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-   -   Air France A330-200 missing (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/375937-air-france-a330-200-missing.html)

Flight Safety 3rd June 2009 20:20

protectthehornet, probe icing and the ACARS reported degradation of the flight control systems could be connected. Besides the electrical busses, the probes are also in common with the ADIRUs and the ISIS. I'll admit however that this scenario requires certain unusual assumptions to be plausible. However consider the possibility of trying to maintain control of the aircraft with degrading flight controls caused by probe icing, in severe turbulence. Since an AD exists for the A330 regarding probe icing, it is a known issue with reported effects and degradation of the flight control systems.

icevane 3rd June 2009 20:35

AF Track
 
The German news source Der Spiegel just posted an overlay of the A330 track with that of the IR sat image at the time of the accident.

If one where to judge by that, they flew right through the worst CB activity in the region.

Flyinheavy 3rd June 2009 20:39

@PJ2:

I agree with what You write,but:

'We only hear (but have no evidence or confirmation that it is "A330" wreckage) of "pieces" found and a 20km "oil slick".'

How many planes are missing at the South Atlantic?

Brazilians are pretty sure about having found the A330

22 Degree Halo 3rd June 2009 20:46

Found this

PY0FF assists in search for flight AF-447 | DX World of Ham Radio

Appears this radio operator was told to "keep quiet" even though communication was scare at the time. From one of the links translated:


But he upheld the reprimand. The fact is that, having disclosed the recorded conversation between the crew of two Hercules C-130 which were searches, along with an airplane house, had no access to any other communication

:confused:

wes_wall 3rd June 2009 21:00


Officials have released some details of these messages, ..... The report said the pilot sent a manual signal at 11 p.m. local time saying he was flying through an area of "CBs
"

Why would the Captain do this? A question to those still flying. Do you periodically, or ever, send a manual message to a maintenance center advising in-flight conditions? I know that I might advise center what my current flight level ride was, particularly if it was rough, but I don’t ever recall forwarding such info to flight ops. Now, if damage was suspected or potentially occuring to the airplane, then that’s a different matter. I just find it strange.

safetypee 3rd June 2009 21:06

Re ‘pitot icing’ (TAT probe icing) see http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/37578...ml#post4963257
Presumably any TAT anomalies could affect the ADC and ultimately the flight control system. However many of these systems have internal monitors, data cross comparators and validation routines which could eliminate erroneous information, although possibly degrading control system performance.

The links above primarily relate to engine ‘rollback’, which if the particular engine variant was susceptible (always a first time) would be a viable event in the reported atmospheric conditions. However, even with the loss of both engines the aircraft should be capable of flight to a lower altitude where, with improving conditions, systems and engines could be reinstated.

Lost in Saigon 3rd June 2009 21:08


Originally Posted by wes_wall (Post 4972350)
"

Why would the Captain do this? A question to those still flying. Do you periodically, or ever, send a manual message to a maintenance center advising in-flight conditions? I know that I might advise center what my current flight level ride was, particularly if it was rough, but I don’t ever recall forwarding such info to flight ops. Now, if damage was suspected or potentially occuring to the airplane, then that’s a different matter. I just find it strange.


It can be quite normal. The message from the pilot would have been hand typed on the keypad and sent to Air France Flight Dispatch.

Separate function from the auto maintenance function.

greuzi 3rd June 2009 21:09

PJ2

My personal opinion on the cause of the accident has not been offerred. As I said, the cause of previous accidents was often proven not to be related in any way to terrorism. To promote this theory was not my point.

I simply point out a change in behaviour from a few years ago by the important people in front of the cameras.

To eliminate the subject in the early stages over anything else? They could have picked many possibilities, or denied them, yet they really seemed to promote the idea that a thunderstorm broke up the aircraft.

Our colleagues who fly these machines every day they work now tell us that the theory is at the extremes of possibility.

