Selective Bidding
 

I think most US airlines have this option these days. It probably saves a few confrontations each month.:confused:

Another method that some airlines use is having first officer bids close a couple of days after the captains' lines are awarded.

And, in politically correct America, I don't think the NTSB can call for raised hiring and training standards because that would be unfair to people who don't have good flying skills. Remember the late RS's training record before being hired at FedEx?

Similarly, background checks are considered to have a disparate impact against some folks with poor employment and arrest records. Auburn Calloway had been fired by Gulf Air (the one in Biloxi, Mississippi) and Tigers before going to work at FedEx.

Any call for raised standards will be criticized in some quarters as bigoted, unfair and exclusionary.

As Huck says, it is the elephant in the room that you can't mention. :=

They must be related to that flock of pigs I just saw blasting past my house; but I can't mention them either otherwise men in white coats come a knocking.

Arriving a bit "late to the party,” but...
 

I’ll offer just a couple of opinionated observations, anyway…

It could easily be that the reason the RoD increased without any control column movement is that the throttles were reduced. The factors that makes up an understanding of airplane landings includes both the airspeed (based on 1.3Vs increased by any wind/gust factor), where the 30% increase in this speed is gradually reduced to “zero” by reaching the threshold, while maintaining the other adjustments); power reduction may be started as early as threshold crossing but should be started no later than initiation of the flare, and should be at idle no later than main gear touchdown. Also, the pilot flying should be acutely aware that as elevator back pressure will be required to achieve level flight attitude at the end of the flare (the airplane should be landed in this “level flight attitude”), as the power is reduced, an increase in that back pressure will be necessary, BUT only to the point that keeps the nose from moving downward – to keep that level flight attitude. If that back pressure is not applied, the nose WILL begin to move downward – and depending on where this starts, the airspeed could easily begin to increase.

I haven’t examined the FDR to ferret out the specifics of pitch, elevator position, and airspeeds at appropriate points just prior to the touchdown – but I would suspect that some violation of these precepts, as outlined above, could be found in explanation of what occurred. Also, anytime physical control of the airplane is accomplished in this very “intense” portion of the approach/landing – just prior to initiating the flare through the actual touchdown – there is an increased likelihood of the pilot assuming control not being able to pick up – correct, if or where necessary – and then maintain the proper level flight attitude, through the remainder of the power reduction (if necessary), maintaining the level flight attitude, and maintaining a center-line ground track (not to mention any crosswind correction if or where required).

I suspect that the VASI and the glide slope indication not being exactly aligned is not peculiar to the LGA airport – after all … observation of Red/White lights is not expected to be anywhere near as precise as the electronic indication of the transmitted glide slope – and I would suspect that there aren’t many pilots who devote much, if any, specific attention to the VASI light indications, particularly after crossing the threshold.

As for the apparent absence of flight control inputs for the last couple of seconds prior to “touchdown” (using the term generically), and according to a cursory look at the FDR, it looks like something on the order of 2-4 seconds, and both pilots were very likely focused on what they saw developing with an abnormally low nose position that close to the runway - focusing on what was about to happen, rather than what to do to effect it.

[quote].Quote:
This. This is the elephant in the room, in a couple of crashes lately
[/quote

UPS...?

In his official statement to the NTSB, the Co-pilot PF stated that during the accident landing he used the PAPI as his "primary reference" and he was "working the PAPI" down to the "25-30 foot range", when the Captain took over.

The Captain on the other hand said that she referenced the HUD, that she "loved the HUD" and considered herself a "HUD cripple" (dependent on the HUD). She stated that at lower altitudes the HUD would be in "instrument mode". And just before landing she would still "look through the HUD" though not necessarily reading the numbers on the HUD.

Sounds like they both had problems then.

The problem with some is that they believe that once the thrust levers hit the idle stop that the power is immediately at idle. To get idle thrust at touchdown the trust levers need to hit the idle stops before the main wheels hit the pavement.

This is also observed when coming out of reverse. I see many going through to the full down position while the engines are still winding down, giving a burst of forward thrust when you really don't need it.

The thrust lever position indicates commanded thrust & the N1 gauges indicate actual thrust.

Not being from the USA, I'm not sure that I understand this fully. Are you saying that women can't fly as well as men, or that there is a quota for women that has to be filled irrespective of ability?

Or is it something quite different, that makes sense?

The elephant in the room is a yankee way of saying that everyone in the room sees it but is hesitant to be the one to bring it up.

