What ever happened to 2.5 to 3 degrees per second basic pilot training

Apologies ZFT, I may have unintentially obfuscated information given by our check pilot on this. The cost issue is from the airline's point of view and/or by extension, the FFS operators & manufacturers. I would imagine even on multi-platform sims available for certain sub-types, money is still spent acquiring the data packs and on programming support. I now see how it can be a money maker for the provider of the data. Thank you.

Proprietary issues - I will revisit and ask for clarification.

Other than what you've kindly remarked upon, have you any idea what the motivation would be for a manufacturer to withold flight test data packages from simulator manufacturers?

Good for takeoff, yes sir, BM. :ok:

This particular strike was during landing (apparently the flight segment involved in all A321 tail strikes) by a relatively low-time on type commander, who very likely would have benefitted from a FFS with fidelity to the A321's flight dynamics.

vapilot2004
Oh yes. It all boils down to money. The major OEMs are all positioning themselves for the major slice of the (future) training market and this is why datapack costs have skyrocketed to upwards of US$8M for the new generation aircraft. Makes any independent or even 3rd party airline operation totally non competitive.

(This is why LM bought out Sim Industries, Textron acquired Mechtronix and so forth so that their internal markets were also both closed to competition and protected).

Boeing and Airbus will eventually have more or less total control of the training market via data costs and be able to dictate training policy and prices and until then they need to ensure that the industry 'toes their line'.

Ask anyone about the "Boeing Model" and you may be surprised. This was the start!

Thank you ZFT. Ah yes, money, the root of all things good (advancement) and evil (profit motives). This makes some sense, although OEM sim companies are likely not happy about this new direction. What do you think about this development? Good or bad for flight safety?

The Boeing Model - I'm not sure I know this one and there was no consensus found in open discussion. Would this relate to Alteon?

Memories of the Tech Log entry in a Tristar.....
Tailskid used

vapilot2004, your information re. this incident in post #44 is incorrect.

DES, care to enlighten then? Thanks.

My bold.

A couple of clarifications.

1. BA shorthaul a/c do not get inspected by an engineer/technician/mechanic during turnrounds. The flight crew do it (Rumour is they got a pay rise to accept this responsibility some years ago). Engineering staff only attend on request, or if there is a controlled inspection that is scheduled to be carried out during the turnround.

2. Even though BA has an engineering presence at GLA, it is hangar based. There is no BA line maintenance at GLA, it is subcontracted to a 3rd party (not sure who).

3. None of this is relevant as the damage was discovered during the turnround and the a/c taken out of service for repair.

This is from the report, Tur:

Actually I believe some sort of damage was discovered when the aircraft failed to pressurize during the climb after the first (post-strike) turnaround. Otherwise, thank you for the BA specific information. :ok:

Thanks for that.

Where is the report? All I can find for the above info is the Av Herald.

Turin, I am mistaken and this could have been what Doug E was on about. Apologies. Cross-linked this event and one from the past regarding a Dublin BA flight from 1998. :O

Thanks again for the information regarding turn around.

No worries pal.

If you search my posts over the years I've made some cracking bloopers. :ok:

vapilot2004

Whilst standardisation should be good for safety, in this case I fear it will have the opposite effect for 2 significant reasons. The Airframers are in training for the financial reward and no other reason. Yes, they harp on about safety but its lip service and nothing more. If safety really was their priority then their training courses and datapacks etc. wouldn’t be priced out of reach! Unfortunately this industry is now totally financially controlled and more expensive training equates to less training quantity and training costs once the airframes have control will skyrocket just as they have already done so with the rotary wing and business jet markets where independent competition has been virtually eradicated.

Secondly, all things are not equal, as much as they would like to maintain they are. Crews operating in this part of the world face very different challenges to the crews operating in say Europe and the training must reflect that. The OEM way isn’t necessarily right under all circumstances yet in the not too distant future, the rigid OEM way is likely to be the only way.

The Boeing model or subsidy isn’t discussed much due to the fear factor. (Although a few months ago FSI did refer to it in a Flight International article). Some 4 years ago or thereabouts, Boeing announced that to ‘protect their IPR’ they were introducing a 15% charge on anything to do with activities on Boeing simulators. 3rd party training, updates etc. In effect any revenue generated on a Boeing simulator whether from training or from say replacing a visual system attracts a 15% commission for Boeings.