The irony is that facts are facts, regardless of the reason. Whatever caused this tragedy, your odds of encountering the same problem if you fly on one of these are now considered the same whether freak of nature, a one-off, or anything else. That is why it makes no sense to exclude or promote an idea over another. The statistics of dying remain the same if you are SLF or crew.

I'd rather fly 6'000 miles (and often do) than drive, sail, walk or run. I will live longer by flying so I will continue to do so.

RoyHudd 3rd June 2009 21:36

Voice of Experience.
 
Recently flew an A330 at night through a massive and therefore unavoidable stormy area in the Med, painting green, no red/purple, climbing, lost airspeed indications, A/P disconnected, ditto A/THR, into Alternate Law, flying raw data. For about 16 minutes. No CB's, just icing and mod/severe turbulence. AOA discrepancy acc. QRH. Demanding.

Had this happened in a CB area, with wx radar u/s, things would have been even more awkward.

Had the AF crew experienced a reversion in bad weather, it is conceivable that the a/c could have been difficult to control. No difference in this situation between Airbus and B777.

All conjecture. But sadly much amateur guesswork posted here. I cannot comprehend why amateurs would wish to post their "ideas", any more than I would start posting my thoughts on neurosurgery on a dedicated website.

Many fools on this site. Pity the media pay it such attention. Perhaps that is why our PPL/SPL/aviation enthusiast pals feel the need to post. Devalues the discussion.

efatnas 3rd June 2009 22:15

Reanevaplue
 
Looks like they lost some navigation equipment, the radar among others. I personally don't like Airbus with all their fly by wire stuff... I think they might have been just overwhelmed by the failures and went into somewhat of a strong return which they couldn't see. Can't imagine handling a level 5 on standby instruments. That said, knowing the lousy WX enroute, without radar they should have made a precautionary landing in Recife or Fortaleza. A few hours into the flight, the copilots were probably flying and they might not have had the nerve to turn around without the captains permission. I was in this situation before; I'm just speculating, but me, without my radar working and other funny failures, considering the forecast......wouldn't have gone on. But then I'm a chicken. It is a big loss, and whatever happened, it seems like the crew was loaded up max.....well my five cents worth.....
Ciao

vapilot2004 3rd June 2009 22:21


Buoys might have limited value in this search.

The pingers can nominally be heard for about 2 miles (10,000 ft) The depth of the ocean in this area appears to be about 10,000 feet, but varies between about 8,000 feet and 12,000 feet. It would be pure luck to drop a monitoring buoy in a position where it heard a pinger, given the depth in the area, and the fact that at the surface, the radius of success is substantially smaller than 2 miles..

The distance the pinger can be heard will also be affected by any thermal layers in the ocean, and the terrain where the wreckage came to rest, both reducing the range..

The search won't begin to be effective until towed sensors that work below the surface are deployed. I suspect they are being flown in as we discuss this.
The type of sonobuoy that the P-3 carries is an improved version of the type that has allowed us to track Soviet boomers around the world using only the passive-type sonar, that is listening only.

Generally, these are laid out in a pattern-grid field for SAR use. An Orion can typically carry over 4 dozen of these things or more for that purpose. They don't just plop one in the water in a random fashion.

As Bubbers correctly pointed out earlier, for effective active sonar searches, a side-scan array is the best option as would be for finding a DFDR/CVR using passive hydrophones. The aforementioned sonobuoys are most often used for SAR operations for temporarily marking a location at sea.

