first, if something goes wrong in the operations area they say, "You can ring the boss but he won't come and sort it" at the other they say, "I'll just pop in and tell the boss what's happened." You don't have to take long to work out which type of establishment works better and has happy customers ...

MWorth
Ah yes, get a plan for approval and then work to the plan for approval. That's the way to engineer in the 21st century.


Turbine D
The ONLY thing to do is to walk around the 'shop' be it an office, a department store, or a factory. TALK to the people at the coal face and you will learn what you need to know.

But Boeing was due for a fall. They had become global top dog and yet they still wanted more profit. When that happens, if the shareholders and bonus catchers won't accept "Steady as we go, doing good work" then they start cutting chunks of the company out and retiring the long standing employees who know what to do in a crisis. Mainly because they were there in the LAST crisis!

Subsequently, Boeing found themselves in the same position as their legacy carrier clients! They were big and fat and, because they were top dog, thought that they knew how how to do it. They had become so brain damaged by success that they had no concept of failure. When the failure arrived - they were caught in the headlights and had no idea how to handle it.

Posters ask how the Board allows this to continue? Boards don't like admitting they have made a complete stuff up and are STILL running the company over the edge. So they have to pretend that they know what they are doing. From what has been written about this CEO, he is obviously a spectacular speaker and can convince people face to face of almost anything. Saying No to him will take a lot.

The only thing that will change that are deaths or large amounts of money. They have, thus far, avoided the deaths so when the large amounts of money start rushing out of the door - he will follow.

For the record, I have never worked in the airline industry but was in IT and telecoms for 27 years, working for a very wide range of companies (finance, shipping, cargo, retail, etc) in many different countries, including the USA. I specialised in big projects and I've made my fair number of mistakes.

A very confusing article. It seems to purposely plant this confusion by making competing claims of what level of safety is required.

Of course the FAA will be 1000 percent sure that it meets the regulated standards which are less than 100 % safe. All we should expect is the same level of safety that all new aircraft enter the fleet at.

That's why we code regulations so we have something to compare our sense of acceptable safety against, rather than a mix of weasel words by any person.

Connor's reassurance that the batteries aren't used in flight isn't right?

What starts the APU in the air?
Also, the 787 also has electric brakes, no power, no brakes, yeah I know that the brakes aren't used in flight but I'd consider them a vital part of aircraft equipment.

Is ETOPS dependent on starting the APU? I don't think so, as dispatch with an inop APU is allowed (or so I've been told).

Battery capacity doesn't extend the range of the aircraft. That is done by the RAT (or APU, if it starts). The primary battery serves to provide short term power while the RAT deploys to keep critical instruments powered. And it provides emergency braking power, which is not an ETOPS range issue.

The battery function is binary. It either works or it doesn't. And the trouble it causes by not working is not range or capacity dependant. If the primary battery isn't there upon main power loss, the ensuing problems occur immediately. Not after 90 or 120 minutes. So a main battery failure will affect any length of flight or diversion capabilities.

I think Weber is correct in speculating that reduced battery reliability will affect ETOPS limits. After a first failure that results in a decision to divert to an alternate, the probability of a second failure that results in the need to use the battery, and the probability that the battery will then have failed, increases with the remaining flight time.

Whilst an a/c can dispatch with an inop APU, its Etops will certainly be compromised.
Because with a 50% reduction of electrical power following an engine failure on an all electrical a/c then load shedding would have to take place without the APU.
Don't forget the back up electrical hydaulic electrical pumps will kick in to pwr the lost engine driven hydraulic system just to add to the load problems.
So at this point it would be imperitive to land at the nearest suitable a/p. Hence the reduction in Etops capability with a U/S Apu.
People have a mistaken belief in the RAT, it is an emergancy pwr source of very modest pwr output, it certain will not give any output on ldg where electrical pwr is needed to stop the a/c.
An a/c can not dispatch without a servicable main battery, there are lots of vital services eg discharge of fire bottles etc where battery pwr is needed.
I said in an earlier posting that the removal of circa 150 batteries to date is very very significant. Only 2 caught fire so the rest must have been to under performing (low charge)??

