Matched only by such a third rate invective!

Thanks, that makes sense. But it doesn't rule out an intermittent pitot leak (cf GOL) scenario either.

I remember it on A300/A310 as well, but never touched it in 20 years of my flt times We use to say "fly manually with a/p engaged"

Almost certainly, but what might be very interesting and useful is if that system's data was copied off the previous night and has the info from the previous days flight. Data isn't a lot of use if it is never analysed so logically it must get taken off the onboard server sometime...

Incidentally, that incident you posted about with the failure to fully reconnect pitot feed in the radome, did the UAS manifest only beyond certain altitude or pitch levels? [I think some on this thread are discounting pitot failure because it would/should have been picked up on takeoff roll].

This is not in response to our (not so) Mad Flt Scientist's post, but intended to augment post #368

Problem is that finding the vertical stabilizer intact and separate from the rest of the wreckage is not an indication of pre-impact separation - they are pretty strong, in a relatively protected position in most impacts, and tend to come off in one piece.

XL888 vertical stabilizer was found intact, and floating, as was AF447. In the 447 case we had a few years of speculation on here about attachment failure (cf. AA587) before the black boxes confirmed it was an intact impact.

I don't know - my Portuguese isn't good enough to do a verbatim translation of the report.

But if yours is: RELATÓRIO FINAL IG - 014/CENIPA/2013

Pilot using PAN PAN call and then downgrading to all clear should have reported incident to the Company using Safety Report Form (my ex-company SOP required also tech log note of raised Safety Report in order to alert next crew about it), it could have saved lives of 189 ppl...

Indeed you can't and you mustn't, especially in the right seat; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birgenair_Flight_301

One of the driving forces for the creation of CRM and the timely destruction of the fallacy that the "Skipper's always right. Period." mentality.

Apparently, we're not the only ones trying to figure out if its the FDR or CVR - just heard on Radio NZ that "the authorities now say they are not sure if its the the CVR or FDR"

On another note, I was surprised to see the FRD/CVR being handled by Chief of the National SAR Agency. I thought these things needed to sit in water (if recovered from undersea) and be carefully delivered to experts who painstakingly ensure a careful process is followed, not being waved around and brandished with bare hands in the dry in a manner that could see it in any way compromised/dropped/shaken etc. Just classic grandstanding or am I missing something?

I think the procedure for retrieving data from a recorder that's had a swim in the sea is pretty well practised by now, as we saw with the recent Air Niugini B738, whose recorder was flown 1200 miles to Port Moresby before the memory modules were carefully removed and decontaminated.

DaveReidUK is right. These days are not like the old days - FDR/CVR is written to solid state memory modules and doesn't necessarily need to be 'transitioned' from retrieval depth to surface depth.

In all honesty, these days, it feels more like the most protection that FDR/CVR Modules need when recovered is to keep them safe from "those that might seek to do them harm" before data can be retrieved and analysed. A sad state of affairs.

As a non-pilot, the STS seems very important to me and also - a bit scary?
 

That thing will get into it's protective box AFTER EVERYBODY with a rank higher then "mother in law" has been photographed with it.
In that area promotion pictures are more important then finding out the truth.

Thanks for that, CaptainSandL. I note that Boeing seem to have extended the operating airspeed range for the STS for the MAX; on the NGs the operating range was 100 – 300 KIAS.

Has there been any confirmation on exactly which call JT610 made - MAYDAY or PAN? Or neither? In the Australian press one expert commentator is suggesting that a MAYDAY call for a UAS was a sure sign that the crew panicked. I've yet to see a confirmation that JT610 actually declared a MAYDAY.

I also am concerned that STS as an automated system that uses airspeed as an input could work against the pilot. I note in the training video above the trim wheel merrily spinning back and forth uncommanded after AP and AT disengaged. Can STS be disabled? should it be? for uas_

Trim Wheel
 

"I also am concerned that STS as an automated system that uses airspeed as an input could work against the pilot. I note in the training video above the trim wheel merrily spinning back and forth uncommanded after AP and AT disengaged. Can STS be disabled? should it be? for uas_""

Can be disabled immediately by a quick blip on the pitch trim.

Can’t you just grab the trim wheel and immobilize it if necessary?"

No, it is very powerful"


Regards
Exeng

Salute!

