Excuse me, but -
"...raised the possibility that a key device that ASSISTS THE PILOT IN CONTROLLING the Boeing 777’s speed may have malfunctioned."

I would agree on that statement and that would be the brain.

if you had a pilot directed to manipulate the thrust levers to maintain Vref plus 5 and a proper descent rate, and he or she DID NOT MAINTAIN SPEED, at least we would hope the OTHER PILOT would notice and do something about it (other than crash).

so too the automation...direct it to hold speed and if it doesn't do so, DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT other than let it crash.

There are some days you just have to be a pilot. On that day, the redundancy of having two (in reality three) pilots in the cockpit/flightdeck/whatever failed. Really incredible failure points, considering that level of the profession.

rottenray, bravo for your efforts in post #23 of (hopefully) curtailing a harmfull poster. Agree 100%. Well put.

I suggest you, and others, do a little research before making these kind of attacks. Those comments are directly from a number of different sources and media reports made at the time of the incident.

I did a detailed review of media comments and available photos etc., along with a detailed review and analysis of the amateur video that captured the incident from almost the moment the aircraft came to rest, thru the next 20 minutes or so.

I noted the possibility of a casualty before it was getting much media - based on evidence in the early scene photos, which speculation sadly turned out to be true.

I was highly critical of the emergency response - which was disjointed and uncoordinated ... with firefighters seemingly unprepared for a major incident response. The equipment was poorly positioned, and key equipment (ie: foam booms) either unused or unworkable.

The firefighters clearly had no plan on fighting a fire in a round fuselage - instead of deploying booms (several clearly broken) to spray down into the fire they simply - and ineffectively - emptied whole tankers of foam shooting OVER the top of the fuselage.

The tapes and photos show the girl run over was NOT in that location during the evacuation. She was not placed there until long after the evacuation. They also show firefighters were on scene - the same truck - for many minutes - with a clear view of the spot the girl was placed - and that there was no significant amount of foam deployed there, other than on the isolated engine pylon area, until many minutes later - after the pax evaced and the fuselage became fully involved in fire.

Media and other reports showed the firefighter who ran over the girl had been picking up lunch when the crash occurred, and that she jumped into a truck solo - with no spotter, proceeded to the incident and ran over the girl.

Other reports indicated firefighters had placed the girl there, and for some reason they had determined she was deceased - which was clearly not true. Whether accurate or not, there is NO excuse for abandoning a victim - deceased or not - in harms way, as here.

Helmet cams on firefighters confirmed many of these facts. The SFO Fire Dept responded by banning personal video devices, despite that this incident was well on its way to being covered up before the personal video surfaced.

My opinion, based on hours of review of the video, the photos and numerous reports - is that had their been fire onboard earlier the majority of pax would have perished - in large part a result of the fire response.

Keep in mind as well that nearly 20 minutes after the crash survivors who had run toward approach end of runway, and found the seriously injured crew along the way, had to repeatedly call 911 and beg for emergency responders.

And that we saw media reports that noted ambulances and other responders had been held for a significant time unable to access the field. Which a review of the amateur video confirms - a LARGE contingent of emergency vehicles can be seen to respond in mass, some 15 minutes or so after the crash.

Here are the several posts I wrote originally on this incident including the detailed timeline review and supporting documentation:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post7937757

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post7939704

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post7951640

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post7951724

http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post8001903

http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post8001940

Please read these. They show at minimum, the criticism is entirely appropriate. I would also note in direct response to 'Sir Richard' and his ignorant and offensive "ambulance chaser" comment ... that the counsel for the girls family appears to be acting in the highest professional manner. I would note in the LVRJ article on no criminal charges, rather than rhetoric and accusations this same attorney stated: “It’s really not the subject of criminal prosecution ... It’s properly the subject of civil action."

Those are the actions of a professional and ethical attorney -the opposite of those who employ "ambulance chaser" name-calling.

I would also note I am usually a strong supporter of law enforcement and emergency responders, however, this incident demands thorough review and accountability, and the SFO FD officials responses to date have been IMO anything but professional.

"Gung ho" is an exactly correct description of the fire truck driver based on what we have heard reported about her actions that day. It is not a personal condemnation of her but an accurate description of her actions.

