Grounded by a part integrated to Boeing by same group
 

Hi,

The WRONG designed battery was integrated into Boeing 787 ( for two mission critical functions) by the same group that supplied the FAULTY Air speed sensors used in AF 447?

In the group website we read "mission critical" products.

Boeing could be viewed as the main responsible if bought the batteries and installed it?

I thought the sensors were blocked by ice caused by super cooled water condensing into ice and blocking the pitot tubes rather than the sensor being faulty?

Sorry, RR

Here I must defend Thales. The pitot probe was certificated, and speced to the A330 by other than Thales.

Any insufficiencies belong to the people who fastened the devices to the hull, imo. The AD should have been an EAD. Captain Chris Scott has the elegant answer to the problem: The airflow at Pitot position on the A330 is different than on the A320, and that is problematic.....

The DREAM,

Here, again, Thales did everything correctly. Boeing is responsible, even though they may not be culpable.

Boeing went to great pains to certify the Batteries, including developing the actual criteria, and certification parameters.

The fly in the ointment is the process, not the player.

The FAA is the problem. They have devolved to yes men and women, who play a role, instead of a part.

What the industry needs, imo, is an independent non-governmental body, one that has the power and the expertise to protect the public, not an "in-name only" husk, that works for industry, not the public.

Given that Boeing and the NTSB have moved on from the battery to the monitoring, charging and other systems around it, I'm not sure you can describe the battery as 'WRONG'.

SoS

"WRONG" is for the NTSB to suggest, and the FAA to action. imo.

Only two things change what makind does: Money and Death.

Fortunately, no one has died and it is Money that is going to change this. Companies that try to save money in the early stages (of anything) usually land up paying MORE money in the later stages.

Humans don't change much. When the report on the crash of Shuttle Columbia was published, they showed that NASA had not learned some of the lessons from Shuttle Challenger 17 years before.

Wrong designed battery
 

Hi,

The placement of adjacent cells inside a case easily capable to start a "positive feedback mechanism" called Thermal Runaway is:

One serious ERROR.

The battery has a label Thales in it.

And there are other errors in this WRONGLY DESIGNED BATTERY.

It´s clear my position?

People forget or worse: Not learn
 

Hi,

PAXboy @ # 735

Richard Feyman worked very well in this subject.

Your comment is VERY OPPORTUNE.

RR

Richard Feynman. Student of John Wheeler.

"Time exists to prevent everything from happening at once...."

"Space exists to prevent everything from happening to me......"

John Wheeler

Operational history of the B787 battery cell?
 

It has been mentioned a couple of times on one of the threads discussing the present B787 problems, that the cell (LVP65) has been approved by NASA, ESA and other bodies.

I wonder what this particular type of cell has been used for - other than being a part of the B787 battery system?
If the B787 battery is not the first user of LVP65, there must be information available about the operational experiences with this cell.

What I mean is that if this cell has a perfect service record for many years in all other applications, it is not fair to call the cell wrongly designed IMO - the battery itself is a different story.

But if it is designed especially for the B787 - OK, then it is another story!

Start here?

http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf...rieshazard.pdf

Boeing is on the glide slope
 

The evidence of the past several decades is that Boeing has lost the recipe for managing complex engineering projects.
The problem began during the Reagan era, when Boeing won much more business than they could cope with. They were slow on some and others were terminated for the convenience of the government, but no lessons were learned. A decade later, they won a huge NRO contract for Future Imagery Architechture, to follow on to Lockheed's existing spy satellites, which they failed utterly to produce. The only hardware from this multi billion dollar disaster are some telescopes that the NRO has recently gifted to NASA.
Since then, we have had badly delayed efforts such as the Australia Wedgetail radar surveillance project and the Japanese and Italian KC versions of the 767, also many years behind schedule and low on performance.
The 787 in other words shows performance in line with recent Boeing developments. It is not an exception and quite possibly the current battery/electrical system problems are only a symptom, rather than the real problem. Boeing used to respect engineering and flourished because of it, imho. Now it is increasingly outsourcing the engineering because it respects primarily financial returns. We will see how well that works over the coming years.

lomapaseo:

And how's that working out for them? There's only so much one can do when you get too far away from 'the trenches'.

During my time, Boeing didn't build much of the electrical systems (panels and wire bundles was about it). We did do our own certification and acceptance testing, which helped give our staff some hands on systems experience. Now, this is all gone.

"If the Certification process was well conducted Boeing could even be a "victim" that simply bought bad batteries?"

Who says that the batterie caused the failure? Maybe the batterie ist the victim of a big surrounding electrical installation...

RR_NDB:
I do remember that :hmm:

Can you refer me back to that post, so I can comment on the context ?. My position
was and still is, that the problem is fundamentally that of battery management.. Ok,
sticking neck out, but i've been pretty consistent about that all along and that the
enclosure design is deficient, for various reasons...

syseng68k

I cannot recall your concern with enclosure. can you refresh? Battery case? Battery group box?

many thanks

Lyman:

Here's one:

26th January, #161, tech log

All in all, not impressed. Boards and connectors of that type should
never be located anywhere near cells and their contents...

.#164, tech log

The assumption they possibly made was that the cells are sealed, but they
are not. With age, vibration and pressure changes from internal heating &
cooling, they will leak vapour which will accumulate within the enclosure.
Vapour meets electroncis = corrosion and it wouldn't need much deposited
on the pcb to cause measurement error in sensitive analog electronics.

I was going to make some comment about consumer electronics quality in a
billion $ a/c project, but I suppose i'd better not http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...lies/worry.gif...

Probably find more with a search...

Fellows
 

EEengr

Typically Technical Fellows report to a Sr Vp level. So I imagine that once they assess their short commings in all this they can effect some changes immediately in the process gaps. Nothing would stop them from auditing anything that they feel contributed including vendor performance. (financial contracts not included)

Lyman:

Sorry, have been posting to tech log and r&n and didn't make a note of which it
was posted in. Try tech log...

?
 

Allusions to black holes or Feynmans QED appears to be somewhat highbrow for the level of problem the B787 has at present. The hi tech battery/electronics have some problems... this is more a Homer Simpson "D'oh!" moment I would have thought, as far as program risk management goes. One assumes that given their time again, there would be some changes in how and what they decide to add as bleeding edge technology.

The assumption of responsibility of the FAA in the present condition is not consistent with their obligations; the regulator merely determines that the compliance basis of the manufacturer has been proved at the time of certification, to the agreed basis of certification. If the manufacturer has a problem thereafter but complied appropriately with the process, then it is a defect to be dealt with accordingly by manufacturer and regulatory process of continued airworthiness. The FAA ACO is obviously aware of the commercial sensitivity of the current situation, but it is not of their making, they didn't force the manufacturer to apply new technology. The special conditions that apply to the battery were reasonable and at the time of determination, the evidence would (or should) have pointed to the compliance with the intent of the regulations.