Doze...

"@Lyman:

Bonin only got the Stall Warn because he pulled up."

He pulled up because he was four degrees nose down, ascending in an updraft....probably would not have happened to you, or to your mentors....

@Lyman

Evidence of updraft please.

What you're saying explains a corrective maneouvre, but does not explain trying to hold the pitch attitude at 15 degrees.

Check the Vs, attitude, and g for the updraft, approx 1500 fpm. Where do you get 15 degrees? It got there much later, and his initial input became a target, followed by nose down inputs. This is old stuff Doze.....

Was the a/c in A Law? At SW? What does the 330 do in NL when Alpha Floor is bust, due turb? Does the A/P deselect?

What caused the THS to quit at 3 degrees, before winding up at the SW? Load factor inhibit? It should have been following the elevators...could not have been OS inhibit....

Exactly what the pilot tells it to do. This crash was not automation-related. V/S was manually ordered.

AP is out with UAS - instantly.

THS never "quit" - it shows an uninterrupted curve following the PF's nose-up commands.

Without Autotrim, the elevators paid off at ceiling limit, at the beginning of 'momentum'! At this point the nose was dropping, and there was almost the recovery when Captain came in, but the SW honked again, he pulled, the THS kept winding up, and he mushed into the STALL, the Nose dropped later, by thirty five degrees in ten seconds, she started to roll like a pretzel, is that what you want in a STALL? Or would elevators quit be a better schema?

THS was at 5 degrees NU at apogee. If the crew had levelled off it would have stayed there and reoriented itself. Roll required correction from AP disengagement onwards.

And since when has pulling up been the correct response to a Stall Warning?

Roll in Stall regime requires rudder to correct. Neither pilot tried this prior to the Captain's recommendation.

Interrupted curve? That means arrested, stopped, quit...

Manually ordered Vs? Proof please....A/P drops immediately it is exceeded in limits, and remains in Normal Law....how long was UAS obtained prior to loss of auto? And the pilot knew it was UAS also immediately? Negative. You are not keeping up....you really want the THS to waste ll that energy at the end of your climb? Do you know what mush is? Read the report and 3 interim, at STALL Warn .1 he pushed nose down, repeatedly. Can an aircraft stall with nose down?

Rudder was at four degree
RTLU at apogee, and the a/c was slooow.....

The curve's not interrupted, it follows right though.

Manually ordered V/S? He pulled up as soon as things started going south! No matter what you want to believe, the sidestick traces prove it was not the automatics but the PF that commanded that climb from the outset.

It does not matter how long UAS existed past a certain point, Alt2 (and by extension autopilot lockout) is retained from that point onwards.

SS traces mean what? How about the Vs traces, ok? The THS was not moving with the elevators continuously, did BEA change their text? No you misundstand vv UAS, the airplane was checking speeds for how long with the pilots playing checkers? If you are contemplating a move, should the pilot be made aware?


"past a certain point" NO, prior to a certain point, with pilot's unaware...

Studi...at .80 Mach, nose low by four degrees and in an updraft, could you possibly be guilty of a itch too much NU? At SW, three seconds after loss of autopilot, out of the blue, he is alarmed, and since he! Not familiar with SW in NL, could he be excused for thinking the hazard was quite real, and go into your "overload"? Just askin.....

SS traces mean that whatever the automatics were doing, the SS inputs were being tracked. The aircraft flightpath is consistent with the SS inputs.

UAS detection takes less than a second to detect and confirm.

The crew were not tricked. The automatics commanded neither the climb nor the stall. The crew were responsible for the flightpath from the second the automatics disconnected. Get over it.

PS. An "itch" too much NU? Try 10 degrees! Try attempting to hold it during the resultant zoom climb! Try attempting to hold it after stalling!

Not tricked, the automatics are not abstract and devious thinkers. But held in the dark v/v UAS, but also by AF, And Airbus...

Could you keep track of your SS in the dark, shaking like a roller coaster, assessing each bump, and response? You have no way of knowing what your commands are causing the aircraft to do... Look out? Ridiculous.? Feel the seat, dangerous....look at the panel? Vibrating numbers, very loud nose outside, airstream howling, too fast? FD gone, no cuddly line to follow, a cacophony of alarms, some important, some banal, all of them wanting attention. ECAM? Not your job, !!!! it looks bad....

By the way, you are not wearing your belts.....damn.....

Doze....

"PS. An "itch" too much NU? Try 10 degrees! Try attempting to hold it during the resultant zoom climb! Try attempting to hold it after stalling!"

Stop reading op's mail....:E

He did not get ten degrees Pitch up until eleven seconds after the SW1.....
After several nose down inputs mixed with ups, and how will you remember to sum them when you cannot see the panel for its shaking?