Just as criticisms of the fire dept response are not personal either - but fair criticism of their actions and the departments plan and training.

And "put yourself in their place" should NEVER be a consideration, or any part of a professional and competent review of these actions.

The Fire departments actions that day clearly IMO failed. It is clear from a myriad of sources and information they failed. They failed to prevent the aircraft from becoming fully engulfed in fire - which did not occur until more than 15 minutes after the crash. They failed to respond to the entire crash scene - failing to reach critically injured people near the tail section for nearly 20 minutes. And they grossly and critically failed to protect the life of a survivor of a major aircraft disaster - directly causing her death.

They did NOT drop her in foam. There was no foam there until very late in the incident. Had they simply insured she got to the safe triage area - not far away, she would have survived. Even if they thought she was deceased that should have been their proper action.

Sorry if I am digressing but every time I discuss this accident with others, the issue of the FLCH trap comes up. I can really tell you what's wrong with Asiana Training. I am retired for some 6 years now but when I was east in kimchiland years ago, the initial training in KAL and OZ were done by Alteon. I had never heard about the FLCH trap from any of the Alteon blokes!

I was only made aware of this FLCH trap during my OE training by a South East Asian Chinese guy who had initial training with actual Boeing factory pilots. During my 5 years over in ICN, I never had anyone re highlighting that! Sure, we did a lot of automation degradation. We had too many non rated Alteon guys who became T7 instructors who became 777 experts after a fortnight of conversion training! 757 guys, MD 11 guys who think that the T7 is a bloated B737. These Alteon blokes are there to satisfy some vague requirements, fail some guys occasionally to put fear ( fear based management technics ) and show that the system is " working "!

I read somewhere that it is only now that OZ is reviewing some of the stuff taught at their Training Center. The word I heard is that they are telling pilots that the T7 autothrottle system is faulty instead of teaching them real understanding of its logic and algorithms. OZ is not training pilots but dunces:ugh:

I'm sorry if I come up too "jumpy" on the crew, but this accident is rubbish and IMO any attempt to cover up the crew's blatant mistakes is rubbish too. As others have said, it was properly functioning aircraft, on a visual approach and on a beautiful day. How the hell did they miss so many cues and just basically sitting there and watching the aircraft crash?

I just wonder how did we manage to fly 40 years ago without having a major airliner crash every week! :rolleyes:

The pilots didn't miss the cues. The cues were obvious all the way down the flight path but were ignored. The answer to your question is in the blind culture of the operator and similar operators in that region, where protection against loss of face is considered a higher priority over airmanship and flight safety common sense. It is not as if this event was just an isolated case.

These pilots lost their faces in SFO! Airmanship would have avoid that shame.

"FLCH trap"
More accurately, it is an Autothrottle 'HOLD' trap, as it can happen any time the the A/T goes into HOLD mode, with the A/P disengaged.

Or, even more accurately, it can happen any time the A/T is not in SPD.

"FLCH trap"
More accurately, it is an Autothrottle 'HOLD' trap, as it can happen any time the the A/T goes into HOLD mode, with the A/P disengaged.

Or, even more accurately, it can happen any time the A/T is not in SPD.

Or even more importantly it can happen anytime the sharp end jet jockeys are not in PILOT mode.

Not so- A/T wake up is available in any A/T mode (including disengaged) except HOLD.

Has the system led pilots up the garden path? From the educated comments on this thread, there seems to be an awful lot of (semi) automated modes in today's airliners. Does it really need to be that complicated in order to meet the Power + Attitude = Performance mantra?

Can someone remind me - why does Boeing want the A/T left engaged on the 777? I remember this being discussed somewhere but can't find it now.
My personal view is that I feel far more on top of what's happening with it disengaged, but it seems that this has been deemed unacceptable by someone, somewhere. If I'm honest, my speed awareness is definitely degraded as a result of this.

