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Boeing Resisted Pilots Calls for Steps On MAX
“The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like [Lion Air], and the even worse thing would be another one.” - Mike Sinnett, Boeing VP.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/b...ane-crash.html |
I was wondering who was going to be the fall guy. The federal grand jury has subpoenaed American and Southwest communications with Boeing over this issue. |
These accidents and the design features that led to them are looking like the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The corporate (executive/management) cultures of the manufacturer and the regulator(s) are what really need to be corrected.
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WOW, just WOW!
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Originally Posted by Australopithecus
(Post 10471396)
I was wondering who was going to be the fall guy. The federal grand jury has subpoenaed American and Southwest communications with Boeing over this issue. And the back ground of - $1,000,000 per aircraft, if extra training is required. |
[QUOTE=ImbracableCrunk;10471393]“The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like [Lion Air], and the even worse thing would be another one.” - Mike Sinnett, Boeing VP. I don’t see a bright future for Mr. Sinnett... MS |
WSJ
https://www.wsj.com/articles/faa-saw...sk-11557831723
...Boeing’s description of MCAS came up in talks with pilot unions after the first MAX crash in October in Indonesia. In contrast to the company’s early stance that the system wasn’t deemed critical for safety, Boeing executive Mike Sinnett described it as “flight-critical software” in explaining to American Airlines pilots why a software fix shouldn’t be rushed, according to the group’s president, Capt. Dan Carey, who reviewed a recording he made of the November meeting. A Boeing spokesman said Mr. Sinnett disagreed with Mr. Carey’s characterization. |
From that NYT article (emphasis mine):
(..) Mr. Sinnett and Mr. Bomben, explained that the company did not believe that pilots needed to know about the software, because they were already trained to deal with scenarios like the one on the doomed Lion Air flight. All pilots are expected to know how to take control of an aircraft when the plane’s tail begins moving in an uncontrolled way because of a malfunction, nudging the aircraft toward the ground. “The assumption is that the flight crews have been trained,” Mr. Sinnett said in the meeting. He added later: “Rightly or wrongly, that was the design criteria and that’s how the airplane was certified with the system and pilot working together.” |
“We don’t want to rush and do a crappy job of fixing the right things and we also don’t want to fix the wrong things,” Mr. Sinnett said, later adding, “For flight-critical software, I don’t think you want us to rush, rush it faster.”
Ummm, if you want me to go fly that thing and it has an issue with a "flight critical" item, well yes, yes I do want you to rush the fix. And if you fix a few things along the way that do not need fixing well that's OK too. Because if, for God's sake you send me out in an airplane with a critical or fatal flaw in a piece of flight-critical software and it goes south I am going to be very unimpressed. Full Stop. If accurate that recording is going to cost Boeing billions in damages and may end the MAX program for all time, cast under a cloud of suspicion regarding its certification from within which it cannot escape. The reason?? Sinnett is tacitly admitting months prior to the ET crash that there is "something" that needs "fixing" on the MAX in a flight critical system. This as a part of his argument that the airplane should keep on flying. If your jaw didn't hit the floor read it again. "That left fetzer valve switch?? Well we placarded it against any use with a warning that "Flipping this switch may result in your death" because we weren't sure what it does or how it works. After all, if you really needed it you'd know what it was and why it was there right?? But whatever, if you do accidentally hit that switch just use these other two nifty switches over here to stop the bad behavior. You do that and all will end well." Uh huh... Cheers- dce |
Originally Posted by wonkazoo
(Post 10471528)
“We don’t want to rush and do a crappy job of fixing the right things and we also don’t want to fix the wrong things,” Mr. Sinnett said, later adding, “For flight-critical software, I don’t think you want us to rush, rush it faster.”
Ummm, if you want me to go fly that thing and it has an issue with a "flight critical" item, well yes, yes I do want you to rush the fix. And if you fix a few things along the way that do not need fixing well that's OK too. Because if, for God's sake you send me out in an airplane with a critical or fatal flaw in a piece of flight-critical software and it goes south I am going to be very unimpressed. Full Stop. If accurate that recording is going to cost Boeing billions in damages and may end the MAX program for all time, cast under a cloud of suspicion regarding its certification from within which it cannot escape. The reason?? Sinnett is tacitly admitting months prior to the ET crash that there is "something" that needs "fixing" on the MAX in a flight critical system. This as a part of his argument that the airplane should keep on flying. If your jaw didn't hit the floor read it again. "That left fetzer valve switch?? Well we placarded it against any use with a warning that "Flipping this switch may result in your death" because we weren't sure what it does or how it works. After all, if you really needed it you'd know what it was and why it was there right?? But whatever, if you do accidentally hit that switch just use these other two nifty switches over here to stop the bad behavior. You do that and all will end well." Uh huh... Cheers- dce But yeah. The narrative has always had some gaping holes in it, now just a lot more...gaping. |
https://www.c-span.org/video/?460584...ify-boeing-737
I watched one of the other hearings - could be interesting in a few hours. |
Originally Posted by ImbracableCrunk
(Post 10471393)
“The worst thing that can ever happen is a tragedy like [Lion Air], and the even worse thing would be another one.” - Mike Sinnett, Boeing VP.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/b...ane-crash.html ]“No one has yet to conclude that the sole cause of this was this function on the airplane,” Mr. Sinnett said, according to a recording of the Nov. 27 meeting reviewed by The New York Times. |
Originally Posted by Jet Jockey A4
(Post 10471447)
WOW, just WOW!
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Originally Posted by Chesty Morgan
(Post 10471618)
I know! People are STILL calling it an anti stall system :rolleyes:
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Originally Posted by derjodel
(Post 10471635)
While you are correct, it is basically impossible to exceed AoA in a Max, isn't it? E.g. AF447 could not have happened with a MCAS system operating (assuming it isn't switched off below certain IAS, as stall warning in Airbus is).
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The UK RAF had a military Nimrod crash in 2006. One of the outcomes of the crash was Haddon-Cave which was a pretty scathing review of how the UK MoD had approached airworthiness. The review forced a complete change of military airworthiness oversight and regulation. General malaise 11. The Nimrod Safety Case process was fatally undermined by a general malaise: a widespread assumption by those involved that the Nimrod was ‘safe anyway’ (because it had successfully flown for 30 years) and the task of drawing up the Safety Case became essentially a paperwork and ‘tick- box’ exercise. (Chapter 11) |
"The Boeing executives, Mr. Sinnett and Mr. Bomben, explained that the company did not believe that pilots needed to know about the software, because they were already trained to deal with scenarios like the one on the doomed Lion Air flight. All pilots are expected to know how to take control of an aircraft when the plane’s tail begins moving in an uncontrolled way because of a malfunction, nudging the aircraft toward the ground." Where have we read similar statements recently? Just Fancy That, as the Eye would put it. |
All pilots are expected to know how to take control of an aircraft when the plane’s tail begins moving in an uncontrolled way because of a malfunction, nudging the aircraft toward the ground." There is a real problem when non-pilots are rewarded for decreasing the training budgets, they don’t understand how close to the bone they can cut until they’ve hit it. |
Originally Posted by Cows getting bigger
(Post 10471664)
The UK RAF had a military Nimrod crash in 2006. One of the outcomes of the crash was Haddon-Cave which was a pretty scathing review of how the UK MoD had approached airworthiness. The review forced a complete change of military airworthiness oversight and regulation. |
Yes, MCAS is not to prevent a stall. It's to prevent a pilot from pulling the nose up too quickly and getting into a too high AOA. Which would cause a stall. Obfuscation by reductio ad absurdum is an excellent skill for folks who want to evade the obvious to develop. |
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