Wizz bird strike, unreliable airspeed .. continue to destination
 

I am not a commander but was fairly shocked by this video of a Wizz crew's decision making. This is not an operation's decision either in my view, this is a command decision.

The crew basically said that the issue had resolved. So assuming their fuel situation was still within limits to make the flight, I really don't see any issues with continuing on.

Their issue was a birdstrike. Supposing their unreliable airspeed was resolved, they had absolutely no idea as to the extent of any airframe damage because they obviously could not perform any visual inspection. It seems totally reckless to have continued. I still can't understand why the captain didn't make a decision himself.

I'm no great fan of W6, but to be fair after listening to the conversation what I find the most disturbing is that ATC twice interrupted the obviously busy and troubleshooting crew with a totally unnecessary call after explicitly being asked to stand by.

The captain would have made the decision himself. But he would have involved others in his decision making process. He would have called company, spoken to maintenance, company could have spoken to Airbus, and relayed it back to the captain.

At the end of the day the captain made the decision to continue after taking in information from many different sources. Whether or not it was the right decision to continue is not knowable, we are not privy to all the facts. But the fact the captain chose to involve the company in his decision making process shows that this captain is probably one of the better ones out there.

That was my take on it too. Think I would have had a few words with the tower controller.

The knew they'd hit a bird at around 500 feet. Presumably they saw the bird and it was nearer to a Starling than a Stork. They had a transient (?) issue with unreliable airspeed but took up a hold while running troubleshooting - presumably involving checklists etc. They reported plenty fuel and that they'd need to burn some off before landing.

Crew satisfied themselves they were OK to continue and cleared that decision with Wizz Ops.

In effect the Captain made the decision but consulted with Ops.

I do not know the Wizzair company SOPs but it is fairly common , if not the norm nowadays, for a crew to counsult their OPS or Tech to make that decision. If the unreliable airpseed was due to a bird part obstucting the pitot, it often clear itself with the speed, and if indications go back to normal, I do not see a problem with the Captain decsion here..
As to ATC asking a question durin a PAN-PAN, it is fairly standard. PAN is not a emergency and does not require any special handling. The stand by , yes. not the PAN
Finally as far as I know EIN is still a military airbase , so ATC is military. , but things might have changed since the last tiem I flew there. so waiting to be corrected if it changed. Just to say that military controllers are fairly used to PAN calls and well aware of the differences betwenn a PAN-PAN and a MAYDAY.

what planet are you on? “Bird parts often clear with speed”… seriously? Unreliable airspeed of any degree is a major problem industry wide leading in many cases to LOC. It concerns me greatly that you don’t even see the extreme Inherent danger within your post.

Why is that? They had an unreliable airspeed event (doesn't say for how long), and resolved the situation. I'm sure they were each looking at a normal PFD before setting off to the destination. Assuming everything was "green" at that point, why'd you return? How long would you have stayed airborne to burn fuel? Would you do an overweight landing with all indications normal?

Yet another case of "Armchair Pilots" here. As I have said frequently on this forum: You weren't there! The decision was taken, ultimately and after what was obviously careful consideration at all levels, to continue. End of story. Move along there - go and get another cup of tea.................

Living in the real world my friend, not Microsoft Flight SIM like many around this Forum, or as Gizm0 calls them: "Armchair pilots" (when they are pilots). I maintain all of my post, adding the confirmation that ATC in EIN is indeed still military. A small correction on what you said: temporary unreliable airspeed indications are not causing LOC - the (bad) immediate handling of them did. It was not the case here. Coming back to the original question put on this thread, I do not see anything wrong with the Captain decision I am not a Wizzair fan , but here, nothing done wrongly, quite professionally even. Time indeed to move to another subject..

Maintenance Control has live access to status of all aircraft systems through ACARS datalink. A lot more and in fact deeper info to what is available for the pilots. Engine health, pressurization, hydraulic systems, any lights taken out by the bird, the reason of the unreliable airspeed indication etc etc. It's only wise to ask them what they see to support your (the commander's) decision.

I don’t think that MX has data quite as granular as you claim. And I have encountered crew members wanting to rely on MX input to justify frankly wacky decision making. Case in point an engine high vibration during climb out: after thrust reduction vibration greatly reduced, but F/O contacted MX. The engine was so badly damaged that it had been shaking like a dog ****ting razor blades, but they said it was normal.

Since I am in fact writing from my armchair I will not opine on the temporary unreliable airspeed. I can see merits to either course of action.