But.... if there is a trap here, and it a known trap - at least the trainers who've posted on here know about it - why do not ALL crews know about it? Is it not highlighted in FCOM 2? Have the airline training departments not caught on to it an issued chapter & verse on the trap? And how did the FAA/JAA et all certify it without that information being understood throughout the pilot community? Likely more questions than answers.
And if it is true on B777 is it also true on B787? and any other types of other manufacturers out there? Could this be the hidden trap-door to a smoking hole? They were damn lucky. If this had been an inferno with no survivors I suspect the reaction would have been much more loud and vigorous than it has been up to now. So far it has mostly been about lack of pilot reaction. They all survived the prang, but the inferno outcome would have caused much more technical furore, after not doubt much head scratching.

There is a good discussion here about a helicopter which seems to have achieved something remarkably similar to the Asiana. There is also the relatively recent UPS cargo crash at Birmingham and of course AF447.

Call me a bluff old traditionalist, but I'm sort of seeing a trend.

Those little girls would not have been in that field if the pilots had not put them there. The rescue crews were trying to do the best they could with what they had. I'm sure that driver didn't have two other drivers behind him monitoring his actions and another in 1st class hanging out...

I have the greatest of respect for all the emergency services. When something like the unfortunate running over of a potential survivor happens, it is simplistic to blame it on the driver. I hesitate to talk about Human Factors on a professional pilots forum, but they come into play here
- she was away from the station when the shout came in
- finding the station empty, she took the reserve machine to the scene (presumably with ATC permission)
- she arrived at the incident with little or no situational awareness and presumably without direction from the incident controller
- the incident scene itself sounds like it was still in the initial response stage and had not developed into an organised site (command post, triage area, etc)

All these points have the potential for human factors failings (system failure), like did she have a radio while she was away, was she requested to bring the reserve machine, was there a reporting point at the scene, and I'm sure they will have all been addressed internally. I feel for the driver, she used her initiative in a rapidly evolving scenario, and had it panned out differently, her bringing another machine may well have saved lives.

I've been involved in Major Incidents, and even the best Major Incident plans can't cover every possibility

Basic, basic flying on approach/landing is - aimpoint, airspeed.

That's really BASIC flying. It didn't happen.

Watching guys eyes on final below 1000'. Longest interval to glance to at airspeed is typically 5 seconds. It can be as quick as every two seconds. At 500' they were was slow and correction took over 40 seconds, and perhaps 50 seconds? What were they looking at?

NASA has done eye tracking studies. They probably have the data on how often crews look at airspeed on final.

misd-agin:


For those who have a modern HUD and know how to use it, they are looking at IAS almost continuously.

The F-18 comes to mind. It came out in the early 1980s with a HUD.

FLCH trap, A/T Hold trap
 

Agree totally with Woody...in my years up in the land of the morning calm, Alteons guys had no clue about the B777 system traps. It is after some reported failures or incidents that they reactively came out pontificating about how great their systems knowledge. I am very wary of the ex 757 guys who are so inept because they know everything because to then the 777 is just a bigger 757!

Now, I think when Woodey talks about FLCH trap he meant other aspects of that mode in addition the A/T being in Hold! Go study your systems guys!

Don't know who Woody is but knowing how to fly any airplane would have prevented this incident. Automation is to help you, not fly your aircraft, if you can not.

armchair critics
 

I really wonder how many of the armchair critics, who are so strident about the fire crew actions, have ever been in a high stress chaotic situation where they had to save their own life and/or save others?

If they had, and perhaps more than once, they would understand how quickly a situation like that can turn to crap and have a bad ending.

This type of stuff is usually dished up by people with no real experience of anything remotely like the incident they are ranting about.

I stand corrected. You are absolutely right!

+1! :ugh:

Bubbers making sense as usual. :D

Bubbers is just stating the bloody obvious minus the self aggrandizing anecdotes at Toncontin! Sure had they remember to fly blah blah blah...but they didn't because they were fools or fooled into thinking the automation will take care of the shop. With newer generations of planes and manufacturers taking the road to greater autoomation, new pilots have to cope with automation traps because their SOPs predicated full use of automation.

We will never be going to have new generation of planes behaving like the DC3sc, F-27s or B747 classics that we enjoyed years ago. Present airline SOPs, airport architecture and system, ATC, TRACON, PRNAV, arrivals and departures are full of automatics with their inherent concomitant traps. If pilots are not made aware of such traps and only taught to click off everything automatic, we will only have a short term solution. Fine by me as a pilot, but what about future progress.