As an aside:
At the frequency of the DFDR/CVR pinger (37.5khz) the average absorption rate in sea water is between 6-10 dB/km. This does not take into account thermal layers. The relationship between absorption and frequency is more on a log scale rather than linear. Lower frequencies can travel further than higher ones, not unlike the audio range in air.

iptamenos 3rd June 2009 22:24

Flight Planning, Severe Weather Recognition (S/A), Electrical Failure,Decision Making
 
Planning: did the crew evaluate the severe weather developing in the ITCZ? Were well informed?
Severe Weather Recognition: did they identify the problem of severe weather early? did they have the onboard equipment (WX radar, Comm for sigmets etc) functioning? The sat wx shows fast change in the wx situation the time of the accident.
Electrical Failures ACARS reports: did the onboard equipment gave the proper responce to the crew for the electrical failures? could the AF maintenance ground team help the situation? (HF and other links are available available)?
Decision Making: were well informed, not overloaded, to make the right descision and take proper action? did they have any option or there was no way out due to too late reaction after lost of all redundances of control?

We have to hear answers from the investigation board to questions of the circumstances how and why it happened and lessons learned.

bigdunc 3rd June 2009 22:32


ditto A/THR, into Alternate Law, flying raw data
Royhudd, why/how did you end up in alternate law exactly?

Mercenary Pilot 3rd June 2009 22:33

Details of F-GZCP ground collision in 2006.


DATE: 17.08.2006 LOCAL TIME: - LOCATION: Paris-CDG Intl AP (LFPG) COUNTRY: France
AIRLINE1: Air France TYPE: Airbus A321-211 REGISTRATION: F-GTAM C/N: 1859 AGE: 3 y + 9 m
AIRLINE2: Air France TYPE: Airbus A330-203 REGISTRATION: F-GZCP C/N: 660 AGE: 1 y + 5 m
OPERATION:1 ISP FLIGHT No.: - FROM: Paris-CDG TO: Rome-FCO VIA: -
OPERATION2: ISP FLIGHT No.: - FROM: Paris-CDG TO: Ouagadougou VIA: -
OCCUPANTS1: PAX: - CREW: x
FATALITIES: PAX: 0 CREW: 0 OTHER: 0
INJURIES: PAX: 0 CREW: 0 OTHER: 0
DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: minor
OCCUPANTS2: PAX: - CREW: x
FATALITIES: PAX: 0 CREW: 0 OTHER: 0
INJURIES: PAX: 0 CREW: 0 OTHER: 0
DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: minor

Both aircraft suffered damage in a ground collision at Charles de Gaulle Airport.
The tail of the A321 was substantially damaged when it was hit by the taxiing A330.

Damage to the latter was considered as minor.



agusaleale 3rd June 2009 22:37

Admiral Ackbar:

I know that Air France has been spewing too much stuff (lightning, pressurisation ,electrical failure, etc.) that they shouldn't in these early stages of the investigation but a retired Air France pilot (Jean Serrat) on France 2's main news broadcast last night stated that internally at Air France people are talking about extreme icing conditions in the time period preceding the crash...

As I said, I think AF should be a lot quieter than it is about this incident but thought people might like to know
Sounds very similar situation to the Austral accident in Fray Bentos, where the pitot probe iced and caused the crash, when the plane entered a CB.

McGinty 3rd June 2009 22:55

AF Track
 
Here is the track referred to above, from the BBC web site. His weather radar must have been u/s.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl...7525/img/1.jpg

TripleBravo 3rd June 2009 23:22

Red Paddy:

To me there is only one thing that could cause a shutdown that would leave non essential items operating while essential items such as the ADIRU's and ISIS shut down and that would be a fire in the avionics bay knocking out essential systems in an erratic manner and not shutting down non essientials first.
Paddy, my absolute sympathies to your neighbours, I understand that search for "the truth" is priority to them. There are multiple scenarios possible for that sequence of ACARS messages. I did not have the time to clearly verify how the mentioned systems are interconnected, but it is clear that PRIM1 and SEC1 are both at DC ESS as well as HOT BAT. So a massive failure at those could possibly lead to the picture we have and strike the aircraft at its very heart.

The computer systems are placed in a way in the e-bay that a local physical damage (bomb blast / fire) would not render e. g. all PRIM unservicable. This has been taken care for by design.