Bubbers, I thought you were blowing your bags but you are right! TEITR is Yank-originated...

The Elephant in the Room

:D

Hi peekay4 … and I say again “I would suspect that there aren’t many pilots who devote much, if any, specific attention to the VASI light indications, particularly after crossing the threshold.” I would wonder if the instructor who trained this pilot was ever aware of his tendencies to “rivet” his attention to one particular reference … apparently to the exclusion of all the others that should remain an active part of his scan? And, based on her comment, I think there is at least a possibility that the Captain had tendencies along the same lines. Too me, this “wrong-headed attention riveting” is characteristic of those who learn a particular “habit pattern” while training in a simulator, where whatever the characteristic happens to be (and sometimes it is a contrived sequence or procedure – essentially a “cheat sheet”), it also tends to produce a reasonable result – in the simulator - but, in the airplane, it could lead to a less than satisfactory result!

It is the instructor’s job to be aware of any such developing tendencies and STOP them before they become HABIT. We want pilots to fly their simulators the way they fly (or the way we want them to fly) their airplanes … and this won't happen by allowing the pilot to flail about in a simulator, determining what works and what doesn't work "for him/her" outside of DIRECT instructor involvement and understanding. To do this, we have to ensure that during initial, and ALL follow-on, simulator training, the INSTRUCTOR will step in and ensure that the student does not make these kinds of incorrect assumptions or incorrectly rivet his/her attention on something that could easily lead that pilot astray when piloting the real airplane. This is not an easy task - instructing is not easy - and not every pilot (even every good pilot) will make a good instructor!

I don’t have a particular problem with the Captain’s statement that “before landing she would still look through the HUD, though not necessarily reading the numbers on the HUD.” A HUD system was developed so that the pilot could do precisely that – “look through the HUD” and see what would normally be seen when looking through the front windscreen. Again, it should have been an instructor’s responsibility to ensure that this pilot was not developing a “crutch” that works in the simulator but could (and perhaps DID??) become a problem if used in the airplane. I don't have any information about any other problems or any other history that this particular Captain may or may not have had ... I'm limiting my comments to this particular statement.

VASI lights were never intended to be, and are not an acceptable source of, glide path indication all the way to touchdown. This "approach aid" was merely intended to provide a night time visual reference to a pilot to help orient him/her with a visible, when visibility allows, and if it does, a vertically acceptable approach path to the runway. While I wasn’t standing next to those who developed the system when they were making the final adjustments to their product, I can imagine they well knew that if a pilot was going to make a vertical error, they would have preferred that pilot to be “too high” rather than “too low” during the approach. I would also expect that these folks were also well aware of the fact that their product was NOT able, and they did not build it to be interpreted as able, to provide "electronic instrument accuracy" for glide path indications all the way to touchdown.

As you can probably tell, my focus is instructors – as I fervently believe it is the instructor’s proper use of proper training tools – and the best and most complete tool available today is the flight simulator – that will ensure that the student learns what is necessary for that pilot to competently and safely operate the airplane for which that pilot is in training to learn to fly. I have come to learn that far too many instructors have allowed the simulator to teach their students, instead of that instructor, himself or herself, teaching those students to accurately and competently fly the airplane, using the simulator as a tool to accomplish that end.

Can you provide supporting documentation? I've not seen this explained quite like that.

CRM the issue?
 

I see the captain was given more CRM training, after many f/os refused to fly with her. I wonder if these f/os were asked why they were requesting to be excused. Was it cockpit manners they were worried about, or cockpit skills?

In my experience as both f/o and captain, I was always far less concerned with a grumpy partner, than an incompetent partner. If an awkward colleague could be trusted to perform a safe flight, I was more than happy.

I would agree … and the way I have always taught is that the pilot may initiate thrust reduction toward idle as soon as crossing over the runway threshold, and should be initiated no later than when the flare is initiated, and the power levers must be in the idle detent no later than upon main gear touchdown. I am not a big believer in sequential power reduction (i.e., “pull slightly back, stop, further back, stop again, further back, stop again, all the way to idle”) – while I don’t have any problem in a slow and deliberate power reduction, once the reduction is initiated, I prefer to keep the retardation movement until the idle position is reached. And, again, I say if the throttles are not AT idle upon main gear touchdown, they should be reduced all the way at that time.

ALSO, and importantly, if, at any time, the pilot feels it necessary to advance the power levers - ANY amount - THAT would initiate an immediate GO AROUND.

I suppose, it depends on your definition of "quota"...

