Still on your personal agenda and vendetta?

What options were left when the aircraft couldn't fly?

Rejecting a takeoff is somewhat of an active decision, is it not? This case seems more like a crash shortly after takeoff.

But i guess it's a question of definition really. So it's just an astonishment that you would label it something that does not fit what one might call an RTO.
Why not discuss the definition instead of throwing labels at each other? Oh what do i say continue it's the internet after all :)

No and no.
Apparently the #1 engine touched the paved side of the RW after a sudden wind (see report).
In fact, this was the FIRST ground contact.
#2 engine left a little after, possibly due to some unbalance
The fuselage ground contact happened about 600 metres (2000 ft) AFTER the #2 engine was lost on the RW.

BOTH ENGINES are pictured in the scenario (preliminary report).
The same report shows NO TRACE OF DEPLOYED REVERSERS.

Yes, either of those is possible. Neither scenario fits the ICAO definition (or indeed any generally accepted definition) of an RTO. I stand by my comments.

No, and no.

In fact, in the absence of any reported evidence, I'm not suggesting that the pilots deployed reversers at all. Are you ?

According to the report no one was able to save the flight in the simulator. A microburst can exceed the performance of the aircraft regardless of crew experience.

Simply that had it been an RTO in the accepted sense (i.e. before V1, or failing that, at least before VR), then it would be reasonable to find evidence of deployed reversers.

We appear to be agreed that no such evidence has emerged as yet, and probably would have by now had that been the case.

It wasn't:
Recordings (CVR) aren't published, but in the report both GEARS appear DOWN & LOCKED until the last second at 20:22:55 (UTC) in which could be interpreted as both were being unlocked and beginning to "go up". Page 27 of preliminary report.
At that moment, both engines rested about 300 metres back...

I'm confused, too.

We know where the engines ended up and we can deduce approximately where they were torn off (more accurately in the case of No 1 engine because of the marks on the tarmac).

But how are you relating that to the timeline in the FDR readout ? We can see that the gear was selected up at some point between 20:22:50 and 20:22:52, at which point the aircraft had rotated and was between 5' and 15' above the runway.

I can't see any charts in the FDR readout that show the horizontal position of the aircraft vs time.

You can pull the throttles to idle and select the reverse levers to 'deploy' at any time - even at 39k (there is a mechanical interlock that will prevent moving the reverse levers from 'stow' if the throttles are above idle'). BUT, nothing will happen with regard to the reversers unless 'weight on wheels' (WOW) is true.

Regarding my earlier post about thrust settings:
75 degrees thrust lever angle is TO/GA at least according to:
http://aviationconsultantsworldwide.com/E190Engines.pdf

75 degrees was set and constant according to the FDR readout in the preliminary report.
Also there is a reserve power setting that is automatically activated for wind shear, engine failure or by placing the thrust levers at 85 degrees.

Headwind shears from sim photos
 

MM:SS Hdg A/S G/S Wθ xWθ WV HW =cos(xWθ)*WV
22:42 32 146 122 47 15 33 32
22:47 34 144 139 63 29 18 16
22:50 32 145 146 103 71 11 4
22:56 30 124 159 204 174 21-21
22:57 30 127 162 220 190 24-24

Unfortunately the source tag fails to put out a fixed pitch font. Mods, feel welcome to fix

Note the change in airspeed and groundspeed in close step with headwind component - a signature of windshear incidents and accidents.

While these photos are at variable intervals, they do show a - 56 kt h/w shear over 15 seconds.

I sincerely doubt any action of "gear up" in those last two seconds.
The AC skidded and bounced (pictures from above the RW end) for at least 100 meters (300 ft) before stopping.
What is showed in the SIM screen captures (pages 34 to 39) is not correlated with real timeline.

I'm not really sure what point you are trying to make ?

You will be aware, obviously, that the FDR charts on Pages 27/28 of the report stop at the point where the aircraft started to descend.

The last plots on the chart, at 20:25:55, show the aircraft climbing through 30' AGL, engines performing normally and gear in transit having been selected Up.

Incidentally, although my statement

was correct, you can very approximately estimate the point along the runway at which the aircraft became airborne by integration from the longitudinal acceleration plot, which clearly shows the start of roll followed by a roughly constant 0.2 g (say 2 m/s²) acceleration for approximately 35 seconds before rotation.

This gives a ground roll of approximately 1200 m which, had it started on the piano keys (it may not have) would have meant rotation just past Twy D. If the takeoff roll had been from the Twy E or Twy D intersections (though the sim screens suggest not), rotation would have been around 650/1150 m further on, respectively.

By comparison, Twy B, where the No 1 engine impact witness marks were found, is approximately 2400 m from the piano keys.

@DaveReidUK
Your figures coincide with some PAX statements.
This means the AC was aloft in the region of 1000/1200 meters. There's no FDR data from 20:22:55 until the "stop" of the AC on soft ground.
It's supposed the max alt was in the region of 30/40 ft AGL (with the data given by the preliminary report)

The "gear up" selection is not at 30 ft but at less than 15 ft AGL.
And in the SIM captures appears to be made at 8 ft AGL (supposedly made after copying the FDR data).

