If they did occur and were never reported how would the press report on that? If they were "nothing burgers" then wasn't the original evaluation by Boeing correct? The first incident we know about was reported by the crew to their maintainers; certainly a search of operator records would find similar problems where the pilots shut off the electric trim in order to restrain MCAS.

Are the US operators complicit in hiding information about MCAS?

Not sure if I am missing out on some news, but hasn't the MCAS defect been modded at this point?
Kinda sorry to see this turn into an MCAS hamsterwheel.

It all blends together. The EICAS shoe is still waiting to drop, which with the most recent extra years delay of the MAX 10 might well be revisited, as the waiver for modern crew alerting is written into law with a date that depends on the certification of the MAX 10.

https://aviationweek.com/mro/safety-...grades-737-max

https://www.aviationpros.com/aircraf...lerting-system

Unqualified (unequivocal) agree.

Just highlighting one subpart, the planned appearance before a Senate Subcommittee of the most recently publicized whistleblower - depending on what is revealed and whether his (anticipated) revelations about 787 production imply (or even demonstrate) new and serious concerns - could provide the political cover and impetus for FAA to take an even more stringent approach to any and all pending matters before the agency.

yes, the hearings take place today, 4 witnesses. see link to AP article with an overview in Thread Boeing latest news. in a few hours speculation will partially turn into insight.😊

Some good - IMO - a new part series from Mentour Now.
Link is to the first.
I've found his view good. But then again I'm just a SLF... :)

Let's finish the week with a bit of black humour !

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....6d0c34a204.jpg

Just speechless
 

Coming from the new Boeing chairman to justify the 33 M$ pay package of the current CEO:https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/17/i...age/index.html

🤔🤨🙄……….

Shouldn't the entire board step down after this debacle and the statements they made. ' Giving greater emphasis on quality and safety' shouldn't they be ingrained in the very core of everyone in management in the aviation business-. Apparnetly other things were more important in the CEOs objectives. Go back xx years and they lay off half of Seattle but a CEO who has overseen the dismantling of a once great company gets $33m a year !

It’s a straightforward lie from the chairman. The executive reward scheme is linked to their extraction of money from Boeing, be it dividends or share buy-backs. Everything else is secondary. Those decades of under-investment may well be fatal. Wall Street is the problem - read Makers vs Takers by Rana Faroohar. Wall Street is no longer about ‘investment’ but speculative trading and wealth extraction.

Well, it seems to this SLF/Attorney that something is being overlooked, in the drastic criticism and deriding of the executive comp package awarded to the embattled Mr. Calhoun.

One could argue, and not without much good reason, that taking account of only the glaring failures of the current Board and top management is not just unfair - after all, fairness to these individuals departed into the Indian Ocean with the Lion Air flight more than five years ago - not just unfair, it's also dense, maybe even obtuse. What accounting is there for all of the things they got right? Take the KC-46 program. Lots of troubles in and around that program, correct? Junk and debris and whatnot left where it shouldn't be, inside completed airframes, the scandal with the procurement controvery or controversies, probably more I'm just not aware of or not recalling - also correct, yes? But how many flight hours has the tanker completed, how many upgrades or modifications of its systems, how much expansion of its operating profile, and so forth? It would not be unreasonable to take the same analytic approach to many of Boeing's programs.

But it's not the approach I think is most fitting to the moment. Let's go back in time, okay? Dennis Muilenburg has done a serial face-plant in the aftermath of either just the first MAX air crash disaster, or the aftermath of the second, depending on your point of view about all the events. (Saying it this way allows for those who assert that the company folded, wilted, in the face of ignorant press and other media frenzy after the Ethiopian air crash disaster, in their ignoring the failures of the airline, the aviators, and the Ethiopian government.) So, that CEO is going to get the boot. Here's the question.

At that point in time, what executive comp package would have been sufficient, would have been marketable in the pool of available executive level talent, to attract an individual with the required leadership, strategic, implementation, delegation, political, and any other capabilities and capacities you contend are needed now for Boeing? Use any reasonable set of qualifications and qualities you like, whether or not you can name someone specifically who would fit that description. You think such business types (heck, I'm just a legal type, 33 million U.S. dollars sounds like a pretty big bankroll to this SLF/attorney but what do I know?) work for nominal or ordinary amounts?

Now take that into the present. What do you think it will take to attract someone to the CEO role at Boeing TODAY who has the required talents, abilities, experience, etc etc.,? By the way, for the avoidance of doubt, this post uses "you" indiscriminately, it's not directed at anyone specifically, it's just convenience of form.

I think a patriot - perhaps an ex-member of the general staff - might take the role for $500k

Whether they'd be allowed to succeed or not...

Which really begs the question. Let's say such a former Chief of Staff took on this massive, and massively difficult, challenge of returning Company to engineering preeminence. What would the financial reward be once this imagined, and hoped-for, restoration had been accomplished? Surely it would not be proper to say only Thank You for Your Service while Dennis M. and Dave Calhoun hold onto multi-millions..... ?

I don’t have a problem with richly rewarding success, but that is not what happened here. The problems at Boeing were obvious when Muilenburg got the chop. The current boss could have take decisive action to right the ship, but chose the same old same old, knowing that no matter what happened he would get his big payout.

What should be: Performance based incentive metrics that cover the quality and innovation, not short term stock appreciation

What is: Performance based metrics that only reward short term stock appreciation


The people who could fix Boeing don’t want the job and the people who want the job can’t fix Boeing.

I think that they probably do want the job, but they won't be offered it or allowed to come anywhere near it.