There is a quota system in all large airlines, across the Western world. No company, let alone an airline, can afford to have a roll-call of employees that does not tick most of the required employee types. And since there may be only one or two applicants within each required type, standards may well have to be sacrificed to make up the numbers.

The UK health and police have suffered greatly from this policy, with numerous cases of substandard employees rising much higher within these organisations than they should have done.

For instance, 75% of UK doctors who are banned, were trained abroad. And this is not 'discrimination' as the GMC is a pro-diversity organisation. It is simply a case of bad doctors and the GMC being unwilling to admit that overseas training is simply not as good as UK or European training. So the GMC is putting UK patients at risk, so they can tick all the required boxes.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...ed-abroad.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/he...truck-off.html

The VASI is not an acceptable guide, while the PAPI is. Not sure why anyone uses VASI any more.

The VASI gives a different touchdown point, depending if you are high or low on glide. The PAPI will always endevour to bring you to the same point on the runway, no matter how high or low you are.

As I said, I wasn’t there when the concept and the design stages were envisioned; commission, and completed – and I can’t provide any “supporting documentation,” other than what can be logically understood by how those systems are defined and described in official documents published by the FAA and their Airports Division – with particular focus on these specific systems. That language goes into some minor detail regarding what a pilot may expect from the use of and the dependence upon the use of, these systems – whether discussing the Visual Approach Slope Indictor (VASI) system or the Precision Approach Path Indicator System (PAPI).

Those descriptions are as follows:

Nowhere in any of these descriptions is there any reference to any Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI) system being able to, or that it should be relied upon for, accurate glide path indication to the actual touchdown – and, to the contrary, describes these systems providing vertical guidance for a VFR approach or for the visual portion of an instrument approach, neither of which relies upon or references accuracy to touchdown or touchdown position.

Additionally, it should be noted that even the most accurate precision Instrument Landing System does not provide accurate vertical guidance all the way to a safe touchdown. All ILS approaches to and including touchdown are predicated on an autopilot interface with the airplane’s radar altimeter – and is not related to the ILS glide slope information – as touchdown would occur some distance past the glide slope transmitter - and a visual touchdown would also be well beyond the VASI or PAPI indicators.

Trying to find the ICAO/AC/PL documentation where it explicitly says it, but from what I recall, VASI is good to 200ft, PAPI to 50 ft. Common sense says looking sideways at a VASI/PAPI while in the flair is a bad idea...

Concurs with the manufacturer:
Research Engineers PAPI

AirRabbit - specifically regarding thrust levers, you suggest that if they require advancing late in the landing a go around should be initiated. I have flown plenty of approaches where a late positive addition of thrust was simply required to arrest the rate of descent very late in a landing rather than due to a condition that would require an immediate go around.

As ever though, we are simply talking about appropriate control inputs at the appropriate time to achieve the demanded flight path.

jwscud

I agree with you about throttle movement. Many times at airports with great stands of trees (which blank the natural wind), I will give a bit of throttle to decrease descent rate below 100'.

I never thought of going around, just a bump of power to compensate and everything worked out fine.

The FO said the PAPI was his primary reference during approach; he did not say it was his only reference. He stated that his crosschecks were the PAPI, the runway, and the airspeed. He said he also referred the glideslope every 3 to 4 crosschecks. (Ref: NTSB Interview Summaries, pp. 17-18).

The FO was an instructor himself, w/ 22 years in the USAF flying F-15C and F-117s. He was a T-38 chief evaluator until he retired and joined SWA. At the time of the accident he had 1,200 hrs at SWA.

People make mistakes; One would hope someone with his flight experience has the basics of flying (and landing) down pat.

What? Are you suggesting a 30 knot reduction from VAPP at the threshold.

You could just pull the stick back a bit to maintain flight to the aimpoint...

Sometimes just a pitch adjustment might work but other days you could save a lot of money by just adding some power to maintain airspeed so you can still taxi to parking after impact.

A burst of power when needed always worked for me and I didn't break anything in 55 years.

Well said JW11. Same for me 42 years.
I'm afraid pilots are no longer taught to fly the bl&@dy aeroplane onto the rwy. & keep controlling it till stop. My last few years watching co-pilots flare & wait letting the aeroplane wander off on it's own was entertaining to say the least. No wonder some teach Go-Around instead of fly the -- thing.
IMHO it is why so many are crashing. In this case it would appear no one even had their hands on the controls. Guess HR are employing customer relation people instead of pilots.
Rant over
:)

Eh?? I hope you are SLF, Captainblogs, rather than in control of an aircraft.