In those extremely bad conditions, what could made the PF order "gear up" when the AC was LESS than 15 ft AGL (because the command "gear up", takes a while to the FO to move the arm/hand, find the lever and push, besides [I suppose] there wasn't a pleasant TO procedure to take it in the calm way).
If things happened as the data shows, the PF commanded "gear up" being 6 to 9 ft AGL and that's difficult to understand (to me).

Let me add something:
We're having some discussions based on data given by the Mexican authorities.
The same "authorities" introduce a THIRD PILOT in the cockpit, in a kind of non-authorized training action, making the beginning of the TO procedure until the PIC asks for the command of the AC.
This third pilot appears at the very END of the report, in a 36 words paragraph, as saying: "Ahhhh, we forgot to comment the TO started not with the PIC and the FO but with another pilot in training, playing FO, of course not authorized..."
If this third pilot made the beginning of the TO procedure, had to be seated in the right seat, am I right?
And the FO was in the "observer seat".
One thing is sure: the PIC was sitting in the left seat because had to be evacuated PILOT AND SEAT together when the AC took fire and this was made by the only Spanish passenger on board.

The FDR datasheet maybe not "that real" (this is a guess, I'm a bad boy)

There's a possibility that things went as you tell, but...

Confirmed:
The third pilot was at the controls at the beginning of the TO procedure (not being known until what step of TO) and these were returned to the PIC.
What is assumed by the Mex authorities is that there weren't any waiver to make any training in that flight/AC.
Evidently all was under the carpet just to avoid the insurances waterfall but rumors made them to assume it (besides it was made almost buried by a lot of technical data in the preliminary report).
After being medical treated, pilots were under curfew.
The Spanish pax that made a complex evac of the PIC with the cockpit under fire intended to have a phone call with the PIC (the pax in Durango's hospital and the PIC in a Mexico DF hospital) and could only talk to an Aeromexico employee who said "the PIC was recovering from surgery, thanks".

From the report:

"No existe evidencia de fallas humanas en la conducción de
la aeronave. No hubo información para que la tripulación
considerara demorar el despegue y los ejercicios de
simulador concluyeron todos con el mismo resultado."

They are saying there was no human error in the HANDLING of the aircraft and then insisting that there was no information to make the crew consider delaying the take off.

The question is: "How many crews would have decided to delay the T.O. or NOT to T.O. if they saw what this crew saw when they started the take off roll?

I think most crews would not depart if they saw this coming.

I'm not surprised the insurance company won't pay out. If this is true, the mind boggles. The pilots are going on strike? Do they want the crew re-instated?

The Aeromexico pilots "reaction" towards a strike is favouring Aeromexico.
Takes attention out of the real focus: THE ACCIDENT.
Insurance companies always want to find a way to don't pay. This is not new.

@sabenaboy

If the microburst came suddenly (not to believe the video's time lapse as the happened in the airport), it's not difficult to understand that crew could be got in underpants.
PIC talking to his friend (right seat) about the AC cockpit, this beginning TO procedure and then PIC asks for the command...
And the burst came into action with the AC in full thrust. This is corroborated by several pax statements. TO thrust begun "normally" and no extreme rain or wind at that time.
Then the cockpit had to be a real mess. Confusion had to be the right word.
Because GEAR UP is being made when the AC was 3 or 4 meters (9 to 12 ft) AGL...(data from the preliminary report, if we have to believe it)
My question is:
- who is going to order GEAR UP being almost on ground?
- E190 and all ACs can fly hundreds of miles GEAR DOWN.
- besides there's no trace of any RTO intention, if you're in trouble during TO, would you prefer to land back on your three set of wheels or belly-first?
- why to do an useless action (gear up) that takes time and concentration of the other crew, provided he/she is able to handle the AC?

am
 

That's exactly the point. It's hard to believe that there was not something looking very mean when this "crew" looked down the runway just prior to starting the take off roll. Haven't we all heard of severe microbursts associated with downpoors during training? A captain that lets a non rated observer act as F/O during departure is not likely to be the prudent type who would say: 'that doesn't look reassuring at the end of the rwy, let's just wait a bit and sit it out.
I think that a lot of normal crews would have had the common sense not to start the take off roll. The question if they aborted or not, or if they could have made it through the microburst is not important.
THÉ question is "could and should a normal crew have known that they were heading to a potentially dangerous microburst? If what they saw through the cockpit windows vaguely resembled what you can see in the youtube video above, the answer is YES!

Page 41 of the preliminary report:
"Se detectó una sesión de habilitación en ruta no autorizada. Un tripulante desarrolló las funciones de copiloto, con el acompañamiento del Comandante, hasta que este le pidió los controles. Se dio aviso a la autoridad aeronáutica."
Translation:
"It's been detected a non authorized training session. A crew member developed copilot functions along with the Commander until this (the commander) asked for the controls. It's been given word of this to the aeronautic authority".

This is the sole mention to a breach in the rules. It's not clear until WHEN (which part of the TO procedure) the PIC asked for the controls of the AC.

Absolutely. This jump seat rider was presumably approved by the company. If not, so what as to jump seat privileges?

D'accord, but...
To understand the policy of blaming mainly on Wx (putting under the carpet the crew affaire), have to dig into the insurance contracts. Not reachable for us, but easy to suppose its terms.
Besides it, it's not to forget some peculiarities that could concur. All depends on the possible godfather/s of the crew members (inside & outside the carrier).
Can't say more...