fdr, #116, https://www.pprune.org/showpost.php?p=10484586&postcount=116
Thank you for the well considered views; interesting challenges.

A solution might require a combination of back-end and front-end fixes.
Adding relatively simple, low risk, minimum certification items at the back, ‘T’ strip, wedge, VGs, could restore the lost ability to move the trim wheel. Also can the severity of a trim runaway be limited (suggestions from other posters), less trim range, new - slower electric trim motor (then requires more, or predictive STS, autopilot issues).
I agree that change is never without risk, flight test surprise, or certification effort, particularly with an already highly modified variant aircraft, which may have less leeway for adjustment.

Front-end change should concentrate on the mechanics. What effect does the smaller trim wheel have, can this be changed, or the lever arm, or gearing be improved.
The human involvement might be the biggest challenge - the expected human contribution in mitigating high risk conditions; recognition, understanding, then choice of action. The accidents have challenged the fundamental beliefs in this area.

I disagree with the notion that the industry can turn the clock back. Even if the new variants are sufficiently similar to the original design, suggesting that trim runaway could be mitigated by training.
Times have changed (part of the problem). Piloting skill levels and range of experiences differ; not lower standards, but a sufficient standard to match the different challenges today, more complexity, more to know, to remember. People (pilots, regulators, manufactures) have not changed, but the conditions in which they work have, possibly with great effect.

‘shrug it's shoulders’, not to walk away. There is an interesting argument to be made re ‘the greater good’, which could differentiate action between the NG and Max.
After 9/11, reduced air travel resulted in more road deaths because of change of travel method, more than might be expected from aircraft accidents. Thus, NG grounding could be involve greater risk from change in travel than the continued risk in service.
Not so easy for the Max because of the relatively shorter time scale, the accidents, and public knowledge of the Boeing FAA situation - emotional effect. Fix the Max; MCAS done, but trim runaway requires a lot of effort.

We should not expect the FAA to judge a NG and Max split; however, the collective authorities might be able to, being the next best thing to a world opinion short of governmental agreement via ICAO, with political and time scale problems.
But we should not misjudge the fickle public opinion, swayed by media or politically motivated; I doubt a quick resolution in any area

Driving deaths and injuries post-9/11

You Tube

The view from outside looking in: Boeing needs to start over, design a new clean slate single aisle. All this fussing around on how to thread this needle is wasted effort, lipstick on a pig.

I, and I suspect most of the public, still have a foundation of trust toward Boeing, even after how the 787 launch occurred, for everything up to the MAX, but how they handle this could erase it all.

Down playing anything= trust gone. Blaming anyone outside Boeing= trust gone.

(What gobsmacks me most about the NYT article is how casually MCAS came into existence, and how casually it was implemented.)

If Boeing did their strategy right, the MAX is a neutralization innovation in the market, intended to level the playing field in the short term, which only works if they simultaneously started development of a disruptive offering, a new clean slate single aisle. So they should be only 2-4 years away from launching that new one, right?

wow, if this article is correct, MCAS _is_ an anti-stall system. That changes everything. It’s a system designed on purpose to continously trim down based on a single aoa input _to prevent stall_.

The slats are OK. It is some tracks which will need replacement. 2 day down time was quoted on CNN news - presumably after delivery of heat treated parts.

No training, we just tried out various stab settings and speeds vs manual trim.
I imagine manual trim can be impossible at nearly any stab settings. It’s all about the load on the stab.
This is a 737 issue since none of the other aircraft I have flown have had a manual trim wheel like the 737.
Had Boeing removed the trim wheel on the Max and made it electric only, we would not have this discussion.
I have no worries about the NG. I have never had a runaway trim. I have never had an AOA fail.

*Knock on wood*

Hi there Gums. Always enjoy your posts which throw up interesting points
Think this is the core of the problem. My view is that the pilots I grew up with were the top guns of the civil world. They needed to be. B747 quadruple engine failure. b744 turned upside down by intruder and lost 2 miles altitude in 90 seconds. Sioux City. Hudson River + a thousand more. All flown to the a safe landing, or least worst outcome as per Sioux City.

So, Boeing fix MCAS and make sure you can trim STAB in all realistic scenarios. Done already I would imagine. Software + hardware fixes. Awaiting the politicians and spin doctors on both sides - ah! And lawyers, to release plane for service.
So alls we’ll then. Back to “normal”. Well no. Because we’ve been going down a path for some years of downgrading pilot training to the point where the only time they are really needed- when automatics fail badly, they can’t cope.
A daily example and exception is xwind landings which currently automatics can’t do > 25 kts wet. Max wind 30:kts.
But they practice it so often that’s ok.
But given an ET style multiple failure scenario, or QF Ex SIN they have nothing to fall back on. And unless our engineer friends can produce a crash proof plane, dream on, this is going to get worse.
so the nightmare facing the industry and regulators is not MCAS or STAB issues. It’s the thousands of pilots already out there like this, and the 30,000 needed over next few decades.
My view? Bite the bullet and train them. But, the core of the problem is there aren’t enough of them with the “right stuff” to be trained. Start up airlines popping up and just buying “”:buses with wings” and some xbox guys to fly them.
In my airline (one of...) it took 10-15 years 10,000 hours to be put in command. And boy were you glad when the unexpected was thrown at you.
But I hear some say”get that dinosaur off this forum before my brain explodes with anger and indignation! “
Isn’t there a forum for old farts that he could join? Where he can dream of halcyon days when pilots could fly a plane with stick and rudder and a thing called airmanship? And think outside the box and understand the systems enough to know right from wrong?
I will tootle off now and take my blood pressure pills.
Y
Im looking for one,

yanrair,
“My view? Bite the bullet and train them. But, the core of the problem is there aren’t enough of them with the “right stuff” to be trained.”
You appear to exclude yourself - ‘train them’, but no training for you. Retired ? But you still need to train your mind.
When would the industry reach the required standard, who would judge, how.

alf, … just ‘an old f…’, but prepared to consider alternative views, consider what the industry’s current safety needs are, and how they could be met - practical, cost effective.

My cockpit is full of protective systems that got developed because of past years top gun pilots who flew their aircraft into the ground, crashed with other aircraft or flew straight into thunderstorms.

A June 2nd front page Seattle Times article goes “Fateful 737 MAX revamp left key players in the dark.” The sub-head says “Critical decisions on design certification were based on misguided assumptions.”

The article is devoted 100% then to the proposition that the MAX’s “fatal flaws” have been “traced to a breakdown late in the plane’s development, when test pilots, engineers and regulators were left in the dark about a fundamental overhaul to an automated system that would ultimately play a role in two crashes.” No mention is made of the ships new, larger, more powerful engines, and their placement vis a vis the airframe, as the true and FUNDAMENTAL cause of why the MAX flys “differently” at times than any of its brethren. So differently, in fact, that an entirely new system had to be invented to cope with what Boeing is subtly admitting is a major and certain “aerodynamic” (as Gums says) shortfall.

But as for test pilots being left in the dark? Far from it I would venture. The latter would have been first to witness the new “bucking bronco” do her “characteristics” thing as she kicked up her heals to their spurs. Unless they’d been warned what maybe to expect (?), it must have been pretty unsettling. But that would be another story.