A firey was telling me how they lose someone every year. It's a dangerous job, just like it is for the people on the ground.

looks to me to be a post by an armchair critic who is full of shiite, and himself...have 2 seasons behind me in a Douglas...it aint easy...exhilarating, frightening, tiring...not easy...the "easy" drop is when you hit something due to complacency...

Wake/ downwash raises dust.

Big deal....:rolleyes:

It would appear that the Crew shares your concern. They came damned close to buying the farm!

https://www.safecom.gov/searchone_new.asp?ID=23587

Good follow-up to the event!

I spent 17 years in fix wing fire suppression and have got to say that video was hard to watch and the crew was very lucky they did not hit the hill. I never thought this job was especially dangerous as we had good SOP's and excellent equipment. One thing I never like about the US program was, unlike Canada, lead planes were not mandatory. I firmly believe that this near miss would not have happened if they were operating with a lead airplane as the lead airplane would have determined the safe ridge crossing height and min drop altitude before the tanker got low and would have explicitly warned about the ridge on the exit or more likely would have found a better line for the drop.

As there is no link anywhere - here you go
https://twitter(dot)com/avioesemusic...707137/video/1

Replace the (dot) by a dot :-)

Thanks evil7.... that is eye watering! The time between ‘miss’ and wake dust says it all.....

He did not buy the farm. But I'll bet he left a big deposit.

Your C130A accident video, N130HP, on June 17, 2002 does not itself show careless or reckless operation. The video shows that the aircraft is essentially within its normal flight envelope.

The NTSB report suggests that the aircraft may have exceeded the ZFW earlier by up to 232lbs, but at the time of the accident, it was within limits. The report additionally opines that the aircraft may have exceeded the flap extended g limit of 2.0, however that is inconsistent with the wings level near level flight attitude in the video, the aircraft was within the speed limit for the 50% flap that was extended at that time. The report extensively covers the fatigue cracks on the wing center section, which compromised the structural integrity of the aircraft.

The NTSB report suggests that the aircraft was manoeuvring at 2.4g based on "video" at the time of the pull up that occurred before the wing failure, however, the video that has been released does not show a 2.4g pull pitch rate occurring for a speed of 146KCAS. Equally, at 91,000lbs, the actual load on the aircraft did not exceed the 2.0g load limit for the flap extension, being 75% of the permitted weight to be subject to a 2.0g load factor. The load factor itself is a limit, not the ultimate load necessary which would be a 3.0g load at 120,000+ lbs, which well exceeded the manoeuvring at the time of the failure. It is possible that in 2002 there was other video capturing the seconds prior to the pull up that the NTSB could base their statement on, but it is not the video that hit youtube.

Fatigue failures occur at 1.0g when they are ready. Two different aircraft types I have flown have had wing failures at 1.0g, and of course the Piper PA28RT201 loss at Daytona Beach with the CPL candidate and examiner occurred at 1.0g.

The early C130's had demonstrated potential failure of the CWS during hydrostatic testing that led to the inspection program for that area. The outer wing panels had their own issues. Significant fatigue cracking was found at the failure point so I am not sure that passing comment on reckless flying of the deceased has merit or is in good taste.

FYI, in 1994, N135FF, another C130A doing duty in fire fighting lost the left wing at the CWS in level, unaccelerated flight. The critical crack length for propagation was reported at about 1", the 2002 accident aircraft had a crack in excess of 12" prior to the failure on examination post accident.

Yes, that was close.

The footage leaves me ever more comfortable with the policy adopted in my part of the world where a fleet of AT-802s are the only fixed wind a/c we use for aerial fire attack. They work very well in our particular spread of variables which come in every new fire situation.

Can’t get facebook link to paste. Interesting fire drop.

https://www.facebook.com/104563622953080/posts/3035325553210191/

https://fireaviation.com/2019/08/14/a-shocking-drop-by-a-bae-146/

That was close!

They'll probably have a talk about it when they get home.

Could happen to most of us, misjudging distance, or altitude, flying in an unknown area.

This looks not unlike the video that started this thread in August last year.

It is the same video!

The shadow merged with the aircraft.

As long as you continue to see it ;)

A fine illustration of the danger of the vortices downwind and below, sometimes even above, a ridge crest.