Why couldn't the hypothetical Navajo pilot make the same decision to accept the clearance to 7,800? In such case, there would likely be no on-board TAWS to make the save.

Post #6 has the radar vectoring chart.

Two questions. 1) This may be naive, but why do they even set up an approach that messes with Mount Ashland? Couldn't the approach be via the valley created by Bear and Emigrant Creeks?

2)Have any flights tried this approach since and how were they directed? A brief check of flightradar24 shows the twice-daily flights coming around and using RY 14.

The RNAV (RNP AR) 32 does just that but requires special crew and aircraft certification. The splays for conventional approaches may be too wide to work in the Emigrant valley. I’m sure the approach has been flown since with a changed clearance.

Hopefully not as I said before because he or she is proficient in reading approach plates and would not make the same mistake as the CRJ we are writing about. Not flying the arc at 10000 ft is a huge error especially in mountainous terrain.

my opinion
 

The clearance issued is contradictory in itself.
One can not clear a flight for a standard APP procedure and add some "home-braided" addition, obviously referring to an MVA unknown to the crew.
My understanding of using MVA´s is that they become connected to the information that this is a RADAR vector, indicating to the crew that the controller takes over most of their responsibility of Obstacle Clearance.
The final responsibility doubtless rests with the crew.
Therefore, ATC issued a p...poor clearance and the crew failed to catch that blunder.
If it wasn´t such a serious incident one could say just another example how important a good pre-flight briefing and cockpit communication is.

As a side note, I held for several years a license as APP controller.

Here is another graphic, MVA chart on FAA chart plan view:

aterpster: A clear & straight forward chart with all the info you need. Looking at the contours and all the lump stuff underneath you, when I've been in such terrain, IMC, I was super aware, cautious, sensitive to everything. It was self-preservation. I'm not casting aspersions on the players here, but we hear of many occasions where it seems pilots are relinquishing responsibility for the safety of the flight, situational awareness and overall planning. I treat ATC like my wife. They give me instructions and if there is no reason not to go with flow then I'll comply, but there is always a consideration ' is it really what I want to do'.
An example of what I mean is a PF accepting an ATC short cut to finals, then getting hot/high and making a GA, then blaming ATC. It happens more often than you'd think, and certainly more than should happen if guys are doing their job properly.

Fully agree, the chart reflects the complexity of the terrain underneath.
I am wondering why someone would choose for that demanding approach - e.g. the 6.91 ° slope, no slope guidance, only DME fixes - in a wind calm situation and having the choice of a solid ILS APP on the other side. The few more miles flying distance - if at all - to the IAF ILS 14 can´t be a good reason.

Annex 14: Shades of AA in Cali? A few minutes late or many years early.

Yeah, correct, but there are so many cases that show the one or the other similarity. Seems like some bad habits are not to eliminate. By the way, that´s what drove me out of that otherwise interesting job of incident and accident investigation, many summer ago.

It's not just the terrain - look at those obstructions in the valley close to the track.

I've flown into this airport numerous times and cannot recall getting that clearance, having said that I always requested the ILS because this approach is garbage, even in day VMC. The ILS with a circle to 32 can be done at lower mins then this VOR.
As mentioned previously the setup is strengthened by the common practice in the U.S. of getting vectors to final at altitudes lower then published on the charts.
If anything positive here it's the fact that after multiple human errors the technology worked and the crew reacted as trained, therefore no smoking hole.
Retraining for all involved.

There is a spot height @7655' immediately to the north east of the right hand turn to finals. The aircraft had already descended to 7800' prior to reaching the lead in to the final radial. There was around 150' vertical separation, assuming standard pressure and standard temperature at that point, with rapidly rising terrain within a mile of their track. The EGPWS would have been going nuts, as would the GPWS system with a likely Mode II and a possible but not likely Mode IV modes. That terrain is steep, and would have been pretty challenging for the reactive system to give adequate warnings. EGPWS is a blessing, when it is available, not temp limited etc...

Here is a 3D view of the terrain:

cappt

What's worse in this incident is that they weren't even being provided with radar vectors. I am very familiar with KMFR and agree wholeheartedly that the approaches from the south are awful, except for the RNP AR approach.

But, it's all about "pushing tin" by ATC and meeting schedule by the crew. When the weather is good and the wind favors Runway 32 Frick and Frack will go for the so-called straight-in IAPs every time. Doing the ILS then flying a VFR pattern to Runway 32 upsets that "keep 'em moving" apple cart.

I spoke with a flight ops type from a major airline that uses Medford only as an alternate. They mandate the ILS 14 for both Runways 14 and 32. Although this carrier is RNP AR qualified they don't maintain RNP AR for alternate-only airports.

Wow, interesting. Many seem to want to put the pilot(s) at fault for descending below the Arc alt of 10,000'. They were cleared for a RW32 VOR/DME C Approach via the arc. MVA's do not enter the equation. It is quite clear via the approach chart there is no decent blo 10,000' until the intercept. That said, there is no way the controller should be mentioning anything about 7800'. That is very very poor and I would guess it is a local unit procedure that must be addressed and eliminated. I am a long long time controller of which the last 25 years have been in Approach. Fix it.

I routinely get cleared for altitudes lower than charted for the segment I'm on, on the approach.

While not on a vector, I always took it as the controller using the allowed envelope of a vector, given that I'm on radar, while navigating laterally using the radio nav aids.

This is in the U.S.

Clearance is not an order; IMHO. It's a "you can do it if you want to." Radar vectors are something else, and still need to be assessed by PIC.

Vessbot


If it’s a published segment and/or a significant deviation from the charted altitude, I’d question it. There’s not a lot of margin. I did some flyability checks and often procedural altitudes will be right at the minimum ROC.