PLEASE:

Prior to sitting down for the purpose of flight, check the circuit breakers thoroughly.

upon entering the cockpit, with electrical power on, move the throttles up and hear the warning.

know signs of plane THINKING it is in the air (rat epr gauge heated on ground, strobes on (you might even hear them in your radio), gear over ride button retracted.

check killer items on runway

AND IF THE PLANE DON'T FLY RIGHT< FIREWALL POWER< FLAPS 15.

bubbers is right of course about nose oleo strut

justme69 has some good things to say too.


and ALL MEL's are a load of crap...the plane should be right to start.

Another example of a bad MEL is : autopilot inop along with pressurization in manual mode. IT is hard to fly this plane with the ap out and the other pilot having to work the pressurization wheel manually.

and yes, there should be a big frickn light that says:

AIR MODE

GROUND MODE

and all planes should have this, not just the MD80.

this ''fix'' should cost about 5 bucks, but will really cost about 50k

If true, there has been a collective or unconcious downgrading of training... isn't a 'What if?' thinking process, instilled at about day one?
.. and then reinforced at every step thereafter?

it would hurt your head for a pilot to work out the correct measure of "what ifs" relative to an MEL.

A team of experts should have already worked these out and had them validated by the regulator. That's not to say that they got them all right, as there is always something to be learned in the in-service data in combination with human error.

The pilot has the choice of not taking the plane, but keep your arguments simple.

I always thought part of being a professional pilot was looking at mechanical problems from our perspective and when maintenance had done their work take a look at what they did and how it could affect your next flight. I would rather risk a headache thinking it through rather than severe head trauma from not.

SLF Here...

IMHO MELs exist just to justify the operation of an aircraft which does not satisfy the safety requirements.
How can a piece of equipment (i.e. a/c) can be operated for 10 days, and than grounded because is not safe?
Still in IMHO MELs were created to avoid to ground planes for minor issues, but now are used to keep the planes off the ground as long as possible. Today most of the operators are not looking at MELs as a way to minimize the cost of repair, but as a way to maximise profit.

Still a silly opinion of a SLF

Agree:ok:

on "your" next flight it is appropriate. That's what i meant by your option not to accept

so, don't like the MEL...write your congressman, or whatever you have in your nation.

IT IS WRONG..the whole concept of MEL is MONEY driven.

sevenstrokeroll;
Absolutely correct.

With airlines keeping minimum inventories on parts and keeping maintenance staffing at mainline and offline stations, the MEL is being treated as a scheduling tool, not a maintenance tool.

Those two concepts are not exclusive

I actually meant fitters and technicians, not pilots...

HarryMan, That is what I thought you meant. The maintenance people should make sure what they are MELing isn't associated with other systems that could cause problems. Also pilots should look at what was done and not let questionable fixes put them back in the air again.

That sounds a really nice simple fix, but think logically about it and it will make the situation much, much worse.

As I understand the posts here, this plane has several sensors/circuits that take part in the ground/air mode decision. So which one do you choose to light up your big frickin light? Only part of the plane thought it was in air mode, the rest was still on the ground. Put in your light and choose the wrong circuit to drive it and you make the whole thing many times worse.

"Oh look,. RAT heater is on."
"That can mean the plane thinks it is in the air - remember Spanair at Madrid?"
"No, it can't be the same as that, the big frickin light says we are in ground mode....."

lomapaseo;
Yes, I'm fully aware of that but thank you for making the point clearer, even if only some pilot starting out in his/her commercial career reads this and learns one more fact about aviation that isn't taught as a licensing requirement...

The key requirement has been amply stated in the thread. However, hands up those who haven't either been fooled only to realize it later or probably more likely at least had maintenance try to fool you into taking the airplane "under the MEL" when you know damn well the airplane doesn't belong in the air?

Like I say, these are traps for young players and I'll bet you more than one crew has taken an airplane that shouldn't have gone.

As someone here said, "It's all about the money" and absolutely nothing else. Management never sets the park brake; that is up to us.

