Final Approach is fully managed.

Until the FAF then they selected FPA, and for some reason pulled OPEN CLIMB

Yes. But a different beast from RNAV approach.

From the report:

:sad:

The vast majority of visuals at my airline are hand flown with no autothrottle, it's not prohibited or recommended, just what we do. It is after all a visual, backed up with electronic aid of course. If anything needs to be done in the box the PM does it.
If the thought of hand flying an airliner to the runway brings out cold sweat beads then you might rethink your profession.

@ khorton
Well, what I was alluding to is actually "EASA Rulemaking Task RMT.0647 - Loss of control or loss of flight path during go-around or other flight phases”. So it is possible that we'll actually get a rule - or maybe an interpretation of an existing rule - requiring the issue of 'excess' thrust on GA to be addressed. But, as we all know, rulemaking is never a quick process.

Final Approach is fully managed.

It is when it is well planned & well executed.

If the thought of hand flying an airliner to the runway brings out cold sweat beads then you might rethink your profession.

It does when your company's culture is agin such heresy. Would you believe that the in some companies it is a requirement on a line check for each to fly an automatic NPA. It is included in the OPC/LPC every 6 months as well. Thus, on a line check the only manual flying demonstrated is the few 00' from MDA to landing. The a/c is fully configured and fully trimmed on speed. OMG how much more easy can it get? So, in all sim checks & line checks the only manual approaches & GA's demonstrated to check criteria are the engine out mandatory items and the base leg from a circling approach.

we'll actually get a rule requiring the issue of 'excess' thrust on GA to be addressed.

PM to PF, "I think the ROC is excessive." PF to PM "I'll reduce thrust a little then." PM to PF, "Great idea."

First rule of piloting. Keep the a/c performance under control at all times. Full power is not always your friend. Enough is enough, as Rolls Royce used to claim in their cars.

MFS, et al,
I think that you would agree that excess thrust does not cause accidents; although it might contribute to workload demands and challenge human performance during GA, why fall back on rule-making or modification.
The simplest 'modification' is to disengage the autothrust system and position the thrust levers manually to give a suitable rate of climb. This requires pilots to be adaptable, when not to follow SOPs, to have knowledge of system and performance assumptions.

More rule making is likely to further cage pilots into procedural compliance, to be less adaptable. SOP dependance may be a greater threat to safe operation than automation dependance.
Perhaps LoC is not the dominant problem; we continually see conflicting goals in normal operation.
Even in this thread, the demand more manual flight vs the perceived pressure to use automation, represents an operational dilemma usually resolved under time and situation pressures by the crew. Which ever option is chosen, with hindsight it will be the wrong choice.
The industry has to understand and engage with the foresight required for many 'normal' influencing factors in operations.

Not rules or modification; whichever we choose could be wrong, similarly for human performance, but the latter would be quicker to implement, and even if it only gives a small improvement for GA there may be benefits elsewhere.

"I was there when, still sitting in the flight deck at Muharraq , the Captain of a B707-338C, operating as QF739 on February 21, 1969 explained how he regained control after the aircraft went out of control over the Arabian Gulf on route to Bahrain at FL350 and M 0.81, dived inverted, rolled, probably went supersonic momentarily (not recorded accurately due to compressibility issues at the pitots) ) recorded +4.57G and - 0.63 G, and lost 19,000 ft.

"I realised that we had finally entered a spin", he said, "so I recovered it like I would a Tiger Moth. No big deal." And off he went with the crew for a stiff drink in the Gulf Hotel. We found soap stuck to the ceilings in the toilets."


No spin. Apparently pilot induced high altitude upset.


The Bahrain Bomber Incident

What's the rationale behind that? You guys sure have some strange rules in Europe. I think most of my European based colleagues would find US manuals surprisingly permissive.

Mind you, we have our fair share of stupid SOPs, but nothing as restrictive as that.

Ryanair when I worked for them required an NPA on one sector of a line check. Not exactly a huge surprise given the number of their destinations served solely by quite challenging offset NPAs.

Disconnecting a perfectly trimmed aircraft at minima from an offset approach on a windy day and getting in a decent position to land isn't a bad demonstration of handling skills.

PEI - "MFS, et al,
I think that you would agree that excess thrust does not cause accidents; although it might contribute to workload demands and challenge human performance during GA, why fall back on rule-making or modification.
The simplest 'modification' is to disengage the autothrust system and position the thrust levers manually to give a suitable rate of climb. This requires pilots to be adaptable, when not to follow SOPs, to have knowledge of system and performance assumptions.

Thank you. TOGA, then autothrottles/thrust off, nice 1000' FPM climb and life is much calmer.

There have been several incidents on the A320, while during go-around from low altitude the PF moved the thrust lever past MCT towards the TOGA detent, felt significant thrust kick in, then pulled back for a nice climb.

The problem is, the thrust lever never actually reached the TOGA detent, leaving the AP in LAND mode and the aircraft happily accelerated towards ground.

Final Approach is fully managed....RAT 5, you missed my point, when the FMA displays "Final Approach", the aircraft is in a fully managed mode...apparently they changed the mode several times later on..and the approach was mis-managed..

It was a joke from a Boeing guy. Select the humour button on MCP: keep engaged at all times.

Indeed the incident commenced with a pilot induced "upset", but that was at cruising altitude. So far as the spin is concerned, I can only quote the Captain, speaking just after landing.

I know the reports don't mention that, but that's what he said, and it's entirely plausible that the aircraft could have eventually entered a spin after the other gyrations it went through.

The interesting thing was that a team of engineers from Boeing and QANTAS spent many days inspecting the structure minutely, and found almost no structural damage from pulling well over 4G and -.63 G. Do they still build them like that?

The CC said that a baby flew almost the whole length of the economy cabin during the negative G period, and landed unharmed in an empty seat.

This may be relevant and mods feel free to remove if not.
Read an interview with a Rouge pilot (it's online somewhere) where he's basically saying "we turn on the auto pilot a few seconds into the climb and these things basically land themselves anyway."
Sounded quite smug and blase in the interview.
Hand flying on type really is a forgotten or unlearned art by some.

The autoflight system is indeed typically engaged shortly after takeoff.

However in the particular type involved cannot perform autolands off a non-precision or RNAV approach. At some point, usually around 400' on most approaches, even if one has used the ILS in the initial phase of the approach, someone has to hand-fly to the landing.

Without a link to the original story, the comment, "these aircraft basically land themselves", isn't worth quoting and isn't worth giving credence to.

I fly at the formentioned company.. a handful of guys let otto do most of the work.. the majority of guys and gals I fly with fly a good portion of the departure (albeit following the FDs) and depending on the approach/weather take over at some point prior to "just before touch down". I probably hand fly more than most and somewhere around 30-50% of mine are AP A/THR off prior to intersepting final.

Rouge at one time had many brand new airbus drivers and it's easy to see how someone can get mixed up in different modes. It is quiet evident that happened with the speed changes/open climb etc.. The question is when it all went to $hit why they didn't disconnect all the magic sooner and look out the window or simply go around and let themselves catch back up to the airplane.. I personally have not seen this level of flying on display and so it's hard for me to say where the problem originates from. I or others I fly with would have no problem disconnecting and flying it like a cessna or trying again. Wonder why that didn't happen here?

That is the big question. I had suggested rather abruptly before, that the crew knew the approach was not stabilized, and it is easy to say so from behind a computer.

What was it that prevented them from climbing out of the hole they dug? Would I be able to when things like that start hitting the fan? Uneasy to answer, for all we know these gents were as well trained and as proffesional as the ordinary us.