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-   -   Malaysian Airlines MH370 contact lost (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/535538-malaysian-airlines-mh370-contact-lost.html)

under_exposed 25th Mar 2014 11:13


Quote:
@syseng68k
It's actually much easier to recover data from over-written digital media. FBI software can recover data from digital media that has been over-written multiple times, or reformatted repeatedly.
Absolutely false. As mentioned before, it is simply impossible to recover any physically overwritten digital information.
While there is a theory that this is possible, nobody has been able to demonstrate being able to recover significant amounts of data.

Pontius Navigator 25th Mar 2014 11:16


Originally Posted by sky9 (Post 8399723)
I see that Inmarsat have used a speed of 450 kts for their calculation. Assuming that a 777 operates at 0.84 or there abouts that equates to a TAS closer to 500kts.

How would that affect the arcs that they have published and how far down those arcs the aircraft might have flown.

What is the T7 range speed? It would not be 'thereabouts'; it is either 0.84 or it isn't.

The speed of 450 kts groundspeed predicates a constant wind iro 60 kts head wind assuming an OAT of -40C and my memory and calculation being correct which give a TAS of 510.

APLFLIGHT 25th Mar 2014 11:27

@A69 could you please provide us with the official source/weblink of the "AAIB summary" ?

OleOle 25th Mar 2014 11:28

Regarding the yellow and the red track on the aaib image/globe.

- Yellow represents the solution which covers the greatest distance, red the solution for smallest distance?
- Yellow is great circle, red is constant magnetic heading?

Together with the search areas that points to great circle solution, i.e. FMC and not to A/P => deliberate action?

Edit: Thinking about it, there could be a solution with 450 knots and constant magnetic heading which is much closer to the yellow track => deliberate action not confirmed

OPENDOOR 25th Mar 2014 11:36


I think the idea of EPIRBs is not the best way forward. I would think more about using the satellite broadband link. Audio feed parallel with a CVR channel, 48 kb codec (G722 or similar would give enough audio bandwidth to ID warning tones) add a 2kb slow data channel for an integrated GPS data. Add error correction and you could fit 2 into the minimum broadband link.
Activation could be for example an aircraft loses ADS-B, VHF comms, departs flight plan, departs cleared altitude etc then ATC could poll the aircraft and switch on the CVR link.
Automatic battery back up incase of power failure.

The issue will be with how those in the cockpit feel about possible remote monitoring of anything they say?
ionagh; with respect (and I mean that) your proposal is not proof against tampering or catastrophic failure of the a/c

A fiber optic cable run from the AIMS unit to a internal hull mounted data exchange/charging/monitoring device constantly updating the external EPIRB/data recorder would provide a truly independent resource for SAR/AAIB people. No CVR snooping either.

It wouldn't need ED-12 certification as total failure would not affect the a/c

(yes, I did look it up)

ED-12B
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
Latest Revision December 1, 1992

Capt Kremin 25th Mar 2014 11:39


Together with the search areas that points to great circle solution, i.e. FMC and not to A/P => deliberate action?
Ole ole, looks like it.

It also looks like the green track on the graphic I put together, the western route using a constant magnetic hdg, as suspected, does not match any track which would correlate with the hourly satellite pings.

A69 25th Mar 2014 11:43


Originally Posted by APLFLIGHT
@A69 could you please provide us with the official source/weblink of the "AAIB summary" ?

Yes, It's on the facebook page of Ministry of Transport Malaysia.
Here's the link https://www.facebook.com/permalink.p...78566888854999

OleOle 25th Mar 2014 11:47

In the doppler shift diagram there are three bursts close to where MH370 turned south between ~ 18:20 -18:30 utc. If that is not just symbolic, it would indicate turning south happened in that time window.

- Why three burst in such a short time?
- And wasn't last PSR contact at 18:40 utc (2:40 MYT)?

FastFlier 25th Mar 2014 11:52

Inmarsat Pings
 
BBC are reporting a final partial Inmarsat handshake ping received at 08:19 following the routine handshake received at 08:11 with no explanation. I'm not familiar with 777 systems, but could this have resulted from a transient power interruption during bus transfer following the loss of a genny?

Methersgate 25th Mar 2014 11:56

Small objects, and objects that that are floating "high", will be subject to surface drift, the wind and wave derived motion of the uppermost layer of sea water, which is typically in the direction of the surface wind and should be applied after allowance is made for the current. In an areas such as the one under consideration, the surface drift can be quite fast.

