Hello,


I's not really a problem for french autorities :{

September 11 was undoubtedly a fatidic day ....

Remaining under the carpet since 44 years ( I was 19 yo)
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1968/f-hb...f-hb680911.pdf
Nobody is saying this is HMS Vincennes fact! But french Navy fact, covered up by BEA and "La raison d'Etat".

Please, don't applaud

I think it's fair to say that the BEA is a *considerably* different organisation than it was in 1968!

Clandestino wrote:
A search of that site under "photos/photographers" yields zero results for a "Clandestino." May I have my five minutes back? :8

The opinion was BEA have not presented as certain that the pitot probes clogged due water Ice. Ice was present, and a noise like Ice was on the CVR.

Do not be a pushover.

Micro granulated ICE behaves diffently than either supercooled Water, or water as rain, or mist. It is a solid, like dust, and it's dispersion and concentrations in areas of convective development are not well known. I have assumed that the pack up of the tubes resembled that of perhaps volcanic dust, rather than ICE, in it's behaviours and effects.

As such, the clog might be assumed to have developed over time, and likely was not conducive to near simultaneous failure of the three probes.

Of the two or three objective posters who might consider this, perhaps someone would like to comment? I am disappointed that one or two credible posters here have succumbed to accusatory and ineffective attempts at invective. It is wasteful of bandwidth, and I am serious in my question.

It is also symptomatic of groupthink.

Are the traces of the elevators, and THS available from Caraibes?

Since when is it forbidden to backtrack the THS trace to suss elevator position?
Failing a suitable expanation for the seeming failure of the THS to track the two (2) elevators in the unusual climb to 38,000 feet, it would appear to be an interesting method to gain information.

All may not be as it seems, or it might, but to leave holes in the report unaddressed invites careless "me too" affirmations.

As i was adressing you, there was no need to waste your time with explaining terminology to you, as you proved now that you can explain the terminology even in great detail.
If your understanding of accuracy is omitting the deviations from cruise level and omitting the roll channel, which BEA adressed in great detail as well (the deviation in roll, by the way also the deviation in altitude -300feet, the pitch being 0, and the VS showing a descent) then there is reason or ignorance behind it.
As long as i find it necessary to mention those points written down in BEA report due to its importance of the discussion i will will accept the fate, that it helps to your amusement.

That your view of the findings of BEA human factors group is a different one, should not surprise me or anyone else here on the forum. Wether that view of you disqualifies the HF groups contribution or sheds some light on yourself is not relevant to the case here.

Is that unfair to say that the the statutes and regulations governing the BEA are the same as 1968?
The only thing that has changed since 1968 are the means of communication and ease the exchange of information (true or false) thanks to internet
The news are now everywhere in a second to everybody in the world ... not like the paper press in 1968
Other experts than BEA can now easily communicate the results of their research to a wider audience
The "Goebels" are not now the only ones that can express themselves .. they have competitors
Barking guard dogs have become more menacing :)

What you are actively pushing is not accuracy but distraction through overanalyzing non-essential details!

AF447 stalled after largely inappropriate pilot inputs - that's the basics. To use road analogy: your insistence of concentrating on roll and altitude deviations is similar to refuting the statement that the driver who caused an accident by running the red light without making any attempt to stop was at fault by insisting we have to check what kind of tyres were on his car before we can make any conclusion about his driving skill.

I disagree with BEA's view "almost all the crews that heard the stall warning considered it to be surprising and irrelevant" should be viewed as the proof that all the crews considered stall warning to be irrelevant as BEA also clearly states that there were crews that descended after stall warning and no crew has stalled. Case of TAM crew is especially poignant when making lame excuses for crew unable to understand what computer shouting :"STALL STALL STALL STALL STALL" wants to tell them.

I disagree with BEA's view that flying without external visual reference makes attaining appropriate pitch more difficult as I have good reasons to believe airline pilots set their attitude according to attitude indicator, not external horizon.

I disagree with BEA's view that "Specifically, the approach to stall on a classic aeroplane is always associated with a more or less pronounced nose-up input." because it just isn't! It is true only in the strictly controlled circumstances of stall testing or training. In real life there were trims set very near or even below stall speed and then one absolutely gets no pronounced nose up input. There was inadverent trim application (TAROM at Paris). There was fighting the autopilot resulting in extreme nose-up trim (CAL at Nagoya). There was failing to monitor the airspeed so by the time stickshaker fired, autopilot has trimmed to well below normal approach speed and surprised crew could not remember using the manual trim but rather reduced power to regain control (Thomsonfly at Bournemouth). So no, synthetic pitch forces do not give you the clue how far you are from the stall, just how far you are from the trimmed state for your weight, speed, CG and power. If it is trimmed below Vs, effect is very similar to the one when FBW Airbus in alternate law without protections get pulled onto the flightpath it just can not maintain performance-wise. Except, unlike conventional and synthetic pitch feel aeroplanes, FBW Airbi autotrim when stick is pushed forward, sparing their pilot even that little effort.

This is what is called supporting one's opinion with arguments.

