Washington Dulles RTO incident
 

Could've been much much worse. Thankfully UAL had their eyes ahead.

WTF??? The controller almost didn't seem to realise what a cock up he'd made!!!!

Clear left...

+1 and I think he realized it right after UA326 told him he had cleared them.

Sounds like they switch controllers (judging by the voices) at some point when 326 gets the line up and wait and requests a few minutes to reset some things?

It's only a guess but I would think that the controller (possibly a little shaken) requested to be relieved from his position. All I can say is that with multiple runway crossings at many major US airports, and the amount of tin that moves around at these airports, it's a wonder that these type of incidents don't happen more frequently. On the whole ATC do a magnificent job.

That's for sure, but controllers will also voluntarily request to be relieved as soon as possible after an incident. They don't have to be told!

I suspect that any decent process will have such a request from a controller built in because it's a safety issue. I have vague recollection of reading an accident write-up (with fatalities) that was controller error where the unfortunate person couldn't be relieved for half an hour due to lack of someone to sit in the chair.

What it really comes down to is whether the controller wants off or not, they are coming off and protocals are initiated, statements, pee in s bottle, NATCA rep, preservation of data, etc. Its nice to say he or she may ask to come off position, its moot, they're coming off.

At United does the crew require an amended dispatch release after a rejected takeoff for a non-maintenance reason? In recent years that seems to be a big deal with some outfits, not so big with others.

Think night and moderate rain. Think Tenerife. Think Air Canada at SFO. Seems like the weakest link in the U.S. air transport system.

I don't know if this is ATC bashing but let's get one thing straight: Tenerife was not an ATC error. It was pilot error! Furthermore, there was no ground radar to assist the controller. It was also an era when official ATC phraseology used the term "standby for take-off". A clipped transmission made the senior Captain think he had been cleared for take-off and he dismissed doubts expressed by other crew members! Since then we have CRM in the cockpit and "departure" iso "take-off" used by ATC with the sole exception of an actual take-off clearance. As for Air Canada at SFO, yet again pilot error!

OK, I misunderstood what you were saying. However, when there is an incident like that, possibly not that bad but serious enough, who else in the tower knows about the screw-up? It may rely on the controller to flag the problem (no point in hiding it because someone's going to file a report) in the first instance to get things moving.

Indeed, Tenerife was not ATC error, nor was SFO. IAD was. Airport layout as well. The public isn't going to care whose fault it is if another high speed collision between two large transports occurs on a runway at a major airport. Think: weak link.

Runway Status Lights Debut at Washington-Dulles
 

Was the RWSL system not operational or just ignored by the crossing aircraft?

"Runway status lights (RWSL) are now operational on runways and taxiways at Washington-Dulles International Airport (IAD).

The fully automated lighting system is being implemented at airports throughout the U.S. as part of a program to help enhance runway safety. The lighting system provides direct runway status information to pilots and surface vehicle operators indicating when it is unsafe to enter, cross, or takeoff from a runway. It requires no input from controllers as it processes information from surveillance systems and then activates runway entrance lights and takeoff hold lights in accordance with the motion and velocity of the detected traffic.

Light fixtures embedded in the pavement are directly visible to pilots and vehicle operators.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to have RWSLs operational at 23 U.S. airports by the end of 2016."

https://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/runw...es-airport.php