The start of the problem is listed in the second paragraph the Flight Global report:
So, it was wrong from the start and NO MATTER who did what it was always going to be wrong. No one would imagine that a/c 'thought' it was a different model to what it actually was!
Possibly time for some slack to be given.

Or even worse than the gimli glider...an Air Florida at DCA

I don't blame the flt crew, the fault is entirely with the engineering staff. They knew there was a discrepancy, they took appropriate rectification action but failed to do that correctly.

There is no excuse really.

Putting the Gimli Glider aside for a moment, was there not a similar case with an ATR in Italy where the wrong card had been installed and it thought it had a lot more fuel onboard than it actually had.
ATR72 vs ATR42?
Ended up in the Mediterranian with some loss of life, if I recall.

For reasons that could not be determined, the aircraft's internal fuel-quantity indicator had registered the aircraft as a 777-200, which features a smaller centre fuel tank than the -200ER. This caused the aircraft's instruments to under-measure the amount of fuel on board.

So I'm thinking that this fuel issue has existed from day one of this aircrafts life so that means it's been under reporting the fuel load by 41Tons. So how many times have they landed above the allowable maximum landing weight and were these Heavy landing recorded and inspected?

Bk

Not likely. It's common for LRU's to be 'pin selected' for different configurations of the aircraft. On some aircraft, it's literally done with programing pins, but on the newer stuff it's typically done with a software key. All it took was for some engineering work to have been done on the FQIS that was not done correctly.
Hard to believe that this aircraft had been flying around for years with a 41 ton weight discrepancy that was never noticed...

Official report here: https://www.mot.gov.sg/docs/default-...nal-report.pdf

Few interesting actions and recommendations, including that the aircraft manufacturer upgraded subsequent versions of the FQPU to be able to detect and prevent incorrect program pins configuration.

Or.....MK Airlines in Halifax.....not enough thrust used for the runway length based on its actual weight.

In short, yes.
Tootle pip!!

Tuninter Flight 1153, 6 August 2005, 16 of 39 on board killed.

The report has only just been published, 12/6/2018.

I like to keep things simple. Just one question:- What happened on previous flight?

MP

What would you expect to happen when they departed with hardly any or no fuel in the CWT?

As a 777 pilot, that’s really interesting. My experience of the fuel quantity system is that it is very accurate 99.9% of the time but every now-and-then gets confused. I remember once the indicated fuel quantity dropping quite rapidly in one wing, to the point that we thought an engine shutdown might be on the cards but as there was no roll tendency with the AP out and no visible leaking, we had a further think about it and while we were doing that, the fuel came back again!

I’m afraid I disagree with that one. Being >40t overweight for your calculated performance is a big deal in these days of multiple derates, improved climb and CofG adjustments. You could hit something AEO, let alone OEI, not to mention being on the wrong side of the drag curve the whole flight.

From my reading of it, the problem was with the centre tank programmed capacity, so once the CT fuel was down to what the aeroplane thought was its nominal capacity (it’s used first) it’s likely that the total fuel indication would have been correct. There would still have been a large discrepancy between that and the totaliser, so definitely still an issue that might have caused a precautionary landing but not a fuel exhaustion scenario.