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-   -   Atlas Air 767 down/Texas (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/618723-atlas-air-767-down-texas.html)

Jeff05 24th Feb 2019 18:36


Originally Posted by FIRESYSOK (Post 10399387)


This is a FAR121-Supplemental operating a flag (domestic) flight. So the 45-minute RSV applies, not 30min.

Why they leveled at ~6000í for a time and tracked West toward a different transition waypoint than other arrivals is curious to me more than a critical fuel status, but stranger things have happened. That said, those wouldnít have been causal, but perhaps a significant link. I stand by my Ďamateur-hourí speculations and donít feel they detract from the discussion.

RIP, fellas.

th

Thanks for the correction/clarification - good to know.

PJ2 24th Feb 2019 18:40


Originally Posted by FIRESYSOK (Post 10399298)
Thanks. Iím just wondering where his 30-minute fuel supply -after alternate- fits in to this discussion. Maybe someone can enlighten me.

A discussion about fuel load is a sidebar perhaps of technical interest. Even given what is known at this point, I doubt that it figures in terms of cause.


CONSO 24th Feb 2019 18:43


Originally Posted by tdracer (Post 10399353)
The windscreen and surrounding structure is common between the 757, 767, and 777, and I'm not aware of any windscreen penetrations on any of those types.
However there is still a risk with large birds - during the development of the 757-300 and 767-400ER, it was determined there was a vulnerability with the forward bulkhead - a large enough bird could penetrate into the flight deck. I don't know if the requirements changed after the initial 757/767 cert, or it was due to better analysis tools, but the bulkhead had to be beefed up in some areas. I'm reasonably sure it was never retrofit.
90,000 hours is not that old for a 767 - even before I retired I was aware of several passenger 767s that had more than 100,000 hours and were still going strong.

FWIW- The initial 767 cockpit was designed for 3 crew- but with the then onset of two crew- additional rerouting of several systems ( eg hydraulics and switches rerouting ) About that time the chicken cannon was brought into play ( firing a frozen chicken from an air cannon into a partial cockpit structure to determine windscreen and ' skull cap ' strengths). Forget the weight and speeds involved ..
The result was that the ' skull cap' above the windscreen and the window framework had to be redesigned mostly with titanium. The skull cap cuz some important switches and valves were located there and damage or loss could cause major flight control issues- but still had to be within reach of pilot and copilot..

While the first one or two flyable 767.s built may not have had the rework, I am sure all the rest had that redesign.

WhatsaLizad? 24th Feb 2019 18:44

Birds have penetrated the forward bulkhead in front of the cockpit of a 767-300 at least once before. Medium sized birds blasted through it on one flight, fortunately missing the Captain but sending blood, guts and feathers against the aft left wall of the cockpit.


Havingwings4ever 24th Feb 2019 18:51

Airframetime should't be issue, our 76-3 were the first to exceed 100k worldwide according to our airline and recieved an extension to 150k with an adapted maintenance program. Planes still flew fine:)

DaveReidUK 24th Feb 2019 18:53


Originally Posted by CONSO (Post 10399410)
About that time the chicken cannon was brought into play ( firing a frozen chicken from an air cannon into a partial cockpit structure to determine windscreen and ' skull cap ' strengths).

I thought it was only the Air Force that supposedly forgot to defrost the birds before the test ... ?


CONSO 24th Feb 2019 19:10

tdracer said ..

90,000 hours is not that old for a 767 - even before I retired I was aware of several passenger 767s that had more than 100,000 hours and were still going strong.
One subtle reason for the very long fatigue life of the 767 and related was the extensive use of two Boeing devlopd processes. One being a technique called ' coldworking " details of which can be found in manuals, info provided by Fatigue Technology ( http://www.fatiguetech.com/ ) developed in the late 60's by Lou Champoux ( next to my desk ) at the time.. In simple terms, bypushing/pulling a mandrel thru a sleeve inserted in the hole - or a special mandrel without a sleeve, the hole stretches leaving the nearby surrounding material in tension, which then results in major fatigue improvement. This techniques was used on main spars, lower wing panels, parts of wing box and some parts of fuselage, etc.

