In response to the above rumour.......How about CM1 takeover with sidestick button pushed during previous approach....FO sidestick locks out after 45 seconds......touch and go....rotate call....no response as stick locked out.......Capts stick should be fine though so trimming it airborne seems odd.
All speculation of course - going to be a really interesting report. A4 |
How about deep landing, not enough room to stop and decision to go before they hit the lights?Looking at the photos they did hit the lights as one is embedded in the lower fuselage. There is very little coming out about this incident, so it may be a wait for the interim report before we know anything.
|
Both engines shutdown during landing according to the Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau.
Both engines stalled during right turn after touch and go. According to Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau after touch and go airplane did not react to pitch control. Therefore airplane lost altitude during t/o roll and imapcted to the end of runway. Engines suffered heavy damage but pilots got airspeed and altitude back until right turn, when both engines shutdown inflight. Instructor and cadet injured during landing. |
I hope those are the words of a journalist and not what the Investigation Board actually said. Still, lots of questions.
Both engines stalled during right turn after touch and go. According to Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau after touch and go airplane did not react to pitch control. Therefore airplane lost altitude during t/o roll and imapcted to the end of runway. Engines suffered heavy damage but pilots got airspeed and altitude back until right turn, when both engines shutdown inflight. Instructor and cadet injured during landing |
Originally Posted by 172_driver
(Post 10083660)
I hope those are the words of a journalist and not what the Investigation Board actually said.
On February 28, 2018, at 12.02, Smartlynx Airlines Airbus A-320-214 took off from Tallinn Airport to conduct training flights. On board, there was a master instructor, a pilot, four students, and an Aviation Administration inspector. The training consisted of repeated touch and goes as part of the type certification training. At 17.04, after a successful approach and landing on the runway, the aircraft could not gain altitude on a new take off. The aircraft did not respond to any control inputs, lost altitude and contacted the runway with the engines and the main gear doors were sheared [suggesting gear was already up or in transition]. After ground contact the aircraft started to gain altitude, and the pilots managed to stabilize the aircraft and completed a 180 turn to land on runway 26. After completing the turn both engines stopped producing power. The pilot declared emergency [not clear exaclty when, but this explains the rapid arrival of the fire trucks]. The aircraft landed at 17.11, touching down about 150 meters before the runway, and ultimately stopped 15 meters to the south of the runway edge. During the landing, all the tires deflated. The instructor and one of the students received minor injuries in the accident. |
Thanks andrasz, that's a bit clearer.
Now over to the investigators to do theirs. |
As I heard that after a "successful approach and landing" they were trying to continue this flight with ELAC 1, 2 FAIL message on ECAM. During this training TRI were trying to reset this fault several times. As I heard...
Airbus pilots will understand what does it mean. No pitch control available. |
I am finding it quite remarkable that dual engine failure involving the current generation aircraft in EASA environment, followed by somewhat successful landing, has managed to generate only 3 pages so far... Poor dog who died in overhead bin has generated 6 pages in a shorter time span.
|
Originally Posted by CSCL
(Post 10085425)
As I heard that after a "successful approach and landing" they were trying to continue this flight with ELAC 1, 2 FAIL message on ECAM. During this training TRI were trying to reset this fault several times. As I heard...
Airbus pilots will understand what does it mean. No pitch control available. |
Originally Posted by CargoOne
(Post 10085497)
I am finding it quite remarkable that dual engine failure involving the current generation aircraft in EASA environment, followed by somewhat successful landing, has managed to generate only 3 pages so far... Poor dog who died in overhead bin has generated 6 pages in a shorter time span.
