PPRuNe Forums

PPRuNe Forums (https://www.pprune.org/)
-   Rumours & News (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news-13/)
-   -   Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB? (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/582445-emirates-b777-gear-collapse-dxb.html)

sceh 10th Aug 2016 07:54

I think 'over 7000' is a reasonable statement. It is saying in effect that the FO was not a newly qualified pilot, the likelihood is that the captain had more but that doesn't need saying as this is a 'good news' message about how well they did.

No it isn't. If they had more why would they not say so? Is 7000 some kind of magic number?
When this type of statement is made it usually means they have LESS.

Sorry, this is a con

aiming point 10th Aug 2016 08:22


I didn't see where he explained why the PNF (apparently mistakenly) thought the aircraft had achieved the positive rate of climb necessary before retracting the landing gear,
Numerous possibilities.

Getting to be too many pages to read back thru so this may have been mentioned; just a small thought, but why did ATC feel an urgency to transmit GA instructions to an aircraft that's in a dynamic maneuver at a critical phase approx 100' agl, and why did the PNF feel an urgency to reply?

604driver 10th Aug 2016 08:26


Originally Posted by gatbusdriver (Post 9468692)
1 " GO AROUND FLAPS 20 "

2 " POSITIVE CLIMB/RATE "

3 " GEAR UP "

1 happened for a reason (if it was called). Bounced landing? Minor/significant windshear?

2 With 145 kts (ish) Vref you can easily establish a positive rate of climb, so the question is was TOGA hit and was the thrust supplied.

3 As PF this is an automatic response whether positive climb is established or not (or not for the V1 cut when PM forgets to call it!)


Regards

How about....

1. "GO AROUND, CHECK THRUST"

2. FLAPS xxx

Etc etc.

Just saying because it's what our manufacturer advocates.

All the best

keepitrealok 10th Aug 2016 09:10


Anyone who has seen lots of go-arounds on a 777 simulator will note the handling pilot gives a quick push on the TOGA switches and then pulls up to 15 degrees using both hands and looks at the PFD.
I'm not sure where because I have only seen that occur on the very, very rare occasion and when a pilot does it, it stands out out like the proverbial dogs......

If they are taking their hands off the thrust levers during the G/A to perform the manoeuvre then they are doing it wrongly. The thrust levers should be guarded when the flaps are out of up. The only reason the hand comes of them during the take off is to ensure the Capt doesn't reject after V1. As soon as the the jet is airborne, the PF's inboard hand should be placed back on the thrust levers to guard the movement.

G/A - no rejected take off possibility - so it should be one hand on the control column, one hand on the thrust levers. Always. That way they will always know that they have full thrust, without necessarily having to look.

Basic Flying Skills 101.

bobdxb 10th Aug 2016 09:29


Originally Posted by maligno (Post 9468821)
1.- anybody knows why Captain Ibrahim Alseouni had only 7000 hrs?

is this EK capt? not familiar with the name

Being staff number 202xxx, how is that possible?
I estimate not less than 17 years in EK.
15 yrs...

Centaurus 10th Aug 2016 11:23


Would two hands on the control wheel be a hang over from the early days of large transport aircraft where you needed the strength of both arms to get the nose off the ground ?
.

Could be - especially without powered controls. Rather like doing a manual reversion take off in a 737. Never done of course but just comparing arm strength :ok:

Toruk Macto 10th Aug 2016 11:40

If you needed 2 hands to get a 777's nose up would that be an indication you might be a little slow ?

RAT 5 10th Aug 2016 12:13

The current tendency for the PF to press TOGA in a GA and rely on the autothrottles to do their thing, without keeping his hand on the thrust levers to ensure required thrust is set, needs to be reviewed

Admit; don't know about B777, but could be similar to B737NG.
Manual approach call GA, advance T/L's with straight arm - 2 hands onto control column - and call for flap change, call for PM to check thrust, after +ve climb confirmed call for gear up. Hand back on thrust levers when approaching level off.
Automatic approach with A/T: call GA, press TOGA, follow through with own arm and call for PM to check thrust, after +ve climb confirmed call for gear up. after mode changes a/c reverts to single A/P and A/T remains engaged all under the watchful eye of PF/PM.
Seems to work every time (00's) I've seen it in the sim. Not seen any problem PF having 2 hands on control column, assuming PM did their job of setting correct thrust after PF's rough application of more puff. I suggest this is not a black/white or right/wrong topic. Some pilots have strong opinions, normal; some airlines have SOP's, normal. Sometimes they differ, normal. Whose is the next round?

