Stocious

Perhaps you would care to explain why the non handling pilot operates REVERSE on landing?
Different SOPs may seem to be 'alien' until they are explained.

What is wrong by adopting AIRBUS standard SOPs ?

The AAIB report on the Airbus incident at KOS, July 2007, makes very interesting reading about the vagaries of training on the BUS

Base training in the A321 won't happen simply because there aren't that many in the fleet compared to the A319/320s plus of course it costs the company slightly more.

The 6 month restriction on A321 landings for FPP cadets only really affects the line training on an A321 sector as the majority of new FPP's are sent to LGW where the A321 doesn't operate from. By the time those that request transfers up to LHR get their moves, they will be relatively experienced and well past the 6 month restriction.

Champ

Re BA unusual SOP's. I had a BA Line Trainer express a genuine belief to me that it was Airbus SOP to select a speed below green dot. News to me and a big no no in all other airlines operating Airbus only fleets. I just continue to manage speed and select it once the flap is out.

Perhaps you would care to explain why the non handling pilot operates REVERSE on landing?
I'm sure you have SOP's that would seem alien and 'ridiculous' to us as well.

Regarding the latter, indeed. I've always been amazed how different airlines try to invent the wheel; trying to out-smart each other, even the manufacturer. To be fair, operators do sometimes evolve good techniques that are an improvement on FCTM. I wonder how much feed-back there is from them to the author of the FCTM. Most communication seems to be the other way round.
Regarding the former; is this a company standard on all types? If it is then there is a company culture: if it is just AB then someone in that fleet's management has to justify it. I did fly for a B767 operator, one of many, whose SOP manual had been written by a fleet manger who had been the private jet pilot of the boss in his early days and before that a B707 pilot. Knowing this it explained some plain whacko inclusions. B707 is an old steam driven 3 crew cockpit. He needed a clean sheet of paper to write SOP's for a B767, but tinkered with much of what he knew from a coloured past. Wow, weird.
I used to fly for another whose CP didn't understand much of the new wiz-bang VNAV & TOGA functions; so he by-passed them and we cleaned up in V/S until end of noise abate?????
I apologise for topic diversion/creep, but sometimes I wonder why we don't question more often, but act like dumb sheep.

I believe that the NTSB are having a serious look at how BA handle thrust levers after the incident in Vegas.

RAT 5

I think that you have hit the nail firmly on the head.
Why did I get a distinct sense of deja vu when reading it........

Migrating from the B727 through to B737 200/300 & then the NGs, remnants 727 operations still found its way through.
As you say, start with a clean sheet, based on the manufacturer's "suggested" operating procedures (SOPs)

It is unfortunately, apart from the A380 because Airbus wouldn't approve it which says a lot about the policy. A hangover from the 747 Classic apparently, ludicrous that it is still being done, there has been talk of changing it for years, perhaps they might finally get on with it now and join the rest of the airline world.

To be clear, BA have implemented the process of the restriction until Line Continuation Training already. There have been many 'near misses' as well as this, and many cadets having issues. As someone previously says, perhaps indicative of an in-house training problem.
Anyway not to worry, they got rid of the pilot involved in this incident so problem solved, eh?

Max Angle: This BA "foible" regarding the non-handling pilot selecting REV after touchdown goes even further back - in fact that was SOP on Vanguards, Tridents and B707-436 in the '70s.!!! A deeply ingrained cultural issue within BA.

Do not forget to say if it was during the take off or landing.

I suspect this is a hang back to FE days and >2 engines. OMG, what does the single pilot PF do in a pilot incapacitation NNC: AND more importantly what happens in an RTO? Surely PM does not activate TR's then? Surely an RTO should be as similar to a normal landing as possible to avoid 'forgetfulness'. In BA who actions the RTO? If it is always captain, and F/O is PF it does make it sound very complicated if they then become PM and have to operate TR's. If they don't do that then why on a landing?