On the other hand, this alone does not render the plane uncontrollable. In essence, even only one backup ISIS could provide enough navigational aid to bring it back to earth in one piece (providing PFD or ND on its front), albeit I imagine the workload would be quite massive. If it were only the computers that were mentioned in the ACARS messages, it could possibly even still execute an automated ILS approach, if I'm not mistaken.

If the timing of the ACARS message correspond to the occurrence of failures over time is not sure at the moment. It could well be that the Maintenance Computer System, which collects these data, waits for several occurences of failure reports before relaying them to the home base. So for me it is not sure that really the AP disconnected at first, then the PRIM1 etc. It was not designed as a real-time DFDR backup, just for maintenance information and action, eliminating false alarms.

RWA:

In an Airbus, you can go to 'Direct Law' (I think!). But, also as far as I know, that means that you won't have elevators or ailerons to fly with, just the rudder and the trim controls.......
Direct Law delivers full authority. But other than Normal Law, the Sidestick commands real rudder movements without limits, as opposed to protected roll rates / g-loads etc. (Saw it afterwards, was already answered by khorton and GlidingAerobats.)


Quote:
As an add-on, if ADIRU and ISIS are completely non-functional, and you have no external horizon reference - is that even recoverable?
There is a gyroscopic horizon in the cockpit, if that's what you mean...
There is even 3 ADIRU (one would be enough), 2 ISIS (which can in a way replace the 3 ADIRUs), 3 PRIM (one would be enough), 2 SEC (which can provide backup to PRIMs) and so on... As said above, the ACARS messages alone do not indicate a helpless bird.


Lost in Saigon:

One very important piece of information is missing though. Was the cabin vertical speed indicating a climb or a descent?
I would very much argue this to be a climb, i. e. pressure loss. If it would be a descent, there had two independent computers to be failed *and* a source of overpressure to be present (aircraft descent, increased bleed air pressure), because the outflow valves would have to be stuck in their present position or being closed. But still to be verified, agreed.

Jo90:

Q. Which part of your aircraft is most likely to be struck?
A. The nose.
No, lightning bolts do not come from upfront like birds.

J2P:

We only hear (but have no evidence or confirmation that it is "A330" wreckage) of "pieces" found and a 20km "oil slick".
As press has it, I think Brazil authorities confirmed that these were of AF447. But then, no information about where they derived this from...

icevane:

If one where to judge by that, they flew right through the worst CB activity in the region.
To me, Spiegel is not exactly known as a sound aeronautics treasure of wisdom, so I would not bet my money on their published charts.


If anyone could provide me with the MSN number of the cited Qantas A332 (AF447 being MSN660), then I could check the make and model of the ADIRU of these two.

Zeffy 3rd June 2009 23:30

NTSB to assist BEA
 
************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
June 3, 2009

************************************************************
NTSB TO ASSIST FRENCH WITH AIRBUS A-330 ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
************************************************************

The National Transportation Safety Board has accepted an
invitation from the French aviation accident investigation
authority, the Bureau d'Enquˆtes et d'Analyses (BEA), to
assist in the investigation of Air France flight 447, the A-
330 that crashed in the Atlantic Ocean off the Brazilian
coast on Monday morning.

NTSB Acting Chairman Mark V. Rosenker has designated senior
air safety investigator Bill English as the U.S. Accredited
Representative. The U.S. team will also include technical
advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
General Electric and Honeywell.

Information on the progress of the investigation will be
released by the BEA. The agency's phone number in France is
(33)1 49 92 72 00; their website is
http://www.bea.aero/index.php, and their email address is
[email protected].

###

NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************
This message is delivered to you as a free service from the
National Transportation Safety Board.

edmundronald 4th June 2009 00:00

Add GPS header to ACARS
 
SLF query:
Wouldn't it make sense to add a GPS position header to the ACARS messages? As ACARS seems to just be company-internal, non-navigating instrumentation, this ought to be possible without a lot of certification/red tape and might speed up the search for a missing or even ditched plane the next time around ...