The second process also ' first ' used on major spar assembly was/is called ElectroMagneticRiveting - which uses magnetic drivers to drive and expand a rivet in ONE blow, which also has a major effect on fatigue life. Although the process had been used on smaller parts/assemblies since early 747 days, the use on major spar assembly was a first on 767. The machine was known as ASAT automatic assembly tool. That also was the founding of a company used around the world as improved and further developed by a company called Electro Impact - whos major facility is next to Boeing Everett. They have branched out since then with major wing composite layup for 777X. And no - I do not and have not worked for ElectroImpact or Fatigue Technolocy but have had many personal contacts/background with those involved in both companies over the years.

CONSO 24th Feb 2019 19:20


Originally Posted by DaveReidUK (Post 10399424)
I thought it was only the Air Force that supposedly forgot to defrost the birds before the test ... ?

details- details- A careful check will reveal the particulars- as to just how much frozen the birds, turkeys, etc were at time of launch/firing- I did not fbeleive it was necessary to define/explain the exact test parameters. And birds have been found to impact jets at altitudes well over 15,000 feet.
My point was to SIMPLY explain the test used to detrmine design parameters, I'm sure the FAA an various wildlife protection agencies can explain why chickens and turkeys instead o geese, etc.


see also


PJ2 24th Feb 2019 20:02


Originally Posted by WhatsaLizad? (Post 10399412)
Birds have penetrated the forward bulkhead in front of the cockpit of a 767-300 at least once before. Medium sized birds blasted through it on one flight, fortunately missing the Captain but sending blood, guts and feathers against the aft left wall of the cockpit.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....aae17f7b80.jpg https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....d2b7f0661c.jpg

neilki 24th Feb 2019 20:03

Part 121 fuel requirements
 

Originally Posted by Jeff05 (Post 10399321)


Refers to 30 minutes final reserve holding at 1500 above alternate (or destination if alternate not required). This must be intact on landing.

May be slightly different in FAA land (I have only flown reciprocating engine aircraft under FAA rules) but those are the ICAO requirements for jets.

Thoughts with the families and friends of the victims at this awful time.

I'm pretty sure the fuel thing is a red herring; but under 14CFR Part 121 there is no requirement to land with a specific amount of fuel.
The aircraft must be dispatched with a planned amount of fuel on landing. If you burn it all without declaring a problem to ATC and your dispatcher that's a violation; but it's a planning requirement only.

Its Atlas. As well as the Amazon 767 s they operate the worlds largest 747 fleet. 400s & -8's. They know what they're doing.

aircarver 24th Feb 2019 20:06

The Mythbusters admitted their early 'chicken gun' tests on a Cherokee were akin to testing cardboard with a .357 magnum ....

lomapaseo 24th Feb 2019 20:20

Instead of all these what-if combinations I would prefer to parse the discussions down to the supporting facts at this time with no more than one leap of speculation beyond what is known.

Question. Do we know the length and spread of the debris trail ?

does that give us a hint of the attitude of the plane during break-up?

fox niner 24th Feb 2019 20:22

Instead of speculating, you might want to watch the ntsb press conference at 2200Z.

https://mobile.twitter.com/NTSB_Newsroom

Joejosh999 24th Feb 2019 20:43


Originally Posted by PJ2 (Post 10399496)
What starts a sudden, rapid nose-over followed by an uncorrected, steep descent in which there were no previous non-normal communications or other indication of trouble on a proven type operated by an experienced carrier?

...jammed stab? Trim runaway?

Agent1966 24th Feb 2019 20:59

I heard it....very faint.

Old Boeing Driver 24th Feb 2019 21:04

Remember the B-737 rudder hard-over issues?

Does anyone here know of any similar issues/instances on the B-767?