Can you refute anything of this by providing valid counterarguments or is this pathetic ad hominem:

...the best you can come up with?

It is not forbidden but is stupendously meaningless when elevator position is recorded.

DFDR traces of AF447 and other incidents totally refute the gradual clogging over time theory. Whatever it was, it clogs and unclogs pitots very fast.

@Clandestino
Thank you for the detailed description of your position concerning stall recognition, and you might wonder, i share your view in most points. There is nothing wrong with having a different oppinion then the final report, as any oppinion is a personal view of things derived from personal expierience and personal knowledge.

As the report is out and our discussions here do or should include the findings of a group of experts working over such a long period of time we should to the benefit of other readers present our own oppinion as that, a own oppinion despite differetn findings of the BEA group. When this own oppinion is presented like in your last post, then its more usefull instead the short and absolute statements you like to throw at others, even when those argue along the line of the BEA findings. Thats what others called arrogant, please note, that i do not support this position.

NOt necessary, the counterargument was and is BEA´s findings, again, it´s not a holey position, we are all entiteled to a different position if we present them like you did thankfully now.


Distraction needs motivation, i have none to serve. You yourself said, you wished to be judged on accuracy. Challenged on this accuracy you now call it overanalyzing non-esseential details. They might be nonessential for yourself, but when you present the impression that the aircraft was in straight and level flight and no pilot input was required then it is an over simplification of the situation.
I´m fully on the line of PJ2´s "Do nothing", what in my world was basically called "maintain aircraft control" before continueing with the further steps "Analyze the situation" and "Take proper action". It has been explained by PJ2 in great detail and it does include minor corrections to stabilize the flightpath, which ended in gross destabilization and finally into stall in case of AF447.

I think it´s time to end our turf war, i respect your position and point of view as it is based on expierience and knowledge. But with the presentation of them you would not advance to instructor of the year. That might also apply to my person as well, accepted.

Yes, you two, pack it in or find somewhere more appropriate to TRY and point score to eachother. This crash happened because inexperienced, so called "pilots" failed to recognise flight with unreliable airspeed. Lots of people are dead as a result. We should now focus on Training, Training, Training. Stop the rot of a dumbed down industry where pilots pay airlines to fly . Get back to Airlines investing , either singly or jointly into Professional Pilot Training Acadamies where cadets are highly selected for aptitude & potential rather than the size of their wallets. Airlines, start recommending manual flying practice whenever and wherever appropriate.

No problem Franzl, glad we have sorted it out.

1. they were ceritified in according with applicable regulations. Legally, they were pilots. They passed their checkrides. They were given their UAS training. That they were unable to apply UAS procedure is indicative of their performance at the time of the accident, not overall performance. The two are connected but link is not as rigid as many believe. Good pilots do make bad mistakes. That's why we have TEM.

2. according to CVR both of them recognized they have no good display of speed very promptly. IMHO UAS procedure execution would have to be promptly executed after the recognition and why it wasn't didn't get satisfactory explanation from BEA.

3. When does one become experienced? CM1 had 6547 hours, 4479 on type. CM2 had 2936 total, 847 on type. Is there any statistics showing that inexperienced pilots participate in more incidents and accidents? What are we going to do with old hands making basic mistakes and losing control when their logbook shows more than 20 000 hours?

Richard Bach understood it very well when he wrote in "Loops, voices and the fear of death" that what keeps us safe when things go wrong while flying is knowledge. Now, if the only way of acquiring knowledge were one's own experience, we would be in great trouble.

While doing that we could do well to remember:

That would be interfering with "the invisible hand of the market". If there is no significant difference in insurance incurred costs when it comes to employing one of two ATPL holders, one who can truly be called a pilot and other who can just jump the regulatory hoops but regularly falls to pieces when AP quits, there is no incentive in money-worshiping and near-sighted world of modern management to choose one over other. William R. Voss has made brutally honest evaluation of contemporary aviation $afety in July issue of Aviation Safety World - recommended read, if you ask me.

Hello gentlemen,

@Dozy w #848
Yes, of course!
Formerly, BEA was 'Burau Enquetes Accidents'
but nowadays, fashion is to use a 'soft language', and BEA is recalled 'Bureau Enquetes & Analysis'
and those (as me) who have a bad minding of the events call it 'Bureau Excuses Airbus'.


Despite the BEA's engineers have very goog technical knowledge, I find it is a pity they get ONLY driftig buoys for searching the wreckage location.

In fact, DIVING BUOYS were availlable, but they never use them!
Perhaps it was too easy to calculate retrodrift whith diving buoys data.

Searshing group:
Despite Russan' opinion 'searsch near LKP' (and it seems to me that they experienced a lot of wreckages), BEA searshed ALL AROUND.


@ Studi
Yes, Tarom was another aircraft type,
Furthermore, PF fault was to try to intercept glide while he was too high.

My only idea was to show the inapropriate FBW answer.



@ Alls
I was very angry while reading '...Assange '
I am so sorry and I ask you to excuse me.

With real time ACARS, AF and BUS known since 2009 june 1st morning what hapenned.