Needless to say this gave them yet another significant advantage on top of the obvious free data they enjoy plus other benefits such as free Jeppeson FMS and ARINC 424 data and just adds to the overall problem and is of course yet another element in the scheme for total training control.

Other OEMs haven’t followed yet but adopt different ways. Some refuse to supply data, some charge ridiculous subscriptions for OEBs, ADs and SBs but all are designed to both frustrate and drive up costs and eventually drive away any competition. The sad thing is, they will succeed.

vapilot2004, the incident you refer to in 1998 was British Midland, not BA, as stated in your post #53.

ZFT:
 

I read a quote somewhere around the turn of the century stating engineers have less say in the manufacturing of commercial aircraft at the C-suite level and pilots are becoming fewer and fewer in airline upper management. Over a decade down the road, the quote was prescient.

ZFT: To your excellent second point: A good airline is like a stable ecosystem with all of the parts and people working to support the whole, by design. A shift away from company training programmes towards anything mandated by manufacterers has great disruptive potential, I agree. Standardized OPS, one of the hallmarks of safety culture, will also suffer.

"The Boeing Model" 5 years or so ago? That was about the time Boeing's training arm was renamed and restructured. Interesting. Thank you.

ARINC ramblings: A few years ago, in a valiant quest to solve a minor flight data issue, one of our engineers used his own money to purchase ARINC data or documents that were not provided by the company, the aircraft manufacturer, nor the LRU OEM. He figured it out, and altruistically forwarded his fix to all parties, resulting in a form letter from the manufacturer, nada from ARINC, with the LRU guys the only ones following up with personal thank you and discussion during a dinner on them.

You, sir, are a gentleman. Cheers!




Doug E, thank you for the correction. I missed by more than a decade and an entire airline.

Do we know what crew retraining occurred following this unfortunate event?

I'm not a pilot; just an SLF. I have no dog in this fight. That said, along with everyone else I've been waiting for the LoCo business model to result in worsening air safety. And yet, 2015 has been the safest (and busiest) year ever for aviation. According to FlightGlobal, last year Western-built jets few 3.7 billion people on 32 million flights without killing anyone in accidents [FG treats GW and MetroJet as non-accidental].

That's over half of the world's population.

It's never pretty to watch global corporations extending their monopolies: look what's happening with Internet corporations. Yet it must be said that unless last year was an aberration, jet-powered commercial aviation is doing something very right. Well done to you all, and thank you.

Duck, it's not just LoCos that have this accountant driven culture - most of the airlines do now, and as demonstrated, so do the manufacturers. Even the authorities have little concern over safety, focusing almost exclusively on money.

I would hazard a guess that luck and statistical anomaly would play a part.

When I started flying, there was a lot of difficult and unpleasant aircraft to master. Many a cruel dinosaur to placate and also many old wizards to learn from.

My last type rating was onto the 737 after years of flying more primitive and temperamental beasts.

The Standard Alteon CBT and FSTD training were the "modern way". I of course went through the system fine and came out able to follow SOP and fly the thing easily and safely, like all the others before me. I still basically knew nothing about the aircraft... But that's seemingly how Boeing want it.

I have spent the last 2 years correcting that... On the line, in the hanger, anywhere I can. Watching my colleagues looking at the Wx radar trying to figure it out because they can't work out what the flippin' great black cloud in front of us is or them busily tapping at the FMC to build a pink line to give VNAV guidance as they simply cannot figure it out by looking out the window is saddening.

Yes, the everyday safety of modern avionics is great. But the lack of airmanship, common sense or basic flying ability is growing daily and just once in a while it still comes in handy.:

AF447. BA038 (meant to say this being the exception!!), in fact the various ATRs, Airbus Boeings and others that have either crashed because of mis handling or not because of good airmanship over the last few years.

BA038? Mishandling?

What ever happened to 2.5 to 3 degrees per second basic pilot training





Well that doesn't work on different a/c.


Consider this statement - "2 to 2.5 degrees per second, reaching a target of 7-9 degrees in four seconds." That's an actual pitch rate of 1.75-2.25 degrees per second.


Knowing the actual limits, and techniques, of different a/c is important.


Boeing has tail strike guidance on it's HUD's. Dotted line, keep the VV (velocity vector) at or below the limit. What's the basic limit? Two degrees less than tail strike angle.


That's not that tough to see. Tail strike limit of 9.5 degrees on the 321? Freeze the pitch attitude at the 7.5 mark on the ADI and wait for the plane to fly.


11.5 degree tail strike limit on the 319? Freeze it at the 10 mark until liftoff.


737NG? Target/freeze of 7.5 degrees (HUD limit display at 8 degrees)


757-200? 10 degrees.


767-300? 7.5 degrees.


777-200? 10 degrees.


777-300? 7.5 degrees.


Rotate - freeze/pause if necessary at target limit, liftoff, mini pause, continue rotation. Done smoothly it's unnoticeable to the passengers.

Look ahead of the aft section "dome"..and who says she's not a curvy thing of beauty.
 

I agree with Glad Rag, Airbus FCTM A320 say that although it is 3 degrees a second but anything down to 2 degrees has no significant degradation of performance. I always ease off and hold near before the critical pitch, aircraft flies fine. Most tail scrapes do occur on landing though, more variables and different geometry.

..........:ok::ok:

AAIB report published
 

No mention of the barely 300 hrs total time for the PF as being a factor?

Talk about ignoring the big white elephant in the room.

So the PF flies the aircraft then when visual the PM becomes the PF and the now PM retards the thrust leaver? How utterly bizarre and in contraction to the airbus FCOM.

Surely if people retard at different and inconsistent rates its going to make flaring that little bit more difficult and create more of a challenge for perfectinf the technique.

Chop the thrust and down she goes. Smoothly and progressively closing them can aid a good touch down. Not having clue as to when and how quickly the other guy will cut the thrust just seems a bit odd.

BA has used cadets since then days of Hamble has it not?

Squawk7700 - Apart from the top of page 8!

Where does it say that in the report?

Meatballs - you've totally misinterpreted BAs monitored approach technique. Assuming visual and stable, at 1,000' the PM (who became PM at TOD) takes over and lands the aircraft, they handle the thrust levers until touch down when the PM selects reverse. I used to be skeptical about the monitored approach before joining BA but seeing it in action, I actually think it's quite a good thing.

Oh. I get it now! I feel for the guy/gal. I can't think of a worse thing to happen so soon into their career. I hope s/he is back online and hopefully moving on.

From the AAIB report
Have BA put such restrictions in place and if so, what are these experience requirements? Do other operators of the A321 limit landings to crew of a certain experience level?

The report is from the current month's AAIB bulletin and can be assumed to be reasonably up to date. It makes a clear distinction between safety actions that the operator has already implemented, like specific A321 differences training, and those that are so far just being considered.

So if co-pilot experience restrictions are already in place, that's only been done in the last few days.

That's incorrect.

New cadets cannot fly A321 aircraft until they have been line flying for 6 months. This policy has been in place for some time (6 months or so)

Many thanks, you beat me to it!

That's just giving the data, Chesty.

My comment was in regard to experience not being listed as one of the factors to the accident.

The airline certainly thought it was a factor, which is why not only do they have some measures in place already, but also state they will evaluate restricting A321 landings even further for inexperienced crew.

I am sure the Operator has learnt a lot from this event.
The benefit of hindslght is a wonderful thing.

Two days post completion of line training still requires very careful handling, and I doubt very much even if "PITCH" had been called by the Captain it would have prevented the incident.
A similar event occurred at KOS a few years ago, and was subject to an AAIB enquiry. Worth reading as it highlights the importance of being fully and consistently competent at landing the beastie.

As to why the non handling pilot has the task of selecting REVERSE must lie in some ancient SOP [Boeing 707? VC10?] as a sensible procedure in a stonking crosswind where the handling pilot had both hands on the control column initially. ?? Hardly applicable to the BUS.
Perhaps someone can shed some light as to this procedure?

The restriction referred to in the AAIB report was that co-pilots flying the A321 would not be allowed to perform landings until they had sufficient experience on type.

So not the same thing at all, unless you're suggesting the AAIB have got the wrong end of the stick.