..................and fly the thing like an aeroplane! It used to be - Throttles, Mixture, Pitch, Carb. Heat, Cowl Flaps etc. etc. now it's only throttles, can't they at least cope with that ? |
Piltdown Man : Re comparing with TK/AMS.
Of course it is not 100% but for me it started and ended the same ; not ideal ATC vectoring followed by a high and fast profile, resulting in an unstablized approach not interupted, one failure ( or trap) , then not monitoring speed,( or not noticing speed decay ) stall. ( or close to stall ) impact. I'd like to know what happenend in their heads. This time we have a chance to know. |
ATC - I do see where you are coming from. And I'll also add that neither of the crews were fully aware of the imminent danger they were in until it was too late. Asiana appeared not to notice and therefore did nothing, the TK crew noticed, but didn't follow up. Both tried in vain at the last moment to escape, but failed. It will be interesting to see what the Asiana crew has to say but I believe the biggest revelations in this incident will be in national standards and culture. Unless this very sensitive area is approached, this type of event will be repeated on a regular basis over the next few years.
Personally, the people to take the lead on this are the manufacturers and insurance companies (a rather un-holy alliance). ICAO are unlikely to mandate how an aircraft is to be flown but unless we improve our skill levels as an industry, we'll be parking a few more aircraft in usual places. |
What would have been the consequences for the PF if he had gone around earlier?
Obviously he would have avoided the crash but what would have happened to his training record, comand, promotion, etc? I have not flown in Korea but know some that have and acording to them the consequences of messing up (an approach during training for example) can be pretty harsh. Because they didn't go around and instead came damn near to killing >200 people I suspect his command chances have melted away and following consequences will be an a trillion times more severe than if they had. And what of the judgement of the trainer? Is he still a trainer? This a CREW screw up. Personally, the people to take the lead on this are the manufacturers and insurance companies (a rather un-holy alliance). ICAO are unlikely to mandate how an aircraft is to be flown but unless we improve our skill levels as an industry, we'll be parking a few more aircraft in usual places. I thought this was the role of a professional and sincere training department: and if they don't do it then the XAA's should be monitoring this and taking the lead. Where do the FAA & EASA stand on this issue? They are very silent. If this crash was found to be of a technical/design nature then whole worldwide fleet would be grounded until he problem was solved. It is a worldwide problem, many cultures and a/c types, and is in the human factors/training category. I don't see/hear the relevant authorities putting energy in finding the antidote. I wonder if they even acknowledge there is a problem. May be I'm wrong: let's hear it. |
Piltdown Man : I agree with you here. ICAO won't change Annex 13 for a while to come, no need to look for help in this direction unfortunately.
Look, the vast majority of accidents we see today ( say last 15 years) are not anymore single human failures (e.g. Pilot error) but Organisational errors.( lot or small errors committed by a multitude or people all around ) Society is also changind and expect 100% safe travel, so when something happens someone must be to blame for negligence. Add to this the culture ( a big factor in the 2 accidents we compared ) that everybody wants to avoid because of political incorrectness, and we are likely to get stuck in the present accident investigations model focussing on Technical issues and pilot errors. Unlike Colgan, AF447, TK etc.. the crew this time is available, and if properly debrieffed, could help us a lot to change the current approach. |
Whilst it may have been dark, can we throw the Birmingham UPS crash into the same melting pot?
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cows...UPS was an instrument approach in instrument conditions, in the dark and a non precision approach as well.
the asiana crash was a visual approach with the crew reporting the airport 17 miles out.. and I don't recall the UPS getting slow...low perhaps, but slow no. asiana was low, slow ...in perfect conditions. |
Originally Posted by roulishollandais
(Post 8137624)
but FBW systems place "protections" and flight laws unknown from pilots.
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Asiana was totally pilot error because a simple visual approach with no glide slope is a non event for even a student pilot. Three airline pilots couldn't do it?
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Originally Posted by my post
Originally Posted by Cool Guys
In my opinion, with good automation many of these problems should not occur. Good automation does not have traps, it is simple, the auto pilot mimics manual control pretty close
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What is gestual process, I have never heard of that term.
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bubbers44 What is gestual process, I have never heard of that term. |
Bubbers wrote: “ Three airline pilots couldn't do it?”
I seem to recall mention of the 3rd guy (relief FO) calling out “descent rate” more than once. Correct? If so, was it a cockpit gradient issue that the two senior guys up front ignored him? Or the old issue of the audio channel being the first to get overloaded? |
Originally Posted by Locked door
(Post 8136131)
If the accident aircraft had been on a lazy ten mile final ILS this accident probably wouldn't have happened. Seriously, why do people keep making this twaddle up about this being some kind of crazy slam dunk approach? They were not turned in short. They were not turned in high They were not turned in fast. Why do people keep insisting this was a factor? |
Originally Posted by roulishollandais
(Post 8142605)
DozyWannabe I am surprised that you misunderstood my post concerning mandatory conditions for automation to work or fail ...
