Threemiles:

This doesn't match other known facts, the low altitude excursion being of prime importance. There are three independent sources that indicate a low level over Malaysia; the first being the earliest Malaysian press releases, the second was the eyewitness at Kota Bharu and third, the Thai radar report which stated that their track was intermittant - this would not be the case had the flight been at cruise altitude. The flight path would have been around 100nm from the Hat Yai radar, not at a range extremity for that radar. It was clear weather and the side profile of a 777 is literally as big as a barn. Any radar that couldn't display an unambigious track of that target (at altitude) would be a broken down radar. There is no reason to think the Thai radar was on the blink that night.

Then there is the question: where did the Australians get the information they used to draw that flight path, and how much critical thought went into plotting the early parts of the flight before the Inmarsat data provided their arcs? I have to assume that they just accepted a Malaysian plot without question.

If we take the 2:22 arrival at MEKAR as bedrock then the known information doesn't support that flightpath, a 777 doesn't go that fast.

(I have some personal doubts about the 2:22 time. Remember that in the first couple of days they gave a time of 2:40 for last radar contact. Then for a time they were using a time of 2:15. But for now we have to accept it.)

Portions of the flight path released makes no sense. They have the plane looping south of Butterworth and even south of Pulau Pinang island. That would just be an attention getting excursion, or diversion, from the intended direction of the flight. The only way one could make a case for that flight path is if they accepted the onboard fire scenario, which I do not. That has been discussed thouroughly here.

I ask you to reconsider.

Based on the evidence available, the balance of probability would surely suggest the following deliberate sequence:
1. At FIR boundary, turn off ACARS / transponder and fail to handover to Vietnam ATC.
2. Low level flight back over the Malaysian peninsula
3. Once over the Indian Ocean and beyond primary radar, climb back to normal cruise levels, and turn south. Ultimately it likely headed towards Perth while hiding in plain sight flying along airways - possibly M641 (India to Perth) or L894 (Middle East to Perth)

This sequence would achieve the following outcomes, which I believe were intended:
1. Maximal confusion with ATC at handover. A catastrophic systems failure exactly at the FIR boundary is sufficiently unlikely to permit the tentative conclusion this was a deliberate act.
2. Minimse the risk of real-time detection crossing Malaysia. The main risk was primary radar, so a low level flight was necessary to make primary radar sporadic. Any layperson accounts of a low flying aircraft (in the middle of the night after moonset) would likely be contradictory, and would not emerge until the next day anyway.
3. Subsequent climb to normal cruise levels to maximise range and allow a long flight away from Malaysia in the wrong direction.
4. A chance sighting by a ship of an early morning flight at high altitude heading in the direction of Perth would not be suspicious.
5. A controlled ditching at first light so as to minimise the risk that debris would eventually wash up somewhere. Possibly turn off airway during descent so that any floating wreckage would be less likely to be seen by aircraft later that day.

If the pinger data is now void, all we really have is the Inmarsat data.

Without the Inmarsat data (perhaps an oversight), all we would have would be a sighting by an oil rig worker in the South China Sea, a suggestion of a turn back by Vietnam ATC, few vague reports of an aircraft crossing Malaysia at low level, and a sporadic primary radar contact.

How does this scenario fit with the last few Inmarsat arcs (assuming by then a constant course and speed)?

If we are now down to a needle in a haystack, it might be worth looking near the last arc along these two airways. Even then the search area would be huge. So far the Bluefin has only searched 850 square km.

The only other way we might get lucky is if someone provides information (e.g. that mystery telephone call prior to departure), or by looking for unlikely patterns of internet searches (this was likely very carefully researched).

Do you have access to full-resolution image from which this was cut?

The "02:07:06" point is not aligned with the rest of the track and may be an unrelated aircraft (maybe SQ68 or UAE343) or just a false positive.

Lines marked "other a/c's" are waypoint corridors.

@Sir Richard #10929

Approach to PEN. Given decent cloudbase and surface W/V, a no-radio approach to R/W22 would be preferable. Not sure that they would have any on-board nav receivers remaining, and there are bits of dark forested hills just N of the approach to R/W04. All the lights of George Town are available for a sraight-in app to 22.

Whatever, we do know that they didn't land at PEN.

Any overall explanation of what went on has to include the Inmarsat curved position lines and, I believe, the reports from (several) fishermen at sea and others along the coast to the south of Kota Bharu. No-one has yet explained how the radar traces etc can be positively attached to MH370, except on the basis of 'well, who else can it have been?'

@propduffer

what you call independant sources is less than inofficial and called rumours. Nowhere has been any confirmation of the data you apply. Nowhere has been a release from Thai radars. Weather is not a factor for modern primary defense radar.

At 5000 ft a plane can go not faster than 330 NM ground speed (very optimistic). For half the way between IGARI and MEKAR it would lose 1/4 of its forward speed, which is 1/8 of the total route progress. This is at least 55 NM from a very conservative route length estimate (neglecting the 15 kts headwind and the lengthy turn after IGARI).

