Perhaps the approaches were initially staggered, but the High airspeed of the Cirrus, coupled with an early turn to final might have closed the gap between the two aircraft.

Not sure if the normal separation rules for parallel approaches apply once you have VFR flights involved? You pass the traffic information, then the pilot is responsible for separation.

To some earlier post..... the Metro was on short final, what would you gain from telling him a part of his fuselage is missing? He wouldn't go around.... and there are no real checklists to complete in this event.... if anything, a quick landing is probably the safest anyway.

Did the controller see the collision? She could've had her eyes elsewhere for a second.

Yes, the previously-mentioned "independent parallel approaches", and the rules applying to those, refer to instrument approaches only.

In terms of ATC not being able to see the damage, the damage is quite obvious from a sideways view, but when you are looking straight down the nose of the aircraft, even if you have astonishingly good eyesight, the damage would have been nearly invisible.

DaveReidUK

Yes, all talk about rules for IPA are way out of scope in this case.

Not commenting on the actions of the two TWR controllers in this case, but as a controller myself, what I can say, is that one of the things that influence when you commit further traffic info, is when one aircraft reports the other aircraft in sight. Especially when it is the aircraft that have to maneuver to avoid collision and/or find its place in a sequence.

It is also quite probable that the 17R controller told his 17L colleague that the Cirrus had the Metro in sight.

There is however an elephant in the room, and that is that commercial pressure to allow parallell VFR operations on that close RWYs on separate frequencies DO introduce an increased risk compared to having one frequency for both runways.
It clearly works well at MANY airports all the time all over the world, but at some point someone will own the risk.🤐

See and avoid isn't good enough as sole strategy. It is high risk..We are not up to the task..

We've never been up to the task. Even when our immediate survival has depended on us spotting approaching aircraft intent on hitting us with something, if not themselves then some piece of hardware they're carrying.
We've accepted the risk associated with "see and be seen" operations and done our best to mitigate it, acknowledging that by doing so we're able to do a lot more things that we wouldn't be able to otherwise.

Check Airman

DFW doesn't. They have enough runways and they normally depart on the inboards and land on the outers. 17L/35R is far enough away from 17C/35C they don't need it. ORD has some published for 10R/28R and 10C/28C but in over a decade of flying out of there I've never heard of them being used.

And of the millions of times see and avoid has worked?

Doesn’t mean there isn’t room for improvement, but let’s not lose sight of its effectiveness the majority of the time.

Control towers don't do what you think they do.

No surprises...

Final Report

A Cirrus SR22 and a Swearingen AS226TC were approaching to land on parallel runways and being controlled by different controllers on different control tower frequencies. The pilot of the
Swearingen was established on an extended final approach for the left runway, while the pilot of the Cirrus was flying a right traffic pattern for the right runway.

Data from an on-board recording device showed that the Cirrus’ airspeed on the base leg of the approach was more than 50 kts above the manufacturer’s recommended speed of 90 to 95
kts. As the Cirrus made the right turn from the base leg to the final approach, its flight path carried it through the extended centerline for the assigned runway (right), and into the extended centerline for the left runway where the collision occurred. At the time of the collision, the Cirrus had completed about ½ of the 90° turn from base to final and its trajectory would have taken it even further left of the final approach course for the left runway.

The pilot of the Swearingen landed uneventfully; the pilot of the Cirrus deployed the airframe parachute system, and the airplane came to rest upright about 3 nautical miles from the airport. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage to their fuselage.

During the approach sequence the controller working the Swearingen did not issue a traffic advisory to the pilot regarding the location of the Cirrus and the potential conflict. The issuance of traffic information during simultaneous parallel runway operations was required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65Y, which details air traffic control procedures
and phraseology for use by persons providing air traffic control services. The controller Page 2 of 11 CEN21FA215 working the Cirrus did issue a traffic advisory to the Cirrus pilot regarding the Swearingen on the parallel approach

I see the report doesn't include flight experience for the Cirrus pilot.

Although I've seen the odd report where such information has been missing it's not the norm, and I'd have thought it less common in recent times. I find this a useful metric, is anyone able to shed light on why it's missing here?

FP.

A glaring omission especially given the detailed flight information that’s listed for the pilot not at fault.

indeed , it would seem the Cirrus pilot did not really cooperate with the NTSB, as details about the aircraft maintenance status are also missing

Have been into Centennial a couple of times .. last time 4 or 5 years ago I was in a 172 landing on 28 and was a little surprised that there was a stream of corporate jet and feederliner traffic on 35 R operating on a different frequency.

I was having my normal bimble round from Meadowlake and simply doing a few touch and goes at fields around Denver (I love that there are no landing fees).

It was a bit surprising to be cleared to land on 28 and to be told there is no go-round from your runway due to conflicting traffic. When I did a full stop and was ready to depart again I was sent off on 10 again, to avoid conflicting traffic. Couldn't fly east quick enough !

Surprised they don't have more trouble there ......

KAPA is busy with more than 300,000 operations annually.

Given that the Cirrus hit the Swearingen from slightly behind on the right side, I don't think a traffic advisory would have made a difference. I doubt the Swearingen pilot could have seen the Cirrus from the left seat.