Edmund

protectthehornet 4th June 2009 00:17

Best Media report
 
the weather channel has just reported that two independent lightning observation newtworks say that the nearest lightning to the flight path was 150 miles away.

Lost in Saigon 4th June 2009 00:18


Originally Posted by TripleBravo (Post 4972620)

Lost in Saigon:

I would very much argue this to be a climb, i. e. pressure loss. If it would be a descent, there had two independent computers to be failed *and* a source of overpressure to be present (aircraft descent, increased bleed air pressure), because the outflow valves would have to be stuck in their present position or being closed. But still to be verified, agreed.


I disagree with your assessment. Nothing would have had to fail as you describe.

Even if there was no failure of any system at all you would still get a "advisory regarding cabin vertical speed" once the aircraft descended in a dive below the pressure altitude of the cabin (6000-8000 feet)

You would have "caught the cabin" in descent resulting in a very high descent rate for the cabin.

The fact that the "advisory regarding cabin vertical speed" was the last message sent prior to impact tends to support my theory.

Does it not?

ByteJockey 4th June 2009 00:26

A summary of the final messages from Flight 447
 
The Associated Press: A summary of the final messages from Flight 447

French and Brazilian officials have described a "burst" of messages from Flight 447 just before it disappeared.

A more complete chronology was published Wednesday by Brazil's O Estado de S. Paulo newspaper, citing an unidentified Air France source, and confirmed to The Associated Press by an aviation industry source with knowledge of the investigation:

11:00 p.m. local time — The pilot sends a manual signal saying the jet was flying through CBs — towering cumulo-nimulus thunderheads.

11:10 p.m. — A cascade of automatic messages indicate trouble: The autopilot had disengaged, stabilizing controls were damaged, flight systems deteriorated.

11:13 p.m. — Messages report more problems: The system that monitors speed, altitude and direction failed. The main flight computer and wing spoilers failed.

11:14 p.m. — The final message indicates a loss of cabin pressure and complete system failure — catastrophic events in a plane that was likely already plunging toward the ocean.

torquebox 4th June 2009 00:28

Jo90:

Quote:
Q. Which part of your aircraft is most likely to be struck?
A. The nose.
No, lightning bolts do not come from upfront like birds.



Actually from experience lightning pretty much always hits at the front of the aircraft. Normally strikes in a pattern along the airframe but definately starts at the front. Radomes seem to cop a lot which is why they have such massive lightning diverter strips.

Lost in Saigon 4th June 2009 00:32


A more complete chronology was published Wednesday by Brazil's O Estado de S. Paulo newspaper, citing an unidentified Air France source, and confirmed to The Associated Press by an aviation industry source with knowledge of the investigation:

_ 11 p.m. local time — The pilot sends a manual signal saying the jet was flying through CBs — towering cumulo-nimulus thunderheads.

_ 11:10 p.m. — A cascade of automatic messages indicate trouble: The autopilot had disengaged, stabilizing controls were damaged, flight systems deteriorated.

_ 11:13 p.m. — Messages report more problems: The system that monitors speed, altitude and direction failed. The main flight computer and wing spoilers failed.

_ 11:14 p.m. — The final message indicates a loss of cabin pressure and complete system failure — catastrophic events in a plane that was likely already plunging toward the ocean.

The final message was "advisory regarding cabin vertical speed". Everyone seems to be making false assumptions of what this means.

The problem is that this and all other "reports" are not reporting facts. They are simply interpretations of the various news media trying to put it into layman's terms.

wilyflier 4th June 2009 00:35

post 776 triple bravo
 
Small point you say lightning strike doesnt come on the nose.Sorry, ive had one like that, build up of static ,then a discharge explosion straight forward off the nose , broke the radome and disabled weather radar.