OleOle 25th Mar 2014 12:00

Capt Kremin


Ole ole, looks like it.

It also looks like the green track on the graphic I put together, the western route using a constant magnetic hdg, as suspected, does not match any track which would correlate with the hourly satellite pings.
Actually on second thought I think we still don't have enough data to jump to conclusions. The aaib tracks mark just the two extreme possibilities. There might as well be a constant magnetic heading solution with a higher speed and a more westward heading than the red track. That would end up much closer to the great circle (yellow) solution.

oldoberon 25th Mar 2014 12:00


Originally Posted by Ptkay (Post 8399980)
Could it be, that at the final moments of flight, at 0019utc, so well within the window of 0011 to 0115 utc, agreed to be the time of fuel exhaust, someone had circulated power (switch them all off for a while and then later switch SATCOMM back on) to try to alert the time of crash,

or was it effect of low power on fuel exhaust?

This could be a good indicator, that 0019 was the exact time of the final power failure.

could it be engine wound down no gennies, rat came on then satcom tried to fire up

ie does rat power satcom for an expected acars report (even though they don't subscribe), but that wouldn't explain just a partial ping unless it hit the water at that point.

Ptkay 25th Mar 2014 12:02


could it be engine wound down no gennies, rat came on then satcom tried to fire up
This was my exact suggestion few posts before:


or was it effect of low power on fuel exhaustion?

This could be a good indicator, that 0019utc (08:10) was the exact time of the final power failure.
Is the Inmarsat comms device on RAT at all?

UnreliableSource 25th Mar 2014 12:18

Inmarsat
 

Quote:
MAS no satellite contract...
The inmarsat information with logon/logoff probes pretty well confirms that MAS was an active customer. No network provider would be probing non-customers in this way.

I had picked up the no sat contract from a very early post, but this clearly was wrong.

flt001 25th Mar 2014 12:19

Inmarsat Calculations
 
Some more information on the Inmarsat calculations:

http://i.imgur.com/vtNqkyN.jpg

http://i.imgur.com/1qn0Zep.jpg

Source

volcanicash 25th Mar 2014 12:24

@A69 thanks for posting the AAIB report and charts. Assuming the blue dots on the “Measured Data” chart are actual points of measurement for the burst frequency offset analysis (as implied), the satellite and aircraft would appear to have communicated more often than had previously been thought – i.e. at (roughly) the following times:

0042L
0055L
0107L

0225L
0227L
0228L

0340L
0440L
0540L
0640L
0811L
0819L (partial)

It would be interesting to know what prompted the comms between 0225L and 0230L.

Hogger60 25th Mar 2014 12:30


MAS no satellite contract therefore by your own statement the switching vhf to data would disconnect ACARS - agreed?
No I don't agree. From various news sources (Google MAS satellite contract) MAS didn't have the contract to continuously transmit its position and other continuous data (ala AF447) via ACARS satellite data (in order to save about 10usd/flt), but they retained the the ability to transmit data via satellite on a request basis. For example to request weather or contact ops in an emergency, or when using CPDLC. Without the satellite connection the aircraft wouldn't be able to use CPDLC when outside of VHF range, and I know they were able to do that.

To turn off the ACARS data transmission you have to go into the com's page on center console, and perform the four step process to actually turn it off. Simply moving the VHF 3 radio head out of the data mode won't do it.

oldoberon 25th Mar 2014 12:43


Originally Posted by UnreliableSource (Post 8400077)
The inmarsat information with logon/logoff probes pretty well confirms that MAS was an active customer. No network provider would be probing non-customers in this way.

I had picked up the no sat contract from a very early post, but this clearly was wrong.

no sat contract FOR Acars. not no sat contract, even if transmitted by aircraft not accepted by satellite

JamesGV 25th Mar 2014 13:24

"BBC are reporting a final partial Inmarsat handshake ping received at 08:19 following the routine handshake received at 08:11 with no explanation".

Flame out.
RAT deployed.
SATCOM Packs ( are ON/RUN) provides the last (new) "handshake".

IF the report is actually correct.

philip2412 25th Mar 2014 13:32

We`ve heard,that the Pilot was separated from his wife,but still living under the same roof.
Do we know, who was the force behind this separation ?
Maybe it was his wife and the pilot still hoped to reconcile.Wč`ve heard she left him just the day before that flight.If, and it is of course a big "if"this affected him really strongly it could have triggered a suicide situation.


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