I don't want to be an old fart reliving and regurgitating my glory days telling everyone to use quill pens and parchment everytime the wireless keyboard runs out of battery ( of course some are not battery powered ). Sigh...........

Why has this accident caused so much and vivid discussion on Pprune?
Because the probable cause is so damning. The probable cause, being over reliance on automation because of lack of basic flying skills, is an insult to thousands of professional aviators all around the globe. The NTSB will have to come up with a final report which highlights this and at the same time remains "politically correct" at all times.
Re the FLCH trap and THR HOLD mode that's in the 777. Surely Boeing can assume that the pilots that fly their airplanes, can actually fly airplanes! Come on. What has happened? We have to wake up pronto. The NTSB will have to come up with some landmark report about this.
The Before Asiana Era has just ended.
Welcome to the After Asiana Era.

Tipsy...bravo! Finally we have an experienced oldie who lived the past, shine in the present and appreciate progress for the future. Much as we all love consummate hand flying skills, the future of aviation is going to be dictated by even more automatics.

Oldie skygods leading a boycott of automatics? Wow, without daily practice and yet fly like a bird whenever some auto glich appear due to management of automatics? Good story at the pub for sure but a tad unreal!

In another life, I flew like a bird too island hopping in my old 737 - 200s, 4 to 5 legs a day into places I knew like the back of my hand. I was pretty confident, cocksure at times as I handfly everyday with no company SOP restrictions. Traffic was easily manageable by ATC, we had all the time and space.

In my present life, I probably make a landing every 2 weeks. All PRNAV SIDs and STARS, a draconian FOQA/AIMS program and a multitudes of other SOPs requiring maximum use of automation for efficiency, economy and airspace constraints. Well, what a litany of excuses you may say...well these are facts of life in modern airline flying. I certainly enjoyed my past hand flying and certainly enjoy the handflying during my sim training and checks but I equally look forward to the challenges of flying the automatics and learning of all the traps!

There seems to be the same misunderstanding that only the pilots are to blame for this incident developing as in other threads.

Yes, pilots should be able to fly a visual, non precision or precision approaches. However the recent cargo crash by US pilots at a US field and numerous other accidents and incidents on approach suggest that there are other factors too.

At SFO there are two tightly spaced parallel runways. Switching off the ILS / LOC to either of them is not sensible. This combined with the policy of late runway changes, pairing aircraft on approach and ATC routinely inducing high energy situations increases pilot workload and therefore reduces spare mental capacity and situational awareness.

If the accident aircraft had been on a lazy ten mile final ILS this accident probably wouldn't have happened. The investigating authority has very little influence on the training standards of the airlines that fly to SFO, but a lot of influence on how the ATC and airfield is organised. With a little thought the operating environment could be a lot safer.

I am a regular (every eight weeks or so) visitor to SFO. More often than I'd like I find myself (in a 747) with speedbrakes fully deployed, taking flap near limiting speeds, sometimes gear down way early, using the MCP or hand flying to intercept the visual profile (or if I'm lucky the ILS/LOC) from above with another a/c very close on the parallel approach. How much spare capacity do I and my crew have to deal with an unexpected TCAS RA, an engine failure etc. Contrast that to how much spare capacity I and my crew would have on a lazy ILS with staggered approaches so no other a/c are near.

Don't rely on pilots being skilled to stop them having accidents. It's all about providing the safest possible environment. Do that and you'll have fewer accidents.

remember the age old saying, "a superior pilot uses their superior judgement to avoid using their superior skill"

I am geriatric couch potato now and I marvel at exploits of bubbers at TGU. I may or may nothave flown so well...I just don't remember as I started at 16 and after 48 years of pedalling airborne contraptions I called it a day after 5 years on the T7. No I had not heard of the FLCH trap but I always override the ATS as if I am flying manual thrust levers. My f/os at times looked alarmed as they heard the autothrottle servos fighting my manual input ( rarely ), or as I increase thrust anticipating ALT capture or SPD mode activation when in HOLD mode.

