Thank you for that. Your response leaves me looking at the "leaked" info and more puzzled than before. The implication of that reported sequence is that once a mistaken hit of that switch, TOGA, the Left Seat pilot became inert, both physically and mentally.
I find that hard to believe, and so am quite keen to read the report when it comes out.
(My last areas of professional concentration before leaving aviation for other jobs was training, crew training, human performance, CRM, and human factors).

(Airbubba: I am in no way impugning your cred as a source - I've found your input to be generally solid over the years ... )

beginning to suspect that illuminating the suitability of someone in the flight deck is a stumbling point..

Noteworthy perhaps that in the Nagoya crash, the actions of the PF were entirely reasonable based on his training and previous experience on B747. Unfortunately the sim that he had trained on for the A300 was programmed with a different TOGA behavior than the actual plane in question. An Airbus precursor to Boeing's MCAS phenomenon?

more than one airplane will trim against manual inputs when the autopilot is engaged..

Indeed. The point is that in simulator training, moving the yoke forward in GA mode would disconnect the autopilot.
When push came to shove in the actual flight, that did not happen. It wasn't the primary cause of the crash, but it contributed.

can't see how it relates the MCAS...

Wrong thread - this 767 didn't have MCAS.

Presumably AviatorDave is talking about the initial factual report rather than the final report?

Q
 

Unexpected TOGA
 

I must agree with Lonewolf50 (post 881) about actions subsequent to TOGA selection.

During my time on the 76 I twice experienced inadvertent TOGA selection, once by myself as PF and the other time by the F/O as PF. Both occurred in very turbulent conditions on finals, at Tenerife and Las Vegas. It is some years ago now, but I cannot recall any drama. The aircraft left the G/S and went up like a lift and all we had to do was fly the machine, just as if it were an aeroplane. Flap 20, Gear UP, Levelled off and went round for another go. There is no doubt that it was the turbulence which caused both incidents – the palm switches were knocked by our hands being shaken by the hard rocking and rolling.

In this case, there must be more to it than that.

Prober

CI140 had the AP engaged in the GA 13 seconds after the inadvertent TOGA selection, but the pilot was not aware of that fact, and was forcing the yoke against the AP resulting in the excessive backtrim case. The TOGA engagement was accidental by the handling pilot.

The Nagoya flight was off a stable approach, but had the anomaly of the accidental TOGA triggering, and the subsequent engagement of the AP which the pilot fought against.

The Taipei A300-622R accident, CI676 was slightly different. It came off an unstable approach where the aircraft was high, 7,000' @ 16nm, which would have been manageable, but increased the workload. The crew disconnected the AP and shortly thereafter did a GA manually flown. The pitch up with full thrust ended up at 41 degrees nose up before any nose down elevator was applied, and trim was applied nose down 6 seconds later. At the top of the zoom climb, the crew achieved 42.5 degrees nose up, roll excursions laterally of 48.5 degrees right, a minimum recorded speed of 43KCAS at 2751'. Thrust was slightly reduced, and the nose lowered finally going to 45 degrees nose down, following a 79 degree left roll excursion. Last data was at 136RA (uncorrected for pitch) 599'PA, 237KCAS, 18 degrees nose down, pulling 2.2g and near wings level.

In the 90's there was a spate of wild rides on the 300-600 and the 310 with spectacular displays put on in Moscow and in Paris by visiting aircraft. Boeing's partial thrust GA (targeted rate of climb) is less likely to get the drivers out of sorts, and some bus users implemented a soft GA procedure which led to the wild ride GA at Melbourne of an A320 of an AUS carrier where the guys essentially did a downwards going GA, and missed planet earth by not much. At low weights, the application of full thrust on underslung engines will get the attention of the crew, with a considerable trim change requirement to be managed, or not. The or not gets mentions in the funny pages. Getting out of trim is not a Max8 issue alone, it is an issue with all of these aircraft, and it is a part of the cyclic matrix that is deficient in its practice. The SLF's prefer we don't practice en route, so there are limited occasions for the crew to practice AP and manually flown GA's.

CI140 more or less vertically parked adjacent to the runway at RJBB. it was nowhere near a recovery in the time and space available, the wreckage distribution was more or less within the planform of the aircraft.

Good post, fdr.

Actually, CI140 crashed at Nagoya Airfield, RJNA. RJBB is KIX, Osaka Kansai.

After the A300 crashes the Dynasty Airbus fleet was made almost all expat and the planes were subsequently retired according to a friend who flew the B-744 at China Air during that deadly period.

I've done the dreaded two-engine missed approach in the A306, A310 and B-767 in years past. I'd say the A310 is the most challenging with the pitchup, the B-767 the most docile. Obviously, if you fight the autopilot on the go-around bad things can happen in any aircraft.

every 2-engine go-around I ever did in a jet, my body was telling me excessive pitch up, however, the automatics, in fact, put the pitch exactly where it was supposed to be...look before you touch...

Correct - the wreckage was clearly visible from the terminal for a long time afterwards!