PJ2 4th June 2009 00:38

Lost in Saigon;

The fact that the "advisory regarding cabin vertical speed" was the last message sent prior to impact tends to support my theory.
[removed comment]

I know that there are a number of reports "out there" concerning such messages but they are not "fact" until they are in-hand and available. If you have an actual source, perhaps it could be provided? As I posted earlier, any ACARS message will have a time stamp, a reference to the ATA System Chapter and a text message describing the failure(s).

I'm not disputing that they exist but am disputing, until we see these messages, their timing and content. I simply don't trust the media, Air France's press information or anyone else's information. There are too many guessers, speculators and interested parties to trust anything but original sources.

On a related matter upon which I earlier posted, hopefully too, the copies of the last logbook page were pulled before departure as is standard procedure, so we can learn what, if any, snags the aircraft had and either cleared or MEL'd before departure.

We have absolutely no other evidence upon which to base speculation so everything is possible and therefore nothing is privileged as probable.

The actual aircraft course and position has still yet to be determined. The Vazquez presentation itself states that the line shown is "extrapolation".

PJ2

Lost in Saigon - post edited to respond to your last message:

They are simply interpretations of the various news media trying to put it into layman's terms.
Precisely, and very poor layman's terms at that. The imprecision is entirely misleading and distracting and is of no use whatsoever.

Lost in Saigon 4th June 2009 00:43


Originally Posted by PJ2 (Post 4972742)
Lost in Saigon;

When you say "the fact that..." in reference to the ACARS messages, to what documents do you refer as "fact"?

I know that there are a number of reports "out there" concerning such messages but they are not "fact" until they are in-hand and available. If you have an actual source, perhaps it could be provided? As I posted earlier, any ACARS message will have a time stamp, a reference to the ATA System Chapter and a text message describing the failure(s).

I'm not disputing that they exist but am disputing, until we see these messages, their timing and content. I simply don't trust the media, Air France's press information or anyone else's information. There are too many guessers, speculators and interested parties to trust anything but original sources.

I agree. No one has shown us the actual ACARS reports yet. The initial reports simply said "advisory regarding cabin vertical speed". It appears to me that many(but not all) subsequent reports added "loss of pressurization" on their own.

PJ2 4th June 2009 00:51

Lost -Sorry, we're overlapping one another here.

It appears to me that many(but not all) subsequent reports added "loss of pressurization" on their own.
Yes, I think so.

I suspect when the ACARS messages are finally released in some form, there will be dozens of them trying to keep up with a degrading situation and therefore all within a very short period of time. The FWC's (flight warning computers for others) would be generating these until the power was no longer available. Such a point may or may not be a structural failure point - we just can't determine that yet.

md-100 4th June 2009 01:00

does the ACARS transmit in VHF or HF?

captplaystation 4th June 2009 01:00

Am I the only one that thinks WTF? ? the PIC or indeed anyone in the flightdeck is doing bothering to send a "manually entered" message to some ops bod sat in an office several thousand km away in CDG saying they are having a rough ride ? with the greatest of respect so F? W ? Did they expect them to call Sarko and ask if he could ask Obama to have the clouds eliminated ? this strikes me as either so much BS. . . OR I am seriously worried that any crew of an A 330 could waste valuable time "texting" OPS instead of concentrating on where they were pointing the airframe. . .Pleeeaase tell me this isn't true.
Jeezuz, what next, beam me down Scotty it's rough up here. . . . Nah ? you are joking , right ?

blueloo 4th June 2009 01:08

I agree with captplaystation: never once going through turbulence have I thought of ACARSing ops to let them know its bumpy. Why would you? It doesnt achieve anything. ... Seems very bizarre.

re Huck reply below: Yes I agree - but it is a different story advising Air Traffic control for Weather deviation purposes, compared to the company. As for other company traffic on that route - maybe - but I would be surprised if they operate that route that frequently to make it worthwhile.

PJ2 4th June 2009 01:08

md-100;
The ACARS transmits on VHF frequencies when in range of VHF reception and automatically switches over to SATCOM when required.