Have you never heard of the 'clutching hand'? (The trees scenario, described by Glendalegoon).

Have you never heard of the old aviation addage - that you pull back on the stick to go up, and pull back a bit more to go down... ? Never heard of that?

Or perhaps you are in the same school as Air France pilots, who opine "I am pulling back as hard as I can, but she is still going down" ... ? Do you follow the French school of theory of flight?

Please review the standard graphs detailing angle of attack, lift and drag. There are many aircraft, including the 737 with the 40o flap setting, where pulling back at ref speed results in a change of body angle, but no reduction in sink rate.

If you don't comprehend this, and don't know that the clutching hand refers to, please stay away from aircraft.

A bit harsh there I think. Depending on the thrust setting and speed at the time (not power BTW) a gentle increase in back pressure is often enough. Sounds like a hyper active, twitchy captain who insists on flying the aircraft through the effo. I feel that he would have achieved a perfectly satisfactory landing if she'd just left him alone. If she felt the landing was not safely assured she should have called for a go around. Interfering with the controls without a proper handover is never acceptable.

wait a second please!~


I described the blanking effect of a stand of trees and that adding power (briefly, just a quick shot) could help.

funny thing is I have never heard of the CLUTCHING HAND ( did read a book called, "THE GRIPPING HAND" once). Perhaps the clutching hand is sort of an advisory circular title...maybe I learned before it was written...gosh am I getting old!!!!

ICE PACK...I think you have something here. I have noticed that many pilots get the plane close to the ground and then just sort of give up and hope for the best.

but I have also noticed the same thing on takeoff. get going fast enough and give up completely on directional control and just sort of jump into the air. And hope for the best.


I had the great luck as a youngster to see ROBERT A BOB HOOVER perform with his SHRIKE COMMANDER at the RENO AIR RACES...I mean 50 years ago or so. Watching the way that man MADE THE PLANE GO WHERE HE WANTED IT TO, AND KNOWING WHERE HE WANTED IT TO GO impressed the heck out of me.

It took time, but I figured out how to do it (within the limits imposed by wingtip or engine pod clearance) and practice it as well as I can. Hoover had a high wing plane and could do amazing things, 737s not so much.

RULE ONE IN FLYING,,,know where you want the plane to go and know how to get it there and YOU DON"T STOP FLYING THE PLANE UNTIL THE PARKING BRAKE IS SET and chocks are in.

Hi Jwscud – of course, you are correct – and I wouldn’t negatively critique an experienced pilot for making the kind of adjustment you describe – however, in the initial training for landings – I try to instill in the student that power advancement once the flare is well underway or has been established is “go-around neighborhood.” I find that such an understanding reduces the tendency to “take a stab at something/anything.” Once landings are really “learned,” any “fine tuning” with additional power in this area – which is almost always a ROD “adjustment” – is better understood and used only when it is necessary. Perhaps the most difficult aspect to grasp and achieve regularly (until sufficiently practiced) is “elevator back pressure” vs “raising the nose position.”

With the power being reduced and the attitude being maintained – the airspeed will decrease and will tend to bring the nose down – requiring a counter action of increasing elevator back pressure – BUT not to the point that it raises the nose position. In those cases where I’ve seen power added to either adjust ROD or adjust the rate of airspeed reduction while flaring, is usually, but not always, due to an overly aggressive initiation of the elevator back pressure to initiate the flare … the nose starts up, and as the power is either being reduced or is already at “idle,” the rate of descent begins to increase. Because I’ve stressed not getting the nose higher than what is necessary to maintain level flight – the pilot is left with the only option of adding power. Unfortunately, and particularly with the very “new” folks, adding power almost always means either an increase in airspeed or a leveling off (if not a brief climb) – and leveling off with added power means a longer landing and/or gaining altitude – neither of which, at this point, is necessarily needed or wanted, and could become dangerous.

I see the scientists are out in force again.

I don’t know the gentleman myself … only what has been reported. I also agree that it would seem logical that any pilot with the experience you indicate was had by this pilot, would, indeed, mean that he “has the basics of flying (and landing) down pat.” But, and with all due respect to this particular gentleman (and I say that knowing what kind of pressure anyone is under during an accident investigation – and I have no desire to impugn his character, professionalism, or competency), it still sounds a “bit off” to say that he was using the VGSI as his “primary” reference during the approach – particularly in that the glide path information provided by the VGSI at LaGuardia Runway 04 is not “coincident” with the ILS glide slope. In fact, as the ILS Glide Slope transmitter is located 1102 feet from the threshold, and provides a 3.00 degree glide slope, an “on glide slope’ indication over the runway threshold would be at a height of 57 feet, 9 inches; and the elevation according to an “on visual glide slope” indication of the VGSI at the same location over the runway threshold, is reported to be 76 feet.

