Russian 737 on ILS 263 knots over the fence.
 

Flight director addiction can do that to you..

Incident: Aeroflot B738 at Moscow on Jan 24th 2021, high speed, high sink rate ILS approach, GPWS alert

I think last year the Russians changed from QFE to QNH, and Sheremetyevo is at 600' AMSL. They are also giving up meters for the western feet (for altitude).

So, a crew who isn't very current in COVID conditions, looking at 800' on the altimeter, and reverting to previous experience thinking "That's 800 feet to go, I can still do this" and then getting the shock of becoming visual 200' above the ground.

... and perhaps even thinking "that's 800 meters to go..."??

Interesting handling skills.....

Similar to PIA8303 at Karachi last year, thankfully the Russians went around just in time.

Not exactly. In my opinion, it doesn’t seem like there was an intentional violation to continue to land from this unstable approach. Like Centaurus said: Flight director addiction (or dependency). Blindly following FD guidance into a 8 degree nose down attitude with 2680 fpm without noticing all the parameters and not realising they are this close to the ground. They were in IMC, and as Checkboard said, they were probably not used to feet and QNH.

But more data is needed, like height vs. distance and GS indication. This can be a case of false GS signal. RoD from 1100 to 2680 fpm as instructed by the FD seems abnormal. Unless they got high on the glide and the FDs were only indicating to re-intercept. Either way, those RoDs and that pitch should have rung a bell earlier, before they got a GPWS warning. But luckily they followed the GPWS.

Russian VSIs are in meters per second which might have added to the confusion if they were used to operating on this standard and were now looking at feet per minute. The wind is given as 42 kts speed but no direction, if it was a tailwind it wouldn’t have helped the situation. Auto pilot and auto thrust off suggests he wanted a bit of practice to get current again.

Possibly a bit on the fast side initially but salvageable. Slightly late flap extension at slightly high speed could have caused the aircraft to balloon resulting in a strong pitch down command from the FDs. Landing weight not given but a high weight would have added to the problem.

It looks like a bit of manual flying went wrong and energy wasn’t correctly managed, likely that the crew may not have been very current either.

krismiler

"The wind is given as 42 kts speed but no direction, if it was a tailwind it wouldn’t have helped the situation".

Surface wind (per the METAR) was 140 at 8 kts.

This must have been a NG with short field package (the regular NG only have blow back for flaps 30 and 40).
These aircraft are slippery since you only get full leading edge slats when flaps > 25.
The regular NG get full leading edge slats when flaps = 10 or greater.
This makes a big difference when you are hot and high.
Not sure if they have a mixed fleet or only short field versions, but if you are used to the
basic type, you can get a surprise when you fly the short field type.

This may or may not have been a factor, just throwing it out there.

The wind is given as 42 kts when turning to intercept the localiser. Wind a few 1000’ agl is often very different to surface wind, I’ve had strong tail winds on approach and landed with a slight headwind.

I’m putting it down to a bit of manual handling practice gone wrong, the Captain was behind the aircraft, quite possibly due to lack of currency.

There has been an upward trend in unstable approaches recently as crew return to flying after several months on the ground.

The 737 variants are fascinating, for example a 737-800 can carry 40 thousand tons of fuel! So I would expect a very high Vref with it.
:}

Impressive! 40000 ton? That’s half of a small oil tanker.
;)
On-topic: I’m in favour of manual flight to keep your skills sharp, but with 2600m -DZ BR OVC002 it was probably not the best time to practice it.

737 - 800 maximum fuel load is just over 26 tonnes. The 900 series, when fitted with auxiliary tanks can carry up to about 40 tonnes.

With all due respect this approach had gone horribly wrong well before they got anywhere near DA, so the weather at the airfield is largely irrelevant.
There was nothing wrong with the aircraft, as far as we know, so a qualified crew should have had no problem flying the approach in this weather, except for a large failure of situational awareness for what ever reason. If OPS told me that they’d replanned a flight below RVSM airspace because the autopilots were U/S and I refused to take it because the weather at destination was 2600 m ovc at 200ft I think they would be asking if I should be in the left hand seat, or in fact either seat...

Bus Driver Man

You raise a good point, but I'm going to be deliberately difficult, and ask- should an airline pilot not be able to successfully fly down to CAT1 mins? The FD was on. Not exactly high workload.