The SATCOM antenna is on the top of the fuselage and can transmit to satellites in all but very high roll angles.

The ACARS is powered by the AC1 bus. The #3 VHF is powered by the DC1 bus.

Only #1 VHF is powered by the DC Essential bus. There are no communications equipment powered by the Hot Battery Bus.

Huck 4th June 2009 01:12


never once going through turbulence have I thought of ACARSing ops to let them know its bumpy. Why would you? It doesnt achieve anything. ... Seems very bizarre.
1. Maybe he was advising ATC via datalink that he was deviating.

2. Maybe he wanted to warn other company aircraft.

wes_wall 4th June 2009 01:12

I agree completely - thats why I asked the question. It sounded strange to me, and it still does. More over, this information surfaced very late in the thread, leading to suspicion that it is even factual.

Phalanger 4th June 2009 01:17

There is no information of a message being sent out of a radar or any WX related failure. I'm sure that by now AF would have said so if they had it, cause then it would only help their cause. So for now I am disregarding anything to do with that idea.

It's interesting that spoilers are reported as failing in the last set of messages. This would suggest they were still intact till this time (and other things were not falling off). Personally the biggest hint lies with the Qantas/Unknown Airline events. These reports stated while the incorrect readings started the chain, the computers analysing them failed as well. While there maybe be three different types of computers, but they are all progamed to operate the same algurithims. So if there is a problem in thier reasoning, all three computers will act on it (which is was the Qantas incidents have showen). Turbulents can induce strange reading, and if these computers algurithims has some error in them or do not account for cirtain inputs, then it will create uninticapated outputs (like the systems turning off).

Will Fraser 4th June 2009 01:21

I noticed very early the "report" concerning the ride, was that the pilot reported "hard turbulence". He obviously thought it important to get it on the CVR and apprise company of his situation. I know the "hard" was the word used, as I thought it may have been a mistake in translation.

bond7 4th June 2009 01:21

Whatever happened...it's obvious to all now that the crew didn't have enough time to address the problem in hand on time. So please, to the Mr. know it all :ouch:...please reserve your smart comments to yourself or at least help shed some light to the crash investigation agency as to what might've happened...or at least help in locating the ELT!!...
And with ACARS?!?...I wonder how long before a better system is implemented?

ED13 4th June 2009 01:31

some thoughts 2nd time around!
 
Given all (little) evidence avaliable i'm not discounting anything, but given the flight path and the weather info, the fact that af447 flew into a storm cell which as i understand it was at or approaching peak intensity it seems logical that the weather is the primary candidate for the cause/contributing cause/s of the crash.

Must say however that the public relations annoucements of AF re: early call of lightening as cause and the 'the black boxes may never be found' does not sit well with me........:mad:

Phalanger 4th June 2009 01:35


Must say however that the public relations annoucements of AF re: early call of lightening as cause and the 'the black boxes may never be found' does not sit well with me........http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/censored.gif
It does not sit well with me, along with the fact they kept information about the messages close to them and away from Brazil for a long time after the aircraft went missing. I think there is something in these messages that is important and they may just be delaying their release. These message are details, and in 4 minutes there is enough time for them to create a picture of what is happening,

KRviator 4th June 2009 01:58


Originally Posted by TripleBravo
If anyone could provide me with the MSN number of the cited Qantas A332 (AF447 being MSN660), then I could check the make and model of the ADIRU of these two.

The aircraft involved in the QF72 incident is VH-QPA, MSN 0553, according to the preliminary accident report.

Also from the ATSB report, the ADIRU's fitted to the aircraft at the time were as follows:
Model name: LTN-101 Global Navigation Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (GNADIRU).
Part Number: 465020-0303-0316.
ADIRU 1 Serial Number 4167
ADIRU 2 Serial Number 4687
ADIRU 3 Serial Number 4663.


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