Low vis over water
 

Good decision for a go around. Low VI's on a non precision approach with both pilots looking for the runway, along with a lack of depth perception over the water with little horizon, it's a rather classic setup for such a mistake. Any of us who have spent time over water have fought this, especially in our young single pilot days. Same issues as black hole approaches. Makes me think of Kalitta at Gitmo.

Hotel Tango, well here is your chance to shine!
Quite.
So why does it keep happening? Still seems like a reasonable question.

I think we have flogged this one to death with a big stick.

There again, most pilots have been trained to fly at 50ft or lower, for hours on end..
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You do that at MDA. If you can’t see it you go-around. If you lose sight of it later on, you go-around. What you don’t do is carry on lower and lower *hoping* to see something: many have died doing this, which is why we have minima.

It would be interesting to know what guidance the PF was following before they went around that got them in the position they ended up in...

16024 So, you're suggesting that "it keeps happening" at SXM do you? Enlighten us further by all means. Do you have any factual knowledge about this airport?

As for recorded accidents, there was an "arriving" accident at SXM in 1971 and that was a DC-3 which crashed 20 miles short due to fuel starvation. In 1972 an DHC-6 crashed on a night approach. In 2014 a Shorts 360 crashed on departure.

Looking at its safety record I would say it is no more an accident waiting to happen than hundreds of other airports around the world.

If the photo is real, then altimetry error would explain the low altitude and the ADSB reports of being on profile as the ADSB would report GPS 2d position and baro altitude. Given how many non precision approach accidents have been caused by misset altimeters, it seems a plausible explanation, especially if the local QNH was below standard.

16024 posted:
Hotel Tango replied:
Guys, is it just me?
I was just asking.
For perspective last 2 flights for me were NPA into coastal runways, and one of those requires a 45 degree turn after break-off to line up, and the other one has PAPIs that are known to be as good as useless. Neither airport makes it into the hysterical "scariest landings" posted all over the interweb.

Ok, I tried.

Alum shuffler:

With all the publicity this incident has received, it's likely that the experts at Transport Canada will take a good look at the DFDR.

I thought the baro altitude is referenced to standard then the adjustment made for QNH elsewhere, like a transponder. Stand to be corrected...

I'm puzzled. Surely they had some indication of distance-to-run, even if they just set an extended centreline manually several miles from the threshold. Altimetry error should be discounted on this one, since a Rad Alt readout will give a good clue, It's a sea-level airfield

Correct.

In this case, add approximately 150' to the Mode S/ADS-B altitudes to get true AMSL values.

I share your suspicion about a misset altimeter but it appears that the QNH was 1019 hPa according to a weather sequence attached to one of the YouTube videos.

From the approach plate it lists the MDA (H) (CONDITIONAL) as 500 feet. It's one of those 'find the faces in the picture' exercises they used to love in airline interviews but it looks to me like you can go to 500 feet if you can stay at 205 knots or below on the miss until you are on the 180 degree track. It's note 1 on the bottom, not to be confused with note 1 on the top of the plate about DME required.

If you can't stay at or below 205 knots in the turn, your MDA is 770 feet it appears to me. I'm guessing the B-738 on a straight in approach is Cat C for the right side mins table.

I agree that it seems that the 2.98 degree path puts you higher than 500 feet at the 2 DME fix. I get about 601 feet for the charted 1.9 nm to the threshold, plus 50 feet for the TCH and 14 feet elevation for about 665 feet at D2.0.

So, you would indeed go missed at the D2.0 [MA10] point on a CDA before reaching 500 feet. I haven't trained for or done a dive and drive non-precision approach for many years and I thought they were pretty much extinct in airliner ops by now.

But in the past, there were options to do a CDA on a path in VNAV, speed intervene (to avoid throttle surge on some Boeings), a CDA on a path with V/S or a dive to mins early, level off and then land or go missed at the MAP depending on what you saw. On the CDA's you would go missed at MDA without visual contact and not level off even if you hadn't reached the charted MAP.

Is it possible that the WestJet crew saw that they could go just a little lower with an early descent below path to 500 feet before D2.0 and lost track of the altitude before breaking out so low? Does the B-738 give an audio callout at minimums on path that they were expecting but may not have got due to the setup in the box? Obviously, altitude needs to be closely monitored whether the automatic callouts work or not.

Depends on customer specification.

I would really like to know how they got themselves to almost sea level short of the runway so I can avoid the trap they fell into next time I’m in that position.

Giving the benefit of the doubt and assuming that they didn’t just bust minima and get woken up by the 100R call, what could have led to this incident? Visual at MDA but going slightly under then a confusing picture? Following an inappropriately programmed flight director in a visual segment? There’s no extended approach lighting so you’ve got to be able to (continuously) see the runway and/or slope guidance in order to continue.

What was so convincing that it almost put them in the sea following it?

Was there a Windshear event? Microburst event?

Wait for the FDR amd official report

Airbubba, misset alts is the most plausible explanation to cover the actual and ADSB profiles. My comment about lower than standard pressure would have made the error even easier to make, simply forgetting to select QNH at transition, but the error can still occur from a misheard or mal-transmitted QNH. Whatever the cause for altimeter error, it's still the leading cause for non-precision app accidents and fits well here as something to be investigated. It may, of course, have nothing to do with this event...

Airbubba
That would put the aircraft 180ft lower than the 500ft MDH so 320ft. Is that enough error to show in that picture?

Note: The number of altimeter setting errors reported to ASRS is extremely high.

So, you would indeed go missed at the D2.0 [MA10] point on a CDA before reaching 500 feet.

Interesting. Because all CDA SOP's I've used are to GA at MDA if no contact. In Europe I've not come across this situation where 'M' is reached before MDA. From passed Ops 'M' was the decision point on a Dive & Drive. True about Cat C for B737/8. If you didn't use 500' MDA you would be in real trouble at 'M'. If the vis was only 3500m. i.e. coordinated with 500' & 1.9nm you would be very high if stopping at 770' and unstable to land.
The comment about the RA shouting at the crew about their true height is valid. I wonder if Westjet set MAA after leaving platform alt, or set 500' on MCP. If the latter the A/P or FD would level off. If MAA was set then the "+100" or "approaching minimums" & "minimums" would also shout at the crew. They would be looking out of the window. I wonder if much earlier they had been sucked into "sea contact" vertically, i.e. knowing there was nothing to hit except a ship's mast. Were they manual or A/P CMD?
Back to my earlier question: I would be interested to know what they did differently the 2nd time.
Regarding the 'photo shopping' of the first photo; why would she? Why take the 1st & 2nd photos, doctor the 1st, publish them with accusations and set of a manure storm that can easily be answered by the Canadian CAA. They have the crew and technicians to solve that problem should it be true. After all, they did make a GA.