Speaking of fact free piffle, go ahead and refute it, whoever you are. The A320, of which you may be aware, has containerised baggage.
The 737 is loud on an absolute decibel scale compared to modern aircraft. The 737 is the only aircraft in our fleet that requires noise cancelling headsets for OHS reasons. Overhead switchgear with switch lights is leagues ahead of toggle switches.

It is apparent that you are a rabid 737 fan. I am not and neither do I wholesale admire Airbus. But they do make a better short haul aircraft. Like it/don’t like it: don’t care.

By the way I do have over 25 years on the 737, off and on, 200 through to 800.

When you do your 737 walk-around and stand in the main wheel bay, don't you shudder at all the mechanical levers and brackets, and the control cables running in pulleys, going off to the various flight control surfaces? Doesn't having to reach down and unclip the girt bar from the main doors and fix it into the brackets on the floor to arm the doors point towards its mechanical crudeness? Do you not wonder if technology could make the F/O's extensive operation of the overhead panel mostly automatic? Does it not bother you that the 737 cockpit layout and the overhead panel layout is asymmetric - designed for a captain and an assistant, rather than two pilots.

The 737 was good for its day, and no disrespect to it, but have a close detailed look at an A320 family aircraft and all its systems, and its autopilot, auto-thrust and FBW capability, and see how Airbus took the airliner to the next level.

Facts:
Hull loss rate (through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.18/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.18/million departures.
Fatal hull loss rate (again through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.08/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.08/million departures.

Now explain to me how the 737 is an unsafe design compared to the A320 series...

Are you going to compare the 737MAX to the A320 NEO as well? :rolleyes:

I didn’t say that it was less safe, just less refined. Perhaps if it had been a 737 in the Hudson things wouldn’t have gone quite so well. I was almost going to write “quite so swimmingly”, but you get the gist. Your stats also don’t reflect the body of incidents complicated by pilots trying to nut out non-normals using a six-pack, oddly written QRH and sometimes ambiguous dial design on the overhead.

How about the continued use of one horn for both take-off configuration warning and high cabin altitude? That one feature alone caused the loss of at least one aircraft.

Anyway, I think most of us are comparing the 737 that currently exists to the hypothetical aircraft that Boeing could have built if it hadn’t messed up every recent program to the point of being unable to launch a new plane. Since that ship has sailed the reality is that the only choice for the market is the 320-321 NEO and the MAX. Airlines will weigh a myriad of factors in choosing, and none of them will be what the pilots think.

We live in a world, where we continuously "improve" (sometime outright stupid, like coins). There is little place to stick to old-mechanisms, when suitable new technologies exist, which make life easier and less complicated and in the same time, improve the productivity. Just fly the A350 and the B777 as a passenger, and you will notice the difference. Both will bring you to your destination, though the difference in comfort level and wearing out a significant. By limiting the "wearing-out", you in general improve safety.

I like classic stuff, cars, the traditional six-pack, but in modern times, applied at a large scale, there is no longer a place for that stuff, other than to dream about and use for nostalgic reasons.

Comparing the same generation B737/A320 you get comparable figures. From there, the A320 could be improved, since the infrastructure to do so is available, whereas the B737 MAX just did stick to its roots (with unfortunate MCAS lipstick).

And, TBH, I think, the stats for the A320 somewhat deteriorated due to the "somewhat less direct connection with flying" using a lot of automation vs. basic hand flying skills, resulting in somewhat deteriorated basic (IMC) flying skills. For example, the QZ8501, where, after a not-allowed-in-the-air computer reset, the co-pilot was not able to fly just basic glass-sixpack in IMC for only a few minutes (until the computers would be back online).

As chuboy wrote, compare the MAX and NEO and you get the answer. Lipstick can be very dangerous.

Day 1 of my 757-to-737 training course the instructor stood at the front of the class and said "..this aeroplane WILL try to kill you...". Kinda set the scene for the next 5 years. Hated it.

USAir 1549, Hudson swim outcome was independent of the airframe type AFAICS. The alpha floor was in play at the final few seconds, but that led to a high sink rate. USAir was out of energy when they got to the final few seconds, and that is understandable, they had a lot of NYC to avoid on the way down.


To get really messed up takes a computer. Having cables is pretty reliable system wise. It is harder to reverse a mechanical system than the A320 of Lufthansa's that got airborne with the Cats SSC wired backwards in roll.

The B737 flight controls... they are, so so, the ailerons suck, but are legal, just a bid odd. The rudder, well the single shuttle, dual acting servo had a few philosophical issues, and did cause some mayhem, (UAL 585 was not certainly the rudder..., USAir 427 was in autorotation with full backstick, which will ruin a day in most planes, not a surprise, it was a nasty start to the event) The elevators, well, lets not mention the stabiliser... apart from that, the plane is... cost effective. Boeing's replacement that is well overdue will be more like a baby 777 than a 737... and that is not a bad thing, but the B737 is a workhorse.

Alpha floor didn't/couldn't have(damaged engines)but alpha protection came into play which tends to pitch the nose down. That was because the speed was dropped 19kts below Vapp. The resultant high ROD during flare would happen in any aircraft with different reasons. In 737 it would cause a stall warning and pilot would have pushed the stick forward resulting in increase of ROD or continue to stall into Hudson. I think that would have been disastrous. So protections didn't create the problem. It worked as designed.

