ATC Watcher, perhaps you would advise how you know Celia and the atco did not have authority to prevent aircraft from departing. From Motomendes posts 1019 and1022 it is clear that both Colombia and Bolivia government officials believed that they did and I think they would know more about such matters than yourself.

portmanteau : To be honest with you I doubt they do. These statements look to me as just face saving exercises to hide their own regulatory shortcomings.
Unless Bolivia filed a difference with ICAO on Flight plan handling (mind you they might, I have no real wish to spend the time looking for it) under normal worldwide accepted standards, an ARO cannot refuse to transmit a PLN based on EET/Endurance figures.
Responsibility for filing those values and signing for it are the Pilot in Command and him alone.
As to the TWR Controller he would not know since those details are not part of ATC flight plan processing. End of story.

Explained already before .
Do not take for granted everything that "officials" are saying.

I'm pretty disappointed that in the "preliminary report" video of the Colombian Aerocivíl they were pointing at her direction as well.

I'm confused. In the FPL copy we've seen in the media such as here the cruising level is entered as F280. No mention of 30,000 feet.

Correct. FL300 was the actual cruising level for at least part of the flight, whereas the flightplan showed FL280.

Not that the RFL (Requested Flight Level) has any bearing on this. Aircraft will fly at levels other than their original requested level for numerous reasons, such as weather avoidance, ATC initiated level changes due to conflicting traffic, avoiding areas of turbulence etc.

What's the source for that assertion?

The Type Certificate makes no mention of a 29,000 ft limitation.

FL300 is RVSM level for which they had no cert (in AOC OPS SPECS) according to Colombians.

Don't know what were the calculations based on, but according to th preliminary report press
conference statement, the PIC concludes that they would need to make as fuel efficient approach as possible.

On the fuel alarm, that is a misreporting. It did go off according to the FDR.
The mis-report may come from the wording. What is said in the press conference is that the alarm had NOT gone off by the time Bogota control handed over the flight to Medellín control (21 minutes before the crash), but that it did go off 2 minutes after that, so 19 mins before the crash.

Well, they would have been cleared to FL300 by ATC. Still has no real direct bearing on the accident itself though.

True, but that's a clearance issue, nothing to do with aircraft certification.

According to the TC, the aircraft would have been certificated for a maximum altitude of between 31,000 and 35,000 ft, depending on mod state. I can't find a 29,000 ft certification limit anywhere.

Dave

what I meant is in the Ops Specs of an AOC it is defined whether they are MNPS, RNP, RVSM, ILS CAT II etc certificated, and apparently there was no RVSM authorization by the state issuing the AOC. so after FL280 next level is FL310 and after FL290 next is FL330 (semi-circ rule).

so by entering 'W' in item 10, of ICAO FPL they -falsely- declared to ATC they were RVSM certificated, so ATC granted the request for FL300.

As stated by many of us this "accident' was clearly a result of a macho, rule-averse crew working in an inadequately regulated and nepotistic environment who lacked the "professionalism" (lower case intended) or judgement to even declare their error when it must have been clear that it was of fatal proportions.

As the engines began to fail they clearly had the altitude to glide directly to the field yet declined to do so, preferring to pursue a fatal 3-dimensional flight pattern that saw them squander their glide range immediately in a max-drag descent that ate up no distance to home in order to capture an utterly inappropriate glideslope that was clearly only attainable to a powered aircraft, but not a glider.

With all the pre-flight showboating, big I AM pics, and load of high-level high-living pax could they have been partaking too much of the cabin fever that surrounds such prima-donnae - Peruvian Marching Powder perhaps? I can't think of anything else that would make sense in this most senseless of crashes.

How else can you rationalise deliberately flying beyond your available range, deliberately passing en route fuel stops, deliberately arriving at destination with a fraction of required fuel, deliberately going into a hold and saying nothing, losing engines due to fuel starvation and STILL saying nothing...

They clearly weren't in their right minds. Given the nature of the pax perhaps recreational pharmaceuticals played a part?

noflynomore, but was it "the crew" or all down to just the captain? The description by Colombia Civav of the discussions around fuel do not indicate whether there was collusion or argument at any point. Yes we know that aviation accident reports are not concerned with apportioning blame so it is to be hoped that someone in the blame department will make clear one day who, if any, of the crew, can be exonerated from it. This is surely required out of respect for the dead and the comfort of their families.

Confirmation that Bolivia's airport administrator, AASANA, refused Colombian investigators access to the recordings of communications between tower and pilot during takeoff.

Caso LaMia: Colombia revela graves anomalías en Bolivia | Erbol Digital

"They clearly weren't in their right minds."

You are of course correct. However, that is not necessarily the result of the mind-altering substances. The pattern of miscalculation and escalation throughout this tragedy also fits known sociopathic behavioural traits. The constant raising of the stakes when facing diminishing returns, ever greater risk taking in order to hide a dishonest act, is a common occurrence in certain personality profiles.

The total lack of regard for professional, moral and legal standards displayed by this skipper is a telltale sign, as is his de facto criminal attitude towards the safety of all those aboard.

I'm willing to bet that learning about his dealings with close associates will make for some very interesting reading indeed. But, for that reason, I think it unlikely we ever will.

IMHO

21 page preliminary report in english at aerocivil.gov.co/aeronautica civil/accidentes 2016 .Report has been added to the list someone mentioned earlier. some surprises in there, including cvr stopped 01hrs:45 mins before crash. No loadsheet located yet. etc

Direct working link to the report, in English

http://www.aerocivil.gov.co/autorida...SION.pdf?Web=1

So the CVR mysteriously stopped 1 hour 40:45 minutes prior to the accident.
Now I'm sure we are all going to be very interested in why this might have been and in particular whether it was (indeed if it can be) deliberately switched off by the crew.

I believe it can be switched off simply by pulling the appropriate CB.