And, FRAMER now wants us to go to the "most sensible" . Geeeeez.

This is a non-story. I am confident that the crew assessed the situation, decided on the best course of action and carried it out to a successful conclusion. I'm sure they have had a good chuckle at the scribblings of all you Monday morning quarterbacks out there who think you know better or just enjoy slagging other people off. By all means read and learn but just leave it at that .... please

Agree with Smudger.

England is a small place and the difference in time between going to one airport or another is very little. As I doubt there is a specific checklist on the Q400 for “birdstrike to spinner with part of it coming off”, the crew would have wanted to diagnose the problem(s), get some options together then sort out a plan of action. As it wasn't a time-critical scenario (stabilised, precautionary) expending a little mental effort to make the handling of the incident as easy as possible would have been a great idea. If it’s going to take you X amount of time to prepare the aircraft, crew and passengers for an approach and landing, why not spend those X minutes to get to the airfield that offers the best mix of facilities and weather?

I don’t know what the OEI crosswind limits are for the type but to go somewhere that was gusting 30kts+ across the runway in the wet as opposed to 12kts straight down the strip (and a longer strip as well) would raise my eyebrows far more than a decision to carry on for another 5-10 minutes on one engine. The one shut down had not failed, it is important to note.

From what I see it was an interesting technical issue, handled in a competent manner by the crew. What more do you want?

Just a little thought about dispatcher Dan. If I am operating out of GCI with DD assisting on the ground and a tech issue means I have to dispatch under MEL. Will DD then be on the phone to the Daily Mail on the lines of 'Pilot deliberately takes off with a known fault on aircraft!'? All from his expert aviation experience. Methinks I might get a different dispatcher. :hmm:

Airmanship
 

The crew displayed good airmanship. They did not act in haste, they allowed themselves ample time to understand and cope with the situation, reduce tension and stress. Their decision to divert was well considered and executed.

Unlike the ill fated Lear 35A G-MURI carrying Coultard to Nice. Unfortunately in that accident the crew paid for their haste with their lives.

The probable cause in the accident report of the Lear 35 accident was:

following the engine failure, contributed to this situation."

We should on this forum applaud this crew rather than criticise them and hope that the tabloids learn something from it.

OK, colour me ignorant, but I'll take the bait on Landflap's CSI question (13th Nov 2014, 18:20).

As I understand Landflap's scenario, you're in cruise - say FL300? - heading east overhead Larnaca, and an engine quits. (Why? The reason could be important.) Your company says go to Damascus, we've got a spare engine there and you've got an 80kt tailwind. (I take it this is before the Syrian civil war and everyone's nice and friendly.)
Now, it seems to me Larnaca to Damascus is about 180nm, well under half an hour even on one engine, with the 80kt tailwind. Starting over water, yes, but you're very high and if the other engine quits (improbably? depends why the first one went out) then I'd guess you're in glide range either turning back to Larnaca or straight ahead to Beirut.

Alternatively, go round in circles descending into Larnaca. Doesn't that take at least as long as continuing straight ahead? And the other engine can still quit on the way down.

What's the proper professional action in this scenario, and why?

Chronus makes such good sense but I fear his hope is forlorn!

Ex
 

From what I understand Dan is now an ex-dispatcher and is now looking for somewhere to land too!!

I tend to agree. I think the crew most probably weighed the risk of a few extra minutes airborne against the risk of landing in unfavourable weather conditions and then made the decision to continue. Sounds like a safe and sensible thing to do. Our whole job is weighing up risks and choosing what we hope is the best option. Trying to make hard and fast rules like " nearest is nearest is nearest" is understandable but will never be a substitute for solid decision making.

The disparities in opinions of the proper response, for what seemed to be a relatively straightforward event, no doubt sim tested etc. Is somewhat disturbing.

It would seem that the more experienced have sided with the chosen option.

The fresher FO's might have pulled the pin earlier, opting to take on the weather at a local field.

Interesting.

So we critisize the DM for chit journalism then critisize DD for what he supposedly said according to the DM..??

You people make me laff.

Bearing in mind the requirement for a take-off alternate within 1 hr (regardless of a 'land immediately') and this really is a non-event.

I don't see the problem.

I don't think there can be any genuine professionals or even knowledgeable laymen out there who really think that they are better placed to judged the course of action taken than the operating crew in this incident.

The fact that that this whole thread stems from a Daily Mail article in which they take their 'facts' from an over-dramatic baggage chucker who can smell a paycheck rather than anyone with an iota of professional knowledge says it all. The trouble with 'Dan' and many like him is that he is so stupid, he doesn't realise quite how stupid he is. His opinion and speculation is absoulutely worthless, yet the Mail present it as the testimony of an expert witness. Drivel. :ugh:

Yes, exactly, this is terrible journalism.

