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Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape
(Post 10464300)
The training/testing problem is an extension of the software fault tree analysis problem, and the consistent shifting of risk. If you aren't "aware" that AOA is a critical parameter, you won't include testing for AOA disagree, or MCAS, or anything else...
In any case there were never, and are still not, enough simulators to actually test the MAX properly, so your question is moot. That goes back to the whole issue of timetable pressures. I don't know how much of this is "news", but rather confirmation of what many suspected months ago. Prolonging the release of information may be justified on legal grounds, but the drip-drip of revelations does nothing to regain confidence. As claimed by a whistle blower working with the FBI. The single AoA for MCAS to obtain data was intentional move by Boeing. The whistle blower claims that using both AoA vanes would lead to the FAA to require extra training in the simulator. This was not an option for Boeing as the sales was dependant on minor training. Boeing sold the MAX on it NOT requiring simulator training. That is the reason there are "not enough" simulators. Had Boeing used both AoA sensors and the FAA did then decide that MAX did require a similar training event, we would have MANY more simulators than we do today. Not enough simulators is a direct result of Boeing's words to customers. Right now Boeing is trying to get everyone including NASA to put pressure on the FAA to say "no simulator training is required" MCAS is good now, even if originally we would have called for simulator training. In my opinion FAA should throw out the MAX certification and redo it with direct oversight regardless of how long it takes and what training is then decided. Yes it will also hurt airlines around the World but if it looks too good to be true - someone is taking a short cut! and the airlines were/are happy to look away. |
Originally Posted by RTM Boy
(Post 10465168)
Very, very, easy to say with weeks to think about it from the comfort of your armchair. The 'crux' of the issue is that today, with all the technology actually available and design and testing regimes that should be adhered to, no MUST be adhered to, the MAX design should never have got off the CAD drawing board. Boeing should have gone to a brand new design, but for business reasons we are all now well aware of, they decided not to. It's too easy to let the detail of procedures and switches and trimming and Christ knows what else get in the way of seeing things for what they are; look at the big picture; the very fact that systems like MCAS are necessary at all tells you all you need to know about the compromised design of the MAX.
Ask yourself; mmm, is this a good idea? I mean really, is it? Anyone with the slightest understanding of safety and risk management will know you must design problems out from the very start, not try to overcome them with additional systems and procedures that add layers of complexity and increased room for error and so increasing risk - and catastrophic risk at that. To have non-redundant sensor input tells you what about the design. Safety first is it? I know forums are full of mischief makers, but this constant "oh the crew could have staved the situation" narrative is a total diversion from the 'crux' of the issue. It's almost as if you forget that hundreds of PAX and crew have died appalling deaths as a result of flight crew being put in a position they should never ever have been put in. The problem is the big picture, not the setting of trim. Thank you RTM Boy. |
Originally Posted by RTM Boy
(Post 10465168)
...
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Originally Posted by RTM Boy
(Post 10465168)
Very, very, easy to say with weeks to think about it from the comfort of your armchair. The 'crux' of the issue is that today, with all the technology actually available and design and testing regimes that should be adhered to, no MUST be adhered to, the MAX design should never have got off the CAD drawing board. Boeing should have gone to a brand new design, but for business reasons we are all now well aware of, they decided not to. It's too easy to let the detail of procedures and switches and trimming and Christ knows what else get in the way of seeing things for what they are; look at the big picture; the very fact that systems like MCAS are necessary at all tells you all you need to know about the compromised design of the MAX.
Ask yourself; mmm, is this a good idea? I mean really, is it? Anyone with the slightest understanding of safety and risk management will know you must design problems out from the very start, not try to overcome them with additional systems and procedures that add layers of complexity and increased room for error and so increasing risk - and catastrophic risk at that. To have non-redundant sensor input tells you what about the design. Safety first is it? I know forums are full of mischief makers, but this constant "oh the crew could have staved the situation" narrative is a total diversion from the 'crux' of the issue. It's almost as if you forget that hundreds of PAX and crew have died appalling deaths as a result of flight crew being put in a position they should never ever have been put in. The problem is the big picture, not the setting of trim. .
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Well said, RTM Boy. |
Here is a good recent article on Boeing certification problems:
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...uding-737-max/ Fly SAFE! God Bless, and Namaste... |
Boeing presumably expect the MAX to have a 20 year in service life and the fact that this would involve a 1960s master caution system and associated warning lights as the main interface between pilots and system malfunctions to persist into the 2040s is almost unbelievable. Flightcrew training has become increasingly systemised through CBT and many modern pilots started their flying career with Microsoft rather than in a tiger moth or a C150 and they are now far more SOP and rule based in their approach to problem solving compared to when the original B737 was designed and an EICAS or ECAM is central to all modern flightdecks in order to assist with non normal ops. Crews in future years will either be flying modern Airbus or Boeing designs or if selected for the Max, a 1960s throwback. In my view, if the crews of the 21st century do not have an adequate warning system providing full systems information, then the aircraft is not fit for purpose. |
The certification flow chart in the Seattle times article (post 906) is simply incredible. Anyone in the FAA who thought this was acceptable is in the wrong job. |
Thread suspended until there is actual new information. Angels dancing on the head of too small a pin.
Rob |
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