Avherald says

Unless I'm misreading this, they were slightly low on the GS (given the VS), but the CA following the FD to 8 degrees nose down is what really got them into a mess. Am I missing something?

Check Airman

I'll have a pop if you please?

Of course they should be able to do it, but the fact remains that it does seem odd to choose a 200ft cloud base as the day to try it given the year we've all had. Added to that, landing on a wet snow (albeit lightly) covered runway. I'm pretty familiar with Moscow and this time of year, the weather is certainly mixed. However, it does go from incredibly rubbish, to downright lovely. A crew that was likely based probably had decent options for better days to find out. Don't forget that whilst the captain themselves might be happy to FLY the approach down to minimums on a hard marginal day, are they confident/sure that the FO is comfortable and recent enough to really monitor it effectively? Here they clearly weren't as the GPWS did the PMs job for them.

Considering that most/all of us are likely very much on the wrong side of optimum proficiency at the moment, perhaps a wiser operational decision might have been made. Sadly, most guys at my airline are doing just 4 sectors once every 3 months, along with a sim every six to keep their licenses clean and polished. My flying has gone from 6-750hrs a year of time in the air to about 200hrs in the past 12 months and I'm probably one of the luckier ones. Most CPs/FOs are on far less, many also under 1500hrs TT - as is the nature of European short haul flying (see alternative threads for discussion!).

Not sure what the aviation market in Russia is like during covid, but in Europe, it has literally ground to an almost complete halt. For example, my base has nearly 80 A319/20/21s in it and is commercially operating just 7 commercial rotations today with 0 non-commercial flights. Judging by FlightRadar24, recenecy in Europe must be significantly worse than the apparent US baseline. You say 'not exactly high workload', but perhaps for someone who is legally current on the aircraft, though flying just 50hrs in the last 12 months, it might be far harder than you imagine.

Don't misinterpret this as me excusing this mistake, it is clearly inexcusable. But I'm just highlighting that perhaps we might all do well to consider moving the goal posts as to what we think is an appropriate level of automation on a marginal day given the reality of 2020/2021. It's very easy to forget about what the guy to the right (or left!) of you might be comfortable with under the circumstances, especially if you're lucky enough yourself to have done a lot of flying in the last year.

giggitygiggity

You raise good points. Ones we can all relate to. I'd argue that with the decreased flying, there's even more reason to use the chance to keep the raw data skills polished. In light of the crappy weather, I think it's reasonable to turn the FD on though.

If my understanding of the incident is correct (that the PF followed the FD to 8 degrees nose down), it should be a wake up call to those of us who "practice hand flying" with the FD on. A totally pointless exercise IMO. Had the CA in question flown raw data more regularly, I have a strong suspicion the flight would have been uneventful.

On the topic of the PM...if you're not comfortable or proficient enough to monitor an approach, you really shouldn't be in a cockpit at all.

I think what giggitygiggity is suggesting is that for all aviators flying is a perishable skill. Those that have their personal hubris-hounds (we all have those) firmly collared and leashed, and acknowledge that their skillz might currently be on the down-lo, have a marginally better chance of one day lying peacefully in the sunshine sipping their pina colada.

263kts at 480' is pretty sporty, 285 in the GA is well shy of the record, I think the B744 at VMO+60 at 3000' on a GA would be hard to beat. (As the B744 AP was engaged, that was a new data point for BCAG). Should be interesting debrief at Lubyanka square.

Check Airman

I agree that all pilots should be able to fly manually down to CAT1 minima. Especially with the FD. And that all pilots should be able to monitor this as PM. But this was clearly not the case here.

Manual flight with a ceiling at the minima, especially with a lack of recency, does not show good airmanship to me. The chance of a go-around is very high, and those have gone wrong far too often. Should all pilots not be able to manually fly a go-around? Of course, but history has shown that this isn't always the case.

Degrading manual flying skills has caused too many accidents, and I'm against the current industry trend of automation dependency, but this was not the best decision with those Wx conditions as both the PF and PM were not up for the task. However, the OVC 200' could possibly have been mistaken for OVC 200m. But even then, the result would probably have been the same: an unstable approach.

This does show to me, paradoxically, that less restrictions should be imposed by airlines in order to keep or increase our flying skills and that manual flight should be actively encouraged to prevent automation dependency (including FD dependency).