To cut it short, I always follow through the thrust levers and override them as I so judge. Of course the company maintenance guy with anal retention on the jumpseat may not to be to happy hearing the ATS servos grinding as I override the automatic retarding of the thrust levers.

I have no wish to recount my manual flying exploits....not many instances as I always preempted any untoward incidences, so I never allowed any chances for any heroism to develop...like a vague memory of rejecting a takeoff at 50 kts when I noticed in the corner of my eye a fuel truck blundering near an active runway. It did careen onto the runway after I vacated through a faraway perpendicular taxiway according to my f/o. Had I waited until it had ventured onto the runway, and rejected I would probably be at above 110 kts requiring superior skills who I might not have had.

Looking back, maybe I was stupid never getting a 3 minutes of fame. In good old Oz, I used to fly lazily on the venerable 727 down the DME steps and tight circled for the runway. No Foqa, no drama just pure joyful flying with the many " after thumping " checks. On the 777, I could probably do that ( but not very well I guess due to " lack of handling " ) but I am sure my f/o would be very overloaded trying to manipulate the MCP settings as per SOPs.

I do not envy modern airline pilots who have all sort of restrictions working against them especially the freedom to choose the level of automation they desire. I certainly see and appreciate Tipsy's and Molokai's contention. A geriatric should look to the future too! Past glories ( real or imagined ) notwithstanding.:bored:: Nap time!:zzz:

I dont want to counter any of the wise words spoken by the very knowledgeable and experienced people posting above but I have another angle from which this issue can be viewed. I have not piloted a fly by wire jet but I have spent many years automating heavy and complex industrial equipment that can also kill people when it fails to work properly.

In my opinion, with good automation many of these problems should not occur. Good automation does not have traps, it is simple, the auto pilot mimics manual control pretty closely. Good automation actually assists the operator/pilot to operate manually rather than hinder it. People tend to over complicate automation. An old fossil I used to work with used to say it is very easy to make automation complicated & difficult to use and very hard to make it simple & easy to use. In my experience any piece of automation can be made simple and user friendly, it just takes experienced people more time to produce and lots of consultation with the end user/pilot. Experienced people tend to make thing simpler.

Another point I have come to realise with automation is it is very easy to get away with producing messy SW. With the more mechanical professions things have to look nice, other wise it will be noticed by everybody. Electrical professions can be a bit rougher, if cabling is not supported evenly no one except for other electrical people or people with access to electrical enclosures notices. SW onthe other hand is hidden away on flash memory and if you have a few unnecessary loops or illogical implementations no one notices apart from other SW engineers.

Cool guys:

Quote:

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In my opinion, with good automation many of these problems should not occur. Good automation does not have traps, it is simple, the auto pilot mimics manual control pretty closely. Good automation actually assists the operator/pilot to operate manually rather than hinder it. People tend to over complicate automation. An old fossil I used to work with used to say it is very easy to make automation complicated & difficult to use and very hard to make it simple & easy to use.

---

The automation in a Boeing 777 is not just good, it is outstanding. It is simple to use if the pilot has good training, and really understands the fundamentals of flying a jet transport airplane.

There is no FLCH trap. The trap is using that mode when it is not supposed to be used - close to the the ground. In my current company it is absolutely forbidden to use it to intercept flight path from above during approach phase.

As a pilot I disagree. Modern autopilots are simple to use but they still require training, proficiency, etc. And yes, experienced pilots were extensively consulted during their design. But these are complex devices and flying is far more complex than operating machinery on the ground, this equipment is not idiot-proof. These are not smart-phones or cruise controls in cars that can be operated without even reading a manual.

Cool Guys:
No! You can't be referring to "GLITCHES", can you?

Please refrain from conflating the likes of website or factory machinery software with flight control software. They are galaxies apart.

Popped in to see if there's anything new. Still seeing the there I was in SFO stories none of which is relevant to the accident. That you had the boards and gear out and was descending like a bonanza full of doctors isn't relevent to the Asiana crash.

Thanks for the feed back guys. I am glad to hear I am wrong :)

West Coast

That comment just goes to show your total lack of understanding of aviation safety, particularly the 'swiss cheese' or 'error chain' models of accident prevention.