Guess we are heading toward a sub-thread about the "STS" and all the concerns about how much automation you can handle and how to revert to manual flying unless in an Airbus.

And then there's all the "sub-modes", the reversion sequences, what is working versus what is not, and so forth.

The Boeing is not an Airbus with 100% fly by wire. But it appears that a few systems have "help" from HAL..
And the STS is one

Looks like the STS implementation feeds back to the controls to provide some kinda force feedback. Wonderful. But if that system is corrupted, then you might feel something the opposite of what the aero conditions are normally telling you.

For now, I am sticking with a combo of erroneous air data and a mechanical problem with the stab.

Gums opines...

Interesting. I've never flown an aeroplane with STS or similar, but I would imagine seeing and listening to the trim wheel spinning of it's own accord, when I'm hand-flying, would be disconcerting. I wonder how it's designed to/does operate during an Unreliable Airspeed event...

It is interesting to consider that a contributing factor to this accident may have been the Boeing (vs Airbus) approach to introducing automation into the cockpit. Both the STS and elevator feel systems are provided to make the retained Boeing yoke feel (in some flight modes) as if you are flying a simple manual and longitudinally stable aircraft, with assigned stick force per G, and apparent aerodynamic feedback through the controls.

It seems questionable to me if these systems are coded to continue at all in the UAS condition, as they will substantially increase workload and the chance of catastrophic upset if they are being fed with bad airspeed data. The elevator feel system (which just applies force at the yoke) will be quite unhelpful, but the STS is worse as it is physically altering the horiz stab incidence. It doesn't seem hard to imagine that although most experienced but automation-centric crews will not be overwhelmed dealing with the UAS with these additional challenges (as appeared to occur in the flight before the accident), some may leading to catastrophic upset (possible explanation for this flight).

Well,youre into engineering territory but from a pilots perspective....yes,STS(manual flight) just like AP stabilizer trim(automation engaged) would exacerbate an already bad UAS event.FCC controls both STS and AP stab trim and it gets CAS,AoA,IVSI from ADIRU as well as engine N1 from DEU and flap position from FSEU.If speed sensed is low it commands trim down providing certain parameters are met:a)airborne more than 10 seconds b)AP not engaged c)can not oppose pilot commands(ie if the pilot is pulling on the column it wont trim down) d)pilot hasnt operated electrical main trim in the last 5 seconds etc etc
If the ADIRU input of CAS to the FCC is corrupted,you will get the "wrong" trim.This explains the write up of the previous flights commander who reported STS trimming the "wrong way".So if the CAS sensed is low(ASI is under-reading in a climb due static vent blocked) then it will trim down.In reality the speed/AoA is not low at all so the trim is opposite of what is required.Every time the pilot pulls on the column to counteract the unwanted trim the STS cuts out but it will trim again if back pressure is released.This would explain the rollercoaster effect.Similarly,if you are climbing in icing conditions with automation engaged and the pitots ice up,the AP stabilizer will start to trim up to counteract the sensed CAS (ASI overreads in a climb with blocked pitot).If it goes unnoticed by the pilots,it could be very dangerous.
To disable STS you would place the AP stab trim cutout switch to CUTOUT.This is not mentioned in any NNC or FCOM.
The commander of the previous flight got the plane back safely at FL280(non RVSM).Maybe this is because they disabled AP stab trim during trouble-shooting and were naturally reluctant to reinstate it .He may have got the FO to hand fly home below RVSM airspace with AP stab trim in cutout I dont know.
Only one FCC sends the STS signal.On power up it is FCC A .If power remains to the FCCs during turnaround,the squat switch will send a signal to change it to FCC B for next flight.If power is interrupted during turnaround,FCC A will command the STS signal for the next flight too.

Yes, you can.

Good points Rananim. The one issue I see here is with your more complex airspeed unreliable scenario with STS trim involvement is that you need to recognise that there is a linkage between the two, and then do the "Runaway Stabilizer Trim" memory items in addition (should have already covered the initial items in the Airspeed Unreliable initial memory items, Autopilot Off, Autothrottle Off),then Stab Trim Cutout switches (both) cutout, and you are back to a "plain vanilla" (not to diminish the degree of difficulty) airspeed unreliable.

Similar to the windshear escape, it helps to "blip" the trim every couple of seconds so you aren't wrestling the trim during the escape.