I am angry when earing 'leaks'
beacause leaks and 'disformation' are not anonymous:
since the beginning, it was a "terrific storm",
"95 per cent pilot's fault, and 5% Bus" (french minister),
and so on...

It seems to me that all the leaks was made to accredit the thesis of the fault of the pilots.



I wish to say a a very special 'thank you' to all the members of PPRUNE, pilots, technicians, engineers, Organists, for their knowledge, look for and perseverance for more than 3 years.

OK - you tell me precisely when the BEA have made excuses for Airbus.

IIRC both Captain and PF had been trained as pilots by AF after initially working as CC. ( I cannot recall PNF's training.) So both had been sponsored by the airline.
ALL pilots have had to start with low hours to begin with. A spell on short haul increases the chances of more aircraft handling, manually where this can be arranged, rather than going straight onto very long sectors, and this might be possible to arrange.

( Your new pilot should be a part of the airlines' complement for twenty or thirty years, so should be treated by the Airline as an Investment, like their aircraft. " Investment in People" used to be worthwhile.)

Training ought not to be just to pass a minimum standard, whoever lays that down. Some airlines have higher standards than " State Minimum";
This costs money... The alternative costs much more.

In the 1960s an Insurance man is reported to have said " We don't mind how many accidents an airline has... We will just increase their Premiums until safety is cheaper !"
Some airlines did more training. I did !

I still hold the position that the totality of cockpit visual displays, aural warnings, and ECAM, contributed to the crews inability to determine their true condition.

Other than that, I completely agree. Well said.

And the funny thing is that what he's saying is all I've said from the outset. Everything else is just a sideshow.

Which is a fair enough position, that nevertheless asks the question of what, other than blaring "STALLSTALL" in the pilots' ears, while faithfully representing the aircraft's attitude in the ADI, altitude and V/S in the PFD and even airspeed (when it came back) along with "Alternate (NO PROT)" on the ECAM, the system could have done to make it clearer?

Competent pilots can fly with distractions and concentrate on the basics. Aviate, navigate and communicate. Aviate means fly the airplane and keep it under control. This means proper attitude, proper power and proper bank. Not very hard for most seasoned pilots. No competent pilot follows a flight director in this situation. Flight directors only work for normal flight conditions.

No competent pilot at FL350 would pull up to a 15 degree attitude in any airliner because 100% will stall. No competent PNF would allow this to happen if the PF was doing so.

Now we have a situation where UAS caused the PF to pull up to 15 degrees, the PNF not do anything about it but say he had no protections and call for the captain to come back to the cockpit. Stall, stall, stall is blaring and other warnings but the autopilot and autothrottle failed so now it ends up in the PF saying I have no control. All this time he is pulling the SS back putting it into a full stall and maintaining back stick for 3.5 minutes until impact.

What is really scarey is some people on this site defend them.

OK, I will bite (take up your invitation to comment). The idea that the three pitots clogged over time is erroneous. They all clogged quickly at the same time, hence the switch to ALT 2 Law. The reason they clogged is because the plane entered a cloud that was part of a larger CB formation which contained a significant level of ice crystals, beyond what the pitots could remove or clear by its built in heating system. All three probes were identical, all were in the cloud and it would be generally expected all would experience the same fate. Ice crystals are not the same as volcanic ash dust. The two are radically different in both cause and effect. Ice crystal ingestion resolves itself as the pitot heaters overcome the conditions by melting the crystals into plain water. Ash dust, on the contrary, remains for the duration, i.e., you are screwed in terms of speed detection for the duration of the flight.
The condition experienced by AF447, rapid drop in IAS, would suggest the pitot tubes tips clogged, but the drain hole was free (may contradict the BEA version in the final report). However, there is the matter of potential mixed ice crystals plus water. The CB buildups in the ITCZ in the warm season are different than those that occur over land. The conditions are such that the supply of moisture (sea water), warm air and updrafts on the exterior of the CB core could result in a combination of both ice crystals and liquid water at the flight level they were at, even although the surrounding air temperature would indicate differently.
To avoid invectiveness, it is always best to do much research before publishing conclusions, thought or theories that are not supportable. There is a wealth of knowledge on both pitot tubes and weather conditions they may experience on the internet and Google is a good tool to research these topics.

Not me......

What is very more scarey is that Air France (Ref chief pilot Schramm) tell that the maximum of competence was in the cockpit and that pilots made the maximum for save passengers .. plane and them .... :eek:

You speak as if the "stall, stall" was the only sound blaring in the pilots ears. The altitude alerted "C" chord was sounding continuously for almost 50 seconds. That warning is very effective at drowning out most all other cockpit noise. and it can't be cancelled by just pushing the MC.

ECAMS demand attention, and are trained accordingly.


With the "C" chord drowning out other warnings, or at least muddying the water, and with his PM dealing with ECAM actions, Bonin reacted incorrectly.

Less is more.

Yes TurbineD, some of us are willing to defend the pilots. I have, and will continue to do so. I've written that they badly mishandled the situation, but there, IMHO, were contributing factors that deserve some blame as well.