Less Hair 10th Aug 2016 12:42

Looks a bit like the takeoff (GA) variant of the Asiana landing accident at KSFO.

Hi_Tech 10th Aug 2016 13:33

With so many experienced Captains on this thread sharing their expertise here, let me ask a hypothetical question.
Considering what we little know so far, if only the landing gear were not retracted and they did all other wrong things as we know, what could have happened?
The aircraft could have bounced along? Ran off the end of runway? Got airborne again after some distance?

framer 10th Aug 2016 13:40


Manual approach call GA, advance T/L's with straight arm - 2 hands onto control column - and call for flap change, call for PM to check thrust, after +ve climb confirmed call for gear up. Hand back on thrust levers when approaching level off.
I've never seen it flown like that, I know of at least one examiner who would fail an engine on you if he saw your hands come off the thrust levers during a go around ( or on approach for that matter). I guess different companies have different 'techniques' regarding where your hands are placed.

SOPS 10th Aug 2016 13:53

Maybe, just maybe, EK pilots should be allowed to hand fly more? I have an email, from a certain DCPB, that states ' hand flying has no value in this company' . This was from a 'ping' in the early days when I hand flew the aircraft above 5000 feet. ( What made it even funnier, was it was on a line check, and I was told by the TRE doing the check, ' the good thing about EK, as long as you brief non standard stuff, you can do it.) Learnt my lesson there.

Just my thoughts. (But DCPB I still have that email, signed by you )

fireflybob 10th Aug 2016 14:07

In my last company the GA call was "Go Around, Flap XX, Set Go Around Thrust" - "Set Go Around Thrust" was a clear instruction to the PM to make sure GA Thrust was set.

Of course automation dependency with Autothrottles may cause pilots to assume thrust is going to GA (although as has been stated before the FMA should also be checked for annunciation).

Volume 10th Aug 2016 14:44


But I didn't see where he explained why the PNF (apparently mistakenly) thought the aircraft had achieved the positive rate of climb necessary before retracting the landing gear, or why, even if it he thought it had, he didn't leave the gear down as Boeing recommends for a TOGA after a bounced landing.
Maybe they already anticipated that they were operating at the performance limits, and tried to reduce drag as much as possible.
According to the FedEx Narita report, it is not always easy in a bounce to understand whether you are actually climbing, or just rotating. The FedEx Pilots did probably not realize that they were climbing again, the two Emirates guys may have believed they were actually climbing, but in fact they were not.
I do also assume that the sensation of acceleration in a simulator is a bit different from what you actually feel if you rotate a long fuselage. Simulators have not that much vertical space to move.
I really hope for full recorder data becoming available.

Winterapfel 10th Aug 2016 15:01

2 Attachment(s)
I haven't seen them here, link to pictures showing left main gear
Attachment 762

DuneMentat 10th Aug 2016 15:14

Maligno remember that cadets get their staff number the before they go off doing their basic traning but seniority only starts when they start the conversion course so he would have started some 4 years later than his staff number indicates. Also bear in mind that as a cadet they dont fly a lot of hours the first few years during training so say 6000 in the first 10 is probably not far off then a year as a captain to make it 7000

safetypee 10th Aug 2016 16:13

Lonewolf, re #709 :ok:
Has the system, in trying to reduce workload, cluttered up task management in a critical phase of flight?
Yes this is a central issue in recent safety debates.
Many of the implementations of automation are, with hindsight, now seen as 'flawed'. We, the industry, design, cert, operators were unable or unwilling to consider the consequences of automation.
See 'Behind Human Error: Cognitive Systems, Computers, and Hindsight', although 'heavy' reading it does cover most to the human, machine, environment, integration issues; and remind us that trying to fix today's problems with yesterday's solutions is unlikely to be effective.

Wirb, re # 710 as above.
However, complexity is not a simple man-machine interface, but includes the operational environment and social norms (need for instant answers, Google / Wiki mentality).
E.g. is the industry accepting more tail wind approaches, higher wind speeds, and thus higher descent rates, less time to react; whilst larger aircraft may have lower control margin, control response, or tail strike margin, due to inertia or geometry, all of which which could increase the overall exposure to the risk of an unstable approach or bounced landing, requiring a GA.

SOPs are useful for standardisation, but like automation, their effectiveness depends on how they are implemented; as a guideline, information, or as a rule.