On this video they show recovery of the MU, however I wonder what was in hand of 1st diver? Maybe someone could translate what they are talking about in local language...

The object was an underwater LED flashlight.

There was a test pilot of a GA manufacturer who wrote how he used a weight hanging from the overhead by means of a piece of string as a back up attitude indicator. There is a thread running in Rotorheads at the moment that includes examples of nonsense taught in sims by professional trainers, so don't be surprised what you come across anywhere.

According to my Indonesian wife, it's not very interesting.
Basically - we found this black box, I think it's important, be careful with it, we should report this right away...
Like I said, nothing special...

Aviation Herald Report
 

On Nov 1st 2018 the airline confirmed one of their maintenance engineers was on board of the aircraft during the accident flight. This was an "anticipatory measure" in the event of technical problems with the new aircraft. As such, "the presence of the technician has nothing to do with the condition of the aircraft before taking off."

The 737 Max in question had been in service for 11 weeks. Another 10 of the type are flying with the airline, with the first having been delivered in the middle of last year. So hardly a "new aircraft" or type.

Yes, it's not unknown for airlines to carry a flying spanner on a route where there's no engineering support at the far end, but on a route that has 6 daily rotations it's hard to believe that's the reason either..

FDR or CVR?
 

Should be no problem to id the recovered item. The attached cylindrical item (that looks like a grab handle) is the Underwater Locator Device. (Pinger).
It has a unique serial number and expiry date. The aircraft's delivery docs will show which unit had that ULD attached at Boeing prior to delivery.

https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/bp...300-meter.html (translated with google)

Head of Marine Technology and Survey Center for Technology Application Assessment Agency (BPPT) M Ilyas is optimistic the team will find CVR. He estimates that the distance between the FDR and CVR is not far from the sea.

"It is approximately 200-300 meters, not too far from (CVR)," he said at the Jakarta International Container Terminal II Basarnas Post , Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, Thursday (1/11).

Ilyas said, in fact we ship BPPT to have captured two ping locater signals from FDR and CVR. However, BPPT ships must move locations because many scattered fragments are captured by ship sonar scans. So you have to sail to the rubble which is suspected to have CVR instructions.

Pertamina's pipes and strong currents under the sea are also obstacles. So, said Ilyas, the team had difficulty removing the anchor and could not reduce the Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) or underwater robot technology to look for objects.

"The obstacle is that there is a Pertamina pipeline. So that we cannot anchor our ships there to do more detailed ROV. We have to be outside about 550 meters from that location to carry out this ROV operation with the difficulty of the current being very strong there , "he said.

He said, the CVR could last for 30 days starting from the plane falling. The signals sent by FDR and CVR are also very strong, because Lion Air PK-LQP is a new aircraft.

"So the shipment is fast, ping ping is like that. So it is heard (ear) it is a bit different from the other signals. Just because there are many dives today, many ships operate so we have a lot of errors, lots of noise" he explained

Tempo(dot)Co report on ATC Transcirpt
 

Stated in the report that the transcript was not verified. Some correlation to previous theories posted here.

Lion Air pilot Bhavye Suneja asked his airspeed to the ATC after experiencing a technical issue less than two minutes after take-off at 06:21.53.

The pilot’s request to change altitude to 5,000 feet was approved by ATC and was requested to maintain altitude at 06:24.58. During this exchange, Bhavye asked the ATC to confirm the plane’s airspeed to which the ATC answered 332 knots.

at 06:29 the ATC saw Lion Air JT 610 left 5,000 feet followed by the Bhavye communicating to the ATC upon a problem with the plane’s flight control and asked for his plane to be given 3,000 feet separation with other aircraft in his airspace.

at 06:32, ATC asked the pilot whether Bhavye was ready to land again at Soekarno-Hatta, but the pilot did not answer and seconds after, Lion Air flight JT 610 vanished from the ATC’s radar.

flight data recorder (FDR) from the plane’s wreckage submerged under the seabed just 500 meters from its last contact with ATC.

Suggested UAS followed by flight control problem.
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CVR
 

"He said, the CVR could last for 30 days starting from the plane falling. The signals sent by FDR and CVR are also very strong, because Lion Air PK-LQP is a new aircraft."

Just small correction, the CVR and the FDR underwater locator beacons could last for 90 days starting from the plane falling.​​​​​
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