So a combination of low overall experience, low type experience, SOPs that have the PM (was the PM before being the PF before being the PM !!!) instinctively looking down at a critical moment of flight contrived to catch the FO out.

Airbus SOPs have the PF always in control of the thrust levers, including non-normal events. In the days of turbo-props with flight pitch locks etc, the PM may have needed to be involved but in modern jets this is ridiculous!

If, as stated above, BA got rid of the pilot then shame on them. Where were BALPA?

Either crew member can call stop (although there are limited items which an FO is allowed to call stop for to aid ambiguity). PF retards the thrust levers to idle and PM selects max reverse. Once the engines are at forward idle and parking brake is set Captain takes control and roles are reversed to CM1 (who is effectively now PF) and CM2 (who runs ECAM, paper checklists) sounds complex but actually no big deal.

Pilot Incap: Hopefully you'll remember to set your own reverse! (Not a problem for us ex easyJets who still have it in the motor memory).

'Re BA unusual SOP's. I had a BA Line Trainer express a genuine belief to me that it was Airbus SOP to select a speed below green dot. News to me and a big no no in all other airlines operating Airbus only fleets. I just continue to manage speed and select it once the flap is out."
This is standard airbus procedure with a heavy A321 to select a speed below VLS,so the VFE flap 1 is not exceeded then you can return to managed speed as the BA trainer stated.

Not on a light 319 nowhere near any flap limiting speeds though...

Either crew member can call stop (although there are limited items which an FO is allowed to call stop for to aid ambiguity). PF retards the thrust levers to idle and PM selects max reverse. Once the engines are at forward idle and parking brake is set Captain takes control and roles are reversed to CM1 (who is effectively now PF) and CM2 (who runs ECAM, paper checklists) sounds complex but actually no big deal.


This is IMHO an astonishing method. I suspect, if the a/c goes off-road during an RTO, that the XAA's and insurance company will have some acerbic comments. It suggests that a low/medium experienced F/O is in charge of stopping & steering the a/c during a high speed RTO. Strong cross wind, short slippery limiting runway, auto brake disarms and max braking not applied, captain searching for the thrust reversers and is head down.
"I'm my defence, m'lud, I was only obeying SOP's. I know I am the captain and take final responsibility for the safety of the operation, but.............."

RAT 5 I've never once had to search for the thrust reversers, they're not exactly difficult to find, as to directional control well how is that any different to directional control during a landing in the same conditions you've just described? Or are we not to allow F/O's to do anything much less steer the aircraft?

I agree I don't think it's ideal splitting the control of thrust levers and reversers, for one it adds in additional reactional delay, but let's not overstate the issue here.

If a skipper deems it necessary and it's appropriate conditions he can nominate himself PF for the sector. It really is as simple as that.

But (and again remember I'm not a pilot!) if I'm reading the report correctly that's seems to have been what happened to the commander in this instance? i.e. distracted by looking for the reversers right when things were about to get critical? I have another question too. Again according to the report the PF says he seemed to remember being told by a Trainer that the angle for an A321 tail strike was 11 degrees? (which was incorrect?) How important is it to actually know the correct angle yourself because this kind of implies he didn't? Can you sense when you are at too steep a pitch?

I don't quite go that far back..I can't recall for sure exactly how it was done on the 747-136/236 ( suspect the FE fine tuned reverse after the initial selection but can't remember for sure).

AS I recall it when we got the 744s things became logical (i.e. Boeing) for a while and the handling pilot operated the reversers..(certainly on landing). Then, as you say, " cultural issues " and the BA way intervened and the SOPs changed.

Amazing this , really quite amazing . So one of you is handling the aircraft the other the reversers , maybe on a slippy contaminated runway and that's safer/better than what the rest of the world does including the people who make , test and certify the aircraft ?

I had heard somewhere the Airbus refused to sign off on BA method of operating the 380 , is it true that there are still aspects of the way that BA operate the aircraft that Airbus aren't happy with ?