An airplane that passes certification but requires above average pilot skills to fly, is potentially dangerous in the hands of an average pilot. Is the MD-11 one of these aircraft?

Have you heard the one about aeronautical engineers and bad airplane designs? How many aeronautical engineers does it take to correct a bad airplane design? Answer: None, they turn the job over to the pilot trainers instead.

ha ha ha ha
very funny even for an avarage one

"An airplane that passes certification but requires above average pilot skills to fly, is potentially dangerous in the hands of an average pilot".

Another way of looking at it might be that a general reduction in pilot skills has happened since the aircraft was designed and certificated?

Absolutely NO doubt about it.

So, only pilots who got their ATP before January 1990 will be allowed to fly the beast. Problem solved.

There are a few factors to consider in what causes MD11 crashes, but here's one that links up to 411A's point: MCDonnell taught maximum use of automation in that jet. This was therefore adopted by most carriers in their training programs.

I have flown with 5000 hour MD11 pilots who click off the autopilot at 1000' on final, and never turn off the autothrottles. And get very uncomfortable when I do. This is all a result of the "automation pyramid" that is in everybody's manuals.

If I were king I'd defer all the A/T's and mandate hand-flown approaches in visual conditions.

It's hard to play piano well when you practice 3 minutes a month.....

I have learned one thing from this site, old timers are extremely arrogant. If only the crash rates of the past were better than today would they have a case when trying to say how perfect their flying skills are compared to the new automation generation

@413X3 :
You take the words out of my mouth !
This glorification of the past seems to be ingrained in human nature.
As in most other cases also in this case reality rather implies the opposite.

Yes the manual hand flying skills probably have degraded to some extent. But the safety of the overall system : Plane - Pilot - Airport Equipment is so much better than it was in the good old days.
And even the distribution of the accident causes hasn't changed that much since the days of the propliners.

I have several thousands of MD-11 hours and all this talk of the aircraft needing an above average pilot to fly is pure nonsense. This aircraft has its unique characteristics, higher landing speeds, smaller tailplane etc....well, an average pilot adapts. If one transitions from DC-10 to the MD-11, you will understand the differnt handling characteristics and handling qualities. You adapt to that and learn to " feel " how the aircraft behaves on final approach, then prepare to adapt to its handling qualities. On hot, humid days on a high elevation airfield one has to really " feel " the aircraft and be prepared for high sink rates. Trying to fly the MD-11 like any of your previous aircrafts will be inviting disaster... it does not need an above average pilot, it needs an MD-11 pilot!

The same thing when I hear of people likening a B77 to a souped up B767...it is not, the high lift wing and triple bogey undercarriage presents different handling characteristics in strong gusty crosswinds on hot and humid days. Guys, know your aircraft. I knew mine and I survived. I am an average pilot and had my share of crunchers...but I survived.

Oldtimers and arrogance
 

Respect pls to "oldtimers".

What are the statistics for "oldtimers" v. "non-oldtimers" who have crashed large aircraft produced since say 1990?

Arrogance is a known danger to continued flight, and to all that surrounds it, and I suggest it rarely concerns "oldtimers".

The fundamental problem with arrogance is that it tends to kill the responsible, and others. I suggest most "oldtimers" have survived because thay have assimilated this.

Why speculate? Wouldn't it be relatively easy to get the data? Relative ages and experience of the Captains and F/O's who operated flipped flights...and which seat was making the landing. If it were age/experience related, wouldn't such accidents be spread over all other fleets as well?

Another question. Is there such a thing as an 'UN-Airworthy Certificate'?

Aircraft handling qualities can range from marginal to exceptional and still allow type certification. If after a period in service the aircraft is judged too marginal – may be weather or skill related, etc, then the type certificate / modifications can be considered.
The MD 11 has reduced longitudinal stability compared with conventional aircraft and uses a relatively small horizontal tail. It is (or has been) prone to pilot induced oscillations during the final approach and landing.
IIRC the MD 11 flight control system has been subject to at least one Airworthiness Directive requiring modifications.
Then consider the gear/wing structural design !

http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/faq9.htm

Not beating up on any one particular age group but if we did an age analyses of the all the crews that have been involved in MD11 "accidents" I think we would find them to be comparitively young by traditional airline standards. I have no clue what the implications of this might be other than there are a lot of young pilots getting to fly this aircraft today where as in the past it was at the top of the seniority list for most operators.

Age of Cargo Pilots
 

Does anyone know the relative ages of cargo service pilots vs. those in passenger service?

Flight crew experience in prevous accidents
 

The following is from the official accident reports.

Fedex N611FE at EWR (1997):
Captain: 46 y/o, 11,000 hrs total time (1,253 on type, 318 as pilot-in-command)
F/O: 39, 3,703 (95)

China Airlines B-150 at HKG (1999):
Captain: 57, 17,900 (3,260, 2,300)
F/O: 36, 4,630 (2,780)

Not all MD-11 crashes have ended up on their back though? As far as i can remember there have been 3.

1. FedEx N611FE in EWR
2. China 642/Mandarin in HKG (landing in a typhoon and maybe shouldn't have been) and
3. FedEx N526FE in NRT.

That's 3 since service introduction. Is that "excessive" in the terms of becoming an aircraft "habit"?

Some thoughts regarding the fire (I am an ex firefighter with post graduate studies in fire and explosion science).

This is speculation of course because fire behaviour can be difficult to determine from a few photos. But it seems to me that there may have been a relatively confined fire around the area where the wing connects to the fuselage which migrated upwards into the interior of the aircraft through opened up access areas. If there was ever an external pool fire it was relatively small and located between the undercarriages. I don't see much evidence of a large pool fire. A small pool fire may have been extinguished quickly by the firefighters. The fire was localised in intensity breaking thorugh the upper skin in the area of origination first but also migrating through the fuselage fore and aft before breaking through the upper skin areas there with remaining hot spots fore and aft. The larger burnt area at the rear can probably be atttributed to wind direction.


Hope this helps.

Huck
 

Agree wholeheartedly.

But when the aspects/pressures of RVSM, RNP-X and RNP-0.XX are considered, is this trend (if indeed it is a trend) surprising?

Especially in long haul ops?

The number 2 thrust reverser is not deployed, 1 and 3 are. This could indicate a nose gear collapse early in the landing phase, since thrust reverse on engine 2 is only possible after nose gear strut compression ( air/ground sense).

hm
 

LH pilot handling ??
Really?

Did we forget that B747 stall soon after T/O in Joburg or nearby
and last year or so,touch down on one wing in Bremen or nearby ?

maybe more pls remind me now...