Eye Opening Book
 

Thank you “ ATC Watcher “ for the recommendation,

“Suggest to read the excellent book “ collision course “by Prof. Mc Cartin to understand it “

I’ve reached about the middle of the book and I can’t put it down.

The age requirements seem very strange. Here in the UK you only need to be age 18+ to apply and retire at 60. I'll leave it to more qualified observers as to whether UK ATC is any better or worse than that in the USA.

Not sure where you're getting the "retire at 60" from?

NATS Management want you to retire at 60 but NATS HR seem to have a different view.
I was asked by my boss to confirm I would be taking retirement at the 'normal' age of 60 (and if you went past this, you had restrictions put on you such as 'no supervisory duties' and I personally was told I would only be able to do APS, no ADI/ADV) but the HR people kept referring to me as taking 'early' retirement.

It's a relic from two generations ago,
From where I sit, it needs to be increased to account for a variety of changes and mitigation that have been implemented in the past 40+ years.
IT's a blatant case of 'ageism' that really doesn't fit the world of 2023.

The counterpoint to objecting to existing age limitations - discussed at length on this (or another recent (related) thread) - is that the stresses of the profession result in such a level of "burn-out" that these limitations are necessary.

The arguments do seem to replicate those pertinent to age limitations known as mandatory retirement for pilots (also quite contentious).

With final legislative action for the very important bill to reauthorize the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) currently in limbo due to the gross dysfunction in Congress, and therefore any hope of starting to tackle the staffing problems of the NAS also uncertain at best, I hope it won't be "piling on" to add a comment about the book noted in prior posts.

I'm referring to "Collision Course - Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed America" by Joseph A. McCartin (2011, Oxford Univ. Press). It opens with the story of the December 1960 midair collision between a (United) DC-8 and a (TWA) Super Constellation over New York City. I was eight years old - I recall quite clearly the Chicago newspaper and radio-television station coverage of the accident. Starting to read the book has therefore added a kind of data point for my own aspirations toward "aviation and law" or something to that effect. Anyway, although I have a lot more of this book to read, thanks for the recommendation of it!! - and though writing is appreciated subjectively, this SLF/attorney has found Collision Course superbly crafted and put together.

W-R Sixty-Three

Glad you like the book, when you get to the end, PM me if you want and I can fill you in with some info not on the book that might help you in your research. I was involved in organizing the initial international support and had ( still has) personal contacts with some of the players on both sides.
The mood at the time was somewhat similar to what is going on currently in the US Congress in fact , no-one really wants to compromise, it is all about winning or taking revenge. But you can't really work like this.

This article asserts that a near miss at Bergstrom is due to flaws in the US air safety system.
No, the planes depicted were not involved. It was a business jet and an F-18 that had a near miss.

US Air Safety System's Flaws Revealed in Texas Near-Collision (bnn.network)

ATC pros: any comment?

Well , this particular incident is being discussed in the other thread ( Accidents ad close calls ) and as I said there , without the details and the R/T transcript , difficult to comment , But the article you refer is about systemic incidents ,
This sentence in it resumes well the situation :however when it says that :
If they mean ground collisions and runway incursions, the "advanced technology " systems do exists, and are already deployed in many large airports but not everywhere . Just a matter of money. But if they mean an airborne collision warnings, system ,in an airport airport environment I do not see its use. It would not have helped here with a F-18 blazing at 250 Kts above the runway to break with a Citation below taking off at 130 Kts . A simple radar picture would be sufficient to notice this problem .

New FAA Administrator, Michael Whitaker, confirmed today 98-0.

As ATC Watcher mentions, there are systems available to warn of many things. They are often considered to be ‘safety nets’ that ‘save the day’ when normal people and procedures have failed. But it’s not just money that limits their implementation - common sense and effectiveness should also be mentioned here.

Any safety warning system needs to warn when it is necessary and do nothing at other times. Configuring systems to do this is a huge undertaking. But any system that gives false alerts often, particularly in normal operations, will very quickly be ‘tuned out’ of the users’ consciousness. There are many examples of such systems being ignored in the minutes or seconds prior to an incident or accident. The installation of a warning system may sound like a great fix for a hazard, or a response to an incident for someone dealing with paperwork, but that system will only be of value if it truly works when needed and, of course, if the user is actually looking at it (or whatever) at the right moment or is competent to respond to the alert in an appropriate and timely manner.

Absolutely.. Money alone will not solve the problem , but it was my understanding that for the FAA, implementation of SMR and runway incursions warning systems.at all large airports was purely due to budgetary constraints .
Yes, in Linate in 2001 at the time of the ground collision ( SAS-Citation) the SMR was bought, and was delivered to the airport, so the box was ticked for the administration but it was never installed by the technicians. .
Indeed, like in Vnukovo in 2014 ( DA50 colliding with a snowplow) where the ground radar system was installed since a year , but was never configured for the airport, , controllers were untrained for its use and its display was anyway installed at the supervisor desk not at the controllers workstations ..
Technology is great , but it is always down to humans to work it , or mess it up .

I don't disagree with your final sentiment - technology can be great, but it is always down to humans to work it, or mess it up.

But although many suggest a usable SMR as the one thing that would have prevented accidents such as those you cite, it still depends on the operator looking at it at the right time. Sadly, there are examples where serviceable equipment was available but for one of those human factors, it is ignored, sometimes in favour of confirmation bias, or deliberately disabled, often because the technology generates false alerts.

After the Safety Summit convened by FAA in April, a panel of independent experts was appointed to study the issues and report back to FAA.

Politico is reporting that the National Airspace System Safety Review Team has filed its report with FAA. The article contains a link to the report document.(which evidently isn't up on FAA's webpage yet).
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/1...skier-00127312

The degradation in the competence of ATC since the move from allocation of “points on the exam” based on stuff like being an instrument rated pilot, or a veteran with relevant experience, to a focus on diversity, is critically evident.
My home drome is a training tower, and the number of idiotic decisions from controllers are manifold. I recently watched a biz jet forced to go around so that a flight school cirrus, not even at the FAF, could continue a practice ILS against the flow of traffic.
I personally was zipping along at 245 kt in a descent 12 miles from the airport a few days ago, and some 20 something told me to “keep my speed up” while I had been cleared for the visual.
I have a lot of friends who are/were FAA controllers, and to a person, they are ashamed of the way things are going.