Not true. Some procedures look akward, but are understandable though one may not agree with them.

There's nothing about diversion in RF that could be a surprise for a knowledgeable Ops Control team. Which I presume FZ do have.

I wish the press would stop headlining with the adjective 'low cost' to describe flydubai, and to promote the subtext that all LCCs cut corners and compromise safety.

Anyone who has met the flydubai management team and CEO as I have will know that this is a professionally run outfit, part of the Emirates Group. Shoestrings in the UAE can be made of gold thread!

I see the ILS requires 800m vis and has a DA at 200' agl. One assumes they had something better than those to make a 2nd attempt. I also assume that during their 2 hours holding some local operators also made G/A's and diverted. Hint, Hint. Was the ILS working? The NPA requires 160m & 461'.

In post #30 it mentions they seem to make both G/A's from >1500'. Why? If true that is very high and early and they would have been IMC. Even in WS this is quite early unless they had a "WS ahead" warning.
The other curiosity, if FR is correct, is their choice of such high altitudes for their GA's & holding, unless this was a fuel saving measure, but they had plenty. (I have used high holding levels to both be above uncomfortable weather and be at an efficient TOD for return to destination or the diversion alternate.) Against this is the time taken from Wx improvement to FAF on approach.
#77 then tells us that they rose to 4000' on 2nd GA before plummeting. That's 2500', and if they were pitched up by GA thrust and 'lost it' could explain the profile, but 4000', with correct technique, should be enough to recover from a stall. FDR will tell us.
If they did make a GA from 1500'QNH = 4nm from THR and they struck the ground at the THR it does suggest a steep climb & descent. They'd already made 1 GA so were current with the manoeuvre. Do FlyDubai use monitored approaches; manually flown GA's or re-engage CMD; had the crew been there before?
There must have been pressure from somewhere, FTL's or other, not to divert to a close alternate and sit in the ground for an improvement. With loads of fuel and perhaps 2 - 3 sector FTL considerations I can understand their decision might have been coloured.
I hope they find the CVR as well. I would expect that to have much valuable information and put meat on the bones of the sterile FDR.

22:16 FZ981 commences descent from FL360
22:23 S71159 (an Airbus A319 from Moscow-Domodedovo) lands after it's first approach to runway 22
22:28 U62758 (an Airbus A320 from Khudzhand) lands after it's first approach to runway 22
22:39 FZ981 commences final approach to runway 22 at Rostov Airport
22:42 FZ981 aborts first approach at 1725 ft, 6.7 km short of the runway
22:49 FZ981 reaches 8000 feet and heads towards the northeast of the airport
22:54 SU1166 (a Sukhoi Superjet 100-95B from Moscow-Sheremetyevo) aborts the first approach to runway 22
23:07 SU1166 aborts the second approach to runway 22
23:17 SU1166 aborts the third approach to runway 22
23:20 SU1166 diverts towards Krasnodar
23:27 FZ981 enters holding pattern at 15000 feet to the southeast of the airport
00:28 FZ981 leaves the holding pattern and descends for a second approach
00:36 FZ981 intercepts the runway 22 localizer at 10 NM from the runway
00:40 FZ981 aborts second approach at 1550 ft, 5.6 km short of the runway
00:41 FZ981 impacts airport terrain after a steep descent from 3975 feet

Flightdata show that they flew for more than 6hrs. Never flown the 737NG, but that must be pretty close to max endurance not? Would they still have the fuel to divert?

Given the "light pax load (thank god for that one) and a low fuel load, the aircraft must have been very light. This together with a dark stormy night (likely IMC), would have been the perfect scenario to create visual illusions in the G/A... Look up GulfAir in BAH, Afriqiyah in Tripoli, B737 in Kazan...

I know it is too early to speculate, but feel awfully close to the Kazan B737 crash!

Holding for 2 hours in those conditions. Temp was 6, dew at 4, -SHRA, i'm wondering if icing could be a factor.

Just a thought.

After a 4+ hour flight from DXB and 2+ hours of maneuvering/holding I suspect fuel starvation unless they departed DXB with full or close to full tanks.

Footage from another angle has appeared online, this time it appears to be from an Airport security camera. Not much detail but matches the original video. Quite amazing to have 2 angles though!

So which is it?

Which they did according to AvHerald on the link previously posted.

This is from Avherald:

"The aircraft carried fuel for trip, contingency, alternate, final fuel reserve (30 minutes) and additional holding for about 2:30 hours, total fuel for an endurance of about 8.5 hours. The aircraft had been airborne until time of impact for 06:02 hours."

But if my memory serves me right, it's originally from companys announcement.

Airport within 250km would be Krasnodar. Volgograd, Mineralnyye Vody and Sochi are approx 450km away and the weather for MRV was ok yesterday. Wet and cold but very little wind. Cloud base about 3000 ft.

Windshear warning only come less than 1500Ft aal
PWS warning can only come from 1200ft or less all.

Fuel wise. They were very light so shouldn't be a major factor at this point. If it had been full load then yes. Could be wrong on that one.

Why did they hold for 2hrs? 30 mins yes, 1hr maybe but 2hrs!!!!

From various pictures emerging after the crash it seems that this was a very high speed impact, probably at a very steep angle. There is more here than bad weather IMHO

GA and then stall?
Not again???

The NG will only issue reactive WS warnings below 1500 ft AGL, and predictive WS warnings below 1200 ft. FZ also use HGS, a piece of kit that will help you with the monitoring if you know how to use it.
I dropped by the FZ ops center a few years ago when I attended pilot selection in DXB.
Just wanted to say hello and see how they did their stuff.
I was immediately told pilots are not allowed to enter the ops center. That struck me as really weird and was part of the reason why I turned them down.
For me it is essential to have a good working relationship with ops.
Said a thing or two about the company culture and attitude toward their pilots.

just said that.

GA issues happen, see my previous post, a major UK airline nearly took a 737 into a UK city.

residual icing?
 

The 737-800 can accumulate residual icing on the tailplane area, (vref ice comes to mind on the NG flap 15) ? weather and temp at the time perfect for ice build up, a GA with rear trim and ice with pitch power couple could lead to a very violent pitch up and one that is difficult to recover from if you are not very quick. Crews that are use to flying in mild / hot temp zones can get rusty regarding winter ops.

The NG is very resistant to icing. I'm not saying it's not possible for this to be ice related, but it will carry a lot of ice without falling out of the sky.
The ground temp was +6, so even if they picked up ice on the way in, most should be gone during when they approached the runway.
Ice on the NG (in flight) does not worry me much.

The stabiliser on the 737 has caused issues before on GA, particularly with a dual coupled approach and trimming back for autoland, (Thomsonfly BOH one example) this with the addition of ice plus pitch power couple is not a nice combination, it looks like they went around too high for the dual AP to have started to trim back, however many carriers load the -800 with a rear CofG for fuel efficiency reasons, this could all add up. Anyway all speculation until we see an accident report. My thoughts with the families and friends.