I have flown the 737 from both seats and have had no problem operating or monitoring the overhead panel from either seat. With a more streamlined SOP, it's only a handful of switches that require moving during a normal turnaround, backed up by a checklist.

Can you continue to your destination in RVSM to a Cat 3 autoland with both FMGCs failed in an A320? Or dare I say, select different range on NDs with one operative FMGC?

My point about the Hudson was the slide rafts, which the 737 ain’t got. What it does have are ceiling stowed heavy mofo rafts which the crew have to manually launch and faf around before evac starts. I time the drills we do in the cabin mock-ups. It takes too long. And it’s a stupid nod to the Constellation era.

I think the main issue here is that Boeing clearly hasn’t changed its attitude. Despite the MAX debacle, 787 QC, 777 X, KC46 etc it still thinks it should call the shots on safety critical points and regulatory matters. If this company was an individual candidate for flight crew in an airline they would fail an attitude/personality test.

My issue with the Hudson landing with a B737, is the fuselage breaks up in 3 parts, making it an imploded submarine, immediately going to the bottom, with people trapped inside. Not to speak about all those seated around the break-up areas, who get wounded/immobilized. As we've seen with several A32x water landings, the fuselage doesn't break up and stays afloat. It's all "legal" with the B737, though, would not withstand current certification criteria. Think about driving a Beetle, a nice car, 50 years ago, but no longer acceptable for its task, nowadays. It's just an outright dangerous car, with the petrol tank in the crumble zone.

The dinghies: Each time I see the hatches, I get the impression, the whole comes down with a landing where the fuselage breaks up, hurting the people in those areas.

Yep, reliable, though also limited. To have some "combined-control surfaces", it needs a kind of "mechanical" computer, using levers, non-linear mechanics, etc. Can be done, though difficult and difficult to get this reliable.

There are many reports about reversed mechanical cabling (though maybe more in small aircraft GA).

Boeing's near to medium term future is totally dependent on what happens to world air travel. I would suggest that one of the major drivers of recent new MAX orders is the fact that it will be several years before an airline will be able to take delivery of a Airbus 320/321 aircraft ordered now, given how far out the production slots are sold out. If there is another economic contraction then the reality is Airbus could meet nearly all the narrow body demand and Boeing will only be able to move product at an uneconomic price point. In any case I don't think the MAX 10 will ever fly and Boeing has effectively already ceded the 757 size market to Airbus with the A321XLR given the failure to launch the NMA

The wide body market is equally fraught with airlines giving up on the 787 in favor of he A330NEO and the A350 after all the 787 production woes. The future of the 777X program is also looking increasingly uncertain.

If there is a rapid and sustained rebound in world air travel, then I think Boeing may have a chance to dig itself out of the hole it made.

Personally I think there is no longer a future for Boeing commercial and the only question is how long it hangs on before being spun off into bankruptcy

Well said, this sums it up. Let us stick to the facts: If you argue this point from a safety perspective, there would have to be data that supports the notion that an EICAS provides superior safety to the legacy system (master caution etc) in the 737 NG/MAX. Of course, EICAS is more pilot-friendly but there most likely isn't any data that supports the notion that it delivers significantly superior safety - especially when the -10 would be flown by the exact same pilots that are already highly familiar with the legacy warning system. I will also make the point here that the MAX accidents occurred - in part - because of a lack of commonality, not because of commonality.

Regulation is there to support, faciliate and enhance safety. If safety is not negatively affected, then there is nothing wrong with issuing an approval based on grandfather rights.

A note on scope: I am not arguing about "Boeing culture", the MAX crashes, whether a clean-sheet design would be better, or related topics here. I am simply making a point on the safety aspect of approving a legacy system, which has worked just fine for decades, for the -10.

The generation that flew the classic max created a similar safety record to its competitors . Let’s project forward and all of the 737 competitors have advanced systems ? I’m not saying future generations won’t be able to fly safely with no ECAS ?

Just to check that I'm getting this right: The grace period for certifying aircraft according to old rules expires end of 2022. From 2023 on, new regulations require that a plane is being equipped with EICAS on order to get certified. Boeing could have done that easily, as they have known this to be coming for years. But apart from the cost factor, making those adjustments to the 737 would jeopardize the grandfathered certification and they would need to have a new certification – and airlines pilots would have to be type rated anew? Is that about it?

That said, on a personal note: I think the 737 has had its time, but now Boeing needs to move on. From a SLF perspective, Airbus offers the superior product by far. But I'm pretty certain Congress will grant Boeing their extension, the US won't shoot themselves in the foot by taking Airbus' biggest competitor in narrow-body aircraft off the market for a couple of years.

Yes, maybe.

The big question is, whether other XAA's/EASA will rubber stamp the MAX-10 type approval, or that the MAX-10 will become a sole-US orphaned flying airplane...... The latter would be a disgrace to the US its attempt to regain face, after the previous MAX regulatory humiliations, IE just confirming the MAX disaster wasn't an incident, though just ingrained in the US culture ......

Maybe Boeing gets another extension. But aren't they repeating the same mistake from before putting pressure on the government especially on the DOT and FAA? Boeing does not patiently wait. They just try to do it via Congress this time, sort of almost burning bridges. What will this mean for the 777-9 certification needing grandfathering as well? The FAA might be fed up finally?