Similarly for FMA; information and confirmation, but not for control. You cannot determine what the aircraft is doing from the FMA. The information is only feedback as to what the autopilot/aircraft should be doing, but this can only be understood by first assessing what the aircraft is actually doing, - is this what is required for the situation, and is it consistent with what you selected the auto-flight system to do.
Many FMA/SOP implementations focus on reading and calls, inferring safety, yet overlooking the hazards of 'rote' behaviour, - that a mode has been engaged or thrust level achieved but wasn't, or positive climb said but not achieved.

HFP 10th Aug 2016 16:14

I find it very interesting that we as a pilot group believe that hand flying skills have eroded and become a contributing factor to accidents / incidents and thus a return to more hand flying will improve chances of correct handling of abnormal situations.

Skill training, skill retention and skill fade have not been a contributing factor to any of the recent accidents on either the Boeing or the Airbus. Recent Scientific Research points to the contrary.

Lack of understanding of Automation and how it behaves in a non normal situation is what has caused the recent accidents including the 777 accident in Dubai.

This of course is down to perhaps fatigue, lack of exposure in the simulator and or understanding of the systems. We no longer either fly or automate, rather we interact with the automation systems and just as we have spent years training CRM for Human Beings so we should for machines through HFI.

I do believe that the prescriptive simulator sessions we do add no value to understanding recognition primed decisions and or creative problem solving as instructors are now trained within the confines of the airline very quickly and with no in depth training of Human Factors, Cognitive Informatics, and NDM.

The rudder pitch and trim, instrument scan, bank and pitch angle limits detailed in CAA documents around the world do nothing more than ensure skill training and retention for very specific exercises.

If anyone really believes that hand flying a 777 for five hours across the bay of bengal, or even disconnecting the AP and A/T at an early stage to give them more exposure time will improve their skills is grossly mistaken and does not understand the way modern aircraft fly any more.

What we do need is more simulator training to understand how to integrate, interact and take over the automatics when they do not perform to our bounded understanding of the situation.

I do not know what is the route cause of the 777 accident in Dubai, nor can I say that they made the wrong decision because in aviation terms we do not judge the outcome only but the process followed.

The two chaps dealt with an unusual situation and clearly were dealt the wrong end of the stick. None of us go to work with the intent to make a mistake, or believing that this day is going to be the day we make an error which will lead to an accident.

The decision to performa a go-around and retract the gear, though in hindsight may seem odd, at the time must have appeared to them as the only rational decision.

We need to learn from this so that the rest of us do not end in a similar situation and make a similar mistake. The emirates training department needs to learn from this and start teaching and developing pilots rather than just producing compliant non effective training scenarios.

Our kids go to school and we judge and assess their teachers based on their ability to differentiate and teach to the level required.

When was the last time that any of us had a simulator instructor who differentiated his training and pitched it to the level required. Perhaps a trainee needs a little bit more work with his / her EFATO training, but just because he / she achieved the minimum level and due to time pressures we moved on to TCAS handling to tick the box when more value would have been gained by spending a little bit more time on the EFATO.

captplaystation 10th Aug 2016 16:24

SOPS

"Maybe, just maybe, EK pilots should be allowed to hand fly more? I have an email, from a certain DCPB, that states ' hand flying has no value in this company' . This was from a 'ping' in the early days when I hand flew the aircraft above 5000 feet. ( What made it even funnier, was it was on a line check, and I was told by the TRE doing the check, ' the good thing about EK, as long as you brief non standard stuff, you can do it.) Learnt my lesson there.

Just my thoughts. (But DCPB I still have that email, signed by you ) "


The list of companies who have made, and are still making, this fundamental error is unfathonably long . . . . . the "blindness" of managers, many of whom were pilots before they sold out, should be (but isn't) incomprehensible.


As I side note, I had a former colleague in a well known loco, knew the manuals back to front, became one of the companies youngest Capts/LTC/TRI etc, he was one of the "select few" to get DEC with EK. Couldn't fly a simple visual to save himself, & he could never quite figure out why I did a face-palm whenever one of his "circling procedures" failed to put the aircraft in a position to land easily . . when what we needed was a "visual" . I doubt that the direction his former company subsequently went as regards raw data/hand flying changed anything after we parted company . . . . go figure.

Wannabe Flyer 10th Aug 2016 17:04

1 Attachment(s)
Does this picture answer the wheels up or down question


All times are GMT. The time now is 13:20.


Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.