Back in the early 1980's I was a PPL and when ever I was going somewhere in the CAF 707 I always asked to ride in the jump seat. One really shyte day we were assigned the ILS into Ottawa.. The guy driving was a long in the tooth exchange RAF Flt Lt. With a huge cross wind and continuous light to moderate chop he hand flew the approach. The control wheel was making continuous big arcs but all I saw on the HSI were the unmoving needles in a perfect cross.. We broke out at 200 ft with a 20 deg crab angle which was quickly followed by a smooth touchdown one wheel at a time exactly on centerline.

I hate to be one of those old "back in the day, pilots could really fly" old codgers but I bet that today there is only a tiny minority in the cockpit of your average Boeing or Airbus that could do the same....

...Except they do do it. Every day, all over the world. You just don’t hear about it, because it’s not news.

It isn’t even particularly difficult if you do it regularly. But the old saying applies “if you don’t fly for for a week you notice, if you don’t fly for two weeks the copilot notices, if you don’t fly for three the passengers notice.” Currency is important and we can expect plenty of this if rusty pilots start practicing on line in poor weather.

Today’s reality is given a 200ft OVC, 25 kt crosswind, and continuous light to moderate turbulence, the average airline SOP would require this to be flown as a coupled approach.

Nope, no such thing widespread. Whether or not at some airlines such pilot attitudes prevail so they will elect to do so is another story.

Big Pistons Forever

Not at any of the airlines I've flown for. Thankfully.

SID PLATE

Are you sure about that? The B737-800’s I fly have a maximum quoted fuel capacity of 20,896kgs, in practice we rarely manage to load much above 20,600kgs. All somewhat short of the 26 tonnes you are quoting!

This long break in flying for many is a real risk that must not be underestimated. I suspect it has been a factor in many incidents and the odd accident already. Complacency from crew not showing this threat the respect that it deserves will be an issue.

Regardless of experience or being a sky god in an earlier life, those not appreciating the risks will easily fast come unstuck. Mental capacity, flying skills, work rate, situation awareness, decision making, will all be detrimentally affected. For those that have not operated for extended months at a time, now is not the time to take any extra risks whatsoever. It's time to refresh, go through the manuals, checklists and procedures, do the currency sims. Then take things easy, not rush, ignore time pressures as best as possible. The sims might be the easiest part, but then the greatest risks will present back online. Slow the operation down, no rushed approaches, checklists or briefings, turn down the crazy shortcuts to final throwing the barn doors out and the unnecessary raw data visuals. Use the automatics, leave behind the bravado and keep the threats in mind. The operation needs to be kept totally standard, not rushed, with the sole purpose of no reports or incidents, at lowest risk possible. Get back into the swing of things before the 'click click Seneca mode'. Don't be the one that gets caught out, and recognise it could be us the very next time, by truly believing that it is possible in a flash without warning.

No pilot on this planet given the extended breaks in operating will be safe from the threats that this represents without careful management.

An excellent post above, leave the manual flying to the simulator for the moment. Automatics in, keep it standard and slow it down. Triple check everything and make sure everyone knows to speak up if they see anything unusual.

Remember, we aren't the only ones with rusty skills. ATC have only been handling a fraction of normal traffic, ground staff may have just got back from a prolonged lay off, engineers may have only been monitoring stored aircraft etc etc.

I'll continue to be deliberately difficult, if you'll entertain it. The moment we're in right now has gone on a bit longer than we anticipated a year ago. Should we be unfortunate enough for it to go on much longer, we may well find ourselves in a situation where crews say "I'll just use the AP for the first week or so". Then the week turns into a month. Then a few months...See where I'm going?

We should definitely slow down as necessary, and I agree that perhaps it may sometimes be prudent to use a bit more automation than you normally would. However many of us don't know when we'll next get to practise our skills. My personal preference is to make the best use of the opportunity, and use as little automation as possible. Automation dependency creeps up on us stealthily, and that disease has an ideal environment in which to spread now.

Yup but these guys were ONE HUNDRED knots too fast. Absolutely hand fly when you can but be smart about it. Use automation when by conscious decision you have decided it is the best configuration for the conditions, not because it is easy.