Yeah,

At the very least, the light needs to tap on all sensors and indicate:
-Ground
-Air
-Disagree
-Off (light broken)

Unfortunately, if i.e. the Madrid case turns out to be a case of a malfunctioning single relay (R2-5), even if you make this more sophisticated logic, as you just mentioned, it will still confuse the heck out of the pilots ...

They will see an indicator lighted:
-Ground

Then, if they notice at all, they'll see a RAT probe indicating way too high temperature. Maybe they'll notice/figure the heater is on.

Maintenance will see the logic is "correct", so it must be a case of the heater "mysteriously" malfunctioning. Cut it out, MEL the thing, and out we go.

And we still get Madrid's likely inop TOWS takeoff condition ...

Boeing's recommendation of testing TOWS shortly before each take off is the best (and cheapest, mind you) solution. The alarm could still fail from the time it was tested til the time it was actually needed, but usually that would be some short period of taxiing time, so the risk is small.

Testing with a POSITIVE test, where you actually hear the alarm, not a test where you are suppossed to NOT hear the alarms, which is "worthless" in case of a "broken" TOWS.

The real "best solution" is a TOWS re-design where the alarm indicates both, possitive and negative results. Nowadays, with digital technology, I'm sure the change wouldn't cost all that much (at all). You push the handles and the TOWS will announce out-loud:

-Configuration OK (you are good to go)
or
-Beep - slats -- beep -- flaps (you are not yourself today -- drink more coffee and stop chatting on your cellphone with that cute flight attendant you are about to meet)
or
-Silence (TOWS is inop ... you are NOGO)

There is a definite disconnect between pilot and engineer in todays world.Didnt used to be.Engineers were once flt engineers but then they took the third seat out.Pilots used to have work the engineers panel before sitting in the right.Pilots used to get shown the ropes in the hangar during C check..now they learn by rote and do the 6 month answer A,B or C monkey check.Some today have never seen an EEC or PACK..if you see it you'll catch on..a picture tells a thousand words etc.CP's in the old days were tough SOB's who'd wouldnt give a damn for this modern BS(Captain isnt a pilot but a flight manager:hmm:)..they would have been on that Lanzarote incident like flies on dog!!!!! and making sure data was disseminated to their guys..I know the powers that be will throw more SOP's at this as part of their answer..irony is you need less and a little more airmanship.Even if Madrid turns out to be the relay itself and not the cb,the lesson was check the TOWS every time..the full check at the gate during pre-flight.And if the SOP says the other guy checks this or that,doesnt matter,check it again..know the condition of your plane before you go flying.
Justme69,
Thank you for post 2133

FORUM WARNNG! This post implies no judgement/implication/hint/rumour on the cause of this accident.

100% with Ranamin. However, and not wishing to be 'trite', all these 'devices' - TOWS, EGPWS etc are 'backstops', and surely the important lesson is to get it right in the first place. If you need flaps/slats xxx for departure - make sure you have them. If there is high ground (or even just 'ground') around, make sure you know where it is and you are etc etc. It does not matter how you do it, and if your company does not try to ensure there is such thinking in place, develop it yourself. SOPS are not the answer to avoiding accidents, merely part of the building blocks. Sitting in front of these SOPs are pilots with brains and hopefully some sort of survival instinct.

All the warnings TOWS, AIR/GRND shift mechanism etc, still does not exempt any crew from visually checking the positions of the slats/flaps( including the postion of the flap selector) or,if applicable LE devices. Confusing that the A/C systems might not have worked, yes. But, to blame it on this alone, Hmm

CHECKLIST items
 

Just as a reminder of where the focus needs to be:

The Boeing checklist, printed on the chartclip that is affixed to the steering wheel in the B-767 and B-757 contains only the really important items:

Take-Off
FLAPS


Landing
SPEEDBRAKES ARMED
GEAR DOWN
FLAPS

The warning system is just there to alert the pilot in case he has forgotten to set the mentioned items in the correct configuration.
Having items in the wrong configuration is not the fault of the warning system.

(This is not written as accusation of the deceased pilots. If the final outcome of the accident investigation proves that the high lift devices were not properly configured for take-off, well, to err is human, it is as simple as that).