Where in holy hell does that come from?

UAS is obvious to both seats from lack of speed display on the PFDs. I know my only experience comes from the sim, but the SS response was very positive and I had no trouble determining its relative position by feel alone. Altitude loss is apparent on the PFD from the change in colour from the V/S display, as well as the altimeter itself towards the end of the sequence. If FD is gone then it's a simple matter of using the ADI to determine which direction you should be facing. Outside noise? Use the damn panel to determine what could be causing it! The only aural alarm was Stall Warning - take heed.

This wan't a crew valiantly trying to rescue a situation they were thrown into by technology - this was a crew who couldn't find their a**e from their elbow.

(which was not necessarily their fault...)

* - It doesn't matter what the PF got when - the command was way in excess of what was required from the outset. A ND input is not sufficient in isolation, it needs to be *held*. You don't need to sum them in your head, you have to follow through until the aircraft is doing what is required to recover.

Knowing the position of the SS tells you nothing... It is the position of the a/c you need, and that is not necessarily related to the whisk in your mitt. If your scan is crap, or your instruments dancing, you are Screwed.. The stick is a small whip, limp and ineffective as to assiette suss.

If you had only ears and a yoke, you could fly.

Ears and a SS, not so much....

And the report supports the conclusion that the aircraft position was easily discernable to the crew and that despite that fact they failed to fully appreciate just how much danger they were in until it was too late.

The DFDR trace conclusively proves that the PFD in the LHS was 100% reliable throughout the sequence and that the failure to act on what was presented lay with the PNF.

Birgenair 301 and Palm 90 prove that if a copilot is not prepared to overrule their captain and take control, yokes make no difference.

If you'd have asked any KLM pilot prior to 27/3/1977 if their chief training captain would take off without proper clearance, they'd have looked at you like you were mad. Sadly, we all learned differently.

Seeing a yoke move back and forth meant a lot to me as captain. It told me instantly if he was putting in the right inputs. Waiting to see what the airplane does is a bit late to fix an FO FU. AB doesn't feel that way. See what happens?

bubbers44:

If the yoke connection was reversed, you'd have been in trouble! Likewise if there'd been a failure in the artificial feel system.

UA232 highlighted the fact that even if the yokes are rendered completely useless, pilots will still try to use them. With no hydraulics, the inputs made by Capt. Haynes and F/O Records had no effect at all, yet they still held them in a death grip till the final moment. Not that this takes anything away from thir ultimate achievement (or that of the late Capt. Denny Fitch - who I hope has found the peace that it seemed eluded him).

Given that there hasn't been an upsurge in accidents on approach in FBW Airbus types due to "FO FUs", I hope you won't be offended if I suggest that it hasn't made much difference...

I'm sure reversed control movements would have been noticed right after take off.

UA232 did a fine job of saving most of their passengers. They did what they thought was best. I would have done it differently but I wasn't there. They saved a lot of people by what they did. We have to make command decisions when the sh#t hits the fan.

You're grasping at straws. 3 fighters and a light single, but true to form, you ignore what you don't want to deal with. I didn't ask about SS alone, I asked about no feel , no feedback side sticks.

How many other transport category aircraft feature a no feel, no feedback, SS? For that matter, how many other transport category aircraft feature no feel, no feedback controls regardless of where the stick is mounted?

You know that I know this, so who are you trying to convince? As in the UAS recognition problem , the pilot first must know that both sticks are active, he must recognize that the other pilot made an input. But as I first wrote, those warnings are easily drowned in a cacaphony of cockpit noise and stimulation.


Further counterpoint will have to wait, but I'll end with this......there is a reason Airbus says that a crab is their recommended technique for x-wind landings. Based upon PERSONAL EXPERIENCE in the airplane, trying to hold a wing down in gusty conditions could easily result in a nacelle scrap because FBW "protected" roll control is far less powerful and responsive than rudder induced roll. IOW, rudder inputs intended to counter gusts overpower the ailerons/spoilerons and you can't raise the wing quick enough with roll control to keep from soiling your pants. That's not opinion. FWIW, crossed controls work just fine in steady x-winds.

What a completely wrong statement! Dozy, you would have crashed too.
At the apogee the AC was above the lift- and propulsion ceiling, a level off was therefore not possible. Release the stick to acchieve one g flight, not possible, the same would have happened, the trim woIuld have followed the command 1g with SS neutral hands off, same result.

Only a definite and prolonged ND command would have prevented the THS trim to continue its NU movement and then would have moved the trim in the ND direction.

Can we somehow finally agree on that and then stopp argueing on the basis of completely false statements like yours above?

Or is again the knowledge for aerodynamic fundamentals missing like aparently with the crew of AF 447?