No ILS ? - um, remind me how many parallel main runways CDG, one of the key airports of Europe, has. And in heavy rain, with questionable cloud base. And seemingly advised even at first contact they were getting a runway with no ILS.

Dear fellow pilots!
You have to be vigilant flying in France. They do funny things!
Be safe.

My $3500 dollar EFIS in a light aircraft cross checks the closest airports altimeter settings via ADSB in with what I have set and gives me a warning if there is more than a slight difference. Would be nice at my work job!

8314,

Indeed they do. But not always funny sadly. But things NEVER change...... :rolleyes:

Thanks for the info :ok:

Not wishing to start an argument, but the ITM controller did mix it up. According to the BEA report, ATC got it wrong twice, by saying one zero one one in English when speaking with two English speaking aircraft, but got the QNH correct when speaking in French to a French speaking crew.

Edit: thanks for the correction, spekesoftly. (below) Ironic mistake !

ATC got it wrong twice by saying one zero one one, not one zero zero one.

If this had happened in the LTMA the approach controller would have had a flashing alert on the radar that the wrong QNH was set as soon as they were descending through the TL, surprised there’s not similar for CDG. Link

On the subject of do pilots check others transmissions for their own SA: yes they do. Multiple airports in our sector, we prefix the relevant airport when issuing QNH to save the next couple of transmissions being “confirm QNH?” from a pilot inbound to a different airport with a different QNH.

Does it compute[(?)]
 

I try (as SLF/attorney) not to post this sort of comment on every instance or incident where human beings save a situation that was headed toward a seriously bad outcome from reaching that outcome --

Write the computer app or algorithms or software that will do as good a job in this exact situation as the flight crew in the pointy end of the aircraft performed in actual fact. I realize that up to that point, all kinds of flight-operational things happened or didn't happen and that I don't understand (as only SLF, etc.) but nevertheless, disaster was averted, was it not?

Oh, and when programming the mainframe (latest model, or System 4Pi-Model ML-1, or anything else), be sure to allow for uncertainties in translation as between all languages in use in civil aviation, globally. Thanks in advance, ....

Does it compute[(?)]
 

Well clearly the outcome wasn't a smoking hole in the ground, but I'm not entirely sure what point you're trying to make.

An explanation please. I'm way out of the loop, having retired in '04, so before computer-generated approaches had come about. If the aircraft is carrying out a NPA, and has no ILS glidepath, would not the EGPWS be screaming well before this point? Back when, home base on one runway flew over an escarpment. At about 2 miles, suddenly the rad alt went from about 1,000' to 600' almost instantaneously. The GPWS (no EGPWS then) certainly shouted at that point.

You'd think so but in reality the terrain clearance floor function* inhibits the alert due to the vicinity of the runway.

* I think it's this component
​​​​​

Is Norwegian (Sweden or any part) still using the services of this operator?

As mentioned. The old, RA-based GPWS had no reason to go off.

The basic (most likely fitted as per mandate) E-GPWS has a 'Terrain Clearance Floor' which protects you from killing people fully configured where there's no airport - but in this case they were sufficiently close to a runway the alarm did not trigger.

There are more evolved setups, EGPWS+ if you will, unlikely to be fitted to this ship.

DaveReidUK

1. That devotees of the inevitability as well as desirability of more and more flight control automation, to and including deactivating the roles and responsibilities of human being aviators, should acknowledge that the programs or code that run the automation do not at this time have the capacity to deal with a situation such as the one that is the subject of this thread.
2. It can be anticipated that some would point out that the occurrence of the situation resulted from human error, by the controller, and perhaps also by the pilots with regard to various systems, decisions, situational awareness or lack thereof, and probably others. Before noting the human operator saved the situation, the post acknowledges that it doesn't claim or assert an understanding of the pilots' acts or omissions prior to their acts to avert imminent disaster.
i hope that helps as clarification.

Contrary.

The technology exists to save this much sooner than 6 ft RA. It's not deployed yet.

The technology exists to avoid this from even starting to develop. A fistful of elements were there on the flight deck already but not all of the wide range.

Re-counted my chicken yesterday, 6 places in the A320 cockpit where the correct QNH was to be found as per a very unassuming run off the mill set of SOP. (less than Uplinker alludes to).

We're devotees for the not-so-much-of-a-pilots be not allowed to kill the travelling public.

The industry

A) de-skill the crew (check BA dual engine over London),

B) equip the planes with more human centric technology and imperfect solutions to bridge the newly built gap (gazilion cases, from nuisance TCAS, across the whole RNAV freakshow, to ad-extremis MCAS)

C) provide less training overall after putting all those additional systems in place, compared to the old up/forward/down/reverse days

and expect a constant improvement in professional conduct (=maintaining margins from undesirable aircraft state)

Does not work. Overwhelmed and undertrained.

Checkpoint one: PBN is a mandatory part of the Type Rating chckride. For many years, even so it is not listed on the endorsement anymore as a unique skill and becomes embedded.

Then: How many training departments actively teach that for Baro-VNAV 3D approach (this case), the altitude distance checks are futile, not part of the system or certification, and better not be done in lieu of the important stuff? (sound of brains exploding..., sure). There are critical items to verify, about 4 and QNH being one of the 2 more severe - does not have self-monitoring and alerting.

Checkpoint two: Wrong QNH kills immediately on NPA since before WWII and the invention of ATC. How come crews lost the sight of what separates them from TV headlines?

Checkpoint three:
Does your favourite EU lo-co run the annual line-flying checks on real airplane or have they given up 1 of the yearly training sessions (50%) to simulate a normal route flight (with a glitch), depriving the crew of a valuable learning opportunity?

It does not please us to observe and explain that while flying cannot be reduced to become fully deterministic, much of what we do so proudly can be algorithmized (in the non IT sense). That is where supervised automation (even remotely) will completely circumnavigate the challenges above at a lower overall industry cost.

And there you go again, the very last, single word is the crux of all this.

Close call. Really suprising how the French controllers said the incorrect QNH in english - the ICAO standard aviation language, and correct in French. Something is wrong, or ATC was on autopilot that day.

There is not only one international language of aviation (see ICAO).
More importantly, beyond the language itself, the English phraseology should also be the same everywhere in the world, which is not a given! (USA for instance)

.

Every "phrase" could be data transmitted to be a symbol or text on a cockpit display (with confirmation button) anyway to keep voice frequencies clear for any non standard needs.

There will be more non-native english speaking pilots in the future and more long range capable narrowbodies with less long range experienced crews at the controls mixing up global ATC.

this.

The Airbus Global Market forecast for the next 18 years, growth factors:
China domestic = 2.5 (becoming world's largest)
India = 4
​​

That is why the Aircraft should automatically compare the QNH put (during cruise or early descent) into the FMGC approach page with the QNH set on the FCU during transition and give an alarm if off by more than one.

With the increase in PBN, we need more protection against wrong QNH. This would lead to a strong safety net against wrong QNH information or wrong setting.