Marty33 24th Feb 2019 21:29

My GUESS is that something bent, broke or jammed under weather induced maneuvering loads. RIP Giant.

tvasquez 24th Feb 2019 21:40

Tim Vasquez, meteorologist in Texas here... weather data analysis is what I do for a living, and some of you may remember me from the Air France 447 study about 10 years ago.

Regarding the 767 crash in Houston, a lot of images seem to be floating around that use default radar mosaics. These are problematic as they're focused on higher intensity levels, they are not very granular, they often carry an ambiguous scan time, and they're often built from composite products which are the result of multiple scans rather than a single scan. This makes it very difficult to use such data except to define the basic environment. In fact, I initially didn't think much of weather being a factor based on the preliminary images I saw. However I went ahead and accessed the raw WSR-88D base data files, which are for a single level and accurate to within about 1 minute, and I found some interesting stuff.

First of all, one caveat with these images: the ones I've posted here are built from 0.5-deg scans, which were underneath the 767 at a beam center altitude of about 2000-2500 ft and a beam width of about 2000 ft. I used these because there are usually a lack of scatterers at the higher tilts, and most of the convective circulations we see above 5000+ ft are initially generated near the surface. So there are indeed some assumptions about what is going on up at 5000 ft, where the problem presumably started. Time stamps are based on the FlightAware track log, which comes straight from the ASDI feed. My assumption is these times are accurate. Sorry for the watermarks, I got burned back in 2009 by the media reprinting my diagrams commercially without permission.

A couple of conclusions:

* A textbook gust front is clearly shown within 3 nm of the crash site. This correlation is definite and is striking.

* There were no thunderstorms within 5 nm of the crash site. There may have virga or weak showers though.

* It appears some sort of gust surge developed over northern Trinity Bay, lasting about 10 minutes, originating from the storms further west near Baytown, and it reinforced the gust front. This developed ground-relative motion of 50-60 kt along a band 6 nm long oriented NE-SW.

* Velocity product showed a transitory divergent couplet with 65 kt of shear within a 1 nm volume, slightly below and left of the track. This could be a piece of the northern edge of the gust surge. This is probably associated with turbulent motion, as the result of shear & friction along the frontal boundary.

* Velocity at higher levels (4000+ ft) and along the forward edge of the gust front are typically difficult to determine in these situations because a lack of scatterers.

* I don't think a gust front like this is anything that looks particularly dangerous. That said, it's impossible to directly measure turbulence, and in between the turbulence and cloud scales there are often strong circulations that can go undetected. Typically when we see small-scale patterns on radar imagery with strong gradients and circulation, we consider the possibility that strong motions can extrapolate down to the smaller scales. It's certainly possible that this gust surge rolled up into a vortex like I've shown in the cross-section below.. this can certainly be a hazardous area to fly in.

In short I'm skeptical weather caused a direct effect, but I do see enormous potential for a sudden, rough ride here, and that could have been the first event in a chain that led to something like a CG shift or loss of a control surface (from fatigue, improper maintenance, design issue, something like the 737 in Colorado Springs, etc).

It would be interesting to see what the TDWR radars showed, unfortunately as I have to attend to my other work I probably won't have time to look at this.

Anyway this is just an armchair analysis and I'm sure the investigators have more information at this point than we do, but it's nice to have quantitative data to work from.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....ed46ca4f92.jpg

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....8eaf05a485.jpg

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....58831f4826.jpg

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....b0d22176aa.jpg

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....701b58a3c1.jpg
Conceptual vertical cross section of air flow along a gust front ahead of a microburst.

fox niner 24th Feb 2019 21:52


What are they measuring here? What are those holes?

gums 24th Feb 2019 22:07

Salute. Tim!

Good stuff, and it might be relevant if shear or gust had an effect on cargo shift, as some are already discussing.

BTW, I am discounting bird strikes, as we should have heard radio calls like we did with Sully. Something really bad happened, and it happened quickly and crew was BZ trying to save their lives and not talking.

Gums sends...


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