As an “after-the-fact” onlooker, it would seem that if the PF was using the VGSI as a “primary” vertical reference, and was, indeed “on that glide slope,” the airplane would have crossed the runway threshold at 76 feet and would have been 18 feet 3 inches above the “on glide path” indication of the ILS. I don’t intend to have this get into a Mathematics/Geometry lesson, so I’ll let the mathematicians in the group determine what those kinds of numbers actually mean. Additionally, if the PM (pilot monitoring – the Captain) was indeed “looking through the HUD system (on which I would presume was displayed the ILS localizer and glide slope information) would it be beyond reason that the Captain recognized that the airplane was “high,” over the threshold of Runway 04, some 7001 plus feet short of the East River, at whatever airspeed at that time. Is it possible that the PF could have completed the approach at his then-current rate of descent, flared, touched down, reversed the engines, and stopped safely on the runway? Where on that runway would the touch down have occurred? How much braking would have been required? If you were the Captain, what would you have done? My sense is that at least some of you would say “I wouldn’t have let it get that far…”

Flaps 40
 

I flew the 737-200/300 for thousands of hours. We rarely made anything but flaps 40 landings without any problems.


On this approach, the captain was flying the HUD and the FO was visual. She was an admitted HUD addict, and didn't look outside enough until it was too late.


Had she pulled back on the yoke a bit when she closed the power, it would have banged on the runway in typical SWAL fashion. Maybe a bit firmer.


They both just quit flying the plane, although the FO was ordered off the controls.


I have never heard of the “Clutching Hand” either.

I am getting the feeling that some people have not had enough exposure to different ways of thinking about flying.

So much talk of pitch attitude (certainly you dont want to land on the nose wheel or tail skid). But really, its all about rate of descent (somewhere between 0fpm and 500 fpm (maybe 600) at touchdown, in the touchdown zone ( near the 1000' fixed distance marker or so)

I realize that some very big planes require a method of teaching a novice pilot who really never gets to fly much on those super long hauls. I realize he may only get a couple of landings a month (if lucky).

but certainly a southwest pilot , with many legs should be able to FLY and not just set a pitch attitude, cut the throttles at a certain radar altitude and hope for the best


try to learn to fly boys, mainly from the old guys...

and if you can't pat your head and rub your stomach at the same time, maybe you shouldn't be a pilot. a great deal of things are happening and you have to wiggle the rudder, move the ailerons and elevator all at the same time...and even move the throttles.

I'm glad I know how to play the drumset too...always doing four different things....

I hope some of you get this and understand.

Old Boeing Driver

HUD = Head Up Display = looking OUTSIDE!!!:ugh:

Kinda says it all, don't you think!? :ugh:

Yet you managed to describe it perfectly. It is called the 'clutching hand', because it feels like some outside force is dragging you downwards. See "Clutching Hands" on p119, and then look at page 120, right hand column:

http://www.lakesgc.co.uk/mainwebpage...umn%201951.pdf

This is the trouble with modern aviation. So much that was learned, understood and mastered, way back in the 1930s, goes completely over the heads of many modern aviators. They like to wear the gold bars, the mirrored sunglasses, press a few buttons and smile at the No2, but know sweet FA about flying. They pull back on the stick for four minutes, with the engines at full power and the nose pointing at the stars, and still cannot work out why they are descending.

Just don't fly Air France, until all their pilots have done a two-week gliding course.




Without wishing this to sound like collusion, you are spot on again, Glendaledoon. I have never ever looked at pitch attitude in the flare, especially as there is precious little nose to gauge it by on a modern jet.

It all comes down to descent rate and runway perception, with which I can generally judge the wheel height to the nearest 20 cm. If you cannot judge the sink rate and your 'immersion' into the runway (as opposed to being 'above' the runway), you are in for some hard landings.

Even my C152 had a HUD. Yes, honest, a HUD on a C152 !!

Some people choose to call this new innovation 'The Real World'. But I would recommend you taking a look at it one day, as it is a very realistic HUD display …… :ok: