Are you seriously advocating a single button that would shutdown all the engines? You don't see a problem with that?

I agree. I'm sitting there trying to work out what is going on. What do you guys want, everybody to be polite and stay quiet until I ask? The aeroplane's majorly on fire, FFS ATC should keep calling me until I respond! "BA, there's a large fire underneath your centre fuselage!". "Tell ATC to be quiet, I'm busy", while I continue to "Diagnose?". I don't think so.

Put it on a squat switch. What could possibly go wrong? :{

Methinks that should be 1613:50.

Video again, for a refresh...

The flight crew seems to be the last to know there's a raging fire
 

The cabin crew and passengers were very much aware, but it took a long time for the flight crew to receive the information.

The announcement "Remain seated" while a fire is obviously increasing by leaps and bounds only communicates that the flight crew is unaware of the fire. Had they been aware, the announcement would have been "Evacuate".

Isnt it about time that airliners were fitted with video cams that focussed on key areas of the aircraft . Aviation seems to prefer indicators over reality as this technology ha been around for a few years, I know that anything fitted to an airliner cost 20 times as muchas the same thing fitted toa car and understand why but in the circumstances and many others where there is airframe damage out of sight from the flight deck is it too much to spend ratehr than relying on EGT indications and fire 'sensors'

if you spent $!00m plus ona building you would surely have some cctv in there but not it seems on a plane.

As to this incident , from a pax POV then I think the crew did pretty well, they functioned as a crew for a start despite the captain fast tracking a checklist item and as has been often said its all very well having procedures and following them but when the sh-t really hits the fan right in front of you then you may decide to act ina slightly different but still logical way and the key thing is the aircraft stopped quickly and safely , fuel was contained-not ideally but contained and the everyone got out quickly and safely. It struck me in the Sully film how much time the feds spent trying to prove that eh could have landed , well maybe he could if he had headed for Teterboro the same second the first goose struck -ignoring shut down and restart processes of course and . A lot of Monday morning quarterbacking on these issues -whats next VAR for the flight deck LoL

The lack of ATC information can be summarized using a couple of screenshots from the airport security camera and should make it pretty evident why they should have updated the crew.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmf...55bc5a8b0e.png

This is the point of engine failure and the beginning of the event.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmf...661534f72c.png

The fuel ignites a few seconds later, take-off is now aborted and the aircraft starts to slow down.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmf...d0736ecba1.png
The fire is now more intense and things start to get serious. No ATC calls has been made yet since it is just a few seconds after the initial event.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmf...04efaeb73c.png

This is the situation when the crew transmit "Speedbird 2276, stopping". This is the first time where an ATC reply would be expected AND to those who make the argument about "ATC shouldn't disturb the crew" - this is when the latter *is* contacting them reporting that they abort take-off. The situation is pretty evidently bad AND the lack of any more comment from the pilot such as "Speedbird 2276, stopping... (pause) we have an engine fire" is a clear indication that they are unaware of the serious fire.

ATC should have replied "there's a lot of smoke and visible flames on the left side of your aircraft" at this time and it is pretty evident just by looking at the picture.

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmf...11a2db6652.png
This is the situation when the crew transmit "Speedbird 2276, mayday, mayday, request fire services". This is the second occasion when ATC should have told them that they have a serious fire on their left side and a lot of smoke.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmf...5c3177cbd6.png
This picture is from the point in time when ATC reply "fire services on their way" and that they didn't add any information about the fire and smoke is pretty baffling indeed.

An appropriate ATC exchange between Speedbird 2276 and themselves would have been something along the lines:

BA2276: "Speedbird 2276, stopping."
ATC: "Roger, Speedbird 2276, there's smoke and flames on the left side of your aircraft."
BA2276: "OK, standby" (from Speedbird 2276)
BA2276: "Speedbird 2276, mayday, mayday, request fire services!"
ATC: "Fire services are on their way, there's still a lot of smoke and fire on your left side."

The other version would be:

BA2276: "Speedbird 2276, stopping."
BA 2276: "Speedbird 2276, mayday, mayday, request fire services!"
ATC: "Roger, Speedbird 2276, fire services are on their way, there's a lot of smoke and flames on the left side of your aircraft, they are on their way now."
BA2276: "OK, standby"

We can compare it with the 1985 accident in Manchester and the ATC exchange. This image says it all:

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmf...656667ab71.jpg
This is British Airtours flight 28M during their abandoned take-off and the picture was taken at approximately the same time as their information exchange with ATC:

KT28M: "28 Mike, we're abandoning take-off.... (pause, fire warning comes on) it looks as though we've got a fire on the number one."
ATC: "Right, there's a lot of fire, they are on their way now."

This information enabled the captain to tell the cabin "Evacuate on the right side please" and also placed him and his F/O in the appropriate mindset regarding shutting down the remaining engine and get going with evacuation immediately after stopping.

So yes, ATC should convey information to a burning aircraft when the crew contact them. Kindly notice this - "when the crew contact them". It is appropriate to report visible smoke and flames when the aborted take-off is reported (it means that the crew is in the "communicate" stage of aviate, navigate, communicate) so replying with information about the situation is appropriate.

I am pretty sure that the situation in Manchester would have been even worse than it became *if* ATC hadn't told the crew about the fire. It is probable that they would have stopped with the number 2 still running, trying to assess the situation before finally ordering evacuation (or that the cabin crew had initiated it before the engine had been shut down due to the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the cabin).

So a combination of improved possibilities for the crew to assess the situation (cameras) and relevant ATC information during the "communicate" stage is the best course of action.

It doesn't work that way since such a system would have to perform a couple of things:

1. Set parking brake.
2. Shut down the remaining engine(s).
3. Close the fuel supply to the engines.
4. Operate the fire suppression system if needed (such as when fire warning is still on after the first shot have been fired into the engine).
5. Depressurize the cabin.

The next question is when this system should kick into action? Is it when an engine failure is detected (a failure would be defined as sudden rpm drop, loss of thrust, reduced burner pressure, overheating, fire indication etc)? It must be able to distinguish between an "engine failure" and a "catastrophic fuel-fed fire" since the need to evacuate arise in the latter case but not the former.

The question is how the system can determine a fuel leak and a fire caused by it unless a sophisticated set of sensors paired with a computer system can figure out that "X amount of fuel is flowing but the engine is shut down" or "the amount of fuel pumped out of the tank is higher than the amount of fuel received on the engine end". I.e. the fuel is flowing at a normal rate from the tank but the engine failure caused the line to separate so it is flowing out on the tarmac rather than into the right place.

An over-automated aircraft relying on artificial intelligence (i.e. the decision-making is now transferred to the machine itself and different systems operate in specific ways on different events) would be less safe since the automation would require very exact, reliable input from multiple sources in order to make appropriate decisions such as shutting down engines immediately when the speed hits 0 after an abandoned take-off.

Even a manual "evacuation switch" that shuts down the engines, close the fuel-supply, depressurizes the cabin and everything would require pretty complex co-operation across different systems without adding any particular benefit but rather increase risks if something doesn't work in the process.

The normal evacuation checklists are OK, the thing is to convey information to the crew so they can make a quick, informed decision whether an evacuation is necessary or not.

Well the only real thing you have to make safe is to stop both engines - on the 777 that is a matter of flicking 2 switches. I dont see that adding yet another way of shutting down is really needed.

Any switch that has the capability to shut down both (or all) engines has a failure mode that will do exactly that when it shouldn't. As I wrote before, do you really thinks its a good idea to design in a failure mode that will cause the loss of all engines?
It would also violate a several FAR/CSs...
Heck, even with the action of two, independent switches required to shut down both engines, there have been at least two cases when the pilots shut down both engines in-flight when they meant to do something else...

The ATC tape clearly show both ATC and 777 getting stepped on while trying to each tell the other there was a problem

The tower was getting a Delta to go around having seen the smoke from the 777, the Delta really dragged out the RT

Plenty of youtube clips capture it

To me, all this kerfuffle about whether ATC told the crew about the fire, how long it took to call an evac, etc etc, are ALL overshadowed by the fact that the Captain initiated the evac without doing the most important action - shutting down the running engine. It was lucky no-one got sucked into the motor. That should be the focus of any criticism here.