(sarcasm, if not clear enough) |
Originally Posted by joe falchetto 64
(Post 10085579)
How come that Elac 1 and 2 fault leave you without pitch control? Are you sure?
|
Originally Posted by EGPFlyer
(Post 10085615)
It doesn’t.. reconfiguration logic is ELAC 2 then 1, followed by SEC 2 then 1. To lose elevator control you need to lose all 4 or else have a triple hydraulic failure
What can be ruled out from the fact they made a controlled turn and got lined up again? Triple hydraulic failure must be ruled out, no? The FR data for the last flight shows no altitude - can we make any assumptions from that? Speed is shown but FR will interpolate if no speed data is downlinked, do we know if the speed is reported speed or interpolated/GPS speed? Failure of ADS during takeoff would give reversion to...? Leading to 'we have no pitch' when actually control was in a reverted mode needing manual trim to t/o, especially if thrust was reduced by some other factor... Major object strike (multiple multiple birds) resulting in failure of air data system so takeoff in reverted mode and subsequent engine failure due to FOD? Does that make sense? |
Originally Posted by EGPFlyer
(Post 10085615)
It doesn’t.. reconfiguration logic is ELAC 2 then 1, followed by SEC 2 then 1. To lose elevator control you need to lose all 4 or else have a triple hydraulic failure
|
Could we perhaps examine why training sectors with new-to-type pilots was being attempted in such poor weather conditions? It has become clear that the airline is very short of flight crew. Did commercial pressure to get crew on line override prudent decision-making?
|
Originally Posted by ShotOne
(Post 10088595)
Could we perhaps examine why training sectors with new-to-type pilots was being attempted in such poor weather conditions? It has become clear that the airline is very short of flight crew. Did commercial pressure to get crew on line override prudent decision-making?
anyhow the pilots on line are being asked to fly in much worse weather i presume? |
“I don’t get the problem with the weather..”. Really? Did you even read the METAR? Expecting a trainee pilot to cope with such conditions on what for some of them would have been their first touch of the controls of a large aircraft is quite likely to end in a serious accident. Which it did.
|
Originally Posted by ShotOne
(Post 10088822)
“I don’t get the problem with the weather..”. Really? Did you even read the METAR? Expecting a trainee pilot to cope with such conditions on what for some of them would have been their first touch of the controls of a large aircraft is quite likely to end in a serious accident. Which it did.
EETN 281450Z 07013KT 9000 -SHSN DRSN FEW008 BKN013 FEW015CB M13/M15 Q1043 R08/810295 NOSIG= What conditions ? Zero cross wind, good visibility, some light snow in patches, cleared runway (was in Tallinn that day, first hand info), absolutely nothing out of the ordinary. Whatever happened here, I'm sure wx had nothing to do with it. |
BKN at 1300 in snow is challenging conditions to be attempting to train visual circuits (recommend height of 1500’)but for first time in the front of an airliner doubly so. Why would one elect to conduct an initial training flight in such conditions? However I’m sure the investigation team will be grateful for your comments ruling out weather as a factor in this crash. This will save valuable time. Thank you.
|
Originally Posted by ShotOne
(Post 10088878)
BKN at 1300 in snow for visual circuits is challenging training conditions but for first time in the front of an airliner doubly so. I’m sure the investigation team will be grateful for your comments ruling out weather as a factor in this crash. This will save valuable time. Thank you.
9 km visibility in feeble snowshowers and 1300 ft broken clouds should not be challenging to fly with an experienced TRE. Even for a first timer. I do not see what the extra challenge here might be. |
Originally Posted by ShotOne
(Post 10088878)
BKN at 1300 in snow is challenging conditions to be attempting to train visual circuits (recommend height of 1500’)but for first time in the front of an airliner doubly so. Why would one elect to conduct an initial training flight in such conditions? However I’m sure the investigation team will be grateful for your comments ruling out weather as a factor in this crash. This will save valuable time. Thank you.
Besides that, the METAR is really not that terrible, even for training. Take a look at the video on the first page to check the actual weather. And that was similar to the weather it was most of the day. No huge shower storms or terrible visibility, just a flake here and there and the isolated shower at some point. So yeah, discounting the weather as factor might be over the top, but IMHO, so is your interpretation of the METAR and it's impact on the safety of the flight. |
All times are GMT. The time now is 17:58. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.