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Originally Posted by Dark Knight
(Post 10452331)
I suggest it is almost impossible to do this when correctly selecting a flap reposition particularly should one have been properly trained: i.e. when selecting a flap reposition from the Left seat the hand always goes under the pilot flying (F/O's) arm. This prevents the Left seat pilot's arm getting in the way of the Pilot Flying (F/O) use of the thrust levers.
Further the hand/arm would not be anywhere near the TOGA switches. Had for some reason TOGA had been initiated one would think autothrust would be immediately disconnected to maintain the required flight path/remain in control of the aircraft. Or is the required flight path was not able to be maintained a go round carried out. This should be a fairly standard procedure which all training would demonstrate. Can you find any reference for this 'standard procedure' for your, uh, reach around? Some FO's would have their hands on the throttles at 6000 feet with autoflight engaged, others would not in my experience. These are not TOGA switches, they are go-around switches on the B-763. I agree that clicking off the autothrottle and pulling back the thrust levers would be a simple way of handling the initial miscue. Or, selecting FLCH since 6000 is in the altitude window would automatically pull back the power and bring you back on altitude. |
Originally Posted by Dark Knight
(Post 10452331)
Re post 850 from a reliable source.
My thoughts. Did not fly the 767 however, checking Captain Google images, the TOGA (Go Round) switches (as in most Boeings) are positioned such they require a premeditated, definite decision/action to trigger them. I suggest it is almost impossible to do this when correctly selecting a flap reposition particularly should one have been properly trained: i.e. when selecting a flap reposition from the Left seat the hand always goes under the pilot flying (F/O's) arm. This prevents the Left seat pilot's arm getting in the way of the Pilot Flying (F/O) use of the thrust levers. Further the hand/arm would not be anywhere near the TOGA switches. Had for some reason TOGA had been initiated one would think autothrust would be immediately disconnected to maintain the required flight path/remain in control of the aircraft. Or is the required flight path was not able to be maintained a go round carried out. This should be a fairly standard procedure which all training would demonstrate. |
The 767 Go-Around switches are in a different position than the one's on the 737NG and 777. The 737NG and 777 are forward of your hand and are activated by your finger tips. On the 767, if you let your throttle hand thumb relax and lower, it's in about the right position to engage the Go-Around switch. I've unintentionally engaged the Go-Around on both designs (767 and 777). It didn't happen on the 737 because the buttons are smaller and harder to move.
Maybe I'm a klutz but things get bumped. |
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On the 767/757 I was told the go around switches were palm switches. Seemed to work for me. |
Actually preferred them in that position to the 78 reach over and down, seemed easier to find . |
NTSB Preliminary Report published
Says nothing that wasn't known within a week of the mishap. I'm a noob, so can't post the URL.
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Originally Posted by Dark Knight
(Post 10452331)
Re post 850 from a reliable source.
My thoughts. Did not fly the 767 however, checking Captain Google images, the TOGA (Go Round) switches (as in most Boeings) are positioned such they require a premeditated, definite decision/action to trigger them. I suggest it is almost impossible to do this when correctly selecting a flap reposition particularly should one have been properly trained: i.e. when selecting a flap reposition from the Left seat the hand always goes under the pilot flying (F/O's) arm. This prevents the Left seat pilot's arm getting in the way of the Pilot Flying (F/O) use of the thrust levers. Further the hand/arm would not be anywhere near the TOGA switches. Had for some reason TOGA had been initiated one would think autothrust would be immediately disconnected to maintain the required flight path/remain in control of the aircraft. Or is the required flight path was not able to be maintained a go round carried out. This should be a fairly standard procedure which all training would demonstrate. Where do you get these statements from? Who said there was a standard procedure for moving the flap lever? Just making this up? And also, how do you perform a go around at 6000 feet on a STAR? Do you know the definition of a Go-Around? On a Boeing, if you ever need to stop your descent on an arrival and need to climb back up, the easiest and smoothest way would be to set a higher altitude on the MCP and use Level Change. Unless you are about to hit something, you won't use TOGA at this point. As far as hitting the TOGA switches accidentally, stranger things have happened, and it is possible. |
[QUOTE=6PapaWhishey;10454240]Says nothing that wasn't known within a week of the mishap. I'm a noob, so can't post the URL.[/QUO Cant see anything new on NTSB site after March . |
Cant see anything new on NTSB site after March .
[/QUOTE] Here's the text from the report: " On February 23, 2019, at 1239 central standard time, Atlas Air flight 3591, a Boeing 767-375BCF, N1217A, entered a rapid descent from 6,000 ft and impacted a marshy bay area about 40 miles southeast of George Bush Intercontinental Airport (KIAH), Houston, Texas. The two pilots and one nonrevenue jumpseat pilot were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed and highly fragmented. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 domestic cargo flight, which originated from Miami International Airport (KMIA), Miami, Florida, and was destined for KIAH." The report can be found in the " Accident Synopses - by month" page of the NTSB site. |
Here you go (it's more or less content-free): https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Re...=HTML&IType=MA
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Originally Posted by Paul852
(Post 10454651)
Here you go (it's more or less content-free): https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Re...=HTML&IType=MA
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Well, we all knew that.
Nothing new. Time for the ntsb to come up with some real investigating news! |
https://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/16/16.63...3JF12_A300.pdf hitting the TOGA accidentally has resulted in crashes and near crashes before as in CI 140 Nagoya accident A300-600 |
Originally Posted by testpanel
(Post 10454665)
Time for the ntsb to come up with some real investigating news!
If they are being meticulous, and it takes time, where's the problem? |
Originally Posted by armchairpilot94116
(Post 10454713)
https://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/16/16.63...3JF12_A300.pdf hitting the TOGA accidentally has resulted in crashes and near crashes before as in CI 140 Nagoya accident A300-600 I don't recall TOGA being the precipitator. I do recall the screaming call as they fell in a stall of "power Power" They hit the ground flat with little forward speed The CI crash in Tapei was involved with too much power, precip a stall on a canceled approach |
loma, I know very little about 767: if one accidentally hits TOGA, can not then pull the power back by hand? (Or otherwise disengage it?)
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
(Post 10455031)
loma, I know very little about 767: if one accidentally hits TOGA, can not then pull the power back by hand? (Or otherwise disengage it?)
Of course. |
Originally Posted by lomapaseo
(Post 10455019)
I don't recall TOGA being the precipitator. I do recall the screaming call as they fell in a stall of "power Power"
They hit the ground flat with little forward speed The CI crash in Tapei was involved with too much power, precip a stall on a canceled approach |
Originally Posted by lomapaseo
(Post 10455019)
I don't recall TOGA being the precipitator. I do recall the screaming call as they fell in a stall of "power Power"
They hit the ground flat with little forward speed The CI crash in Tapei was involved with too much power, precip a stall on a canceled approach will have to find the accident report memory fades but remember they were a bit high on the approach and did late go around with full load sans the fuel burn from Bali and stalled at low altitude into apartments pilot fatigue was mentioned as a big factor Power applied too late for successful go around it seems or the AOA too high the accident happened at night |
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