Am I the only one that thinks it odd that BA no longer insist on 'window blinds open' as part of their pre-departure and pre-landing safety announcement (unless they have re-instated it very recently).

It isn't mandatory to include this as part of the briefing, but it is considered by most Safety Regulators to be good practice, and most other airlines I've flown on recently still include it, and are quite insistent that all window blinds are fully open for take off and landing. As an airline that has had more than one incident involving a cabin evacuation with a fire outside the aircraft, I'd have thought it would be prudent to re-instate it.

Apologies if they have done so. I haven't flown with BA for quite a few months, but took several flights with them after the Las Vegas incident and was struck by the fact that it no longer formed part of the safety briefing.

Wiggy, trying not to be critical (and since you appear to be knowledgeable about such things), why isn't the evac check list a memory recall item? An evacuation is almost by definition an emergency, I'd think taking the time to look it up could be critical to the success (or lack there of).
Sure, it wouldn't prevent a startled crew from getting in wrong (although that's what sim training is for - to make it second nature), but the seconds it would save could well save lives.

I have flown for over thirty years. Most of my days at work were perfect and most of my colleagues were perfect. I would say well over 90%. Never had to evacuate though. Maybe our thresholds are different.

1. Assess Fire Status
 

This should be the first checklist item after a reject or landing with engine problems once the aircraft has come to a stop.

Assessing fire status should of course include checking with cabin crew eg. "Flight attendants report airframe condition"

I am surprised that there is no comment on the evidence that the cabin crew were trying to contact the cockpit but were ignored as the flight crew focussed on apparently more urgent things. It seems to me that was an opportunity to learn something important that was lost. Perhaps it would help if the cabin crew had a means of indicating a fire with a simple button that would show an indicator somewhere on the instrumentation, that might be more easily integrated into the thinking process while the flight crew is trying to understand a situation.

Too much potential for dithering, to and fro, "what did he say?" "could you confirm that?" etc etc. Shut it down immediately, fire BOTH bottles, then ask questions.

Guys......

According to the report, "While the airplane was decelerating to a stop, the fire warning bell sounded. When the airplane came to stop, the captain called for the engine fire checklist. The third item on the checklist was to move the fuel control switch on the affected side (in this case, the left side) to the cutoff position, which shuts down the respective engine."

Where I work, on this type, there are memory items for this situation which will quickly shut down the engine, cut off fuel and discharge fire bottles. Is it different at BA with only a checklist which can take significantly more seconds to perform?

Just to be clear, for this situation at BA one does not call for Memory Items(and then the checklist once the Memory Items are said to be complete) but instead calls for the Engine Fire checklist at which point, the first two items are performed by memory(different to what I am used to).

Could someone please post the current 777 Engine Fire QRH procedure?

As you can see in bullet 8, this procedure is for an engine fire in flight. Hence it is not optimized for an engine fire on ground (when fuel can collect and burn close to the fuselage, while in flight it will only affect a part of the wing and the according trailing edge devices) and not optimized to prepare for an evacuation.
Normally there should be two procedures (air/ground). And there should be an engine fire procedure (fire warning while the engine performs normally) and an "catastrophic engine failure procedure" when a bunch of warnings go off at the sime time, the engine stops producing thrust and a loud bang supplements the cockpit indications. But that would of course increase the number of procedures to an unacceplable level...
Having a 30 second wait in the procedure makes it quite unsuitable for a situation like this, when prompt decisions about an evacuation have to be taken, and preparation takes time (spool down of the other engine).

For the concorde crash the engine fire procedure was also not the best one to perform with priority... Although formally there was an engine fire warning, so formally it was the right procedure. Hard to blame the crew.

So what would be different in an Engine Fire Checklist (Ground) and an Engine Fire Checklist (Air)? As far as I am aware Boeing do not differentiate.

There is. It is called the 'Engine Severe Damage/Separation' checklist.

Essentially the initial actions are the same leading to the Fire Switch being pulled. In the Engine Severe Damage/Separation case the memory items stop at that point. i.e. the fire bottles do not get discharged.

It may have changed since I was with BA but I recall that on the ground the Engine Fire checklist is accomplished for Engine Severe Damage/Separation.