You may doubt the few hints that are published in official reports but believe the rumours from Malaysian newspapers, though.

If the black box pings go down the drain, the conclusion for a south path from the sat pings might follow. After the release of the (incomplete and edited) raw data there is still no evidence, why only a southern path is possible.

There was and is no need to protect this evidence and the methods, how this conclusion for a southern path was reached.

Nobody has come up for a valid motive to choose a southern path, and discussions about a possible northern path have been avoided.

To repeat myself, if it wasn't some kind of a weird accident, the motive will lead to evidence.

edit:
Wise words. Doesn't that include the option, that not only an accident but also some kind of criminal action may have caused the disapearance of MH370?

No joy from Curtin's undersea recorders either.

MH370: Curtin University team checks undersea recorders for sounds of plane crash - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

It would be helpful if the Curtin underwater acoustics experts had indicated whether they would have expected to hear a ditching aircraft or not. The absence of any sound at about the right time might be quite informative as it may exclude large areas.

Curtin University Acoustic Signals
 

What a small world, I used to work alongside these guys. Would be worth knowing the bearing of the signal and if interesects the Inmarsat arcs....

Curtin University Acoustic Signals
 

A controlled explosion (of the same energy as MH370 hitting the ocean) slightly below the ocean surface with the Curtin University & Cape Leuwin sensors listening might tell us whether the signal is genuine, by the received amplitude and the arrival time.

@P.J.M., map at http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post8498024

The times on that map do not match the (positive handshake) times on the most recent factsheet issued by the ATSB. The times on that map appear to be smoothed to provide an even hourly reference.

Its very bad if we don't have any pinger data and we just have the arcs

The Bluefin searched 850 square km. That search took about a month (there were a few interruptions due to equipment problems, which will also occur in any subsequent search).

Assume the flight ended right on on the final arc, which we believe has a resolution of approx 10km "wide." That is 1200 x 10 = 12000 square km. Thats at least 12 months.

If we assume MH370 could have glided say 100km beyond the final arc, thats 120000 square km or perhaps 10 years.

Then you have to allow for increased technical and logistic difficulties as the search goes further south. The initial search was relatively close to Australia and in relatively calm waters. It will get far harder as you search further south.

Who is going to fund this?

Sure you can use multiple AUVs, but we are still looking at years.

I fear we are going to need another source of information to narrow the area down significantly.

Full Image
 

Nope, I only got the cut from MH Malaysia Airlines B772 Missing Enroute KUL-PEK Part 64 — Civil Aviation Forum | Airliners.net

Post 38 discusses the source.

Since circumstances have changed I will repeat my suggestion that was previously "modded".
In my experience aircraft can only fly TO an FMC fix. Now, as a pilot in an aircraft west of Indonesia who wishes to fly the aircraft on an unlikely track for a long enough period of time to ensure it runs out of fuel what fix position would you enter into the FMC to meet these needs, a fix position that requires no great imagination. Obviously the geographic South Pole.
If anyone is taking bets I would locate the aircraft on a track from its last known position to the geographic South Pole and a distance along track to a little beyond the last Inmarsat ping.

If you read the JACC press release a few posts back, they appear to be planning to search up to 60,000 square kilometres, and expect it to take up to a year. If they start in the most probable areas, hopefully they won't have to search all 60,000 before they find it, but that would appear to cover an area tens of kilometres wide along the entire final arc.

Or to an airfield near the south pole on the antarctic continent? You'd still flame out before you got there.
Looks like a decent bet.

Asking for clarification
 

From the JACC:
Yesterday afternoon, Bluefin-21 completed its last mission searching the remaining areas in the vicinity of the acoustic signals detected in early April by the Towed Pinger Locator deployed from ADV Ocean Shield, within its depth operating limits.

What it means?- that the Bluefin has only searched the areas within its operating limit?
or
- that all the area in the vicinity of pings was within its (upgraded) operating limit?
Sorry to ask something perhaps evident for all but not for me as a French speaking native :O

No, it can also fly using hdg-select, no FMC involved.

Any other number would take 'no great imagination'.

Blue-fin operations
 

It was reported some time ago that the bluefin-21 was unable to scan it's entire assignment despite it's "upgraded" limit.
Consequently there maybe smaller areas that were not scanned, but bluefin-21 had done the majority of the area.

Recall that the AF scanning "missed" the major debris field, it was after WHOI (as a private contractor) was engaged that they located the field close to where it was expected almost a year earlier (and in an area that had been previously scanned)

You are quite right, it could be understood as meaning that Bluefin only searched areas which were within its operating depth BUT if you read on to the 4th paragraph, it states:

The above leaves no doubt that Bluefin completed the search and did so within its operating limitations.

Well, that's how I understand it but could be corrected.