The young dispatcher chap involved is clearly not a pilot and does not understand why an aircraft with a shut-down engine might continue to EGBB instead of turning round and landing back at EGJB. This chap obviously doesn't understand anything about flying twin engined aircraft, ("if the other engine failed we would fall out of the sky"), how the size and orientation of a runway affects landing decisions, what aircraft systems one needs for landing, nor how weather conditions impinge on a landing, etc. etc.

So what does the paper do? It spends the majority of the 'report' focussing on and quoting the OPINIONS of said young chap who is a dispatcher at a small regional airfield, and who has NO experience or knowledge of aircraft operations.

They go and take a picture of the young chap and his girlfriend, who seem to have been told to have suitably serious/scared expressions for the picture.

It would be so much better if the papers had quoted the concerns of the dispatcher chap and then researched the incident and asked BALPA for a general explanation about engine shutdowns. Then the paper could have explained why the Captain and F/O of the Dash did what they did, that they handled the situation really well and professionally, and gone on to say that this is why us pilots undergo extensive training and assessment.

They could have celebrated the fact that experienced professionals do their job very well.

Daily Mail; what exactly are you trying to achieve by making out that everything in our country is crap? I would love to know what your motivations are.

Oh dear, who started all of this?

No, no, it was the bird!

OK, actually a good discussion and as we all know cr@p journalism.

Not directly related to this story but...

When I joined my first airline I was surprised to learn that quite a few of my flight deck colleagues had in their address books the telephone numbers of the news desks of the major newspapers and TV stations no doubt with an eye to making a bob or two for alerting said media organisations to stories of aeronautical interest. (But not if it involved them obviously!). Perhaps Despatcher Dan also had an eye to the main chance and contacted the DM himself.

Good decision and a good job well done imho. Why give yourself a 20kt xwind single engine , when for another 5 mins its a wind straight down the strip = no brainer.

Well, y'see, our 'expert witness' and survivor, 'Desperate Dan' is now world famous.
Therefore, he should have no trouble finding suitable employment elsewhere (perhaps even as the DM's aviation correspondent).

This saga reminds me of the HS 748 that caught fire on takeoff from
Stansted some years ago. It seems at the time many pundits and "junior"
pilots castigated the captain for stopping and putting it in the grass. The
AAIB seemed to think he made the right call. I wonder what the outcome
will be here.

If he'd done it by book and flown a circuit to land then Stansted would have featured with Munich as a football team disaster.

dan the man
 

''From what I understand Dan is now an ex-dispatcher and is now looking for somewhere to land too!!''

yes i would have thought him working for an airline handling agent he would have been told in his training to keep his gob shut to the press in any incident - although he was off duty and a pax he would certainly be having tea with no biccies in his DM's office on his return to the island

7AC & Airbanda - I don't agree you. I'm afraid the closest the report goes is saying that the "...decision was sensible in the circumstances." It never, ever, said that it was the right one. If you work your way through the factual elements of the report you'll see that the the fire damage was minimal with the greatest damage occurring on the ground. Absolutely nowhere does it state that the wing would have burnt off in x seconds or y minutes. And this is an important factor. Furthermore, this crash, for that is what it was, was the result a reaction rather than considered action. For example, how can you possibly know what is happening inside a cowled engine on the side opposite to where you are sat? There was no crew communication on this matter (unless it was done by sign language), the fire warning did not go off until five seconds after the first signs of the fire. But the most glaring omission from this report was any comment the training of the crew. As a result, it fails to make any comparison between with what should have happened and what actually happened on the day.

Lastly, it is not fair to contrast the lucky escape of Leeds United with a flight where the crew appear to have gathered information and worked as a team to ensure a safe outcome.

HS 748 at Stansted
 

Yes, the AAIB said "The Commander's decision to land the aircraft immediately on the runway remaining was sensible in the circumstances."
www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/3_2001_g_ojem.cfm

OldLurker:-
Are you suggesting that is sensible with this particular occurrence, where the circumstances are almost certainly totally different?

manrow:
Obviously I'm not suggesting any such thing. The Stansted incident was brought up in post #99 and subsequently; I quoted the AAIB on that incident. The AAIB hasn't said anything about the Guernsey incident that I've seen.

Obviously the Guernsey incident that was the original subject of this thread is totally different in various ways. At Stansted the mode of failure was different and the captain was "aware that a considerable amount of runway remained ahead of the aircraft" (said AAIB) so that he had the option to make a split-second decision to put it back on the ground, which he did, and everyone walked away.

The similarity pointed out in post #99 is that both crews are castigated by people who weren't there* (but not by the AAIB in the Stansted case) for failing to follow standard procedures; yet both crews' decisions resulted in safe outcomes.

* And Dan, who was there, but has been pretty much dismissed in this thread.

ASR's, MOR's, paperwork and CAA notifications, yes....

But AAIB?? Wasn't technically an 'accident'....

:confused:

AAIB guidance

And the AAIB guidance further defines those exceptions (my bold)

AAIB investigations can also cover events that are not classed as accidents.

@Piltdown Man,

I am merely an observer of both the FlyBe incident and the Emerald Accident and am not qualified to make a detailed critique of flight deck action in either case. I do though stand by my comment that a longer time in the air would certainly, or at least very probably, have been catastrophic in the circumstances of G OJEM.

The AAIB report at Conclusions/Findings point 2 refers to an immediate substantial nacelle fire. At point 4 of conclusions it refers to significant leakage from the fuel heater and fire which posed a considerable hazard to the aircraft (my bold/italics).

The crew were alerted to the fire by the cabin crew via interphone (AAIB report p3).

Eleven years ago I had an engine failure after take off at 1000' in a turbo prop. The Captain suggested we return where we had engineering cover and a strong gusty crosswind. I proposed we fly 35 miles to where there was no engineering cover and no crosswind, and he agreed. It was a mayday of course but an uneventful outcome. Had I known that the "good" engine had the same incorrect IGV settings that caused the other engine to fail I might have taken a different view. There was never a hint of criticism (as far as I'm aware) from the company but who knows if the outcome had been different. Sometimes, as in LOFT exercises I've done there's different outcomes which may not be wrong but help one to learn about failure management.

A genuinely unloaded question...

When an engine is subject to a precautionary shutdown should the continued progress of the flight be on the basis that this is a failed engine (only to be reconsidered in the event of critical problems with the remaining engine)?

Are there not other alternatives?

Some things are rule based (Regs, FCOMs, etc.) while others are expected to be left to training, experience, and reasoned decisions.

The later category probably would take up a thread of their own elsewhere

In a twin I'd say yes and land at the nearest suitable as, I'm sure would everyone.
As you say, in dire straits, with second donk acting up you may HAVE to try a restart. Command decision depending upon reason for first shutdown.

Flying one of them there single turbo-props strikes me as a situation where the captain is going to have to nurse the engine if there's a problem. I'd a JP donk go nuts due severe icing but just closed the throttle and kept it in reserve for the subsequent deadstick. It worked for the taxi in but was knackered.

Speedbird 9, engines failed, not precautionary shutdown...

Restarted following 'command decision'...

If you have to, you have to!!

:D

All these comments. Does anyone who has commented before know what the performance requirements are for a dash 8 single engine. I do as I fly them.

redflyer, it's good to have someone here who knows all about the dash 8. Would you like to give us your informed opinion on the Guernsey incident and its outcome?

I fly a similar category of twin turboprop and have flown into all the airfields mentioned. When I read this first I thought 'that seems like a hell of a long way to go on one engine...surely there was a 'suitable' airport nearer than that'. Then I read the location quoted as near the Needles and Deano777's post on the weather. I would not entertain going to any of the nearer airfields in that kind of crosswind on one engine. The best option of a bad bunch was EGHI; while the W/V was 10 degrees off the runway, the varying direction and the size of the gust factor (19013G32KT 150V230) would make for an uncomfortably turbulent final approach. From the Needles at that altitude there's probably not much to choose between EGHI and EGBB anyway. Cardiff; probably a rushed 'dive and drive' would have task-loaded the crew unnecessarily.

It showed me that a little factual information on what was actually happening around them totally changed my opinion on the crews decision making process. In hindsight I think it was a good call. EGHI might have been a good call also, or it could have resulted in LOC due windshear on short finals...we'll never know.

I seem to remember an asymmetric crosswind approach in a turbo prop (probably more that 20 years ago now) which if I remember rightly resulted in a wing scrape, cartwheel' and many fatalities.
Others may recall the incident?

The problem, as ever, is that the initial sparse information doesn't accurately describe the real situation.
It is easy to assume from the title/headline that there was some sort of engine failure after take off, followed by a decision to continue on to destination, whereas the actual situation appears to be damage incurred after take off/in the departure, but not adversely affecting performance. The crew then subsequently decided on a precautionary shutdown (for whatever reasons), along with an assessment of the actual situation in flight, as well as conditions and risks to be encountered as a result.
A plan was formulated, and a relatively uneventful outcome was the result.
Aren't we all expected to not make the situation any worse than it already is, if we can manage it?

The only casualties involved being to the reputation of a numpty who mistook the situation as an opportunity for 15 minutes of, as it turned out, infamy. And the bird. The latter being the only one unable to walk away from the subsequent landing.