NTSB says Delta Pilot Error
 

I could have sworn the pointy bit was at the front.

NTSB Summary: http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-relea...20160913b.aspx

Synopsis: http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Docu...G_Abstract.pdf

How can two crews report "good" braking, then this?

I'd like to know what type of aircraft reported the "good braking".

Also looking at that short video, it seems there is a lot of snow on the ground.

There is a well illustrated summary here: Delta MD-88 Accident at La Guardia 5 March 2015 - Aerossurance

ALPA are furious with the probable cause only mentioning the Captain

Pax snap of runway
http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/u...-pax-photo.jpg

Nose over the berm
http://aerossurance.com/wp-content/u...909dl-fdny.jpg

The application of excessive reverse thrust during a landing at LaGuardia Airport, New York, March, 5, 2015, led to a loss of directional control and the passenger jet’s departure from the snow covered runway, according to findings of the National Transportation Safety Board

There is another topic on Prune where it is mentioned that in 1 EU major airline, of which a good mate of mine is a captain and has, as yet, had no problems with their SOP, where PM selects Reverse Thrust. I wonder what the debate would be in the event of such an accident in their fleet.

Just a point of information. At my employer, PF does NOT operate reversers! That is a job for PM. That simple fact allows me to pre-brief that PF does not remove their hand from the thrust levers unless they are happy we can stop, AND PM does not select reverse unless they are also happy we can safely stop. Either pilot can call go-around. We both have a very immediate investment, and clear responsibility, in the landing! ONLY when reverse is selected, are we committed to completing the landing! Not before.

Quote from the B777 Emirates crash topic.

That certainly brings CRM to the next level.

PF does not operate the thrust levers? That is astonishing.

Reminds me of that wacko 'monitored approach' some carriers were using a while back for low viz operations. One pilot would fly the plane to minimums and then hand over control to the other pilot to do the landing. :eek:

Sounds like an urban legend but I think it was actually an operational fad at one time, kinda like not using reverse to save the engines. Steel brakes versus carbon brakes or something like that. I realize that you still can't use above idle reverse with some noise curfews.

American Airlines was famous in years past for doing things their own way. At one time their boarding doors were on the other side of the aircraft and they still used QFE long after it was abandoned by other U.S. carriers. I'm told that the PM still guards the throttles after V1 on takeoff because of an engine rollback years ago. Or is someone pulling my leg on this one? :confused:

Anyway, at Delta I'm guessing that the pilot flying handles the throttles and reversers on landing. And going off the end at LGA is unfortunately a time-honored tradition, seems like USAir did it twice on takeoff three years apart.

This widely-circulated item from the 1990's is probably parody but after reading some recent flight ops bulletins, I'm not so sure:

For clarification, Rat5's employer did not have such a policy. The statement came from Pruner 4468.

That's still SOP for many carriers, I believe (in Europe, and U.S. regionals). Monitored approaches isn't inherently good/bad; there's pros and cons to everything.

Thanks for catching that :ok:, I've corrected the earlier post.

Waiting in Idlewild - yes, Idlewild - Customs hall one day, a Pan Am ( Ahh ! ) Captain approached my Captain and asked if "You's guys did that monitored approach stuff ?" ( BEA, the airline that was experimenting with monitored approach was the other airline that merged with BOAC to form the present British Airways

My Captain said No. Well, said the Clipper Skipper, PanAm has used the monitored approach system since day one. Really ? we replied. Yes, said the Clipper Skipper, pointing to his First Officer - I fly, he monitors.

QED.

I'm at a regional in the US and use the monitored approach for Cat II ILS. Autopilot mandatory, FO acts as PF until he calls Minimums at which point the Captain takes control and lands if he sees the runway. (I say CA and FO because the roles are not reversible for Cat II)

I didn't know how to feel about this when I first learned about it and was a bit skeptical of the last-minute monkey motion, but I see the rationale, which is that the Captain has more reaction time once going visual if he's already outside looking for the runway, than he would if transitioning from instruments to outside.

I think a fairer outcome would be 'the Captain failed to sufficiently compensate for a poor aircraft design whilst under high cognitive work load.'

Is this accident indicative of the US system?
The crew appeared to be under some HF pressure, a desire to land. And even with some doubt about landing performance the approach was continued. "If there is doubt, ... then there is no doubt, don't do it."