They have. Fault messages not even shown to the crew by the aircraft, engine parameters by the hundred every second, tricky "secret" resets to fix various systems, works/replacements done on the aircraft the previois night, everything.

Yeah, I have enough Airbus experience to know about the resets etc, but explain the report of a completely healthy engine spitting part numbers out of the tailpipe.

The fun bit of driving is that often the driver gets to make decisions under uncertainty... This has become a buzz word outside of aeronautical decision making, in financial, medical and nuclear sectors, being valid for situations where incomplete and inconsistent information exists and where there are temporal constraints. Add LEO's in critical incidents etc too.

In the warm-fuzzy training, aeronautical decision making, ADM gets a quick nod, as does SA theory, interspersed with PC matters. All good stuff, worth the coffee break. The simulator and classroom tend to be analogs of the real worked, the guys in seat 0L and 0R are those that are up close n' personal to the scenery, and have all the good and bad bits that flow from that.

Of all the types to have UAS on, the bussé is both the best and worst to have it, depending on how the system detects the fault. Being a C* control system the potential need to have to apply manual trim is a complication exacerbated by that being usually only encountered in sim sessions. Boeing's C*U system has the pilot re-indexing the "in trim" speed like a C-150... at all times, but still can be a bit messed up, but at least top get rid of sensors in the Boeing FBW system needs only one red guarded switch to be played with, not a series ELACs or EFCs (remembering that which specific ones you pull off line may cause a complication later...). The complete UAS though, gives the secondary speed display, assuming that the flock of canadian geese didn't take out all of your alpha probes at the same time. Anyway, point is, there are a number of oddities that come to light with P/S and AOA malfunctions, and often they take a moment or two to sort out, the underlying problems tending to be of a limited family of flavor, with special toppings.

Airbus ECAM-NNCL-OEB-AFM-NOTES/CAUTIONS WARNINGS and system descriptions are not renowned for their user friendly nature. If the guys kept the blue on the top, followed common sense to give themselves time to analysis, and followed procedures, and got confirmation of their analysis or input from engineering, and then operational confirmation of the companies preference in maintenance follow-on, don't see that there is much to get out of sorts over.

Birdstrikes happen, sometimes at really annoying times, (ask Sully, ask the B73 drivers on finals into Ciampino, ask the Nimrod crew @ Kinloss, etc) Other times, the systems are not adversely impacted. The drivers in this case would be aware of where the impact was and then promptly aware of the consequent anomaly to instrumentation. Pretty sure that if one side goes bad, it is discernible against the 2 other independent systems that exist. With the system recovering to anywhere near normal, not sure that doing a jettison to being forward a landing with exactly the same potential errors is going to be high up on the agenda of doors to choose from.

Interesting day out, crew done good, so did Ops control system and maint support on this occasion.

Decision Making under Uncertainty warm-fuzzies:

Orasanu, j., Ames, N., Martin, L., Davison, J.;Factors in Aviation Accidents: Decision Errors, Linking expertise and naturalistic decision making (2001)

Rhoda, D. , Pawlak, M.; An assessment of thunderstorm penetrations and deviations by commercial aircraft in the terminal area. Project Report NASA/A-2, 3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory (1999)

Goh, J., Wiegmann, D.;Human factors analysis of accidents involving visual flight rules flight into adverse weather. Aviat. Space Environ. Med., 73 (8) (2002)

O'Hare, D., Smitheram, T;"Pressing on" into deteriorating conditions: An application of behavioral decision theory to pilot decision making. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol., 5 (4) (1995), pp. 351-370

Damasio, A.;Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. Grosset/Putnam, New York (1994)

Causse, M., Baracat, B., Pastor, J., Dehais, F., 2011a. Reward and Uncertainty Favor Risky Decision-Making in Pilots: Evidence from Cardiovascular and Oculometric Measurements. Appl. Psychophysiol. Biofeedback 36 (4), 231–242.

Causse, M., Dehais, F., Arexis, M., Pastor, J., 2011b. Cognitive aging and flight performances in general aviation pilots. Aging Neuropsychol. Cogn. 18 (5), 544–561.

Causse, M., Dehais, F., Pastor, J., 2011c. Executive functions and pilot characteristics predict flight simulator performance in general aviation pilots. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol. 21 (3), 217–234.

As this is over 2 years old (1st July 2020) is there any update or recommendations for actions taken/not taken.

https://avsafety.net/wikibase/237590

I can't see any evidence of an OVV investigation, and if there was one by the airline it won't necessarily find its way into the public domain.