SoS
The date of the communication may be meaningful?

Or maybe just careful.

From a presentation of 2019-09-03 by EASA's Executive Director Patrick KY, as posted on the European Parliament's website:
IMHO, "Too high forces needed to move the manual trim wheel in case of a stabiliser runaway" is technically challenging. I can't see an easy fix. At best, software can make stabilizer runaway extremely unlikely. Training can improve recovery to a degree (see the Boeing advice on "aerodynamically relieving airloads" using manual stabilizer trim thread), but subject to altitude constraints.

Thanks fgrieu... one can't begin to wonder if the MAX return to service is going to happen before Summer 2020...

Another interesting thing in that EASA document is where they propose ECO-Labels on aircraft, like on your household appliances, washers and dryers...

$280 million is a sizable chunk of change.

And of course you try to build what the customer wants. I read elsewhere that SWA wasn't really interested if it was going to take significant retraining/resources (may as well buy a different aircraft then). So if your primary customer wants something you try mighty hard to give it to them. At the same time SWA said sure we'll buy them under that scenario, but for us to commit we need some assurance you won't change the goal later, hence the $1 million incentive.

Sometimes you win such a gamble, sometimes not. Here, in the end, Boeing did not. Neither did SWA.

I don't think that anyone in Boeing or the FAA understands the damage done to both their reputations by self certification.

The actions of EASA (in particular) may just be a reminder to the USA that the FAA is not the sole certifying agency. One wonders when Canada and China are going to follow suit

I understand why EASA is now so strict, they have to be this way. But separating authorities and certification again is the wrong way to go.
We need a bullet proof trustworthy system again. Where everybody can rely on each other. Better bring back the trust again and change everything that's in between.
EASA is not fighting Boeing or anybody else but they must be sure that no interference with the industry takes place (again). We need a united approach to bring it back to flight not a patchwork world. A robust, proven and flight demonstrated modification will be the beginning.

3. Accidents of JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood.

I am guessing EASA want the final reports out to review, before they guess what needs to be addressed. They would not want to commit only to get embarrassed by an oversight, by something in one of the two reports yet to be released.

Seems the 777X also has some issues.
Seattle radio KOMO reports the aircraft had a door pop off during extreme pressurization testing, with FAA officials watching.
https://twitter.com/hashtag/KOMONews?src=hashtag_click

Perhaps merely something misrigged, but Boeing historically uses plug type doors, so perhaps something more serious.

Further reporting on KOMO now that the final test where they bend the wing to failure failed.

https://komonews.com/news/local/door...ng-stress-test

Might not serve the public interest as well as could appear at first glance. Delegates relieve the authority of having to employ thousands more staff to have the full breath of knowledge and experience, as well as capacity for the workload. By applying the logic that the FAA should not delegate design approval there would seem to be a parallel suggestion that all pilot examiners, and maintenance signatories should also be employees of the FAA. after all, they too issue or renew certificates on behalf of the authority. I'm not saying that the designee system worked perfectly in this case, but unless you want every STC, C of A and pilot license or rating to be issued by an employee of the authority, paying all those staff, and waiting for the service. it is probably better to refine and perhaps oversee the present system more carefully.

Possibly, aircraft were issued a design approval with a flaw, by a designee, and unfortunate crashes can be attributed to that. Has a pilot, who has been issued a license by a designated examiner, ever caused an accident? Has there been a call to return all pilot examinations to staff of the authority?

The DER system worked very well for over 50 years. Don't associate that system with the recent direct results of ODA.

It's interesting that the EASA presentation included a graphical description of MCAS by AFP, calling it an "anti-stall system":

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....565aee6f18.png

Mandatory wearing of helmets on a push bike is

a) a injury prevention method.
b) a death prevention method
c) a regulatory requirement.



D) ALL of the above!!!!!!!!!!!!


MCAS is only a regulatory requirement - none of the others were required when MCAS was developed and redeveloped.

Stick to the story - stalls never happen at high AoA and never would a lighter stick force, at a high AoA lead to even one unintentional stall - ever.

EASA need not wait for both accident reports but will I imagine wait for Indonesian report on JT 610. It’s due next month.
ICAO Annex 13 requires that State conducting investigation make Final Report publicly available “if possible” within twelve months. If not, State shall make an interim statement on each anniversary of the occurrence, detailing progress and any safety issues identified.
I expect the report to be just as timely, professional and non-judgemental as Indonesia’s report on Air Asia A320 flight QZ8501 - https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyd...XC-reduite.pdf. Indeed some aspects will be depressingly similar; defect reporting, maintenance, startle/CRM.

A very unfortunate side effect of this debacle is that Boeing have put themselves into play in world trade tensions. Whereas before the different FAAs all had mutual recognition agreements, at a time of Trump inspired trade wars Boeing has made themselves into the ball that will be kicked up and down the muddy pitch until it is bent out of all shape. And all to save a few hundred million dollars and undo decades of superb engineering. It's hard to think of a bigger self-inflicted injury. The entire 737 management team at B would resign out of honour if they were Japanese.

G