The crew had poor information about the runway condition and braking action; yet the FAA has issued endless guidance (ACs) after TALPA on how and what to report, the role (and danger) of PIREPS, and for the industry to reconsider landing performance.

Has anything changed?
Dependence on PIREPS, dependance on reverse thrust, friction measurement (not universally accepted as accurate), and the use of 'actual' landing performance - with minimum additional factors (was this Boeing or third party data?).
Assuming that the landing performance included credit for reverse, was this using max reverse or the recommended lower value to be used on a contaminated runway?

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...5-32_Final.pdf

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...r/AC_91_79.pdf

P.S. neville, a good craftsman works with the tools s/he is given. Don't blame the aircraft; consider the conditions of how and where it was used

*** British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice ***

There appears to be some confusion over the new pilot role titles. This notice will hopefully clear up any misunderstandings.

The titles P1, P2 and Co-Pilot will now cease to have any meaning, within the BA operations manuals. They are to be replaced by Handling Pilot, Non-handling Pilot, Handling Landing Pilot, Non-Handling Landing Pilot, Handling Non-Landing Pilot, and Non Handling Non-Landing Pilot.

The Landing Pilot, is initially the Handling Pilot and will handle the take-off and landing except in role reversal when he is the Non-Handling Pilot for taxi until the Handling Non-Landing Pilot, hands the Handling to the Landing Pilot at eighty knots.

The Non-Landing (Non-Handling, since the Landing Pilot is Handling) Pilot reads the checklist to the Handling Pilot until after the Before Descent Checklist completion, when the Handling Landing Pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Non-Landing Pilot who then becomes the Handling Non-Landing Pilot.

The Landing Pilot is the Non-Handling Pilot until the "decision altitude" call, when the Handling Non-Landing Pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Landing Pilot, unless the latter calls "go-around", in which case the Handling Non-Landing Pilot, continues Handling and the Non-Handling Landing Pilot continues non-handling until the next call of "land" or "go-around", as appropriate.

In view of the recent confusion over these rules, it was deemed necessary to restate them clearly.

I checked; it is not April 1st. Is this for real? Please. This is straight out of a Ronnie Barker sketch or a tongue tripping soliloquy by Sir Humphrey from Yes Minister. If it is true it woud question the sanity and education of the writer, and also of the Flt Ops manager who signed off on it to be published. Please say it ain't so.

I've flown mil and several airlines; monitored approach, one man band etc etc.
Remember: Your last company is history; just do what the ops manual for your present company says.
The people who used to piss me off were those who'd arrive and then bitch about the existing SOP.

JDI! :ok:


p.s. *** British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice *** is :mad:

Both my last two companies used the monitored approach technique for all low-vis ops. The FO flew the approach/monitored the A/P, up until DH, at which point the captain, who has been looking out as well as monitoring the FO/AP combination, takes over for landing. Makes a lot of sense, since the captain has an easier job transitioning to the visual at a critical moment.

Fake "BA monitored approach" notice
 

The so-called "British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice" is a fabrication from the mid 1970s created by a BOAC pilot, who circulated it in a slightly different format as part of an unsuccessful campaign against the merger of BOAC, BEA and several other smaller carriers into British Airways. I have all the original files from that period.

Rather than "wacko", a balanced and more comprehensive description can be found on the respected Eurocontrol / ICAO / Flight Safety Foundation Skybrary site, Monitored Approach - SKYbrary Aviation Safety.

The NTSB said in a 2000 accident report that "the monitored approach method provides for more effective monitoring by the non-flying pilot because captains are more likely to be comfortable offering corrections or challenges to first officers than the reverse situation. ............ Monitored approaches decrease the workload of the flying pilot and increase flight crew interaction, especially when experienced captains monitor and prompt first officers during the execution of approaches."

It's also likely that for example UPS 1354 pilots Capt. Cerea Beal and F/O Shanda Fanning would still be alive if they had been using this procedure. It is specifically designed to protect against many of the contributory factors in that accident, particularly having both pilots "head-up" seeking visual cues as the aircraft approaches DH. This weakness in traditional procedures was recognised in NTSB studies going back as far as 1976. There's much more about these issues on the picma.org.uk website.

However, can I suggest that since the IFR approach procedures used probably did not greatly affect this particular accident, this thread would benefit from concentrating on the issues of contaminated runways, braking action reporting, and aircraft design/handling issues that were actually involved?