All I was saying was that your assertion that 'FBW systems place "protections" and flight laws unknown from pilots' is false, because the FBW protections and laws - as well as the parameters that trigger them - are right there in the manual. Are you suggesting that a visual approach depends on AP or FBW on that type of aircraft, on Books instead of basic gestual process? :} At the risk of sounding like I'm trying to teach you to suck eggs, here's my basic interpretation of the concept:
As for flight management/autopilot systems - Boeing and Airbus source theirs from the same supplier - Honeywell - and always have, certainly in the last few decades. These systems work in the way yourself and Cool Guys describe. |
Just imagine for a second, DEP ARR page, line select rwy in use..ext 10 miles.......add 50' to the runway threshold height and hey presto poor mans glideslope.... 3 seconds work :ok:
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Bubbers wrote: “ Three airline pilots couldn't do it?” ChrisN I seem to recall mention of the 3rd guy (relief FO) calling out “descent rate” more than once. Correct? If so, was it a cockpit gradient issue that the two senior guys up front ignored him? Or the old issue of the audio channel being the first to get overloaded? I dont´t think, the descent rate call was ignored at all, it may have caused the pilot to increase pitch, which agrevated the speed problem without having any noticable effect on arresting the descent. I go with bubbers there. |
the descent rate call was ignored at all, it may have caused the pilot to increase pitch, which agrevated the speed problem without having any noticable effect on arresting the descent. |
DozyWannabe,
Thus we agree about difference between APand FBW. Probably many will agree : we may mimic the AP (mimicing human pilot the first) with confidence , but when the flight system is doing an autoland we feel very suspicious about aircraft's behaviour unless ceiling and visibility are beyond eyes skills and often we are surprised how it manages the thing! We would not have done that. FBW does not mimic the human pilot and it is really very frustating to share autority with the strange thinking of the missing algorithm maker near of the ground! Near of schyzophreny... About your most loved manufacturor flight system's too many "laws", modes, sub-laws, and unnamed objects, gums' analysis is built on experience and I find zero good reason to think otherwise. Being in a manual did never mean "not being unknown. by smart or stupid people.:hmm: Specially if it is not understood and the manual is often modified :ugh: |
Basic Gestural Process
Sorry to use that gallicism "gestual". I searched how to replace the word "gestual" and explain better what I was wanting to describe behind "basic gestual process". In French we have two words : "gestuel(le) (adjectif)" and "gestuelle (noun)". But I didn't want to focuse only on the "gestuelle". "Basic" and "process" are just so important.
I confirm to bubbers44 there is no such/analog existing official expression. Perhaps somebody will correct that fact and say it already exists with an other name? "Basic aircraft handling" suggested by RetiredF4 is near from my aim, but I wanted to say that "Basics" is not only "handling" or, worse, "pushing buttons", but a real high performance dynamic system using many skills of human body and brain, in competition with FBW and automation. I understand that the structure of that system is a multiprocessor (IT science would say "multicore") controlled by some gestural algorithms. I want to remind that the word "process" refers to "procession" (one after the other, it is that simple structure who allowed computors' expansion) , and check-lists and SOPs are "processes". These processes are written in manuals but the most of these piloting and managing flight processes are built with movements and gestures where all the senses are the sensors, and many body parts are the actuators. All the human processes are interconnected during Basic formation in an actual network , with a great possibility of combinations and adaptation in time, greater of these of synthetic algorithms. I agree that human pilot is not able to focuse during hours and hours. But he is able to focuse very well - if regularly trained - during shorter periods and transient parts of flight, see aerobatics, air combat for the best of our Dear PPRuNe's eagles. If something new happens the human has a greater capacity of invention that the computers who are known to be stupid like asses. The AP is enough to help during steady parts of the flight (inter tropical zone is not the best place for meal and other rests). AF447 shows that FBW did NOT protect them. The human pilot has a greater rate of error in repetition, and we know that if he starts a bad analysis he tends to stay in error unaware of the treat he puted on himself if time is missing to sit, think and try again. But the human brain has much better performance facing complexity (if well selected and taught). That cockpit tasks' complexity is desserved by the five senses and many gestures done together in learned processes during basic teaching and regular training. These basic gestural coprocesses conduced Neil Armstrong to put the foot on the Moon. At the same day a sovietic robot crashed not far away. |
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