The PF found himself 100kt fast because he followed the FD to 8 degreees nose down. I really wish we had more details, but I hope we can agree that-

- an ILS with the AP off and FDs on should not be considered a "high workload" environment for an airline pilot

- had the PF practised raw data flying more often, he would not have followed the FD to 8 degrees nose down

- flying raw data only when conditions make it "easy" doesn't do much for your skill and professional development

I had 6 months of not flying between mid March and mid September last year but had recency maintained in the simulator. First flight back I was not comfortable, particularly when I disconnected the autopilot on final. Simple tasks which previously were second nature, now required a bit of thought and took longer to accomplish.

After making a normal landing on one of the shorter runways in our network, my confidence returned. On the home leg I could feel it coming back to me as skills which couldn’t be exercised in the simulator came to be used.

In the last 5 months I will have logged about 30 hours and am currently flying about twice a month. I feel more normal now but am well aware that I’m still a bit rusty. In addition to the recency sims, I’ve had two check rides and recurrent training which involved manual flying and didn’t give me any problems. For the moment I’m leaving the automatics on in the aircraft until I feel comfortable with the extra workload involved in hand flying. I don’t even bother about the schedule, we leave when I feel ready to fly.

Different people are affected in different ways after a prolonged period of not flying, keep the workload as low as possible initially and gradually build up as confidence and currency increases.

Once I’m flying 2-3 days a week and I’m back up to speed again, I’ll consider a bit of manual flying in the aircraft. Every recency sim I’ve done has included an engine failure after V1 and a single engine landing, I’ve had more asymmetric practice in the last year than anytime since I did the endorsement. I’m perfectly comfortable with the automatics switched off in the sim where there are no consequences if a practice session goes a bit wrong.

At the moment I’m flying very conservatively, early descents, configuring early, fully stabilised by 1500’ and staying out of the monthly safety report will do me.

Krismiler, for what it’s worth - I completely agree with your approach..... you’ve explained it very well in my opinion. Can’t expect everyone to agree, but I think it’s a bit unfair to accuse you of being hooked on automatics....I think you’re actually recognising your limitations under these extraordinary circumstances and showing good airmanship....

Anyone who believes that only flying twice a month has no effect on confidence/flying skills is, in my personal opinion, either deluded or not actually a commercial pilot...

I take the Winter off at my outfit, so it's usual to not have flown for 4 months when I go back into the SIM. I find it's not the hand flying but the overall environment that adds to your workload, I can hand fly perfectly well from the SIm day 1, to the line. It's all the rest of it that takes a few days to get back, the SA and general working environment. Usually the hardest part is all the SOP changes that take place over the Winter!

A Polite Question
 

I’m lucky enough that my flying job has been relatively unaffected by COVID. I also do not fly large passenger aircraft.

My question is, what if something were to happen on your first trip back that necessitated a hand-flown approach down to instrument minima?

Are those people that claim they will wait a few trips before they hand fly confident that they could handle an emergency that required a manual approach?

Surely to say you want to wait is to tempt fate a little.

As I say, it is a polite question and don’t think I’m having a dig.

In my flying world we constantly try to do the hardest thing we can to make the routine things easy. ‘Train hard, fight easy’ is the mantra.

But then, we don’t have company profits to worry about. Or passengers for that matter.

Uncomfortable Flying by Hand????
 

It really makes ME feel uncomfortable that the pilot of an airliner in which I am a passenger would feel "uncomfortable" flying manually.

At the moment, the tempo of operations is fairly low. When I arrive at the gate the aircraft is there waiting and at the end of the flight the COVID cleaners take over, no 30 minute turnarounds. No slot times and no delays carrying through. Traffic is pretty light and the workload isn’t too high. During my last turnaround flight I had to ask the F/O what the departure time was supposed to be as it was so far down my list of priorities I had forgotten.

This is a big help that we can start slowly and build up instead of instantly going to normal levels. Our profession has very strict recency requirements in recognition of skill degradation over time, these mitigate the effects but do not eliminate them. Three circuits in the sim once a month ticks the box and is fine for a short absence from the flight deck but now over half of us have been grounded going on for a year.

With major layoffs and slow recoveries in the airline world, next year we may have large numbers of pilots coming back to work who haven’t flown for two years or more. Already there is an increasing trend of unstable approaches as crews are behind the aircraft.

We need to start preparing now to mitigate the effects of the lack of currency that will be evident next year when, hopefully air travel starts to recover. The incidents we are seeing now are just a taste of things to come.