Walnut
 

Concur with what you posted!!
The about 150 changed batteries indicate something ? Probably a desighn flaw ?
Obviously about 150 batteries were changed because they became outperformed of described limits, most probably too much power taken off the devices. Looks like the batteries are used far beyond design expectations.
A LiIon battery discharged below design limits needs a special treatment to become reusable again, if at all.
Probably - speculation - the two reported fires and runaways were caused by trying to charge the emptied batteries with onboard equipment not designed and capable to perform that task correct.
If this may be proofed correct, than there is a a real non realistic approach discovered in the desighn of the battery control and managemnet environment.
The specialists may correct me.

I think the discussion of whether battery failure affects ETOPS has got a bit over-technical. The problem is not that the battery fails, but that it fails in such a way that it might start a fire in a part of the aeroplane not normally containing fires. That, surely, has some influence on how far away you get from a diversion.

I have no technical knowledge, but I live in Auckland, so ETOPS is a matter of existential concern to me. I even had to reassure myself the first time I flew in a 777 from AKL to LAX. Paxen like me choose airlines, sometimes based on the equipment they use, and although I like Air NZ, I'd be reluctant to fly with them on a 787 unless I was sure this problem was really, thoroughly, fixed. As I say, I have no professional knowledge, but I'm reporting in from the commercial reality.

I havent seen the data, but given this aircraft is virtually all electric...what happens if you were dispatched APU non-op, and went engine out?

I suppose this is a very real scenario for testing...but the concern from the way the batteries in the front and back are linked together, it just make one wonder.

A LiIon battery discharged below design limits needs a special treatment to become
 

I should confess that I have not read every post on this thread, nor am I sure that I can even remember every one that I have read, but I would like to ask a question.

Just what do we know about the servive history of the two burnt-out batteries?

With 150 batteries replaced, and something like 50 aircraft in service, were either one of these batteries previously taken out of service and then returned to service after "special treatment".

Just curious.

then there is this...

ANA says it had Dreamliner power distribution panel trouble three times

ANA says it had Dreamliner power distribution panel trouble three times - Yahoo! News

HazelNuts39:

I don't think you want to cut probabilities that close when it comes to critical systems. The difference between ETOPS/non-ETOPS range or flight time is on the order of 3:1 or 4:1.

If a combination of events cannot be shown to be extremely improbable (< 10^-9 per flight hour), then some backup system needs to be provided. The current LiON batteries' service history is several orders of magnitude less than what Boeing predicted. Not just the probability of fire, but of the battery functioning. That is significantly worse than 4 times.

Walnut:

That's the key. Dispatch with a serviceable main battery. And then that battery has to remain serviceable for the duration of the flight. The two fires plus removals puts the battery at such a high probability of failure that the battery system appears to need its own backup.

EEngr: while the RAT deploys to keep critical instruments powered. And it provides emergency braking power,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the RAT needs airspeed to provide the force to spin the blades to create the electrical energy. The job of the brakes is to slow the aircraft upon landing - if airspeed (groundspeed?) and power generation are being reduced once the aircraft is on the runway, where is the energy that keeps the brakes applied? As the aircraft slows the RAT rotation slows ergo the power output decreases. Or are the brakes of the type that when engaged will 'lock' onto that position?

The APU will be started in flight if power is lost in one engine by the power available from the remaining engine.
Battery will only be used to start the APU in flight if ALL electrical power is lost. EG Double engine failure.

The brakes are only powered by the main battery IF all other normal power sources are lost. IE both engine generators fail AND APU generators fail.

Connor is correct. :ok:

Only 50 a/c in service.

The two batteries are not linked. (Or shouldn't be:})

If APU is inop and you lose one engine you still have two good generators producing 500KvA.
If you lose that you are down to the RAT and (Main) battery only. Good luck with that. :eek:

In that situation the main battery provides the power for emergency brakes.

In a traditional hydraulic system the emergency brakes are provided by a compressed gas accumulator. The main battery serves the same function on 787 electric brakes.